Several interviews highlighted the ongoing debate in Zimbabwe over whether the country is experiencing climate vulnerability, climate change, or some combination of the two. Evidence of this debate emerged not only between policymakers and ‘climate’ officials, but also within academia and among the general public in both countries (for example, a commercial farmer in Zimbabwe and an automobile mechanic in Zambia were each very informed about this debate).
Newspaper and media exposure is high in a highly literate country, and this debate is certainly played out even in the media.
The in-country portion of this research effort partially coincided with the UNFCC Conference of the Parties 17, held in Durban, South Africa in December, 2011. The proximity of the conference, perhaps highlighting African viewpoints more than in previous conferences, seemed to have raised general awareness about climate change and vulnerability. In fact, a national television program on Zimbabwean national television featured a Zimbabwean climate specialist, highlighting this debate and the importance of climate change for the country in the future. In a nation that has traditionally been so reliant on its agricultural sector (for both subsistence and export earnings) weather and climate is an everyday concern.
A final explanatory hypothesis in this section is that if the at-risk population in Zimbabwe is concentrated in smaller areas, fewer resources will be required for DRM and therefore less will be spent. Zimbabwe has several areas that are drought and flood prone but this is most common in rural regions. It is the relatively marginal and smaller regions (such as the Zambezi Valley or sparsely populated Southern Matabeleland) that are at the greatest risk; several interviews pointed to the fact that many of the most natural hazard-vulnerable populations live near the borders of the country, such as Muzarabani District, far from the capital and other urban centers of the country. Many of these communities are relatively small, suggesting that fewer DRR resources may be required to offer adequate protection according to this argument. However, it is unclear that this hypothesis has explanatory power in Zimbabwe’s allocation of resources.
The repeated occurrence of natural ‘shocks’ in these areas, with limited changes in government response or preparedness, again point to the fact that this hypothesis requires further testing, but does not appear to hold in Zimbabwe.
through a precarious system, which attempts to balance power between an entrenched ruling elite and an opposition movement that can no longer be suppressed. Although Zimbabwe still lacks truly competitive elections, this move certainly enhanced the democratic credentials of the country. Yet, to date, there are no signs that the MDC has pushed for more preparedness spending. In fact, one interviewee cited Prime Minister Tsvangirai’s declaration in 2011 that no one would go hungry in Zimbabwe that season, and the fact that the latest budget did not include any money allocated to food relief, making a connection between the new, more inclusive government and the status quo before. He argued that in order to make it seem that the power sharing agreement was working the MDC had a distinct interest to portray a picture of a healthy and improving Zimbabwe. This in turn would help convince the populous and current ZANU-PF leadership that involving the MDC in government was a good idea.
The fact that the inclusion of the MDC, which could be interpreted as a move towards democracy in Zimbabwe, did not lead to noticeably higher preparedness spending adds evidence against this hypothesis. At the same time, it is hard to make any judgments about hypotheses regarding electoral incentives given the lack of popular accountability and high degree of uncertainty in the government at the moment. Within the current GPA agreement there is a stipulation to create a new constitution and hold fresh elections, but these have yet to take place nearly four years later.
Other sub-hypotheses are important in this section. The first centers on elections, positing that competitive elections in Zimbabwe will cause the Zimbabwean government to be more likely to invest in DRM, because it will be held more accountable by the Zimbabwean people. The ZANU-PF government has been in power (at least partially, under the current GPA) for 32 years to date, and preparedness spending during that time has not followed any definite political trend. However, simply because there has been a lack of free and fair elections to date in Zimbabwe correlated with low DRR spending, this alone does not necessarily mean that elections have explanatory power over government preparedness spending.
In terms of electoral incentives for the Zimbabwean government affecting DRM spending, there does not appear to be any direct link between preparedness investment and government views of electoral benefits. In a country infamous for irregular—if not rigged – elections, it would be difficult to make the claim that the government, in general, is interested in keeping voters content, possibly with more disaster spending. At the same time, however, this could certainly be the case on a smaller scale, as local politicians or Members of Parliament attempt to create or hold their space in the government.
