INTRODUCTION

101 ency).¹¹

ALL GHG Excl. LUCF tCO2eq/cap

ALL GHG Incl. LUCF tCO2eq/cap

28 MYS 6.3 10.9

29 PHL 1.6 2.3

30 SGP 10.8 10.8

ALL GHG Excl. LUCF tCO2eq/cap

ALL GHG Incl. LUCF tCO2eq/cap

31 THA 4.3 4.9

32 RAA 2.1 2.6

Source: this study, see Appendix E.

The concept of equal per-capita emission rights is based on the principle to share the

cquire additional emission rights and other countries to sell surplus emission rights, if needed.

Annex I countries were also proposed during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol (French proposal

Berlin Mandate (AGBM), UNFCCC (1996))

The Centre of Science and Environment (CSE) in India also supports the Contraction &

asic sustainable emission right.¹³ The methodology assumes that there is a global s

very n

common good of the atmosphere equally among all people of the world. It is a concept traditionally supported by many developing countries, which have so far “used” the atmosphere by far less than developed countries. Many developed countries, however, led by the USA, have very strongly opposed such an approach in the international climate negotiations. As a result, Annex I Parties are not even required to report per-capita emissions in their National Communications to the UNFCCC. Developing country negotiators were successful for the first time with the Marrakech Accords 2001, to introduce a first mention of per-capita emissions as a trade off against their rejection of the Kyoto Mechanisms.¹²

The implementation of equal per capita emission rights could be achieved in many different ways, which can be described as progressive approximations (see also Ecoequity):

The first order approximation would be to allocate equal emissions per capita to all countries for the first possible year (Agarwal and Narain, 1991). The changes between current per-capita emissions and allocated per-per-capita emission rights would be drastic. Emission trading could smoothen these differences, but still, such an approach would be beyond any realism.

The Global Compromise approach as proposed by Müller (1999), which allocates the emission permits from a population-weighted preference score voting for either grand-fathering or per capita allocation, intends to smoothen the differences, but they still remain very large.

A second order approximation would be that per-capita emissions converge from the current level to a level equal for all countries within a defined period. This concept is most elaborated in the Contraction & Convergence (C&C) approach, which originated from the Global Commons Institute (GCI) in London (Meyer, 2000). It aims at an equal per capita distribution of emission entitlements or allowances in the long run. All countries participate and per-capita emission allowances converge from the current level to a level equal for all countries until a predefined date, e.g. 2030 or 2050. Convergence takes place, so that global emissions follow a predefined emission profile that leads to a predefined stabilization level (contraction).

International emission trading would allow the countries to a

Converging per capita emissions for differentiating mitigation commitments among to the Ad Hoc Group on the

Convergence concept (CSE, 1998), but has suggested a variant, in which the concept is combined with b

ustainable emission level, defined as the amount of CO2 that can be emitted in the lo g term without raising the atmospheric CO2 concentrations.¹⁴

ble of decision 15/CP.7 on the Kyoto Mechanisms: “… Emphasizing that the Parties included in shall implement domestic action in accordance with national circumstances and with a view to

emissions in

102

12 Pream Annex I

reducing a manner conducive to narrowing per capita differences between developed and deve i

Conventi

13 This a

14 This s level of p et al., 2001).

lop ng country Parties while working towards achievement of the ultimate objective of the on” (document FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2)

pproach also leads to a sudden re-allocation of the per capita emissions of all countries.

ustainable level of anthropogenic CO2 emissions would ultimately have to be reduced to the ersistent natural sinks, which is around zero, although the level is not clearly defined (Prentice

103 It is the

emissio om the developed countries (which drastically need to reduce emissions) to eed to vic and Ria 2

