The combination of strong government leadership to shift DRM strategy from reactive to a more sustainable risk reduction, combined with an effective mechanism for inclusive, multi-stakeholder engagement and action, as well as a strong level of commitment and resources from the donor and NGO community, suggests a high level of capacity in Ethiopia to deal with natural hazards. In terms of response, a long history of droughts and disasters in Ethiopia have helped both government and partner agencies develop an effective blueprint for delivering food and other supports to communities in need. This experience has helped to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of response. The largest response program, the Productive Safety Net Program, is lauded by donor and partner agencies as a highly effective, well-functioning food aid program that provides food relief to 8 to 11 million food insecure people each year.
This program is singlehandedly led and coordinated by the government, attesting to the high capacity and commitment of the government in times of disasters.
Areas that need improvement in disaster management include providing emergency livestock destocking and alternative livelihood support to pastoral communities. In the realm of disaster preparation, GOE has worked closely with WFP and other donor organizations to establish warehouses with food and supplies that are easily accessible for local communities. Additionally, new programs are being developed in partnership with the WFP to provide real time monitoring and inventory accounting in each of the warehouses. Improvement to capacity for the disaster risk reduction holds the most promise. This can be seen in the GOE taking a proactive and definitive leadership role creating a new National Policy for DRM focusing more on proactive risk reduction. Components of the risk reduction programs include improved early warning systems infrastructure, education and capacity building, and development of new standardized early warning guidelines and checklists to help communities respond earlier to forecasted disasters. Assistance to pastoral communities is a key focus for DRR in Ethiopia. While resettlement of these communities is unacceptable by government and pastoralists, the government and aid communities are exploring alternative programs for lowering risk and increasing livelihood resilience. These include a shift to agro-pastoralism, providing market access and credits to help pastoralist better manage their herds and inventory. Additionally, the voice and representation of the pastoral communities is increasing in national and community based forums for disaster planning and action.
The strong central role and control of the government has helped to improve coordination and minimize duplication of services. Weaknesses resulting from this high level government control include dependence on government consent and funds before any action can be taken, delay in government action when early warning forecasts and assessments are provided, lack of transparency in government assessments of vulnerability and need projections, and low capacity of subnational groups to monitor, plan, and implement DRM at the district and community level. There is promise that these weaknesses will be addressed in the near future. The National Policy on DRM, if passed, will place greater authority by moving the DRM agency under the prime minister’s office reducing the need for bureaucratic approval process using line ministries. Efforts to improve transparency include shifting to more transparent software and modeling systems and training government on using these tools better inform the decision making process.
KENYA
Background on Natural Hazards
Natural hazards continuously plague Kenya. Recurrent droughts and floods, and the subsequent landslides and fires, are all expected semi-annually. In the past 30 years, droughts have recurred more often than the once-per-decade droughts experienced throughout east Africa’s history, now surfacing every two-three years, hardly allowing time for recovery before recurring.
Kenya’s population of 43 million is accustomed to natural hazards, experiencing consistent drought, followed by floods, which often lead to landslides. The indigenous pastoralist community is perhaps most continuously affected by these recurrent droughts, contributing to high livestock mortality rates and minimized access to water. However, endemic drought has overarching consequences that distress Kenya’s population as a whole, making food more expensive, and contributing to lower health rates.
In the past 30 years, almost 9,000 disaster-related deaths were recorded with 50 million collectively affected in some form by a natural disaster.383 Traditionally, the most drought-prone regions are the Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir districts in the North Eastern Province, and the Isiolo and Marsabit districts in the Eastern Province. Regions of western Kenya and the Tana River district in the Coastal Province are most susceptible to flooding.
Most recently, approximately 2.4 million Kenyans remained in 2012 moderately to highly food insecure due to long-term drought conditions. Additionally, many drought refugees from Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan currently living in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps located in the severely drought depleted northern Kenya region require food assistance from USAID/FFP’s Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) to survive on a daily basis. Only 17 percent of Kenyan land is arable and 70 percent of the population lives in non-arid districts, yet the focus of disaster risk reduction is largely on drought management. Table 18 chronicles the natural disasters in Kenya over the last several decades.