There is a certain distinction between local and national politics which is not easy to generalize; different regions and districts around the country have different political situations. We focus on national level decision-making with regard to DRM, which necessarily limits any conclusions about the incentives of local politicians to increase DRM spending. Nevertheless, given the serious centralization of resources and policy, as outlined in the section on capacity above, local politicians are not in a position to achieve much in terms of DRR spending, even if they desired to do so.
Related to the above hypothesis is an argument that a population is more likely to hold a government accountable for a drawn-out disaster such as drought, rather than an acute natural shock (flooding), meaning that a government is more likely to invest in preparedness for the former type of disaster. In fact, this sub-hypothesis is especially relevant for Zimbabwe given that drought and the subsequent ensuing food insecurity is a major issue here. Our research indicates that people in Zimbabwe are more concerned with long-term droughts and especially their implications for national food security, and a subsequent assumption might be that citizens will be more likely to hold the government accountable to such longer-term events. The CPU also mentioned that in response to what it has heard from people on the ground, it is making an effort to also address droughts. Still, the government devotes more resources toward acute shocks such as floods, rather than droughts. More data on citizen perceptions is required for further exploration, but initial findings and interviews suggest that this hypothesis does not hold in Zimbabwe.
The above hypothesis is related to the argument that if politicians perceive that citizens will respond more to disaster response as opposed to preparedness, then they will spend less on preparedness and more on response. Zimbabwe is in the midst of attempting to transition from a focus solely on response to one
more balanced with preparedness. Given that citizens appear to favor preparedness (at least in terms of drought and associated food security), it appears that this hypothesis does not hold, as response has been the focus of Zimbabwe thus far. It should be noted, however, that other causal mechanisms could help explain this relationship, such as the economic resources available to Zimbabwe as well as its other political priorities.
A related question to electoral incentives is this: what about differing support across different sectors of the population – does the Zimbabwean government spend differently on regions of the country due to their differing support of the government at the polls? Again, with limited data on regional disaster-related spending, this is a difficult question to assess at present. While there is evidence that the government has in the past rewarded certain regions of the country for electoral support, this has not specifically involved DRR. This hypothesis, therefore, remains ambiguous. The media’s effects on DRR spending by the government are also undetermined. While much of the Zimbabwean media is state controlled, there exist some independent outlets, yet how much say these have on government policy is ambiguous. In sum, this over-arching hypothesis on democracy does not hold, given the evidence found in Zimbabwe at the moment.
Political Development
This section of hypotheses seeks to understand the relationship between the development of a government, in terms of bureaucrat and politician quality, and disaster investment. In general, we found that a more developed government is associated with higher quantity DRR and preparedness spending.
Several sub-themes are explored here, including agency insulation, independence and location of officials (whether local or national), and corruption of officials.
Under the current power-sharing agreement, government ministries are shared between ministers and deputies of opposing parties (MDC and ZANU-PF). This divvying up of cabinet positions has led to a
“government structure that is highly politicized”664 Though this might also have been the case before the formation of the GNU, the explicitly binary nature of government ministries laid out in the agreement has led to a lessening of focus on DRM activities. Coordination between separate government ministries can also be hampered. A recent regional report claims that, “the nature of responses and their effectiveness is not informed by a clear analysis of the problem, but is largely determined by authority and power. In addition, in most cases political structures have either enabled or constrained the community’s ability to deal with drought.”665 Therefore, it appears that Zimbabwe’s bureaucrats and politicians, in general under its emergency management framework, are technically able to see ways to improve DRR, but the centralization and concentration of government authority hinders such improvement.
