Cabinets as coalition building and crisis mitigation

Existing literature describes the process of cabinet formation and ministerial appointment as transactional. Studies on cabinet composition in Western democracies highlight that leaders appoint ministers who can provide loyalty or ideological cohesion to strengthen cohesion of their governments, or expertise to improve performance (Indridason and Kam 2008). In other cases, ministers from outside parties can be brought into the government to allow the leader to form a viable government (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008).

In Africa, cabinet appointments are often explained as key positions in the regime’s web of patronage. Ministerial appointments are used strategically to counter external threats by bringing political elites and ‘big men’ into the regime’s patronage network, while the

newly incorporated elites deliver votes or political support from their network (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Arriola 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015). The composition of the cabinet therefore provides insight into which groups and constituencies the regime considers integral to their coalition and political survival.

The composition of the cabinet also reflects the threat posed by potential allies within the ruling coalition. Included elites can use the state’s resources to cultivate a base to rival the leader or can try to depose the leader (Choi and Kim 2018). Consequently, African leaders attempt to coup-proof their regimes by creating arrangements that raise the costs of elite coordination and hinder elite threats (Casper and Tyson 2014). Examples include purges (violent and non-violent) and the rotation of elites among different positions to prevent the cultivation of separate powerbases (Jackson and Rosberg 1992; Roessler 2011; Albertus 2012; Geddes 2003; Powell 2012; Woldense 2018).

Elite volatility within the cabinet which happens outside ‘expected periods’, such as post-electoral cabinet changes or democratic alternations in power, is therefore indicative of the regime reconfiguring itself to mitigate against internal and external threats. Political crises or upheavals will necessitate changes to the ruling coalition when changes in the demands and political strength of different subgroups or elites cause changes to what constitutes a ‘stable bargain’. Former allies may begin to become a threat to the leader, necessitating their removal (Roessler 2011). Rent-seeking elites, ideological movements at odds with the regime and dissatisfied ethno-regional communities may engage in protests or political violence to coerce the regime into granting them more state resources or more positions in government (De Waal 2009). A drop in public support may weaken the leader’s legitimacy, making them vulnerable to being ousted by either the opposition or rivals within government (Alesina et al. 1996; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). In her study on the effects of economic crises and falling regime popularity on ministerial stability in Latin America, Martinez-Gallardo describes the relationship between senior government composition and the political environment outlining how:

“[u]nexpected events over the course of a government’s life will change these conditions and make bargains that were previously “stable” no longer viable. Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges.” (Martinez-Gallardo 2014: 5).

Economic crises, scandals, internal factionalism or mass protest all exert pressure on regimes to redistribute the balance of power among elites inside and outside of

government (Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). Leaders managing divided or unruly governments, or who are under siege from opposition forces and widespread popular disapproval, are more likely to dismiss ministers who pose an obstacle to their hegemony, making changes to the ruling coalition to secure their political survival (Martinez-Gallardo 2014). Regimes which have become fractured or lost public confidence may need to implement a ‘changing of the guard’ to demonstrate a willingness to reform (Rivera 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle 1992; Albertus 2012)

The notion of ‘crisis cabinets’ developed here identifies those instances in which leaders or regimes which are confronted with an existential political crisis are forced to operate non-routine cabinet reshuffles involving mass ministerial turnover. Crisis cabinets occur outside periods in which a large-scale change in personnel would be instituted as a formal government procedure, such as the resignation of the cabinet during electoral periods or the democratic transition from one regime to the next.

5.2.1. The dangers of protests

Politics in Africa is frequently portrayed as a process of continual bargaining between the leader and rival elites within and outside the government (Bagayoko, Hutchful and Luckham 2016; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015; De Waal 2009). In contrast, the non-elite masses are ascribed secondary importance as resources to be mobilised by non-elites hoping to enhance their place within the political hierarchy (Quiroz Flores and Smith 2011; Langer 2005; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Ndegwa 1997). However, demonstrations of discontent among a large section of the non-elite can damage a regime’s legitimacy and can embolden rival elites. Historically large-scale protests have provided elites within the government the opportunity to use the regime’s weakened legitimacy to launch a coup or extract concessions (Casper and Tyson 2014; Volpi 2013). During the early 1990s, opposition politicians or former insiders returning from exile sought to co-opt the pro-democracy movements that spread across the continent against the existing autocratic regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992).

It is well established in the literature that regimes rarely rely on repression or force alone to quash protests as these strategies may in fact cause escalation (Levitsky and Way 2002;

Josua and Edel 2015; Sambanis and Zinn 2005). As a result, regimes employ a range of accommodation strategies when dealing with threatening protests, including national

dialogues, constitutional changes or important changes to the senior elite through crisis cabinets (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992; Thurston 2018).

The recent large-scale cabinet reshuffles in Sudan and Algeria are both examples of the regime instituting crisis cabinets to mollify popular discontent. In the aftermath of the leaders’ ouster, factional struggles arose as elites attempted to reorganise the ruling coalition into a stable bargain which would ensure at least part of the regime’s political survival. In Algeria, President Bouteflika dissolved his cabinet in March in a last effort to contain popular protests, and appointed a technocratic caretaker government. As public support continued to wane, Army Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaid Salah, previously a Deputy Minister of Defence, moved on to oust the aging president and purge his faction while retaining key allies in the old guard (Africa Confidential 2019b, 2019c). Similarly, Sudan’s Oman Al-Bashir fired his government and all his regional governors after declaring a one-year state emergency in February, two months after demonstrations against the rising cost of bread had erupted across the country. Weeks later, a segment of the military ousted most political elements loyal to Al-Bashir, including members of his National Congress Party, and eventually agreed to a transition timetable with the protesters (Abdelaziz 2019). Other examples include Mubarak dismissing claims that his son would succeed him and firing the government led by long-standing Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif in an attempt to appease the Tahrir Square protester, or King Hassan of Morocco’s dismissal of his unpopular Prime Minister as a concession to opposition parties (Josua and Edel 2015; Lust-Okar 2004).

These examples show that regimes will offer change in the senior government and turnover in the elite as a concession in return for peace. Existing large-N studies have attempted to approximate regime accommodation strategies through conciliatory rhetoric (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013; Carey 2006), while country-specific investigations have looked at how individual regimes have attempted to mollify protest through legal reform, policies and a change in the elite (Josua and Edel 2015; Lust-Okar 2004; Bogaert 2015;

Volpi 2013). But there are no comparative studies examining the relationship between public unrest and volatility within the ruling elite.

We aim to address this gap in the research through isolating ‘crisis cabinets’ and determining which are preceded by popular protests. Through this process, we aim to

determine whether protests are a common cause of crisis cabinets, and whether these crisis cabinets are distinctly tailored to address protester grievances.