■ Where possible, separate suspected extremists from the rest of the prison population, in particular from those who may be especially vulnerable to radicalisation.
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■ It is important to provide those incarcerated with trained religious scholars of more moderate views who are able to deal not only with their basic religious needs, but who are also sufficiently equipped to counter extremist interpreta-tions of religious texts. Often, either the lack of access to or the unavailability of well-trained clergy opens a void for extremists to fill.
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■ Prison authorities and guards need to be better equipped in order to recognise telling signs of any interaction between extremists and those they are seeking to recruit inside prison. Any related training programmes should form part of a broader, comprehensive strategy to address these issues.
Every effort should be made to reform prison systems and conditions in order not to further aggravate the frustrations and vulnerabilities of individuals, where pos-sible overcoming the most common constraints to such improvements that are financial, manpower and space related.
Broader challenges and possible solutions
Intelligence challenges in preventing attacks
The major challenges associated with pre-empting terrorist attacks are related to the availability of the necessary information to identify the time, place, and mode of attacks in sufficient time so that appropriate action may be taken to prevent them from occurring. For most intelligence agencies one of the primary chal-lenges is how to sift effectively through often large quantities of raw data collected, to separate out distracting ‘noise’ from the real warning signs. As with all such
agencies, they do not have unlimited resources or time in which to process and interpret data.
In addition, intelligence agencies require the capacity to deal with novel and emerging threats, including those that are decentralised in nature. Organised structures, where the primary players and/or their activities are more readily identifiable, may be infiltrated more easily. In contrast, where suicide attacks are being planned by individuals within a close circle of friends and/or family members – who are not part of an identifiable organisation, and have perhaps become ‘self-radicalised’ – intelligence agencies will be much more dependent upon public support. As previously discussed, however, the existence and extent of any such human intelligence from the general public will be largely depend-ent on the nature of the relationship that exists between the security forces and the public, including in terms of the degree of trust existing between them.
Although technology – internet monitoring or telephone call interception – can to some extent mitigate some of these challenges, none can fully replace the value of human sources. Clearly such intelligence gathering methods need to occur within existing legal frameworks and structures to ensure that they are lawful and legitimate, and are not misused for illegitimate causes such as the curbing of political freedom. Such methods will only open up the intelligence services to further criticism and breed distrust.
Other challenges that might lead to what is commonly referred to as ‘intel-ligence failure’ in preventing suicide attacks include:
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■ Under-estimation or ignorance of the potential threat: There may even be the false perception that this type of attack will never occur within the territory of a particular state. Often such responses will occur regardless of the existence of information indicating that such an attack is both possible and likely. Similarly, this condition may exist when intelligence agencies inform political leadership of the potential threat and the latter refuses to act on available intelligence.
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■ Over-confidence: This can result in intelligence agencies forming the opinion that they have sufficient information regarding a particular threat and the resources to counter it. As a consequence, they may miss important details, information and links, for example, that allow a suicide operation to occur when increased vigilance might have prevented it. To be effective, intel-ligence gathering and analysis cannot be turned on and off, but rather needs to be sustained, often for a lengthy period of time, to develop a coherent and
comprehensive intelligence picture as well as the necessary capacity (sources).
Intelligence agencies, where these do not yet exist, need to develop an institu-tional culture of always wanting to know more from all available sources and to test the strength of such information.
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■ Lack of communication within and between agencies: Multiple reasons exist for this challenge. For example, many agencies exist without a central command and control structure, which can breed inter-agency competition to access bigger budgets. Even within agencies, access to relevant information may lead to increased professional successes, which in turn may be linked to better pro-motion opportunities. In other words, when information becomes a commodity with personal value (including prestige and power), it may not always be shared as extensively as it should be for the benefit of ensuring public safety. At a more practical level, effective communication and intelligence sharing may also be hampered in a number of other ways, not least by different procedures govern-ing each of these agencies that may hinder cooperation.
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■ Unavailability of information, often as a result of restrictions on the circulation of sensitive information: Sensitive information is given a particular classifica-tion that restricts its circulaclassifica-tion, including to agents whom it might assist in relation to a particular operation.
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■ Inadequate expertise or experience: This may result in a potentially fatal failure
‘to connect the dots’ between different pieces of information that at first sight may appear disparate and unconnected intelligence. Agents or analysts respon-sible for turning information into useful intelligence may not have sufficient ability, training and/or experience to do so. In particular, it may be necessary to develop a specific skill set to interpret intelligence relating to suicide opera-tions, including any unique features of this type of terrorist action. To put this differently, information comes from different sources and in bits and pieces over a period of time and although computer software exists to put informa-tion in context, it is still the responsibility of a person to analyse and interpret that information. Although it is relatively easy to blame analysts in hindsight, having the ability to present intelligence aimed at preventing attacks, particu-larly suicide attacks, is a skill not all personnel associated with an intelligence agency have.
From collection to analysis, intelligence is the most effective counter-measure to preventing attacks. However, as explained in the absence of pro-active measures,
preventing an attack might be in the hands of an ordinary person who notices sus-picious behaviour and informs the authorities.