NOT FOR QUOTATION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR
KNOWING
mmE TO Hrr IT:
A CONCICP'I'UAL FRAMEWORK
FOR THE
SUSTAINABLe DEWELOPMEWI'
OF
THE m Y A SMichael Thompson Michael Warburton
April 1984 FJP-84-30
Working Rzpers a r e interim reports on work of t h e International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or of its National Member Organiza- tions.
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 2381 Laxenburg. Austria
...
how hard it is to gain, in this country, accurate information as to facts which seem most obvious to the senses.h b d w e of a Journey lhrough the Upper
Provinces of M i a , 1824-25, Reginald Heber, D.D., Lord Bishop of Calcutta.
PREFACE
This paper originated in a short exploratory piece of work for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in the n a t u r e of a "strategic recon- naissance" of a complex knot of environmental-social problems. However, early forays indicated strong underlying parallels with issues being explored in other case studies in t h e Institutional Settings and Environmental Policies (INS) project a t IlASk For this reason, and despite its limited external resources, the Himalaya work written up here took i t s place as one part of a troika INS project. t h a t also involved research on hazardous waste manage- m e n t and on energy policy modeling.
Though the main effort has been on hazardous waste management, t h e intellectual connections between these apparently diverse research fields have proved most instructive. These connections have t o do with t h e ways in which uncertainties (both technical and social) a r e defined by institutions.
especially regulatory a n d policy analytic bodies. The t h r u s t of research on all these fronts has been t o b e t t e r characterise different kinds of uncertainty and to explore t h e origins and policy implications of conflicting problem defini- tions. The practical aim in this effort has been t o encourage better policy design. An understanding of t h e institutional roots of uncertainty and of mul- tiple problem definitions opens t h e way for an anticipatory style of policy for- mulation t h a t is capable of evaluating t h e implementability, a n d t h u s viabil- ity, of different policy options a n d institutional arrangements. This strategic concern is a direct evolution from t h e previous work of t h e Risk Group--the predecessor to INS.
In presenting this work, and as INS Research Leader,
I
cannot l e t pass t h e opportunity of expressing my deep personal appreciation for t h e enthusiasm, commitment and all-round support shown by Mike Warburton as a research colleague in the group. He is much missed.Brian Wynne
CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Appropriate Institutional Development:
An Arrogant Argument for a Humble Approach I Introduction
I1 A Conceptual Framework I Some Strategic Implications
IV
Specific Recommendations to UNEP Chapter 3 Uncertainty on a Himalayan ScaleI Welcome to Uncertainty
Il
Getting to Grips with Uncertainty111 How Have We Got to Grips with Uncertainty?
References
Appendices: A: Terms of Reference
B:
The Advisory/Working GroupKNOWING WHERE
TO
HITIT:
A CONCXPTUAL F'RAMEWORK
FOR THE
SUSMINABLE DEXEZOPMENT
OF
THE -YASMichael Thompson and Michael Warburton
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Rapidly increasing populations of small-scale agriculturalists-people who depend directly on the land for t h e i r living--may be threatening t h e entire ecology of the Himalayan region. But t h e deforestation and the associated massive erosion and flooding a r e not merely technical problems. Beneath them lie millions of people and a multiplicity of social, political and economic processes, perspectives, expectations and ambitions. There can be no doubt that, if t h e r e is a problem. i t is first a n d foremost a human problem.
Nor is t h e Himalayan system a closed system. A t all levels it connects into the wider global system. The jet stream's complex interaction with t h e Greater Himalayan Range is believed to be crucial t o t h e annual onset and ter- mination of t h e monsoon throughout the Indian sub-continent; t h e silt-laden run-off frorn thousands of mountain torrents alternately devastates and nour- ishes t h e Indo-Gangetic Plain and the great deltas that. over the millennia, it has itself created. What happens in the Himalayas is, quite literally, vital to the 350 million people who live in the plains beneath t h e m ; and. farther afield still, millions more, keenly aware t h a t we have only one Himalayas t o lose, mobilize a t every level frorn t h e United Nations to t h e individual t o do what
they can to avert t h a t tragic loss.