General Political and Socioeconomic Background
Kenya was under British colonial power for over 75 years from 1895 until 1964 when it became an independent republic. At this time, presidential elections were held and Jomo Kenyatta became Kenya’s first president and remained so until his death in 1988. Despite holding “free” elections, Kenyan politics have resulted in the election of only two presidents since Kenyatta’s death. Corruption levels are perceived as considerably high and voter fraud is rampant in presidential elections.384 The 2002 presidential election, which brought Mwai Kibaki into office, was deemed fair and it appeared at the time that Kenyan politics were becoming more transparent.
Ethnic fragmentation plays a significant role in determining political office in Kenya. Kenya is home to 42 tribes, with eight main ethno-politically relevant groups and 85 percent ethnic fractionalization (see Figure 14).385 In December 2007, a presidential election between incumbent President Kibaki and Orange Democratic Movement candidate Raila Odinga sparked controversy between rural factions of their respective tribes. Originally leading the vote count, Odinga refused to accept Kibaki’s sudden jump in margin and reclaiming of the presidency. Inciting protests and calling for a recount, Odinga’s refusal to allow Kibaki to remain president soon led to ethnic conflict, killing almost 1,000 people and displacing over half a million Kenyans from their land.
Table 18. Recent History of Major Natural Disasters in Kenya
Year Type Location Dead/Injured/Affected
1975 Drought Widespread 16,000 affected
1977 Drought Widespread 20,000 affected
1980 Drought Widespread 40,000 affected
1982 Floods Nyanza 4,000 affected
1983 / 1984 Drought Widespread 200,000 affected
1985 Floods Nyanza, Western 10,000 affected
1991 / 1992 Drought Widespread 1.5 million affected
1995 / 1996 Drought Widespread 1.41 million affected
1998 / 1999 Floods (El Nino) Widespread 1.5 million affected
1999 / 2000 Drought Widespread 4.4 million affected by famine
2002 Floods Nyanza, Busia, Tana River Basin 150,000 affected
2002 Landslides Meru Central, Murang’a, Nandi 2,000 affected
2004 Floods Widespread 50 dead
2004 Landslides Nyeri/Othaya Kihuri 5 dead
2004 – Dec. 2005 Drought Widespread 3.5 million affected
2006 Floods Isiola, Western Kenya, Marsabit,
Laisamis area 60 dead, Up to 10,000 displaced, 723,000 affected
2007 Landslides Taita Taveta district 3 dead
2008 Landslides Pokot Central 11 dead
2008 Floods Rift Valley 24 dead, 2396 affected
Jul. 2008 – 2009 Drought North Rift, Eastern, Central 3.8 million affected
2009 Urban Fire Nairobi City 120 dead
Oct. 2009 Floods Widespread 44,850 affected
Dec. 2009 Floods Widespread 91,000 affected
Jan. 2010 Drought Widespread 3.75 million affected
Mar. 2010 Floods Widespread 194 dead, 141,000 affected
May 2010 Floods Widespread 100 dead
Jan. 2011 – 2012 Drought Widespread ~3.5 million affected386
Oct. – Dec. 2011 Floods Widespread ~25 dead, ~91,692 affected387
Source: EM-DAT; Kenya National Disaster Management Policy Draft, 2009
Eventually, Kibaki and Odinga came to an agreement on a coalition government, allowing Odinga to serve as a prime minister with dually appointed cabinet members from both candidates’ parties. This has created an environment of political stability but led to increased intra-bureaucratic competition and inefficiency according to some interviews. Most notably, in 2010, the constitution of Kenya was amended, replacing the colonial era 1969 constitution. The December 2012 presidential elections will provide a good indicator of the success of the past five years of collaborative efforts to stem ethnic division. Yet, outside forces can also play a role in domestic strife. As one international aid director points out, “how resources are allocated can either connect or divide communities.” NGOs, media, and government need to be sensitive to post-emergency resource conflict pressures.
Figure 14. Tribal Representation of Kenya Population
Kikuyu 22%
Luhya 14%
13%Luo Kalenjin
12%
Kamba 11%
Kisii 6%
Meru6%
Other African 15%
Kikuyu Luhya Luo Kalenjin Kamba Kisii Meru Other African
Kenya is perceived to be highly corrupt. Control of corruption has scored in between the bottom 10th and 25th percentiles for the past 10 years.388 Additionally, while Kenya is generally not perceived as a pariah state, some considered it a pariah state due to human rights violations under President Moi in 2002 and high levels of corruption as recently as 2007. Conflict events occur frequently – with 400 reported incidents in the past 20 years389 – and attacks against foreigners in the Somalia border regions increased in 2011. Foreigners’ willingness to visit Kenya declined by over 50 percent following the 2007 to 2008 post-election violence. The tourism industry is slowly recovering, though, and continues to comprise the largest portion of GDP from the service sector in Kenya.
