Links to international activities in other fora

161 plement to the global process.

The advantage of a limited group would be that finding an agreement between three parties may be n between 189, but with a view to broader agreement to the outcome

e to the very divergent views and interests of these

s

ustainable

on patterns, governments agreed to increase the global

hannesburg

al JREC

meeting

nergy consumption is achievable in the EU by

governments of the participating countries commit to work towards these objectives, individually or jointly, by undertaking actions they have submitted for inclusion in the

‘International Action Programme’ and through other voluntary measures. They agree that the EU has a high chance of being acceptable on a global level. This process would therefore be a sup

easier tha

afterwards they will have to tackle a wide range of issues important to others. Although only three countries participate, they represent a large share of the global variation in national circumstances. On the other hand it is not guaranteed that these three parties would be able to reach a common position at all, du

countries.

162 d as foreseen in the Johannesburg

mitments to goals, targets and actions

y efforts can be supported.

al and economic

t and

the WSSD - the first session that took a critical and

key element that emerged during the session was the clear link between the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation relationship had its detractors in Johannesburg, two years later the these measurable steps should be reported to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and that progress should be reviewe

Plan of Implementation. An appropriate arrangement for follow-up should be identified in a further meeting in preparation for CSD 14/15.”

In addition, an International Action Programme (IAP) was presented. It includes concrete actions and commitments towards developing renewable energies, which were put forward by a large number of governments, international organisations and stakeholders from civil society, the private sector and other stakeholder groups. All conference participants were invited to contribute to the IAP with voluntary com

within their own spheres of responsibility.

International discussions on renewable energy are an important complementary element, but they are not to be seen as alternative to international efforts to address climate change. The climate agenda is so broad that it has proven useful to consider the specific issue of renewable energy separate and only with the countries really interested in the issue. Possibly other such complementar

Activities on Sustainable development: The Millennium Summit held in September 2000 concluded with the Millennium Declaration incorporating the Millennium Development Goals.

These goals commit the international community to an expanded vision of development that vigorously promotes human development as the key to sustaining soci

progress in all countries, and recognizes the importance of creating a global partnership for development. The goals have been commonly accepted as a framework for measuring development progress. In total eight goals and eighteen targets were defined.

Goal seven “Ensuring Environmental Sustainability” addresses among other indicators, energy use and carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone depleting substances. These indicators relate to target nine “Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources”.

The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) emerged from Agenda 21 in June 1992 as a programme to be adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environmen Development (UNCED). The CSD was created to ensure effective follow-up of UNCED, enhance international cooperation, and examine progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 at the local, national, regional and international levels. In 1997, at Rio+5, the implementation of Agenda 21 was reviewed and a five-year CSD work programme defined, which identified sectoral, cross-sectoral and economic sector/Major Group themes for the subsequent four sessions of the CSD.

CSD 12, held in April 2004, was - since

comprehensive look on how the world is implementing sustainable development. The idea was put forward at that meeting that the CSD should be challenged to become the “watchdog”

of progress aimed at implementing the Johannesburg goals and targets.

Another

(JPOI). While this

rationale behind linking the two sets of international targets and goals has found a new home, with many delegates calling on the CSD to become an effective mechanism for monitoring progress. CSD-12 reaffirmed the WSSD’s agreement of placing the issue of poverty eradication at the center of the sustainable development agenda (IISD coverage CSD-12, 2004)

These international efforts on sustainable development are an important supplement to the climate negotiations. Development plays a crucial role in developing countries in mitigation (keeping GHG emissions low) as well as adaptation (strengthening adaptive capacity being able to cope with the occurring or expected changes).

Trade

163 nce in this area. In the field of trade relations, the US

that the preferred trade partner status does not necessarily apply to all

be worthwhile for the EU to review its ions. An

ven

pe n

bord dispute

The EU and its Member States generally do not have a strong history of linking different political issues to obtain a better negotiating result. Such linking might, however, provide an incentive for certain countries to take a more progressive stance in the climate negotiations. A recent example of such a linking is the negotiations with Russia on its WTO membership, which played a role in Russia’s ratification process of the Kyoto Protocol.