A sub-hypothesis posits that if government agencies are insulated from politics, then they will be more likely to be involved in preparedness activities in the country. In other words, politicization of government could lead to less preparedness spending. Zimbabwe has a political set-up where government agencies are largely part of the political environment rather than isolated bureaucracies. Under this hypothesis, we would thus expect less engagement with preparedness activities. For example, the CPU, in particular, is certainly not insulated from politics. A report from SADC stated that, “the main reason for a number of the 2009 Workshop Recommendations not being implemented is a lack of political will – the importance of DRR needs to be highlighted at national level.”666 Again, this statement brings focus on the will of the government, rather than a lack of resources or know-how. Given that government agencies in Zimbabwe are closely intertwined with politics, and political will to invest in DRR and DRM is limited, we see low preparedness spending. Therefore, the case of Zimbabwe supports this hypothesis.
Understanding how Zimbabwe has or has not prioritized DRM in the past helps with examining how policy might change in the future. For example, in 2002, as the Zimbabwean economy continued to unravel, the Daily News criticized the CPU’s attitude:
“Zimbabwe’s emergency services are long on theory and during mock disasters, but are woefully pathetic during real disasters. Attitudes played a major role in the response of the emergency services. Some people must start explaining this gross conduct.”667
What about local government officials – do they have autonomy and if so, does it lead to greater investment in DRM? Because our research did not target local (sub-national) regions of Zimbabwe, but rather at the country as a whole, it was not possible to gain conclusive evidence on this point. However, this hypothesis is certainly central to the decentralization debate in DRM. To date, the country has faced a tradeoff between localized knowledge and control of budgets.
There have been concerted government efforts to involve local actors and place officials within smaller localities to serve DRM functions. For example, with regard to disaster-related regulations, a senior government official directly involved in DRM related her view that blanket regulations are generally inefficient. She argued that having a planting prohibition on crops closer than 30 meters to river will not work because in one place even 10 meters may be safe and in another even 50 may not be safe.
Currently, such blanket regulations are more the norm than the exception although the CPU is attempting to institute more nuanced regulations. It has the appropriate structure in place to solicit local information, yet the central office still dominates DRM policy. Therefore, local officials are not in control of budgets and projects. It is perhaps in great part because of this centralization that more resources are not devoted to preparedness, especially at a local level. Hence, in Zimbabwe the corollary of this hypothesis is confirmed, as local officials do not have great autonomy, and DRM spending appears to suffer because of this.
Related to the quality of politicians and bureaucrats in Zimbabwe is the level of corruption in government that the country faces. Again, it is difficult to put concrete figures on corruption in any country, and particularly for Zimbabwe. This research did not find evidence of corruption as a major problem in terms of international aid flows to Zimbabwe. This could be in part due to the fact that direct aid to the Zimbabwean government was largely halted under international sanctions, though some of these have been eased under the continuing GPA. Interviews with international NGOs, local NGOs, and several and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies did not bring up any links between corruption and spending on disaster preparedness or management, but the lack of concrete evidence for or against this hypothesis means that we cannot come to a definitive conclusion for this sub-hypothesis.
Civil Society
Government and state-based organizations, such as bilateral aid agencies, are certainly not the only entities working on DRM in Zimbabwe. This section considers the role of civil society, which is made up of local NGOs and community organizations (outside of the government), in disaster risk management.
The primary hypothesis is that if there is a strong civil society, then there will be greater investment in preparedness.
In Zimbabwe, the concept of ‘civil society’ is a complicated one. While the government allows CSOs to exist and work in the country, these organizations must officially operate within the framework that the government allows, political or otherwise. Accordingly, if a CSO is promoting DRM in a way that is acceptable to the government (local and national), this hypothesis might hold true. For example, a project manager from a prominent CSO working on community development and technology in Zimbabwe explained their training programs for Zimbabwean agricultural extension workers, a program welcomed by the cash-strapped government. It appears that as long as CSO spending aligns with government policy in DRR and is apolitical then additional spending is welcomed. Thus, this hypothesis holds in Zimbabwe, where the involvement of civil society has led to more investment in preparedness than otherwise.
