The rainy season in The Gambia arrives annually between the months of May and September.
The 2010 season was particularly devastating as rains came at nearly 56 percent above the normal range.183 Over the course of only two days in September 2010, the country received rains equivalent to 20 percent the annual average, threatening homes and livelihoods of 25,000 people. On September 7, Gambia declared a national disaster for the first time in its history. The event was NDMA’s first foray into coordinating response to a declared disaster.
According to the Gambian Red Cross Society’s assessment, 24,532 people were directly affected by flooding. The severity of the 2010 floods overwhelmed the government and local capacity.
The Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) supported the response operation with 300,000 Swiss Franc (about US $330,000) and assessments revealed immediate need for sanitation, shelter materials, and technical support. Cash coupons for rebuilding homes, non-food items such as blankets, sanitation kits, and mosquito nets as well as training in hygiene and latrine construction were part of the response.
The Red Cross reported several lessons learned from the national disaster:
• The use of cash coupons was well received by the community. They were better able to make home repairs as a result of cash coupons.
• Shelter trainings conducted within the Red Cross organization made staff better able to work with community members to appropriately rehabilitate structures.
• Pre-positioned stocks of materials facilitated immediate aid to several hundred families.
• NDMA’s coordination was challenging leading the NDMA to create a national contingency plan for future disasters.184
One major center of disaster during the 2010 floods occurred at the Kotu Quarry, an abandoned mining area. Located in the Greater Banjul Area, the Quarry is the site of an electrical plant servicing Banjul. Several interviewees pointed to Kotu Quarry as an example of urbanization and the erection of slums along waterways as exacerbating factors for floods. The settlers in Kotu have no legal rights to the land, which disenfranchises the population from government assistance. A member of the Kanifig Municipal Council, which is responsible for Kotu, told reporters that the NDMA has taken charge of affairs such as provision of relief materials. He went on to say “The biggest problem that the KMC is facing is the rapid urbanization of the municipality.” In August 2010, one resident said: “Last year we suffered seriously here, many of our houses collapsed and properties destroyed, usually we don’t experience such but last year was quite different. We have so far contacted our ward councilor to plead for help from the authorities.”185 The low lying ditch, lack of drainage, and accumulation of waste from the community and surrounding areas limit water flow and create rancid living conditions.
By 2011, after the devastation of the 2010 floods, the Gambian government demanded that the Kotu Quarry settlement be vacated and leveled. Authorities threatened to demolish homes even if residents did not vacate the area. The response from the community was uproarious.
An apparent disconnect between ministry officials and the Jammeh regime appears in citizens’
dialogues. One elderly man called on the president to “intervene to tell those who are involved in this ugly move to refer to the constitution” to know his rights as a Gambian. Others complained that the area designated for their resettlement was uninhabitable for its thick forest and that it would be impossible for people living under the poverty line to resettle effectively before the rains came in 2011 without government assistance.
A statement by President Jammeh as early as September 2010 expressed deep dissatisfaction with the condition of Kotu Quarry. He visited the site and called the issue an “administrative failure” of the departments of environment and planning. He placed blame on the population as well, noting that clearing the space in 2008 had not deterred people from resettling there as intended. In the same interview, Jammeh announced his government’s plans for the area. His priorities were to preserve the wetlands and no longer tolerate settlements that block waterways.
Jammeh continued:
“So I am giving everyone a notice that come December you are going to leave because we are going to demolish the whole of this area. There is no politics in this because human health is better than politics. I am concerned about the health of the people. Can you imagine the children living here and the types of insects here;
the type of the stink in this place. We have to clear the waterways because nobody is praying for the rainfall to diminish or reduce. I prefer heavy rains to drought - because during the time of the drought, when there were few rainfalls, that is when people build on the waterways. The government is going to enforce the law, there are regulations that have to be implemented or enforced by Physical Planning, the National Environment Agency.”186
During field interviews at the end of 2011, NGO and government personnel alike were still pointing to Kotu Quarry as a vulnerable community. Several noted that the people who had been evacuated simply came back to their old settlement in Kotu because the land that the government provided was too far from opportunities available in urban Banjul. This provides a vivid example of the challenges in The Gambia. First, the government lacks enforcement capacity to resettle the Kotu community. More importantly for the purposes of this study, the NDMA has undertaken a broad mission of disaster management, which implicates the agency in tasks related to urban and environmental planning. The research team’s fieldwork did not suggest that the NDMA possesses the technical knowledge included these disciplines within its limited capacity.
The challenge may instead speak to a coordination failure in the 2010 floods and the aftermath in Kotu Quarry.
Figure 6. Urbanization in Gambia
60
1990 1995 2000
YEAR
RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION
2005 2010
55
50
45
40
Rural pop. Urban pop.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators188
A general consensus emerged during field interviews on the risk posed by natural disasters, especially flooding, to the Gambia. Moreover, the government’s commitment to NDMA and the presence of several UN organizations and NGOs, suggests that it recognizes the risks posed by recurrent flooding. At a GDP of only $355 per capita (constant USD 2000), almost 30 percent of GDP from agriculture, and with 65 percent of the employed population working in agriculture, major natural disasters have significant effects on the whole country.189 Given these figures and the national breadth of NDMA’s mandate, it is apparent that high-level officials in the Gambia realize the risks of repeated severe flooding and are taking steps to increase awareness among citizens. While NGO professionals pointed to the need for deeper understanding at the community level, policy makers at the national level appear to understand that the Gambia is vulnerable to disasters and have devoted political capital and some budget expenditure to the cause.
