This section evaluates the applicability of each of the seven hypotheses to the cases of Senegal and Gambia. Despite the unique geographical proximity and similar hazard profiles of the two countries, differences in size, political system, and relationship with the international donor community provide an interesting basis for comparing the factors influencing each country’s institutional capacity for disaster risk management. This section examines the evidence from both countries—first Senegal and then Gambia—
that either supports or contradicts each of the hypotheses, noting also where evidence was inconclusive.
Senegal
Moral Hazard
Senegal has been a major recipient of foreign aid for decades. Known as a “darling” of international donors for its political stability since gaining independence, Senegal depends on foreign assistance for 23 percent of its national budget.146 The country received an average of over US $1billion per year in total international development assistance between 2006 and 2009.147
Reviewing the major ongoing DRM activities in Senegal reveals that international donors are investing more in long-term disaster preparedness efforts, such as improved drainage systems, than flood response.148 For example, between 2004 and 2011, the World Bank invested US $15 million on the Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project, whereas after severe flooding in 2009, USAID/OFDA humanitarian assistance to Senegal was US $50,000.149 The Senegalese government’s emphasis on both the necessity of such large-scale public projects and, at the same time, the country’s inability to pay for these projects suggests that moral hazard may have an effect on the government’s investment in preparedness spending.150 A technical adviser in climate change asserted in reference to coastal erosion DRM, “We need money. We have already done the necessary studies. It’s easy to help someone go where he’s going.” This interviewee suggests that while Senegal may have a clear understanding of the necessity for disaster preparedness investment, the government expects external donors to cover the costs.
While Senegal appears to depend on foreign donors for investment in disaster preparedness, the country’s own allocation of funds for emergency flood relief suggests that leadership is motivated by factors besides moral hazard when investing in disaster response. A sub-argument of the moral hazard hypothesis states that if a country expects international aid during or soon after a natural hazard, that government will invest less in DRM. According to a senior officer in Senegal’s disaster management agency, Senegal’s annual DRM budget is $2 million. Apart from these resources, the central government
has invested additional funds in flood response after serious natural hazards. For example, Senegal earmarked about $13 million in government funds to cope with 2008’s floods.151 This evidence suggests that the Senegalese government, despite being dependent on foreign aid, is still willing to spend on relief measures after significant natural shocks.
While moral hazard does not appear to limit the Senegalese government’s investment in disaster response, evidence also points toward a lack of consensus within the government over the fundamental importance of these efforts. For example, the central government spent millions of dollars on prestige projects in Dakar, such as the African Renaissance Monument, during years of major flooding. Construction began on the $27 million, 49-meter-tall bronze statue before the 2008 floods, and the monument was completed in the spring of 2010.152 During construction, a critic wrote, “Impoverished residents in the statue’s shadow endure incessant power blackouts and flooding.”153
A variant of the moral hazard hypothesis also posits that if a country believes that its security situation would deter external aid, that country will invest more in disaster preparedness. This hypothesis potentially applies to Senegal because, since the 1980s, the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) has led a low-level separatist movement in the country’s southern regions.154 However, throughout this long-standing conflict, Senegal has continued to receive substantial foreign aid. The conflict has been confined to the regions south of the Gambia, far from Senegal’s financial and administrative center in Dakar. Additionally, Senegalese leaders have remained on friendly terms with international donors and have participated regularly in international peacekeeping and regional mediation.155 This evidence indicates that while Senegal has experienced internal political conflict and has marginalized opponents to the national government, the state security facet of the moral hazard hypothesis does not apply, as the conflict has not prevented external aid to Senegal.
In conclusion, there is insufficient evidence to fully accept or reject the moral hazard hypothesis in Senegal.
