80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: World Bank, Google.com Public Data Explorer
Many private industry and non-profit groups are taking advantage of Kenya’s high access to information.
These groups are experimenting with innovative programs to diffuse more disaster management information to rural and low-income populations. Examples of this include successful pastoralist insurance programs, crowd sourcing during emergencies, and cell phone tools that enable better community training and communication. A common theme among interviews was the suggestion that dense technical climate and early warning information must be packaged simply and succinctly for consumption by the general population, and targeted to each region’s specific climate hazards and vulnerabilities. Early warning could
Source: World Bank, Google.com Public Data Explorer
also be packaged with direct suggestions on when to plant, when to harvest, and when to buy and sell off livestock.
A representative of an NGO working specifically with disaster preparedness in arid lands stated that effective early warning must go along with early action, and that practitioners need to get a little bit creative and more practical when communicating with communities, and not use extremely technical language. He counseled NGOs and the government early warning systems to build on what people already do, their indigenous knowledge, and not disregard or disrespect their practices. He found that in his work communities feel very disempowered when even well-meaning projects and early warning practices change what they have been doing without integrating their traditional practices. Furthermore, a representative of a local community-based organization stated that a key gap policymakers and practitioners are not addressing is the need to see how the indigenous techniques can be intertwined with scientific knowledge.
External Actors
The external actors hypothesis states that if a country or government has greater exposure to disaster preparedness information and training, then it will invest more in preparedness. There is some, but not conclusive, evidence in support of this hypothesis. A government official noted that heavy rains that traditionally cause flooding and crop destruction could be utilized if farmers were connected to timely and targeted information about planting schedules. He asserted that climate change can be utilized for increased production if information and action were better synthesized. External and media actors diffuse information throughout Kenya. There are several ways external actors encourage disaster risk reduction and preparedness activities to become more important to a state and citizens.
One sub-hypothesis regarding external actors assumes that a state with greater exposure to training and information in disaster risk reduction will invest more there. Government officials and aid practitioners alike agree that in just the past few years regional integration has improved, evolved, and contributed in a positive way to the capacity of Kenya to respond to natural hazards through a variety of regional economic communities (RECs). For Kenya and its neighbors, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in particular serves as a focal point for policy alignment discussion, information sharing, training, negotiation of collective response mechanisms, and addressing transboundary issues. Compared to other east African RECs, IGAD is the leader in disaster management coordination. Its original name from the organization’s 1986 creation, IGAD included an addition “D” for drought so there is considerable history and expertise here regarding the region’s deadliest disaster, slow-onset drought.
Regarding the sub-hypothesis suggesting regional integration and investment in disaster risk reduction and preparedness would encourage investment by Kenya, there is not conclusive evidence. While RECs such as IGAD are still weak in absolute political and economic power, they have pushed the dialogue forward for better disaster risk reduction and preparedness in Kenya. Interviewees who touched on this subject all considered regional cooperation to be continually improving and felt that the deeper integration realized in neighbors’ economies, trade, and policies, the more capacity Kenya would have to rely on its neighbors in times of need. It stands to reason that as regional cooperation increases, IGAD or other RECs would be an ideal forum to pressure the Kenyan government to make risk reduction a bigger priority.
Another sub-hypothesis states that exposure to disaster risk reduction and preparedness activities sponsored by international donors and community organizations make the state more likely to internalize and invest in these activities. In addition to the role of international actors in supporting civil society, there is some evidence, particularly in reference to the training and information offered by the U.S. government in the form of FEWS NET, that this hypothesis may hold true. Stakeholders interviewed all held FEWS NET in high regard as a source of meteorological information and early warning forecast information. FEWS NET plays an important role in the countries it works in to offer support services and training to state meteorological agencies to build capacity. In that regard, all stakeholders interviewed regarded Kenya Meteorological Society in a positive light, with many stating that their predictive information had become more accurate in recent years.