Kenya’s GDP has grown consistently since independence, currently sitting at $36.1 billion USD. However, foreign direct investment has recently dropped considerably, from $729 million USD in 2007 to just $141 million in 2010, following both the Kenyan post-election crisis and world financial crisis.390 Overall, the Kenyan economy has grown at an estimated pace of 5, 5.3, and 5.5 percent respectively in 2010, 2011, and 2012.391 This marks a fairly steady rise since 1980, with a brief drop in the mid 1990s. The robustness of certain sectors, particularly financial services and telecommunications, strengthens the capacity of agriculture and livestock production to adapt to climate hazards.
Kenyan GDP per capita is higher than all of its neighbors.392 Current Kenyan GDP per capita is $1,700 USD and 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. This is partially due to a 40 percent unemployment rate, illustrated by a labor force of 18.5 million in a country with a population over 40 million. Seventy-five percent of the labor force works in agriculture while the remainder works in the industry and services sector. Primary agricultural products include tea, coffee, corn, wheat, sugarcane, fruits, vegetables, dairy, beef, pork, poultry, and eggs.
In terms of social expenditures, health accounts for 12.2 percent of the nation’s GDP, while education spending accounts for only seven percent of GDP. The overall literacy rate is 85 percent and students, on average, spend 11 years in a traditional education facility.393
Sixty percent of the population has access to treated drinking water and 31 percent of people have access to sanitation facilities. HIV/AIDS rates are high at 6.3 percent or 1.5 million people. Life expectancy at birth is 63 years and only 2.7 percent of the population is over the age of 65. Fertility rates are high at four children per woman and the median population age is around 19 years.394
The majority of the Kenyan population is Christian, with approximately 22 percent identified as Muslim or practicing indigenous or other forms of religion. Kenya’s two official languages are English and Kiswahili, but most Kenyans are tri-lingual, speaking both official languages in addition to a tribal tongue.395 While Kenya houses the largest airport in east and central Africa, the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, and major ports in Mombasa, Malinidi, and Lamu, its infrastructure is still far from ideal.396 The ports suffer many challenges due to droughts, floods, and sea-level rise. The roads and railways providing access to the ports and airports are in severe disrepair, making it difficult to transport agricultural products to an appropriate avenue for export. Inability to transport livestock out of the country before drought occurs is crippling to the pastoralist economy in Kenya.
Institutional Capacity for DRR, Preparedness, and Response
Overall, Kenya has shown little political leadership regarding its capacity to address complex climate emergencies. Despite the consistent recurrence of drought and floods, Kenya has yet to approve an official national disaster management policy. Lack of centralized response is mildly compensated for by localized government efforts, but without financial and capital building resources, these community endeavors often fall short, especially in preparedness measures. The majority of disaster-related spending in Kenya follows crises rather than being allocated in preparation for them.
One bilateral donor agency representative said the coordination of government with international and private actors is going well, especially due to UN OCHA and other government-led coordination bodies.
If these coordination efforts continue, district level planning will be a viable arrangement for disaster preparedness in Kenya. District steering groups have the capacity to take every actor into account and bring them all in to share their expertise, without competition, to truly stake a claim in disaster preparedness and response within individual communities.
In general, interviewees largely regard decentralization of disaster management as the best course of action. While there is some debate regarding the level of central government involvement and coordination, all stakeholders interviewed found that higher amounts of responsibility devolved to local levels resulted in more appropriate, adaptable solutions to climate emergencies. Two respondents, both employed with INGOs, stated that the overall coordination mandate should be left to the central government in order to avoid an “emotional” response by donor organizations.
Another theme reiterated by interviewees was the need to ensure that local actors at community, district, and provincial levels have viable revenue streams to do their work effectively and at optimum capacity. Many contacts suggested creating revenue streams either through direct taxation or allocation from the federal budget for disaster management activities. Even when speaking of decentralization, many interviewees stated the importance of strong central government coordinating leadership. A representative of a multilateral organization stated that the goal should be to devolve the closest you can get to the citizen, but the government still needs to coordinate and make sure they have the capacity on the ground.