Howeve

Höhne 003) show that for relatively strict long-term targets (e.g. lower than 450 ppmv CO

greenho only the

low-i come countrie con g

countrie Africa,

allowan iness as usual projections. More excess allowances would be ava l

converg The m

compre ll

cou ie the ti term tar all non

compared to ents (a

“Multi-Sta other w referred While t

approac bally acceptable: C&C does not take national circumstances into acc

the hist

therefor with low emission in the past

the global commons and egalitarian concepts

veloped by the NGO community (Ecoequity, (Aslam, 2002)). This approach is based general perception that under C&C, large resource transfers will take place through n trading fr

developing countries (which will receive more emission allowances than they would n cover their emissions, so called “tropical hot air” or surplus emissions) (e.g. Nakiceno

hi ( 003); van Vuuren et al. (2003)).

r, several recent studies providing detailed calculations (den Elzen et al., 2003;

et al., 2

2) and relatively late convergence by, e.g., 2050, while also considering non-CO2

use gases, not all developing countries would benefit from this approach:

n s would receive excess allowances. As the per-capita emissions have to ver e to a level below the current average of developing countries, those developing s above or close to the average (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, South South Korea, Thailand, China) will soon (for some already after 2012) receive fewer

ces than their bus

ilab e under a higher concentration target, e.g. 550 ppmv CO2, or under earlier ence, e.g. by 2030.

ain strengths of the C&C approach are its clear concept, transparency and hensiveness. Furthermore, it provides certainty regarding global emission levels as a ntr s participate with binding quantitative limitations. It is furthermore cost-effective due to op on of immediate global participation in emission trading. Reaching relatively strict

long-gets (e.g. lower than 450 ppmv CO2) requires less reductions by Annex I countries, if -Annex I countries participate immediately (converging per capita emissions),

a gradual phase-in of developing countries receiving commitm

ge” approach).¹⁵ Under less strict long-term targets (e.g. 550 ppmv CO2), it may be the ay around due to the introduction of surplus emission allowances, which is sometimes

to as “tropical hot air”.

here are many advantages of the C&C approach, several obstacles prevent the h from being glo

ount other than current per-capita emissions. In particular, it does not take into account orical contribution of particular countries to the problem (i.e. past emissions) and is e likely to meet objections from key developing countries

but relatively high per-capita emissions today. They will argue not to be responsible for the problem although they currently have relatively high per-capita emissions. Many developed countries will reject C&C, because of expected large resource transfers and “tropical hot air”, as well as political opposition against

underlying the approach. An early participation of especially the least developed countries may cause implementation problems with reporting emissions and compliance due to their technical and institutional requirements, that are particularly missing in less developed countries at the moment. Involving these countries in international emission trading will be difficult due to lack of reliable emission data, capacity to generate data to meet eligibility requirements, and sufficient capacity for verification and enforcement (Baumert et al., 2003).

A third order approximation of the per-capita concept could be to amend the C&C approach with additional rules that consider, for example, potential for renewable energy, differences in climatic conditions and historical responsibility. The “Per Capita Plus” approach is currently being de

on the overarching principles of adequacy, to ensure climate stabilization, and equity, to ensure fairness between nations. It would specifically allocate emission allowances within a framework of equal per capita rights, as modified by a systematic quantification of relevant national circumstances. Another modification to C&C would be to allow countries that have less economic capability and relatively low emissions to voluntarily not participate in the system (an ‘opt-out clause’) (WBGU, 2003). Countries would only need to accept absolute

15 The Multi-Stage approach is basically a system for a gradual broadening of the group of countries taking on quantified emission limitations and reduction objectives and deepening of their commitments over time (Berk and den Elzen, 2001).

104 emission limits, if they pass a certain threshold value of per-capita emissions or per-capita income or both. Countries below this threshold are allowed to make use of the opt-out clause

claims for other exceptions by other

d that, as a first approximation, luxury

n 1997 as the approach for sharing the Kyoto targets among the EU

onvergence is “differentiated”: Some countries’ converge

ch is designed and how it works. We then quantify emission allowances for the approach and compare them to emission allowances under C&C. Further, we provide a sensitivity analysis of the results. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the pros and cons of the new approach.

Im Dokument Climate Change (Seite 103-106)