Economic Strength
The economics hypothesis states that if a country has resources to spend on disaster preparedness, then it will be more likely to spend in this area. In Kenya, empirical evidence somewhat supports the economics sub-hypotheses, but not the overall hypothesis. One sub-hypothesis states that if a country has a higher GDP, then it will be more likely to spend on preparedness. While Kenya the highest GDP per capita in the region, it still does not spend enough on risk reduction or preparedness to protect against the regular droughts and floods that occur.
Smallholder farms and pastoralists are an important backbone of the Kenyan economy, yet they live and produce their goods in areas most vulnerable to droughts and floods. While only 17 percent of Kenyan land is arable, agriculture accounts for half of the country’s exports and employs roughly 75 percent of the population, almost all of those on smallholder farms.429,430 The “bread basket” of Kenya lies in the densely populated but productive Rift Valley province, an area highly vulnerable to seasonal flooding. Unlike its neighbors Ethiopia and Somalia, Kenya is a livestock-importing nation, with 90 percent of the meat consumed in country produced from nomadic pastoralism.431 As one interview stated, because Kenya is an agricultural export economy, disaster risk reduction must be important.
The African Economic Outlook states, “Kenya will need to reduce its high reliance on agricultural outputs to limit its vulnerability to climate hazards by diversifying the economy.”432 However, there are many ways to reduce the risk of climate hazards affecting agriculture production without reducing output. Many interviewees suggested more climate-resilient roads, with proper drainage and engineered to not be as affected particularly by floods. Roads can also be a risk reduction technique during droughts as well, as better roads to more widely distributed livestock slaughterhouses was also a common theme among interviewees. When pastoralists have the opportunity to easily offload animals in the face of impending drought, they are more resilient. An interviewee estimated that upwards of 80 percent of funding in Kenya’s disaster management sector is spent on response post-crises. Regarding the economic benefits of better planning for natural hazards, a multilateral bank official asked why disaster risk reduction is not seen as a low hanging fruit by the government.
A senior economist interviewed agreed with the African Economic Outlook that diversifying the economy is a first step. He suggested Kenya must focus on reducing its trade deficit through increasing export products. Kenya is a source country for many raw materials but the economy would benefit from moving down the service line with these products. The primary message from this economist was that without robust infrastructure that is disaster resilient, economic growth in a diversified economy could not be sustained, and natural hazards would produce greater economic shocks.
Considering the importance of agriculture and pastoralism to the majority of Kenyan livelihoods, food security was an important component of disaster management according to nearly all experts interviewed.
Interviewees mentioned the crucial role of the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) in disaster risk reduction and preparedness coordination. And yet, in the 2009 draft of the Kenya National Disaster Management Policy while food security issues were addressed briefly, the KFSSG did not appear as a major player in the structure of government disaster management bodies.433
Eighty-eight percent of Kenya’s landmass is arid and semi-arid, home to 30 percent of the population.434 Livestock production is the economic mainstay of these areas, yet over 60 percent of this population lives below the poverty line. As an ILRI report concluded, “drought is a major factor contributing to poverty [and] dependency on food aid is increasing.”435
Another sub-hypothesis states that if there is a vibrant market economy, then there will be more investment in preparedness. This is because market actors will pressure the state to protect their investments, and market actors will engage in their own preparedness activities. This holds somewhat true in Kenya.
Economic resilience among individual citizens, particularly vulnerable pastoralists and farmers, can be strengthened through new insurance protection schemes. New research by ILRI into livestock insurance schemes helps harness the power of private industry to boost resilience among drought prone pastoralists.
In the most recent 2011 drought, ILRI made the first compensatory payouts to 650 pastoralists who lost livestock in the Marsabit district.436 This is a culmination of years of research with the eventual goal to build enough capacity and demonstrate effectiveness so that private insurance companies will take over leadership in the years to come. While capacity at the private sector still needs to be built, interviewees generally agreed that Kenya is particularly innovative in burgeoning insurance regimes.