When discussing allocation of funding for disaster management activities, multiple respondents cited the need to take population density more into consideration. There was the general belief that urban populations were as vulnerable or more vulnerable than those living in drought-stricken arid and semi arid lands. In 2000, UNHABITAT estimated that urban dwellers made up 20 percent of the Kenyan population. In 2010 that figure was 22.2 percent. By 2030 roughly 33 percent, or one-third, of Kenyans are expected to be living in urban settings.397 Currently, UNISDR reports “almost half of Kenya’s capital city Nairobi’s population lives in over 100 informal settlements within the city. Nairobi has some of the most dense, unsanitary and insecure informal settlements in the world.”398 So, while interviewees viewed decentralization positively overall, many suggested that funding allocations take urban poverty into greater consideration.
A few interviewees also indicated that certain central government actors, particularly the military and police leadership, may be unwilling to devolve their decision making power to lower levels considering their institutions operate within very centralized decision making processes. And yet, the new constitution established in 2010 calls for increased devolution in all government operations.399 Therefore, negotiating the roles central government institutions play in relation to devolved actors should be an important clarification that the National Disaster Management Policy takes into account. Yet the 2009 draft does not directly address this, and the leadership of the provincial and district level committees appears very limited in the organizational structure.400
Interviewees regarded decentralization of many aspects of disaster response and risk reduction as one solution to the current lack of effective disaster management capacity. However, a national policy must establish the exact framework for this, and pervasive corruption must be acknowledged.
Only 17 percent of Kenyan land is arable and 70 percent of the population lives in non-arid districts, yet the focus of disaster risk reduction is largely on drought management. The World Bank funded a flood early warning system recently and another international donor is developing a tsunami early warning system, but these projects appear to be on the periphery compared to efforts to manage drought. The first policy success in disaster management was in November 2011 when the government of Kenya established the Drought Management Authority and the National Drought Contingency Fund (under the Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands).401 At the same time, the National Disaster Management Policy first drafted in 1998 has yet to be approved (under the Ministry of State for Special Programmes).402 This signals a positive shift in the priority of DRR within the government of Kenya, but also demonstrates how much drought is the priority natural hazard and how many ministries share different disaster management authority. The following timeline shows how Kenya’s institutional changes to address complex climate emergencies are often a reaction to a particularly devastating disaster occurrence, rather than proactive (see Table 19).
Priority 1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.
Kenya only recently started to invest resources and personnel to address DRR, preparedness, and response.
While climate change emergencies are perceived as an ongoing and growing threat, it is challenging to coordinate efforts in a way that utilizes all potential actors, including the Kenyan government, military, bi- and multi-lateral donors, IOs, national organizations, and community-based initiatives and individuals.
Because the Kenyan National Disaster Management Policy has not been approved, there is no official disaster management plan in existence on which actors can coordinate. While district steering committees have played an instrumental role in formulating community-centered action plans, unless they are given the authority to raise the appropriate revenue and organize themselves it is difficult to enact these plans.
The Kenyan National Disaster Operations Center (NDOC) was started in 1998, manned by officers from different ministries, departments of government, police, and military on a 24 hour basis, to “monitor, co-ordinate, mobilize reserves, and response to disaster incidents in the country.” Their vision is to be the leading focal point for disaster management in Kenya. The NDOC monitors disasters, mobilizes natural resources to combat rapid-onset disasters, coordinates disaster management, and collaborates and networks with other stakeholders, including international actors and universities. Funded by the Office of the President, the NDOC is tasked with collaboration all the way down to the village committee level. Thus far, the department has remained small due to policymakers’ lack of knowledge regarding the importance of disaster preparedness and response. The NDOC faces many challenges, in addition to minimal funding, including the challenge of coordination, avoiding duplication of aid and development efforts, responders traditionally responding in whatever way they see fit without informing the NDOC, and lack of trained responders in the field.
Table 19. Kenya Disaster and Capacity Timeline
1986 Six countries in the Horn of Africa established the intergovernmental authority for development and drought control in their region (IGAD).
1.5 million affected by Drought 1990 World Bank Emergency Drought Recovery Project begins.
1.5 million affected by Drought 1990 World Bank Emergency Drought Recovery Project begins.