The US has more substantial experie

can award the most-favoured-nation (MFN) trading status to countries. In many cases²⁵, this status is awarded permanently, but for certain countries such as China this status is reviewed on an annual basis (World Council on International Trade, 2004).

It should be noted

goods of a certain country. It can also be valid for certain goods or products, e.g. if there is a shortage of a certain product in the importing country. Advantages that may be awarded to preferred trade partners are e.g. (International Trade Data system, 2004):

• The right to be paid before other creditors of the same debtor

• The use of lower duty rates on goods imported from some countries

• Admissibility of goods in quantities over and above those normally permitted

In the context of certain disputes, e.g. on human rights, the preferred trade partner status can be changed. The threat of removing this status can be an instrument in achieving certain negotiation objectives. An example where this may have played a role is the debate on the removal of China’s MFN status after the spy plane incident in April 2001 (Americans and the world, 2004).

In the context of the climate negotiations it might

trade/foreign relations and current and/or potential future preferred partner provis

analytical step that might be useful in this perspective is to prepare a matrix in which for major parties in the climate negotiations (in terms of negotiation bottlenecks) the major trade/foreign relation partners in the EU and its Member States are identified. These can than be matched against existing preferred partner provisions to identify areas in which these relations can be used to further the negotiations.

One important bottleneck in this approach may be the strength of the position of the minister responsible for climate issues in relation to the other ministers. It depends whether the responsible minister has sufficient influence to make e.g. trade and foreign relations subject to this link. This will also be influenced by the relative importance the public attaches to the climate issue compared to other issues on the political agenda.

Other possibilities of linking, that may not have this drawback, can be the provision of financial or other support in certain areas as an award, e.g. related to capacity building in certain areas, technology transfer, etc.

Furthermore, tax adjustments at the border for energy intensive goods could be applied. The rationale would be that industries in a country with high energy taxes have a competitive disadvantage when selling their goods on the international market. Biermann and Brohm (2003) analysed whether certain border adjustments for energy taxes would be permissible under world trade law, in particular the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. They conclude “that despite remaining ambiguity in both the legal provisions and the pertinent case law, border tax adjustments are under certain circumstances compatible with world trade law. Yet gi

rsisti g degrees of legal uncertainty, it seems likely that such energy tax adjustments at the er would be challenged by affected members of the World Trade Organisation before its

settlement mechanism.”

25 In total the MFN status is awarded to about 170 countries.

164 11

11

An v

a single Party t represe

push in nal efforts (Gupta & Grubb, 1999, Obertür & Ott 1999, Ott et al. 2004). If the

• Structural leadership, referring to making use of general political and economic

itment

t and need to be extended further to close the gaps for a few EU , the EU could show leadership in climate change specifically at the structural level.

g comparable statements. However, there are some

al initiatives to bring countries together under the issu

the ‘Gre this rega Advanta internat among potentia countrie

.3 ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGY .3.1 EU leadership

y en ironmental treaty needs a driving force to stimulate its implementation, which can be country or a country group. With regard to climate change, the EU is the Annex I hat is politically most committed to act against climate change and thus would nt the only entity capable to act as a global leader today to further encourage and ternatio

EU takes the 2°C target seriously, it needs to show leadership.

The report of the South-North Dialog on Equity in the Greenhouse (Ott et al. 2004) mentions three different aspects of leadership:

weight

• Instrumental leadership, referring to building coalitions and alliances

• Directional leadership, referring to demonstrating solutions to others

Concrete implementation actions (directional leadership) provide positive signals to other Parties to follow since Parties will acknowledge that the leader is taking the issue seriously (see also Sections 11.3.2 and 11.3.4).

The EU for instance demonstrates such aspect of leadership already today by implementing measures to combat climate change through the implementation of the EU wide emissions trading system as of 1 January 2005, three years prior to the start of the first comm period of the Kyoto Protocol. Additional climate change measures are implemented such as the renewable energy directive and the energy efficiency directive. Individual Member States pursue strategies at different levels, such as renewable energy support programmes that stimulate market penetration of low to zero emission technologies. These measures are a first step, but not yet sufficien

members between current emission trends and the Kyoto targets.

