Ben Ali and the politics of exclusion

The changing composition of the cabinet under Ben Ali, and the increasing allocation of ministerial portfolios to non-party ministers, responded to two main logics shaped by domestic political calculations and external constraints. On the one hand, appointing ministers without a strong political connotation allowed Ben Ali to preserve his power by neutralising politics and preventing the emergence of a political challenger (Erdle, in Perthes 2004: 230). Elites who had served under Bourguiba were marginalised, privileging loyal officials to cultivate public support (Buehler and Ayari 2018). Ben Ali’s party was tasked with the representation of societal interests vis à vis an increasingly depoliticised government, whereas any form of opposition was discouraged or actively repressed through the use of force. His last cabinet – which was forced to resign as a consequence of the popular protests that rocked the country in December 2010 and

January 2011 – comprised ministers who had minimal political profile and were essentially subordinated to the president, thus constituting the natural outcome of the appointments he had made over the previous twenty-four years.

Notably, strategic decisions were taken in the presidential palace in Carthage by Ben Ali and his closest advisers who acted like shadow ministers (Camau and Geisser 2003: 193;

Wolf 2018: 254). The predominance of Carthage over Tunisia’s other political institutions was also demonstrated by the active role of Ben Ali’s family members, who were among the closest advisors to the president and managed to manipulate the day-to-day bureaucratic machine and ministerial appointments alike. At the same time, the penetration of the RCD in the bureaucracy was instrumental in centralising the administrative structure, as all initiatives were required to have the final approval of the Presidency (Hibou 2011: 329).

Additionally, Ben Ali managed to control access to elite status through the domination of the government, the party structures and the security services, thus allowing the president to promote loyalists and exclude possible rivals from influential positions (Erdle, in Perthes 2004: 214). The former president privileged a wide range of highly qualified technocratic figures and security experts who lacked a strong and independent political base. These elites included long-standing ministers like Abdallah Kallel, Ali Chaouch and Abdelwahab Abdallah as well as his special advisor Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, security official Mohamed Ali Ganzoui and the long-standing leader of the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat, UTICA) Hédi Djilani. Ben Ali also operated frequent cabinet reshuffles to prevent elite members from occupying a ministry for too long, while holding regular party congresses – five in twenty years – that guaranteed regular turnover within his RCD.

Although these strategies prevented competitors from alternative cultivating centres of power to the Presidency, they frustrated political ambitions and aroused dissent within the RCD (Wolf 2018). Despite this, no defections occurred among key party figures, and loyalty to the regime endured until Ben Ali’s eventual departure, preluding the eventual regime collapse (Kchouk and Mamuji 2019).

On the other hand, international financial institutions had increasingly promoted a model of technocratic governance to implement economic reforms in Tunisia. Cabinet members under Ben Ali were largely selected from the bureaucratic or academic spheres,

possessing little or no political experience and hardly any popular support. Their names were often unknown to the general public, obscured by the ubiquitous public figure of Ben Ali. Co-opted into government, these groups were considered to have the necessary competence for implementing the liberal economic policies of the new regime while nurturing modest political ambitions. By contrast, only a few members of the cabinet were picked from the private sector, the army and the security services, thus excluding from politics groups with possibly conflicting agendas.

Unsatisfied with slow economic liberalisation, in 2000 the World Bank encouraged the Tunisian government to improve economic governance by removing the political obstacles obstructing reform (Perkins, in Gana 2013: 39). Despite the seemingly positive economic performance, a highly centralised decision-making process was detrimental to the private sector while “conditions seem[ed] right for a more active participation of civil society in the development process” (World Bank 2000: 26). In this sense, the presence of ministers not affiliated to the ruling party, whose pervasive occupation of institutional positions was perceived as an obstacle to achieving effective liberalisation, seems to have facilitated the ‘selective borrowing’ (Stone 2012) and implementation of economic packages negotiated with the international institutions, with the aim of preserving the rentier economy that flourished around Ben Ali and his family (Rijkers, Freund and Nucifora 2014). The appointment of non-affiliated, technocratic ministers in key economic portfolios therefore allowed Ben Ali to formally address external concerns while maintaining his tight grip on the cabinet and on the economy.

Despite Ben Ali’s attempt to neutralise regime change from within and stifle popular dissent, his regime proved unable to weather critical junctures (Hibou 2011). The belated dismissal of secondary regime figures on December 29,¹³ followed by a pledge to hold legislative elections and step down in 2014, failed to placate the unrest that had spread across Tunisia. The ultimate identification of the state institutions with the figure of Ben Ali and the RCD allowed little margin for political manoeuvring and no alternative to the departure of the leader and his closest associates. As a result, the RCD was soon dissolved; Ben Ali and his family fled into exile or were arrested; and several ministers

13 Among the dismissed were the Ministers of Communication, Commerce and Religious Affairs, along with the governors of Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba and Zaghouan (cited in Kchouk and Mamuji 2019: 902).

and secretaries of state with ties to the ruling family faced trial on charges of corruption and embezzlement¹⁴.