The largely frustrating history of attempts to do the "right" thing has left some valuable lessons in its wake, but a great deal r e m a i n s to be learned.
Many meticulously planned projects have turned out t o be totally inappropri- ate, and even counterproductive, when measured against t h e i r stated goals.
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) h a s therefore asked IIASA, first, to t r y t o analyse this complex Himalayan system and, second, to t r y to draw some strategic recommendations from t h a t analysis.*
The prospect of death, Dr. Johnson said, concentrates t h e mind wonder- fully, and a ten-week deadline has much the same effect. We decided, first, t o choose an approach t h a t might allow us to say something useful in t h e very short time-span available to us and. second. to t r y not t o say anything t h a t had already been well said. This Working Paper is a revised version of t h e draft paper, hLterrelationships Between Resources, E'nvironment. People and DeveLopment: ?he Case of the Himulayan Fbothills, t h a t we s u b m i t t e d t o UNEP on Christmas Eve 1982. The first section, Appropriate h.stitutional Develop- m e n t , is essentially t h e Discussion Paper t h a t we provided for t h e Inter-Agency Meeting, sponsored by UNEP, t h a t took place in Geneva on 15 and 16 August 1983. The second section, Uncertainty on a Himalayan Scale, as well a s pro- viding t h e technical a n d reasoned support for t h e a r g u m e n t we advanced in our Discussion Paper, h a s been developed as part of IIASA's continuing con- cern with uncertainty and institutions.
A final qualification is to h o w our limitations. We a t IlASA were not prepared, nor did we a t t e m p t , t o design a specific plan of action for UNEP after only a brief survey study (a study which, moreover, left u s n o t i m e to learn about UNEP as a n institution and about t h e context in which i t has to operate). Rather, we have directed what expertise we have towards outlining a potentially useful perspective on a problem t h a t h a s challenged technical experts from many disciplines for many years. With t h e help of a n advisory/working group composed of several key experts on t h e region*., we have produced a conceptual framework for handling both the technical and t h e human problems. Though our study suffers from some of t h e defects asso- ciated with time-pressured work (and has not yet had t h e benefit of being tested in up-to-date conversations with practitioners in the field), this frame- work reveals a s e t of strategic insights which may help international agencies (and others) t o shape more effective policies for t h e encouragement of environmentally sound development in t h e region. The perspective and revealed insights a r e intended t o provoke productive discussion among people better acquainted than ourselves with the difficulties encountered in imple- menting international programmes.
The starting point for our analysis has been the recognition t h a t man does not interact directly with his environment. I t is not just perception but cognition-seeing and knowing--that brings man and his environment together and, since t h e r e is more than one way of knowing, t h e r e is m o r e t h a n one way for him t o come t o grips with his environment. Since man is a social animal
*See Appendix A.
**See Appendix B. a
and since knowledge is a social product, t h e relation between him and his environment is inevitably threaded through a more or less well integrated buffer of social and cultural institutions-institutions t h a t run the whole gamut from t h e Charter of the United Nations to the Sherpa habit of not men- tioning the names of t h e dead. The analysis, therefore, suggests t h a t , if i t is possible to unlock t h e downward spiral of environmental degradation and unsustainable patterns of development, t h e key ~ 1 1 1 be found within these myriad institutions.
Most attempts to intervene in this downward spiral a r e founded on t h e assumption t h a t the forest is a renewable resource that m u s t be conserved.
But t o apply this assumption where all t h e institutional supports a r e l e n t t o the contrary assumption--that t h e forest is a convertible r e s o u r c e - i s t o invite a t r u l y uphill struggle. All t h e institutions will have to be t u r n e d around before such a project can have any lasting effect. Perceptual mismatches such a s this abound in the Himalayas and t h e y present formidable obstacles t o the implementation of policies t h a t take no account of them. In t h i s study. we t r y t o develop criteria to judge what actions might or might not be appropri- ate in certain contexts. And, in t h e process, we reject the "grand design"
approach t o development.
