Negotiations on post-2012 action

The framework of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol would be the natural home of future climate negotiations. Once the Kyoto Protocol e

for all co The Me

committed to the Protocol.

In the past, an official start of the negotiations on next steps after 2012 was prevented by the fact that the Protocol has not yet entered into force. Without a clear signal that developed countries are taking the lead, developing countries are not willing to enter any discussion on future steps, which evidently might result in additional commitments for th

the agenda item on the revision of the Convention (“second review of adequacy” Article 4.2 (d) of the Convention) was initiated in 1998, as required by the Convention, but deferred without decision for six years in a row. Only unofficial discussions and dialogues on future actions are now going on.

159 a requirement on whe

Future neg nder the Kyoto

Pro o that accepted it,

incl n tart from

ld ratify the Protocol once it is in force to be able to influence its further

given the uncertainty surrounding the entry-into-force of the

ent period. The earlier future Annex I Parties included in Annex B shall be initiated in 2005. Article 9.2 of the Kyoto Protocol calls for a general review of the Protocol coordinated with the review of the Convention, starting at the second meeting of the Parties to the Protocol. This so-called COP/MOP-2 would take place in November 2006. The Kyoto Protocol does not include

n to finalise negotiations for a second commitment period.

otiations could therefore be initiated under the Convention or u toc l. A process under the Convention would involve the 189 countries

udi g USA and Australia and oil producing countries. It would be inclusive and s

the principle that developed countries take the lead and that all countries have certain commitments according to their common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities. A process under the Kyoto Protocol would involve only the countries that ratified the Protocol, for the time being, 128 countries including all major developing countries but excluding e.g.

USA, Australia and major oil producing countries. It can be assumed that oil producing countries wou

development. A process under the Protocol would therefore essentially only exclude the USA and Australia. A Kyoto Protocol process could also be seen as a pure extension of Annex I commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.

Official negotiations on a future climate regime under the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol would have to be initiated by agreeing on a mandate, similar to the Berlin Mandate agreed at COP1.

The first opportunity for a new mandate would be COP10 in Buenos Aires, December 2004 (see also Figure 35). However,

Kyoto Protocol, this is a very unlikely outcome of COP10. The next, more realistic, opportunity would be COP11 in November 2005.

If a continuation under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is negotiated, negotiations should best be finalized by end of 2007 (see Figure 35) as to have agreed on targets for the second commitment period prior to the start of the first commitm

targets are defined the better since the implementation of mitigation measures requires time before emission reductions are realised. In addition, an early agreement creates a more certain political future for companies, stimulating decisions on emission reduction investments.

If, however, additional time is needed, negotiations may be finalised during the first commitment period. But the later the targets are agreed, the more difficult it might become to achieve them. Uncertainty about the future would provide wrong signals to industry.

COP 10 Likely focus on adaptation 2005

First commitment period 2008

Publication of IPCC AR4

2012 2006 2007

Mandate to start of negotiations of second commitment period

COP11 COP/MOP1

COP1

COP 13 Final agreement on CP.2 Intermediate negotiations 2

COP/MOP2

s prior to the start of the first Figure 35. Possible timeline for negotiations on a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol

If the EU and other parties would aim for finalising negotiation

commitment period, the resulting time schedule is very ambitious. Future commitments would have to be finalized in three years from now, including only two years of official negotiation time.

160 To c

decision as Annex I countries would receive binding commitments and a substantial par t

The assessm (IPCC) have the

pote ia ario depicted in

tion, it needs to be defined

or specific policies) have to be

reach.

ac elerate the process, a mandate at COP 11 could already include some guiding s, such

t of he Non-Annex I would receive concrete but non-quantified targets.

ent reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change nt l to serve as a constructive push for the negotiations. In the scen

Figure 35, the fourth assessment report of the IPCC will unfortunately be published relatively late (planned for the end of 2007) to have a substantial impact on the negotiations. If negotiations are extended, the new scientific insights could influence the negotiations.

A sequence of decisions could be envisaged:

• First, the long-term ambition level is defined. The choice of the stabilization level (e.g.

400, 450 or 550 ppmvCO2) significantly influences the required reductions and the entry of countries into the regime (see Chapter 10). Defining a (preliminary) ambition level at an early stage would be very useful for the further design of the system. It may be difficult to reach an agreement on a long-term temperature or concentration level due to uncertainties and the long time horizon. But already the desired global emission level by e.g. 2020 and the direction thereafter would be a useful indication.

• Next, the types of commitments could be agreed (e.g. binding emission targets or policies and measures), including an indication when they should be assumed and by whom.

• Once the types are defined, the accounting or monitoring rules have to be defined unambiguously. For the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, reduction percentages were agreed without a clear agreement how to account for land use change and forestry (LUCF). The then following negotiations on the accounting rules for LUCF were therefore very cumbersome. In addi

whether and if so how emissions from international transportation and other greenhouse gas agents should be included.

• Finally the target values (reduction percentages agreed.

An alternative framework to that of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol would be the decomposition into several treaties on a bilateral or sub-global multilateral basis (see also Sugiyama and Sinton, 2003 or Berk & den Elzen, 2004). Such a system may be easier to implement, as like-minded countries would join efforts on clearly defined issues of their concern. It could include a scenario, where the Kyoto Protocol is in force, not supported by the federal government of the USA, but with several US states being linked through the emission trading system.

As an example, the USA is starting a “methane to markets” initiative, gathering several interested countries to jointly make efforts to reduce CH4 emissions from landfills, underground coalmines, and natural gas and oil systems. ²⁴

As climate change is a global problem, such a decomposed system may not be able to ensure the stringency necessary on the global level to keep the 2°C target within

Even if the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the participation of the USA would be crucial for the overall success of the global emission reduction effort. One alternative could be to organize consultations of the major emitters, e.g. only the USA, China and the EU.

Such an approach would be attractive to the participating countries. China could represent the concerns of the developing nations, USA would be given a prominent role as the leading economic power and the EU could act as an intermediary.

Such an approach would have to have the acceptance of all other countries that are not directly involved. Consequently, any results of such a process should be brought back to the global forum of the UNFCCC. But any proposal that has the backing of China, the USA and

24 See http://www.methanetomarkets.org/ or http://www.epa.gov/methane/international.html

161 plement to the global process.

The advantage of a limited group would be that finding an agreement between three parties may be n between 189, but with a view to broader agreement to the outcome

e to the very divergent views and interests of these

s

ustainable

on patterns, governments agreed to increase the global

hannesburg

al JREC

meeting

nergy consumption is achievable in the EU by

governments of the participating countries commit to work towards these objectives, individually or jointly, by undertaking actions they have submitted for inclusion in the

‘International Action Programme’ and through other voluntary measures. They agree that the EU has a high chance of being acceptable on a global level. This process would therefore be a sup

easier tha

afterwards they will have to tackle a wide range of issues important to others. Although only three countries participate, they represent a large share of the global variation in national circumstances. On the other hand it is not guaranteed that these three parties would be able to reach a common position at all, du

countries.

Im Dokument Climate Change (Seite 160-163)