Outline of thesis

Chapter 2 provides a review of the existing scholarship on political violence and elites, outlining the theoretical framework of the research. The chapter highlights the political significance of violence, drawing attention to how inter-elite relations dictate the functioning of the political orders. The main approaches, existing gaps, and unresolved issues are discussed. Chapter 3 delineates the research design.

The empirical chapters 4 to 8 address the substantive issues of the research, touching upon two main themes. Chapters 4 to 6 are devoted to the analysis of elite behaviour in changing political orders, including the use of consensus-based politics in Tunisia between 2011 and 2018 (Chapter 4); the appointment of ‘crisis cabinets’ following heightened unrest across Africa (Chapter 5); and elite positioning in the wake of leadership changes in Algeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe between 2017 and 2019 (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 and 8 instead look at the structural component of the elite dimension to understand how the fragmented or cohesive nature of conflict spaces can influence violence trajectories in civil war contexts. The proposed case studies include an in-depth investigation of political elites in the Sana’a-based government in Yemen (Chapter 7) and an analysis of armed group fragmentation in 2014-2017 Libya (Chapter 8). A summary of the articles is presented below.

1.3.1. Non-party ministers and consensual politics in Tunisia Authors: Andrea Carboni

Publication status and target journal: Submitted to The Journal of North African Studies

Non-party ministers have constituted a defining feature of contemporary Tunisia. Often boasting a technocratic profile, these ministers have served in an increasing number of ministerial positions under Ben Ali and in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. The article aims to explain why Tunisia’s incumbents have routinely selected non-party ministers over the past thirty years, and how these choices reflect diverging strategies of government. It contends that non-party ministers are critical components of Tunisia’s changing political orders, whose role changed dramatically before and after 2011 despite an ever more prominent presence in the executive. While under Ben Ali the participation of non-party ministers reflected the president’s attempt to neutralise opponents depoliticising the executive, after 2011 their increasing involvement in government contributed to consolidate a consensus-based pact between different political forces.

Using an original dataset of ministerial appointments between 1987 and 2018, the analysis intends to provide a more nuanced understanding of Tunisia’s current order and political settlements more broadly.

1.3.2. Crisis Cabinets and the influence of protests on elite volatility in Africa

Authors: Andrea Carboni and Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd

Publication status and target journal: Submitted to Research & Politics

Appointments in senior government are one of the many tools leaders can use to ensure their political survival. Leaders regularly reshuffle their cabinets outside of election periods in an effort to prevent, or manage, challenges to their leadership. However, how different types of threat lead to different types of change within the senior government remains largely unexplored. Using an original dataset of African cabinets, we examine whether public protests can influence leaders to make changes to their government to mollify public discontent, and whether these changes take a particular form. The findings

demonstrate that protest movements alone are rarely conducive to the appointment of

‘crisis cabinets’ unless elites capitalise on the unrest to mount a challenge against the leader. We also highlight that cabinet reshuffles instituted in response to intense protest tend to address protest demands through a ‘changing of the guard’ and the dismissal of long-standing elites heavily associated with the regime. Through this analysis, the article seeks to provide a more granular understanding of regime reactions to protests, and to contribute to a growing focus on African executives.

1.3.3. Rebooting the System. Regime Cycles, Elites, and Succession in African States

Authors: Andrea Carboni and Clionadh Raleigh

Publication status and target journal: Submitted to Journal of Modern African Studies

Theories of regime change in Africa often rely on various ‘single moment’ approaches.

The ‘coup’ literature posits internal revolutions come from removing the leader; the

‘uprising’ literature suggests change comes from public protest external to the regime;

and the ‘transitology’ literature explains how trajectories towards or away from democracy often arise as a consequence of elections. A common assumption across these explanations is the regimes do significantly change after a coup, public uprising or significant election. Yet, across multiple African regimes that recently experienced a significant regime rupture, we see continuity in the people, systems, policies, and political relationships that populate and structure new governments. What can explain the subtle yet significant shifts that occur between senior elites and authorities after a regime crisis?

We posit that regime crisis is best one of several elite dynamics that commonly occur within an authoritarian regime cycle. We argue that the cycle evident across African authoritarian regimes is driven by a process of elite contestation and consolidation, and dynamic are defined by expectations as to when leaders may leave office. These dynamics therefore indicate the leader-elite relationships are at given time, and suggest when regimes may expand, contract, purge, and fracture as political interests within alter a leader’s claim on power. We focus here on four dynamics of crisis, accommodation, consolidation, and factionalisation, and apply our cycle explanation to recent regime changes in Algeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

1.3.4. Taming the snakes. The Houthis, Saleh and the struggle for power in Yemen

Authors: Andrea Carboni

Publication status and target journal: Preparing for submission to Middle East Studies

This article analyses the events surrounding the collapse of the alliance between Ansar Allah and the faction of the General People’s Congress aligned with former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh in December 2017. Comparing the structure of their respective elite networks, the articles argues that different levels of cohesion among elites were key in determining the outcome of the failed Saleh-inspired uprising. Reflecting a patronage-based support base, higher fragmentation within Saleh’s camp hampered its capacity to mobilise and coordinate elites in a critical juncture, and left it subsequently exposed to repression and co-option. The article further highlights how power relations were not dictated by institutional power-sharing arrangements, but are rather a function of how elites are situated within the network and the strength of the ties they share.

1.3.5. Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War

Authors: Andrea Carboni and James Moody

Publication status and target journal: Published in Small Wars and Insurgencies

After nearly four years of civil war, Libya continues to be described as an ‘ungoverned space’ where the collapse of state institutions reignited tribal, political, religious, and ideological tensions. These accounts, however, obscure Libya’s complex subnational governance, and the role of non-state armed groups in shaping the emerging political orders. By contrast, we contend that distinct subnational political orders have emerged in Libya since 2014 in which actors engage in state-making practices driven by local interests. Using empirical evidence to explore the activity of non-state armed groups during the Libyan civil conflict, we highlight that the local conflict environments in eastern, western, and southern Libya provide specific incentives that shape the process of

armed group splintering and patterns of violence. The findings demonstrate that claims to authority and notions of statehood extend far beyond the state whereby governance relations are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Conflict patterns, (in)stability and the prevailing political order are therefore conditional on the nature of the dominant actor, their strategies, and modes of violence within their areas of influence. Through this analysis, the paper provides a more granular understanding of the local political dynamics that drive violence in Libya and civil wars more generally.