Senegal’s continued dependence on foreign aid for large-scale flood prevention measures, especially related to infrastructure improvements, has been associated with the government investing less in this area, opting instead to spend on other projects. However, in terms of response, Senegal has spent millions of dollars in the wake of natural disasters. Whether or not these efforts are a national priority is debatable. Because Senegal’s disaster relief spending is large in comparison to international donations in this area, the moral hazard argument does not apply to the country’s disaster response investment.
These mixed conclusions point toward a complex relationship between Senegal’s competing priorities for spending on disaster response and long-term preparedness. Yet ultimately, without verifiable data on Senegal’s budgeting for DRM over time, it is difficult to draw robust conclusions about how Senegal’s investment in flood preparedness or response has changed in the presence of aid.
Perceived Risk
In response to forecasts predicting an increase in the frequency and severity of disasters—especially those related to flooding and sea-level rise—the government has increased its investment in disaster management in these areas.
Based on field interviews, the government of Senegal and other stakeholders are very aware of the disaster risk existing in the country. This awareness is due to the rising number of natural disasters that the country has experienced in past decades as well as forecasts predicting that it will experience more frequent and more severe disasters in the future. The growth of perceived risk coincides with more attention to these issues within government. A representative from an IO working in Senegal indicated that their focus on disaster risk management began after the number of flooding events in the country rose. Another interviewee observed, “Ten years ago the country had no capacity to respond to disasters but flooding has brought more attention to this area.”
While controversial, one example of Senegal’s investment in risk reduction for flooding is Plan Jaxaay, which represents Senegal’s largest government-funded investment in preparedness. As mentioned previously, the Plan, which means “big bird” in Wolof, is aimed at relocating a large portion of those in
the areas of Dakar most prone to flooding to higher elevation neighborhoods. The Government initiated the program in 2006 and, for the first phase of the project, appropriated $104 million from both national funds and funds originally designated for legislative elections.156 As of 2009, the site houses about 2,000 families but hundreds of thousands remain in low-lying vulnerable areas.157 While some have criticized the investment as unsustainable and contend that politics motivated the government to implement the well-publicized program, it is difficult to contend that the increasing incidence of floods did not play some role in motivating this expenditure.158
Plan Jaxaay seems to represent an anomalous case of high spending on DRM instead of a consistent commitment on the part of the Senegalese government to deal with flooding hazards by investing significant sums of money in preparedness measures. At the same time, one representative from an IO commends the government for abandoning expensive projects such as this. The interviewee commented that the Senegalese Government has since become “more realistic” about managing floods, because instead of focusing on high-cost relocation efforts that affect only the chosen few, they are trying to address underlying factors that cause flooding. He contends that recommendations for reconstruction and recovery in the 2009 PDNA--including new focuses on land use planning, building drainage infrastructure, and community-based education--reflect this shift. Still, government funding for activities under this new (and seemingly improved) strategy has come nowhere near to matching that of Plan Jaxaay.
The sub-hypothesis that small countries or regions will invest more in preparedness due to the greater threat of a hazard to the country’s overall welfare does not seem to apply to Senegal. It is difficult to assess whether or not Senegal qualifies as a small country without some sort of standardized definition.
The evidence does not support the idea that Senegal’s size, whether large or small, has a strong bearing on the country’s investments in disaster risk management.
An additional sub-hypothesis theorizes that when at-risk populations are concentrated in smaller areas, less money is required to offer a similar level of protection, and, as a consequence, less money will be spent. While the prevalence of urban flooding in Senegal means that the case meets the condition of the sub-hypothesis that at-risk populations be concentrated in small areas, interviews did not yield evidence that less money is spent in these areas as the result of a simple cost-benefit analysis. While it is true that flooding attracts less funding than sea-level rise, for example, the reasons for this asymmetry are more complicated than this proposed explanation suggests.
