Two days after the bombings in Dahab, at 10:30 on 26 April 2006, suicide attackers targeted vehicles near the main Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) peace-keepers base, close to the Rafah border crossing with Gaza.
The first suicide bomber, a man driving a pickup truck, intercepted a peace-keeping SUV, forcing it to stop. He then jumped out of his truck and flung himself at the SUV, blowing him and the vehicle up in the process. This occurred near to the MFO’s base in Gura, which is situated approximately 25 km west of the Gaza Strip. The second attack occurred some 35 minutes later, when a suicide bomber on a bicycle struck the car of his target, Egyptian police Brigadier General Mohammed al-Zamlout.79 According to news reports after the attack, Palestinian police had managed to foil a third attack, which was an attempt by militants to blow up the Karni crossing between Israel and Gaza. Three officers and two militants were wounded in an exchange of fire, following which police found hundreds of kilograms of explosives in the car.80
Notable characteristics
Profile of the attackersThe two suicide bombers were later identified as Salman Muhammad Salim (aged 19) and Id Hammad al-Tarawi (aged 25), who were responsible for the first and second attacks respectively. Also involved in the attacks were Ayman and Yusri
Mohareb, two brothers, who had crossed into the Gaza Strip to prepare for the operation.81
After both bombings, Mohammed Shehta, an Egyptian, together with a Palestinian suspect, were arrested near Jabel Maghara (Maghara Mountain), south-east of Al-Jora. A third suspect was fatally wounded in the operation. Two of the three Dahab suicide bombers were driven to their respective targets on 24 April, and the third suicide attacker on 26 April, from the Bedouin village of Sheikh Zuweid.82
Following police operations conducted during May 2006, Egyptian police managed to dismantle the remainder of the Tawhid wal Jihad cell in the Sinai:83
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■ Eid Salama El-Tirawi, who was the deputy of Nasser al-Mallahi and the uncle of Eid Hammad al-Tarawi (one of the two suicide bombers near the Rafah cross-ing), was killed on 1 May 2006.
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■ Mounir Mohamed Moharib, a car thief who supplied the cars for the Dahab attacks, was killed on 1 May 2006.
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■ Suleiman Salma El-Hamdin, a drug smuggler (who played an important role with his knowledge of smuggler routes) managed to escape on 28 September 2005 when Khaled Musaid Salem (cell leader behind the Taba Hilton Attack) was killed, but was himself fatally wounded on 1 May 2006.
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■ Arafa Auda Ali was killed on 19 May as he tried to throw an explosive device at members of the security forces chasing him. He had replaced Eid Salama El-Tirawi, following the latter’s death on 1 May 2006, as the leader of what had remained of the Tawhid wal Iihad network in Sinai.
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■ Salman Hadi Saleem (aged 27), the older brother of Salman Mohamed Saleem (who blew himself up on 24 April 2006) and of Salman Salman Saleem (who was killed by Egyptian police on 30 April 2006), was captured on 31 May 2006.
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■ Mohammed Eid Hamdan, the brother of one of the Dahab suicide bombers, turned himself in.
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■ Hamdi Abu Gil, a Bedouin from Sheikh Zuweid, managed to escape.
All of these people implicated were Egyptian nationals.
Involvement of close family members
An important feature of these attacks was the close family links between those re-sponsible. Following the Dahab attack, Elian Suleiman El-Hamrawi and his brother
Hussein were arrested in north Sinai. Three other suspects, also brothers, were killed in a gun battle the same day on the outskirts of Al-Arish in north Sinai.84
Similar to other suicide attacks around the continent, the involvement of close relatives is an area of growing concern. Such trends challenge suggestions that family members might be better placed than non-family members to dissuade potential bombers from executing their planned attacks. Furthermore, such links and involvement of family members pose additional and particular challenges to the security services in terms of preventing the attacks, not least in terms of assimilating the necessary prior intelligence, which is unlikely to be readily forthcoming from a tightly knit family or community. Indeed, it is possible that knowledge of the participation of close family members might even enhance the resolve of the bombers to execute their attacks.
Motivation: ideological
According to Egyptian security officials, the above incidents were the work of do-mestic militants, despite some indications that these perpetrators might have had international assistance or influence.
A group calling itself ‘Brigades of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam’ – apparently part of the al-Qa’eda network – claimed responsibility for the Taba and Sharm el-Sheikh attacks. Following the Sharm el-Sheikh bombings, the group stated that the attacks were ‘in response to the crimes committed by the forces of in-ternational evil, which are spilling the blood of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya’.85 Similarly, another group – referring to itself as Jama’a al-Islamiyya Al-Alamiya (World Islamist Group) – also claimed responsibility, stating that it acted to avenge ‘the Palestinian and Arab martyrs dying in Palestine and Iraq’.86 In early October 2004 just prior to the Taba attacks, Ayman Zawahiri, then al-Qa’eda’s number two leader, had called upon Muslims around the world to attack Israeli, Western and Asian interests, specifically mentioning Egypt (possibly due to its relative open policy towards Israel).87
Motivation: marginalisation and socio-economic
The attacks were also motivated by the historical tensions existing between Egyptian nationals and Bedouins at that time. In particular, following the return of the Sinai to Egypt in 1982, after an agreement had been reached between Israel and Egypt, the Bedouins complained of being treated as second-class citizens by their
fellow Egyptians. Sentiments of marginalisation were also prominent prior to the bombings.
The Bedouin community further complained that the Egyptian government had economically marginalised its tribes and their members. Since the Bedouin community is traditionally nomadic, a large number of Egyptians were internally moved from other parts of the country to the Sinai area following its return to Egypt. Such transfers were, however, problematic. In particular, many of those Egyptians moved into traditionally Bedouin areas did not consider Bedouins to be Egyptians, while security personnel, who were only willing to protect the tourism industry, did little to address local tensions. An additional and signifi-cant source of tension was the lack of government investment in and develop-ment of local communities, coupled with a general lack of respect for Bedouin values and customs. In summary, the Bedouin community simply did not share in the financial benefits of the tourism industry.
Furthermore, Bedouins felt culturally marginalised. Considering the existing levels of and grounds for resentment and distrust, community members also complained that security officials were engaged in other provocative activities such as mass arrests, as well as the humiliation of their tribal leaders and women during counter-terrorist operations. The negative effects of such conduct were especially profound within Bedouin culture, which places great emphasis on respect. In disregarding this basic element, the members of this community felt that the fundamental fabric of their culture and identity was being attacked.
These sources of tension did not improve following the bombings. The significant resentment felt by members of the local community prior to the terrorist attacks regarding the limited presence of the security services in their community to protect them was subsequently replaced by the over-deployment of the police – who were often corrupt – around Bedouin communities, which prevented them from moving freely.88
In conclusion, feelings of marginalisation and unfairness, as well as the socio-economic conditions among the Bedouin communities in the Sinai, were signifi-cant contributing factors to these suicide operations.