The ‘political marketplace’ framework. Political elites as business managers in

Political elites do not operate in a vacuum, but are situated in a wider political framework that regulates the interactions between them through norms and institutions with varying degrees of formalisation. In Africa and in the Middle East, the practice of politics is typically understood through the language of neo-patrimonialism and rentierism.

According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1994: 458), the concept of neo-patrimonialism describes political systems where the exercise of political power mostly serves the private interests of the ruling elite. Despite the presence of formal institutions, bureaucratic offices and binding norms, public officials exercise power using personal patronage to award personal favours and bolster popular support among certain societal groups. In a similar fashion, Hazem Beblawi (1990) identifies the heavy dependence on external rents as the single most important characteristic of rentier states. This reliance on rents (which usually derive from natural resources or other strategic assets, such as military aid) exerts a negative effect on the country’s economic and political development, as it does not provide incentives for creating an efficient bureaucracy, stimulating the domestic productive sector and increasing institutional accountability. As a consequence, efforts at democratisation are undermined in both systems of governance.

Dominating much of the academic and policy discourse in recent decades, these frameworks arguably described (and still do in many cases) several political realities across Africa and the Middle East. However, new trends emerging across the region seem to have changed the political landscape of many states (De Waal 2014: 1-2). First, despite major international efforts and sustained socio-economic growth, states have become more fragmented than in the past. Second, the decrease in the number of civil war and large-scale killings has not been matched by greater stability and peace. Third, international interventions, far from stabilising countries, are generating more insecurity, both domestically and regionally. Finally, identity markers maintain their importance despite the decreasing influence of tribal, ethnic and subnational authorities.

Acknowledging this changing reality, Célestin Monga (1996) wrote two decades ago that the neo-patrimonial framework was no longer relevant when describing the contemporary systems of governance in the developing world.

Indeed, political systems have undergone profound transformations. Driven by the emergence of transnational financial networks, the introduction of new telecommunications technologies, and the multiplication of sources of rents following new systems of international intervention across the world (aid, counter-terrorism, cooperation against international organised crime are just a few examples), the forms of political power have come to reflect a new reality in which the control over the means of coercion is increasingly dispersed and political bargaining is conducted through violence, or the threat thereof. To describe the changing realities of politics in Africa and the Middle East, Alex De Waal applies the notion of the ‘political marketplace’ in relation to:

“a contemporary system of governance, characterized by pervasive monetized patronage, in the form of exchange of political loyalty or cooperation for payment. The countries where this occurs share three principal features, namely (a) the dominance of inter-personal political bargaining over formal rules and procedures, (b) pervasive rent-seeking by members of the political and business elite, and (c) integration into a global patronage order. The political marketplace is not a transitional or outdated system that is about to be replaced by Weberian states, but a flexible and dynamic governance order.” (De Waal 2014: 1).

Describing state formation in the Arabian Peninsula, Uzi Rabi (2006: 3) similarly observes that “[T]he state should not be seen as an independent political actor but rather as a ‘political field,’ i.e., an arena in which diverse actors compete for influence and resources. States in this context should not be seen in a fully-fledged ‘Weberian’ manner,

dominated by a rational bureaucratic model.” The political marketplace framework conceives political elites as akin to business managers acting in a political market, where political bargaining is conducted primarily through the exchange of cooperation for reward and the price of loyalty is set by the intersection between demand and supply (De Waal 2014: 1). In this context, political entrepreneurs use money, coercion (or the threat thereof) and all other resources at their disposal to ensure that their competitors comply with the rules of the system. Politics is therefore mostly driven by material, personal interests, with very little room for elements such as ideologies, law and formal rules.

The political marketplace thus creates opportunities for alternative forms of political bargaining and imposes constraints on the behaviour of the political elites. Within this framework, politics varies along four main dimensions: political finance, degree of centralisation of the tools of coercion, the nature of the political bargaining, and the integration with transnational markets (De Waal 2015). These variables influence the mechanisms of political bargaining by creating incentives for existing elites to stage rent-seeking rebellions, by opening up spaces for new actors to join the marketplace or by increasing or limiting the amount of resources available to the political entrepreneurs.

Since such mechanisms are reproduced at all levels, persistent instability and turbulence shape the dynamics of the political marketplace. Failure to meet the expectations of intermediate or local elites may result in struggles between elites seeking to extract their share of resources or in the collapse of the existing marketplace and the subsequent replacement of the incumbent.

The fragmentation that characterises the dynamics of these regimes multiplies the challenges faced by political leaders. A typical outcome of such situations is the militarisation of the political marketplace. Alex De Waal observes that this is a common situation in the Horn of Africa, where control over the means of coercion is decentralised and a wide range of political actors or groups use violence to extort rents and negotiate loyalty to the ruler. (ibid.: 16). This was also the case of Yemen, where President Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled for over three decades in a highly fragmented country, where local, tribal armed militias vying for power and patronage periodically used or threatened violence to claim their share of rents.

However, political marketplaces do not display the same degree of pervasive militarisation. Alternating violence and accommodation, political entrepreneurs may

resort to alternative strategies to placate rent-seeking elites, with violence only used as a last resort. Typical expressions of tamed, neo-patrimonial political bargaining include patronage and coup-proofing, whereby rulers seek to reward intermediate elites to buy their loyalty and deflect any challenge to the leadership. Patronage refers to the practice of granting material benefits to specific groups of people to enhance regime stability (Arriola 2009: 1340). It includes the allocation of funds or the creation of public sector jobs in strategic constituencies, the systematic co-opting of targeted groups into the bureaucracy or the distribution of government posts among certain regional or ethnic communities. As such, patronage has constituted a central component of African and Middle Eastern governance for decades (Alley 2010; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999;

Liddell 2010; Erdle, in Perthes 2004; Owen 2012: 49-53). Coup-proofing describes instead the variety of strategies that rulers use to prevent existential challenges from arising within their own regime (Svolik 2009). Ruling elites across Africa and the Middle East have long tried to mitigate risks to their leadership by establishing ethnic or communal ties between officers and incumbents, creating parallel security institutions (otherwise known as counterbalancing), rotating military and bureaucratic officials frequently, distributing material incentives and exploiting communal ties (Albrecht 2015;

Makara 2013; De Bruin 2018; Heydemann 2007; Pilster and Bohmelt 2011).

However, there is still some ambiguity about the relationship between these phenomena and political stability. Arriola (2009) points out that the concept of patronage has been used to explain both the endemic political instability and the enduring survival of African regimes. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994: 462-463) argue that elites in neo-patrimonial regimes fracture over access to limited resources, exploiting ethnic, regional or other identity markers. Pervasive patronage undermines democratic procedures – where in place – as leaders may capitalise on divisive identities to secure popular support, while generating grievances among underprivileged elite groups. These may be tempted to use violence in order to be included in patronage networks or negotiate a better position. The events of the Arab uprisings seem to suggest that coup-proofing does not always ensure regime survival, nor stability (Barany 2011). At the same time, Huntington (1968: 70), Bayart (1993) and Van de Walle (2006) point to the stabilising effects of patronage, which allows the maintenance of cross-cutting elite clientelist relations and the creation of a cohesive ruling coalition. Both patronage and coup-proofing seek to tie the fate of certain groups to the survival of the regime to ensure their loyalty and prevent regime overthrow

(Makara 2013: 230). Indeed, the proliferation of ministerial positions and security bodies is intended to reward key constituencies and like-minded elites, while keeping possible competitors weak and disorganised.