Several of the interviewees provided support for the “protect your seeds” theory which hypothesizes that a government will spend the most money on disaster management in areas that are the wealthiest and make up a disproportionate amount of the country’s tax base. An anecdote from one interview subject supported this idea. The interviewee described an example where, in 2007, the middle class neighborhood of Mariste in Dakar flooded. In this case the government acted swiftly while the poorer neighborhoods of Pikine and Guédiawaye remained inundated. A representative of a large bilateral aid agency supported the idea that flooding in Dakar’s peri-urban areas received inadequate funding due to the poverty and political marginalization of the affected population.
The significant attention that the government gives to coastal erosion appears to provide further support for this sub-hypothesis. While storm surge and coastal erosion does not pose a large threat to human lives, it does threaten the fishing and tourism industries along the coast, two sectors that contribute significantly to Senegal’s economy. One representative from a multilateral donor agency confirmed that the Senegalese Government focuses on coastal erosion above other disaster types. Another official working within the Ministry of the Environment articulated the threat that coastal erosion poses to the country’s economy, explaining that, “For [Senegal], coastal erosion is, above all, an economic question.”
The final sub-hypothesis postulates that fewer resources will go toward preparing for deadly disaster types because securing a population against these disasters is more costly and therefore has a lower return. While there may be some sense that droughts—the natural disaster that affects the most people in Senegal—are an intractable problem for which preparedness spending has little effect, interview subjects did not speak to this point.
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that the hypothesis of perceived risk is applicable in the case of Senegal. Senegalese officials recognize the risks brought on by natural hazards, and, as a result, their strategies increasingly reflect the idea that preparedness measures are needed. Still, it is worth noting that while the risk of both flooding and coastal erosion in Senegal are high, the economic risks that coastal erosion poses receive more attention within the national government than the humanitarian dangers related to urban flooding.
Electoral Incentives and Democracy
Having transitioned from a single-party state to a multi-party system with competitive elections, Senegal has long been considered among the most mature democracies in Africa.159 However, despite Senegal’s competitive elections and relative stability, critics contend that President Abdoulaye Wade’s personal control over political institutions prevented an independent bureaucracy from effectively funding and implementing DRM efforts.160 Charges of rampant cronyism and corruption came to the international media’s attention in the wake of Wade’s controversial decision to run for a third term as president.161 Senegal elected a new president and ruling party in March 2012. It is too early to draw conclusions about President Macky Sall’s stance on disaster preparedness. However, available research on democracy in Senegal and evidence from field interviews suggest that while Senegal’s electorate has influenced the government to invest in disaster response, voters have not motivated the government to make lasting commitments to disaster preparedness.
In evaluating the effects of Senegal’s democracy on DRM activities, it is crucial to note that although Senegal has competitive elections at the national and local level, the country is not an advanced democracy. The 2011 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index identifies Senegal as a hybrid regime, one that displays characteristics of both democracies and authoritarian states.162 In hybrid regimes, elections are less than free and fair, civil society is weak, corruption is widespread, and judicial independence is limited.
Freedom House similarly describes Senegal as “partly free” due to limited respect for political rights and civil liberties.163
As an example of the weakness of democratic institutions in the country, Wade was able to twice delay municipal elections originally scheduled for 2007 in the face of protests from opposition party members.164 One Senegalese team leader at an IO suggested that these elections were postponed to allow Wade, who was voted in for a second term in 2007, to minimize the political impact of flooding during previous rainy seasons. When Senegal finally held municipal elections in the spring of 2009, opposition parties led by the coalition United to Boost Senegal (BSS) performed well. BSS members won in the majority of cities and regional capitals, including Dakar and Saint-Louis.165 Soon after the elections, Wade’s government announced that flood management would devolve to local collectives. Newly elected opposition leaders condemned the national government’s decision as a political maneuver to shed its responsibilities.166
Major flooding occurred again in 2009. According to a Senegalese lecturer on coastal management and vulnerability, the decentralization of disaster management prior to this flooding event created the widespread perception that the central government was punishing local opposition governments by delaying or reducing DRM funds. This argument, echoed in media reports after the flooding in 2009, supports the sub-argument of the electoral incentives hypothesis, which states that if a government has differing support across regions of a country, then that government will invest less in disaster management in areas dominated by its opponents. Observations of electoral politics in Saint-Louis add weight to the claim that flooding may have been used as an opportunity for the ruling regime to punish those in opposition. According to the Secretary General of an international NGO in Senegal, when a mayor from the opposition took power in 2009, Saint-Louis received less assistance to cope with floods than in previous years. More generally, the majority of interviewees acknowledged the growing politicization of flood management. A regional adviser for a major bilateral donor described this trend by stating that his organization limits funding for flooding in Senegal precisely because it is “too political.”