But can civil society influence the spending of the government on DRR? This is a second and related hypothesis: if CSOs pressure the state to invest in preparedness, then the state will indeed invest more.
Here, we find no evidence in support of this argument. The government may welcome spending from civil society but will not be influenced to spend more based on current civil society pressure. This was a theme in several interviews. Some interviewees cited the exact opposite of this argument, that the
government will request more spending in certain DRR areas by CSOs. For example, local officials from a hospital under threat of serious flood damage reached out to a prominent faith-based international NGO for help, rather than to central Zimbabwean government resources.
Finally, it might be expected that if there are strong local kinship networks in Zimbabwe, then local actors will invest more in preparedness. This research was not focused on gathering the type of data required to evaluate kinship networks across the nation. While this hypothesis is very possibly true, especially due to the difficult socio-economic conditions currently facing the country, without further investigation it is not possible to make a validity statement concerning it. Altogether then, internal influences on DRR investment in Zimbabwe make a difference in preparedness spending, yet this is alongside or in place of the Government of Zimbabwe, which in general is not influenced by CSO activity.
External Actors
This section will focus on the role of actors external to Zimbabwe, such as IOs, INGOs, and neighboring countries. In the same way that CSOs may influence DRM activities, it is necessary to explore how IOs and international NGOs can also influence these activities. The hypothesis is that if a state has more exposure to IOs and NGOs that promote preparedness, then it will also invest more in preparedness. Many international actors are active in Zimbabwe. Most of them are focused on pressing development needs but are cognizant of the importance of DRR and preparedness. Still, one IO representative complained that there were not enough NGOs working on disaster related initiatives. Therefore, it does not seem that there are many actors influencing the state to invest more in preparedness. Instead, most IOs and INGOs are focused on more pressing development needs such as alleviating food insecurity. There is also evidence to suggest but not confirm that the limited exposure of the Government of Zimbabwe to IOs and INGOs that promote preparedness may partially account for the government’s relative underinvestment in DRR and preparedness.
A sub-hypothesis considers the role of neighbors, their own DRM activities, and what effects these might have, if any, on Zimbabwe’s preparedness investment. Specifically, the hypothesis suggests that if Zimbabwe is proximate to other states investing in preparedness, then it will invest more in its own preparedness. This research did not find evidence in support of this hypothesis. The Southern African region, under the umbrella of SADC, has put in place many frameworks and institutions for cooperation within the region. This is especially true in the collaboration of meteorological departments and personnel within the region (through SARCOF and other organizations). Also, the “SADC Secretariat continues to engage Disaster Management Units of the various SADC States so as to enhance their disaster risk management capacities.”668 However, it is not clear that these institutions and connections are enhancing spending or increased preparedness capacity within Zimbabwe. Based on conversations with former MSD personnel, it is possible to note that Zimbabwe certainly has much better information, as well as greater capacity to create information, than it has in the past. This has led to better vulnerability reports but does not mean that it has increased resilience against future hazards.669 Overall though, there is no
A sub-hypothesis considers the role of neighbors, their own DRM activities, and what effects these might have, if any, on Zimbabwe’s preparedness investment. Specifically, the hypothesis suggests that if Zimbabwe is proximate to other states investing in preparedness, then it will invest more in its own preparedness. This research did not find evidence in support of this hypothesis. The Southern African region, under the umbrella of SADC, has put in place many frameworks and institutions for cooperation within the region. This is especially true in the collaboration of meteorological departments and personnel within the region (through SARCOF and other organizations). Also, the “SADC Secretariat continues to engage Disaster Management Units of the various SADC States so as to enhance their disaster risk management capacities.”668 However, it is not clear that these institutions and connections are enhancing spending or increased preparedness capacity within Zimbabwe. Based on conversations with former MSD personnel, it is possible to note that Zimbabwe certainly has much better information, as well as greater capacity to create information, than it has in the past. This has led to better vulnerability reports but does not mean that it has increased resilience against future hazards.669 Overall though, there is no