In addition

Here, this would mean to continue to commit to the Kyoto Protocol. It is important that the Parties that ratified the Protocol emphasize adherence to the emission reduction targets agreed under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU has officially stated that it would adhere to the Kyoto targets even if the Kyoto Protocol should not come into force and thus has set another signal to other Parties taking the climate change issue seriously. Thus, the EU acts as a driving force for other Parties stimulatin

individual Member States that attempt to weaken this resolve.

In addition, The EU could put in its weight linking climate change to other processes, including the preferred trading status discussed in Section 11.2.3. The support of the EU to the membership of Russia in the WTO would be an example.

Finally, leadership can be demonstrated by playing an active role in bringing countries together through informal discussions and dialog processes prior to negotiations thus representing instrumental leadership (see also chapter 11.3.3, 11.3.4). The EU and its member states are funding the informal process to foster information exchange (such as this project, FIACC), but it has not implemented offici

e of climate change – apart from its initiative to collaborate with the G77 by forming en Group’ in Berlin in 1995. The EU could seek to strengthen its leadership position in

rd, as it has done for the coalition on renewable energy (JREC).

ges of the EU taking leadership are manifold: a) the EU would strengthen its ional recognition as a motor to combat climate change, b) the EU would enhance trust

Parties to further talk, negotiate and undertake joint efforts no matter what the l obstacles might be and c) the EU would become preferred partner for developing s, partly with strongly growing economies and large domestic markets.

165 Being t

certain term, th

technol in the EU could protest against the EU

taki com t advanta world m

cost inc sive industries that are internationally competing. And the bes

emissio

funding upport to bring existing technologies to markets.

Con q the EU.

11.3.2

vs. economic efficiency): There is a

ambitious long-term targets

earchers, e.g. on the timing of action: Wigley et al. (1996; WRE profiles) argued that postponing abatement action is always tegy, mainly because reduction options will become cheaper in the

d in the mitigation efforts. Developing countries are only willing to act after

d developing countries. The EU could promote approaches that facilitate the he first to act could also provide a ‘‘competitive advantage’’ (Höhne 2003). It seems that measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions will have to be taken in the long ere is only a serious debate about when and which measures should be taken. New ogies will play an important role. Industry with

ng the lead in reducing emissions, arguing it would distort the international pe itiveness. But reducing energy costs and increasing productivity is always an

ge. In addition, early developed and adopted new technology can later be sold on the arket. And finally, policies could be designed in a way that does not lead to substantial reases for those energy-inten

t performing industries would have new economic opportunities for selling excess n allowances. This advantage could be further enhanced by further technology R&D by the EU, but also implementation s

se uently, a major part of any successful negotiating strategy should be the leadership by

Contents

The strategy would entail to consider in particular the critical issues with Parties that have opposite viewpoints.²⁶ Building on the analysis provided in Chapter 3.2, Figure 1, we identify the following critical issues.

Urgency to act (environmental effectiveness

different perception of ‘urgency’ between the USA and EU politicians and scientists. The US has the viewpoint that immediate emission reductions are not necessary and that it is sufficient to foster technology development so that emissions can decrease in the future. The EU rather believes that urgent action is necessary, as otherwise

(such as a maximum 2°C temperature increase) may be out of reach within a few decades.

This fundamental difference cannot only be observed in the negotiations but also in the scientific literature comparing US authors and European res

a more cost-effective stra

future. On the other hand, mostly Europeans (e.g. Azar, 1998; Van Vuuren and De Vries, 2001) argued that early abatement can significantly accelerate technology development and therefore reduce costs. The difference is also apparent on the future design of an international climate regime (compare e.g. Aldy et al. 2003 and Criqui et al. 2004).

The EU should seek an active dialogue with the USA on their views on what level of emissions is necessary to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system in the short term. As the economic argument has high value in the USA, economists of both sides could be brought together to openly discuss the economics of acting early versus acting late (see also section 11.3.4 on side benefits).