In one interview, a government official mentioned that weak warning systems equipment across The Gambia is a particular problem. The easternmost station was not functional at the time of the interview, putting the Upper River Region, an already vulnerable area, at greater risk for flooding. The country also declared the 2009 floods as a natural disaster for the first time in its history. According to one interview, during the aftermath of the 2009 floods, President Jammeh donated to the National Emergency Fund for the first time. Despite these investments, interviewees from the NGO community assert that capacity remains low and that the overall damage to the economy from big floods could be significant. All of these points illustrate the complex relationship present between risk and actions in managing said risk.
Warning systems exist in the Gambia, but are not functional or maintained. A formal disaster declaration followed the 2009 floods, but challenges still plagued communities, and local level disaster protocol and preparedness knowledge is low.
A sub-hypothesis suggests that populations facing greater threats will receive divergent disaster management spending, but substantial threats throughout Gambia imply a demand for investment
throughout the country. In addition to natural shocks, trends toward urbanization and settlements along low-lying waterways increase risk of flooding disasters. There is a cyclical relationship at play between recurrent flooding, poor agricultural yields, and urban migration of people seeking opportunities other than farming.190
Gambia’s small population of fewer than two million people is most highly concentrated in the Greater Banjul area.191 At 26 percent of the population, Greater Banjul is the most densely populated region in The Gambia. According to the 2003 census, roughly 357,000 people live in Greater Banjul, and 50 percent of the Gambia’s population within 20 kilometers of the Atlantic Coast. Banjul is also the economic center of the Gambia. Due to the concentration of people and assets in the greater Banjul area, flooding disasters pose serious threats there.
The geography of the Gambia is such that the whole country, which flanks the banks of the river, is flood prone. The rapid urbanization of the Greater Banjul area over the course of the last 20 years has created a greater concentration of people and, as in the case of Kotu Quarry, exacerbated the flooding in urban areas. Based on interviews, the prevalent themes in international discourse about risk vulnerability and increasingly common natural disasters are present in The Gambia as well. Challenges regarding urban settlements and threats to livelihoods of vulnerable sectors like agriculture make the conversation around DRM more pressing for the Gambian aid community and government. Evidence, like the vice president’s statements above, suggests that the government acknowledges risk and has joined the international community’s efforts to face these challenges.
While the central Gambian government is aware of its vulnerability to natural disasters at high levels of government, field interviews suggest that at the community level awareness is less saturated. Narratives like that of Kotu Quarry may indicate that people either do not understand the risks posed to health and property by severe flooding, or rather that they value proximity to the urban core over mitigating said risks.
Despite awareness of the risk as demonstrated through NDMA’s mandate and the political will supporting the agency, spending in The Gambia does not reflect posed risks. For example, if the agricultural yield for a given year were completely destroyed by floods, resulting in a 25 percent loss of the net GDP, the Gambian economy would suffer tremendously. Still, spending on disaster risk management does not appear to reflect the gravity of the threat, providing evidence contrary to the hypothesis.
In sum, risk in The Gambia is high and awareness of the risk is present at the decision-making and high political office level, but it is not reflected spending on DRM. Rather, political capital towards NDMA, the country’s coordinating body for natural disasters, and engaging the institutional mechanisms such as declaring disaster for the first time in 2009 exhibits comprehension of risk in the Gambia, and confirms the hypothesis.
Electoral Incentives and Democracy
Fieldwork in the Gambia suggests that citizens do not associate disaster management with elections. Where elections do not provide accountability to the government, DRM will not hinge on election results.
Flooding events in The Gambia happen many times a year and do not reflect the election cycle. Events are not rare, and the government’s investment is constrained by budgetary concerns. This research does not suggest that more or less frequency or severity would spur more investment. In several interviews, personnel in non-governmental and donor organizations in the country noted that Gambians see flooding as a natural phenomenon and do not blame the government for its effects. One interviewee suggested that in the aftermath of disasters and during flooding season, political parties are forgotten. None of the interview subjects suggested that regional differences in political support drive preparedness or response spending as stated in the sub-hypotheses.
Having had minimal change in political structure since President Jammeh took power in 1994, Gambia has had a relatively stable political system. According to the World Governance Indicators, Gambia ranks
in the 54th percentile for political stability, reflecting Jammeh’s strong hold on power.192 However, other sub-indicators including government effectiveness, control of corruption, and regulatory quality remain low. Because political power in the Gambia is strongly centralized, regional differences in political support do not come to bear in directing disaster management funding. Despite its several ethnic groups, friction is minimal and not politically charged. Without these key factors, DRM in The Gambia appears to occur separately from electoral activities.