A common theme running through the majority of interviews was the emphasis placed by the government on disaster response rather than preparedness. In part, the government’s focus on reactive measures seems to be a result of the country’s inability to adequately fund substantial long-term DRM projects, such as residential relocation plans and improved drainage systems. In terms of electoral incentives, interviewees supported the electoral hypothesis sub argument that if politicians perceive that citizens respond more to disaster response than to preparedness, then politicians will spend less on preparedness and more on response. Three Senegalese development experts claimed that government management of post disaster relief directly affects voting behavior.
The Senegalese government appears to be responsive to the public’s calls for disaster response when the failure to provide assistance affects the government’s political capital. An associate director at an IO made the specific claim that the government’s primary concern when investing in disaster preparedness and response was not the effect of these policies on citizens, but rather the effect of these policies on the party’s political standing. As an example, this interviewee pointed to 2005 flooding in the middle class neighborhood of Mariste in Dakar, after which the outcry of influential residents prompted rapid government response. This outcome was compared with inadequate flood response in poorer areas, such as Pikine and Guédiawaye, where floodwater sits for months every year. After continued political pressure in 2005, the government launched Plan Jaxaay, then President Wade’s plan to build housing and relocate citizens living in communities vulnerable to flooding.167 While this plan represented a landmark public statement from the government on the importance of disaster preparedness, launching the initiative may have reflected the government’s immediate political needs to pacify protestors rather than a desire to shift policy toward greater disaster prevention efforts. Relocation activities slowed during the less severe rainy season in 2007.168 Four years after the government launched the plan, only half the planned homes were built and hundreds of thousands of people remained in flood zones.169
On a field visit to Pikine and Guédiawaye, two of the hardest hit areas in Senegal during flooding in 2009, interviews with flood victims revealed further complexities inherent in the relationship between flooding and electoral behavior. A resident of Pikine who has experienced flooding in her home every year since 2005 blames the government for poor relief efforts but believes a new government will not improve response to the affected areas. A resident of Guédiawaye also criticized local leaders for failing to provide resources during floods but did not pass this blame on to former President Wade, who, according to the interviewee, focused on longer-term flood victim relocation efforts under Plan Jaxaay. In contrast to these two perspectives, an article published shortly before the 2012 presidential elections quoted many local residents of Pikine and Guédiawaye who looked forward to using the election to voice their concerns about flooding. The mayor of Pikine, Aliou Diouk, stated, “There has been much talk but little action.
The expectations are enormous. The suburb is aware of the stakes of this election, all eyes are fixed on that hope.”170
News stories such as this provide evidence for an additional sub-argument regarding electoral incentives:
If the media gives more attention to disaster management activities, then governments will invest more in these activities. Senegalese interviewees working in and outside of the government agreed that the media plays a role in influencing public attitudes. While Freedom House ranks Senegal as having limited media independence, these interviewees noted regular television programming by the independent network Walf TV, which broadcasts interviews of flood victims. An associate director of an IO recalled
If the media gives more attention to disaster management activities, then governments will invest more in these activities. Senegalese interviewees working in and outside of the government agreed that the media plays a role in influencing public attitudes. While Freedom House ranks Senegal as having limited media independence, these interviewees noted regular television programming by the independent network Walf TV, which broadcasts interviews of flood victims. An associate director of an IO recalled