Developing country involvement: There is a major conflict, mainly between advanced developing countries and the USA, on whether and how advanced developing countries should be include

the USA has acted, the USA will only act together with the developing countries.

On this controversial point, the EU could enable the dialogue between the USA and the advanced developing countries, as this issue can ultimately be solved only between the USA and the advance

participation of developing countries, such as a multistage setting with first targets for developing countries that avoid capping economic growth or the Triptych approach.

In addition, one could aim to combine the actions already occurring in developing countries with the concept of “meaningful participation” of developing countries requested by the USA.

Advanced developing countries have a clear desire to develop in an efficient way and already

26 On the importance of focal issues see also Hasenclever et al. (2000)

166 imp

internat o have USA

incl adv c

activitie ve to

incl Adapta that of a

the dev ies has to be intensified.

It h t is the case

t effective

change and the ffects of “response measures” (actions by Annex I Parties to reduce emissions and therefore, e.g., lowering the revenues from oil exports) on developing countries. This explicit link in e Convention prevented fast progress on adaptation.

shape ocol are really unacceptable

that a ing country “involvement” are the major obstacles

bound

emiss ll be, that in the future the USA will

Techn emiss

agree ration of technology under the UNFCCC is

Certai d also provide an incentive for Parties that

2

storage.

lement actions towards low emissions. But by no means they want to be bound by ional obligations. Possibly, least developed countries (with the aim t

uded in the reduction effort to reduce the impacts of climate change) could convince an ed developing countries to adopt some kind of targets for the already occurring

s that could move the USA to also adopt measures. These targets would also ha ude a little extra effort and would have to be quantified but on a voluntary basis.

tion: A still unresolved and difficult topic in the international climate negotiations is daptation (see also Chapter 6). Here, the dialogue between the Annex I countries and eloping countr

as o be clarified whether “adaptation” is used to refer to damage repair (as

with insurance) or to damage prevention (increasing adaptive capacity). As a first step a clear definition of adaptation should be agreed upon, or at least constituencies should always make clear, which kind of adaptation they refer to.

Many of the issues considered under adaptation are beyond the coverage of the UNFCCC regime. Promising options for further action on adaptation are the inclusion of adaptation considerations into development and disaster relief (mainstreaming). Bu

implementation of these options would occur outside of the UNFCCC regime. As a consequence, a separate adaptation protocol under the UNFCCC may not seem adequate.

The issues are too broad to be covered only under the UNFCCC. In addition, it could distract attention from the urgent need to address mitigation.

On the other hand, the issue of damage repair and restoration is clearly a matter related to climate change and the UNFCCC. Within the UNFCCC regime, narrowly defined adaptation projects could be implemented through the available funds (GEF, least developed country fund and later the special climate change fund and the adaptation fund). Here, a clear commitment of developed countries could be voiced to support adaptation activities also outside of the UNFCCC.

e EU should work towards de-linking adverse effects of climate In addition, th

e

Article 4.8 of th

Kyoto or not Kyoto: Another major conflict between the USA and the EU is the rejection or continuation of the Kyoto Protocol. The USA is rejecting it, although US negotiators have

d it significantly. It is unclear, which elements of the Prot

and which could be kept. One could assume that the nature of an absolute cap, the level of bsolute cap and the missing develop

for the USA as voiced several times. The flexibility over gases, sectors and national aries introduced through emission trading is likely to be supported by the USA. As ion trading works best with absolute caps, it could we

also support absolute caps, see speech by Senator Byrd (2003). It would be useful to get a clearer view of which elements are acceptable and which not would be a step forward.

ology: Another topic of particular interest to the USA and Japan is that of “technology”.

It seems clear that technology will have an important role to play in reducing greenhouse gas ions, but it is unclear how “technology” can be incorporated within an international ment on climate change. The current conside

related to technology transfer and less to technology development. Further dialogue has to be sought with the USA and also Japan on how technology development can be supported and integrated in an international agreement.

n areas of technological cooperation coul

either depend heavily on fossil fuels or whose GDP is strongly determined by the export of fossil fuels (e.g. OPEC countries). Relevant technologies could include CO removal and

Im Dokument Climate Change (Seite 163-169)