Voice and accountability is the lowest of Gambia’s governance scores, in the 20th percentile. Low scores likely reflect media censorship and centralization of power in The Gambia. According to Gambia Media Support, a Danish NGO, and confirmed through field interviews, the state controls the only national television station in The Gambia.193 According to Freedom House’s measures of freedom of the Press, in 1993, before President Jammeh’s coup to take power, Gambia’s media was listed as “Free.” In every year since 1993, the media has been “Not Free” by Freedom House’s measures.194
Interviews with the Red Cross, Gambia suggest that within the NDMA’s model, farmers and citizen are included in discussions to identify community needs. In particular, one interviewee pointed out that after a major disaster, community members have an opportunity to provide input into the allocation of relief funds, but the participation is low and does not have major influence. Although the question lay outside the scope of this project, lack of participation in public forums may speak to citizens’ lack of confidence in the effectiveness of their voice.
The final electoral sub-hypothesis is: if preparedness has electorally beneficial spillover effects, then governments will invest more in disaster management. Because no interviewees raised the topic of spillover effects or suggested them as a point for further investigation, there is not sufficient evidence for or against this sub-hypothesis.
In the Gambia’s semi-autocratic society, electoral incentives are unlikely to influence disaster management policy. Interview evidence suggests instead that Gambians do not use election polls to influence policy change, nor do they link elections to their experience with natural disasters. In this semi-autocratic regime, the Gambian people do not associate disaster response with political leadership and thus the government does not face popular pressure for investment in DRM.
Political Development
The political development hypothesis is applicable for the Gambia. The National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) is the nodal agency responsible for coordinating all disaster related activities in the Gambia. Since its formation, the NDMA has become the focal point for all disaster related activities and plays a crucial role in disaster preparedness and response. As a coordinator, NDMA interacts closely with government departments, IOs and local NGOs working in the sphere of disaster response. The political centralization of power and effective bureaucratic structure contributed to making the NDMA an effective coordinator in disaster preparedness and response.
This research did not find evidence that corruption in Gambia limited the government’s ability to prepare for, and respond to, natural shocks. Field interviews with government officials, IOs, and local NGOs were used to understand the level of corruption in Gambia as well its impact on disaster preparedness and response. The majority of interviews with IOs and local NGOs noted that the disbursal of disaster aid by NDMA was done in a transparent manner. The interviewees also highlighted use of the media to inform people about the disbursal of disaster funds. One interviewee gave a specific example of media coverage about the provincial governor in Bassee region, who was informing people about their entitlements during the disbursement of aid.
The Transparency International (TI) and Ibrahim Foundation indicators, two of the most important corruption perception indicators for Africa, were used to triangulate the information about corruption perceptions in political and bureaucratic structures of the Gambia gathered from field interviews. The time series Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International shows that in recent years the Gambia has improved in corruption perception (higher values are better). From 2007 Gambia has shown a steady
improvement on the transparency international corruption index. In the year 2009 Gambia overtook Senegal in the TI rankings. On the other hand the Ibrahim index on accountability and corruption for the Gambia shows a steady decline in recent years. Further, freedom house index downgraded the Gambia in its recent report on press freedom.195
The global indicators look at overall corruption trends in the Gambia. The field interviews, on the other hand, focus on a specific institution – the NDMA – and its ability to disburse aid in disaster prone areas.
Thus, the trends from global corruption indicators may not apply to the NDMA. The NDMA has developed a separate bureaucratic structure, which differs in its characteristic from the overall Gambian bureaucracy and does not have strong interaction with business enterprises. The overall corruption perceptions do not seem to have an impact on the DRM activities in Gambia. The field interviews suggest that the effect of corruption within NDMA on disaster response and management is minimal, but this is difficult to verify.
In sum, the research does not conclude that overall corruption in Gambia or the corruption within NFMA affects DRM activities in Gambia.
The National Disaster Management agency is largely insulated from politics due to the centralization of power and the role of the vice president in heading the organization. The insulation of the bureaucracy from political pressures contributes towards making the NDMA an effective nodal agency for DRM activities in the Gambia.
The effectiveness of NDMA as a coordinator and planner was highlighted in all the interviews conducted by the team in Gambia. A majority of the interviewees viewed the NDMA as necessary for effectively responding to natural disasters. Disaster reports by other agencies in Gambia also consistently cite the coordination efforts headed by the NDMA.196 The effectiveness of the NDMA is directly linked to the strong mandate granted to it by the Gambian parliament and its ability to enforce the mandate effectively by setting the disaster management agenda in the country and demanding compliance from all actors in the DRM field. Centralization of power is an important characteristic of the nature of political development in Gambia. President Jammeh, the current president, took power after a coup in 1994.
Since the coup, the president has consolidated his power and moved away from free and fair elections.
Absence of competitive democracy allows for government institutions in Gambia to work without high political interference. Thus, independence of the bureaucracy from political forces plays an important role in allowing NDMA to work as an effective agency.
While the semi-autocratic system of Gambia has allowed for centralizing of power and development of
While the semi-autocratic system of Gambia has allowed for centralizing of power and development of