This sub-hypothesis that if there is a vibrant market economy, then there will be more investment in preparedness holds somewhat true in another way. Interviews with experts indicated that although private industry may have their own disaster management plans internally, their preparedness measures did not leak into creating political will for a stronger overall national disaster preparedness and risk reduction.
Instead, the sub-hypothesis regarding economics that finds the greatest support is if a country sees preparedness spending as a substitute to development spending then the government will spend less on preparedness. Interviewees indicated that foreign aid supports the majority of current disaster preparedness and risk reduction activities in Kenya. Yet this does not lead the central government to use that money “saved” towards an even higher level of spending in the sector. Most interviewees agreed with the general concept that if a restricted grant is given for use in disaster risk reduction, it means that the unrestricted money that might have been used to support those activities could now be used in other sectors of higher political priority. While Kenya has a vibrant market economy with a relatively high GDP per capita that is forecasted to continue its regular growth pattern, investment in disaster risk reduction and preparedness is not particularly strong.
Table 20 provides a snapshot of the hypotheses the research tested, and the findings for each country.
In summary, the Ethiopian cases offered support for five hypotheses, while in Kenya, the research team found strong empirical support for three hypotheses and moderate support for two additional hypotheses. Across the two cases, the research team found the strongest support for the political development and civil society hypotheses, moderate support for the insurance/perceived risk and external actors hypotheses. and mixed evidence for the moral hazard hypothesis. In neither case did the research team find evidence to support a democracy hypothesis or an economics hypothesis.
Even though the countries both provide evidence for some portion of the hypotheses, they do so in different ways.
CONCLUSION
Ethiopia and Kenya are similar in many ways and distinct in others. In the last decade, both countries have made some progress in their respective capacities for disaster risk reduction, preparedness, and response.
The government of Ethiopia has established itself as the leader of all development programs and efforts and is at the helm of a central, integrated overarching framework for DRM. It draws on NGOs and IOs for funds, resources and knowledge; but government actors are the leaders, integrators, and coordinators.
The GOE ties DRM to food security through the DRMFSS agency and has elevated DRM as a priority by planning to move all DRM functions out of line ministry control and to place them directly under the prime minister’s office. DRM processes, procedures, organizational structure, and funding sources have been defined, documented, and written into legislation, effectively moving Ethiopia from a reactive response-oriented country to a proactive preparedness-oriented country. All disaster-related activities fall under the auspices of the DRMFSS, although drought draws the most attention and resources. Ethiopia was able to achieve this level of capacity because of the high donor support and NGO involvement over the past several decades. The GOE has reaped the benefits of learning from their experiences and has utilized NGO and partner agency expertise and services to their advantage. They have strengthened their capacity over the years and are on a path to deepening capacity enhancements.
Table 20. Hypothesis Findings for Ethiopia and Kenya
No - For Ethiopia, a continuous stream of international aid for many decades has not caused it to invest less in preparedness. It accepts donor aid but takes a strong leadership role in coordination and implementation.
Yes - Kenya contrasts in that it is very open and dependent on donor involvement, but provides little government oversight of donor activities and projects. Kenya does not spend as much on preparedness because it relies on donors. There are several forums for coordination but with little leadership and coordination from the government.
Perceived Risk – If governments perceive that the risk of a natural hazard is high, then they will invest more in preparedness.
Yes - Ethiopia has had a long history of natural hazards and understands that more are likely in the future. This motivates them to prepare for and reduce risk.
Somewhat - Kenya also perceives high risk of disasters, but the state does not act. Both donors and government officials in Kenya blame each other for delays and lack of response, revealing the government’s lack it will spend on preparedness. If a government is in a country with a more advanced democracy, then it will invest more in preparedness.
No - Ethiopia, although a democracy on paper, is in reality an authoritarian regime, where the people’s voice in government does not have much influence. Yet, it still invests in its capacity to respond to and prepare for disaster.
No - Kenya is a relatively vibrant democratic system, but voting is based in large part on ethnic and tribal identifies, and policy issues such as disaster management are not high priority for the votes, thus DRM figures weakly in government’s electoral strategies.
Yes - The quality and capacity of the government in Ethiopia is higher than
Yes - Kenya has a much higher perceived level of corruption than Ethiopia.
Civil Society – If there is a strong civil society, then there will be greater investment in preparedness.
Yes - A strong and vibrant civil society that is very effective at engaging in policymaking and invests highly in DRR, however all activities are tightly controlled by the government.
Yes - A strong and vibrant civil society that is very effective at engaging in policymaking and invests highly in DRR, even when the governments do not. capacity building from IOs to build up their own capacity over the last decade.
Somewhat - Kenyan DRM is highly
No - Ethiopia is relatively poor, and yet the government invests substantially in DRM.
No - Kenya is one of the wealthiest African countries, but the government does not commit significant economic resources to DRM.
In comparison, the central government of Kenya does not play the same coordinator and leader role as the GOE with NGO and donor activities. Instead of one forum for coordination, Kenya has many, some of which the government actors themselves, according to interviews, do not consider themselves the leaders in. Kenya has shown commitment to a national strategy for drought preparedness and response, but droughts are only one of the disasters Kenya experiences, and interviews suggested there is little political will to approve a national disaster management policy under the MOSSP. Kenya relies heavily on NGOs and IOs for funds, resources, and knowledge, but unlike Ethiopia have shown little rhetorical or actionable commitment to reducing this dependence. Overall, compared to Ethiopia, at the central government level there is moderately poor coordination, a lack of financial allocation, and little political will for DRM.
The recent 2011 drought authority is placed under MOSNKAA and not MOSSP, resulting in potential policy confusion and duplication. While the rationale for drought management under the MOSNKAA is sound, it does contribute to a wider range of actors with disaster management authority than the GOE. If the intention is to diffuse disaster management authority across several central government ministries and agencies, the government should commit more resources to enhancing cooperation and collaboration between the groups. Contributing to this potential confusion is the observed lack of inter-ministerial coordination on disaster management specifically. The political rivalries within the coalition government co-leading all ministries was noted by interviews to play a part in the background political drama contributing to lack of cohesion in coordination and leadership of this sector.
Despite the weaknesses this chapter pinpoints, Kenya does not have a generally weak capacity in disaster management. In fact, there are so many committed actors both governmental and non-governmental, working on DRM, DRR, drought management, climate change, vulnerability, and food security issues, that the real issues appear to be political will building, and coordination and leadership of the disparate actors under one DRM umbrella. There are many strengths upon which the sector could build to create better overall capacity. Kenya has a robust media that has shown signs of involving the public in discourse surrounding DRM and DRR, a strong and innovative telecommunications sector, improved and accurate early warning systems, a growing and regionally high GDP, and high commitment of external actors and civil society to contribute to building DRM capacity.
Overall, while the two countries share many similarities, their culture and practice of disaster risk management are quite divergent. The Horn of Africa region is infamous for devastating droughts and subsequent famines, including the most recent crisis in 2011. Despite these recurrent crises, it is easy to overlook that DRM capacity in both countries has improved in a post-colonial era. Both countries have unique strengths in disaster management that practitioners and policymakers could better focus on to propel Ethiopia, Kenya, and their entire region to better resilience in the face of changing climate patterns.
Overall, while the two countries share many similarities, their culture and practice of disaster risk management are quite divergent. The Horn of Africa region is infamous for devastating droughts and subsequent famines, including the most recent crisis in 2011. Despite these recurrent crises, it is easy to overlook that DRM capacity in both countries has improved in a post-colonial era. Both countries have unique strengths in disaster management that practitioners and policymakers could better focus on to propel Ethiopia, Kenya, and their entire region to better resilience in the face of changing climate patterns.