To think in t e r m s of "Development with a capital
D"
when confronted by such a veritable patchwork of institutional heterogeneity, t o speak of an"integrated approach t o environmental management and development plan- ning" when confronted by such a diversity of resource perceptions, a n d t o call for policies to be considered in " t h e global framework of the interrelated phenomena of a planned process of development", when t h e only frameworks t h a t could tell you anything about t h e likely efficacy of a policy a r e those a t the most local level, is, we argue, t o invite disaster. These ideas which a r e appealing a t the macro level-the international agencies and t h e national governments of t h e region--must first be related to t h e institutional reality on the local level, and action taken only when t h i s is understood.
For example, t h e Appropriate Technology solutions of fuel-efficient stoves and solar cookers to combat deforestation a r e environmentally appropriate only if t h e forest is being viewed as a renewable r e s o u r c e 4 perception to which, as i t so happens, t h e providers of t h a t technology a r e deeply attached.
But what if those t o whom they wish t o deliver this technology see t h e forest not as a source of fuel but a s a source of fresh agricultural land (and our analysis suggests t h a t this is often, but not always, t h e c a s e in t h e Himalayas)? Give t h e m t h e technology and t h e last obstacle to t h e full clear- ance of t h e forest is removed. As we go from one institutionally induced per- ception t o another, so t h e Appropriate Technology becomes supremely inap- propriate.
In contrast t o this "grand design" approach. t h e alternative t h a t emerges from our analysis seeks to retain a n d respect all these different perceptions by untangling some strands of t h e web of interrelationships t h a t supports them. The result is a s e t of strategic recommendations t h a t a r e designed t o do two things. First, t o help
UNEP
t o remove itself from criticism for taking inappropriate actions and, second. to provide UNEP with an evaluative frame- work t h a t will help i t to channel its effort in potentially effective directions.To be more specific, our analysis suggests t h a t much can be learned from interacting with institutions as they now exist and from monitoring t h e momentum of the particular processes t h a t have led to the present institu- tional configurations. ,The interrelated concepts of political development.
economic development. and institutional development begin t o suggest
context-specific c r i t e r i a for distinguishing appropriate actions and technolo- gies from inappropriate ones.
For example, i t is often suggested t h a t Switzerland faced t h e same prob- lem in 1880 t h a t Nepal faces today: serious deforestation and associated mas- sive erosion and flooding. The Swiss solution was a s t r i c t forestry law t h a t tightly regulated t h e cutting of timber. The serious suggestions made by those who draw this parallel is t h a t s u c h a law (with, of course, appropriate c u l t u r a l adaptations) could form t h e basis for a solution in t h e Himalayas.
Beyond t h e fact t h a t t h e technical problem is essentially quite different in a monsoon-dominated climate, t h e institutional situation of Nepal today, with r e g a r d t o economic and political development, is quite different from t h a t of Switzerland in 1880. A s t r i c t law e n a c t e d by central authority could not possi- bly have t h e same effect, or even t h e s a m e meaning, in Nepal now t h a t i t had i n Switzerland then.
There is indeed a g r e a t deal t h a t m u s t be learned before suggested revi- sions in (let alone transplants of) institutional s t r u c t u r e s can be meaningful.
A sensitivity t o local contexts a n d t h e i r histories is t h e first essential. The appropriate institutional development approach suggests t h a t large-scale pro- jects which attempt t o solve problems defined on a regional scale often cross too m a n y contextual boundaries t o even be considered appropriate, and can sometimes be positively counter-productive if pushed through without revi- sion. Our analysis begins t o offer s o m e c r i t e r i a for evaluating t h e s e contexts a n d t h e i r tremendous local variation. But we also t r y to show t h a t , whilst t h e notion of institutional appropriateness closes certain options (such as t h e Swiss solution), i t does a t t h e s a m e time open up many others t h a t remain hidden t o t h e single problem/single solution approach. These hidden options a r e revealed by taking t h e c o n t r a r y approach--the multiple problem/multiple solution approach.
In surveying t h e extensive d a t a available on "the problem" in t h e Himalayas, we were immediately s t r u c k by t h e remarkable r a n g e of e x p e r t opinion on a n u m b e r of key variables. For example, t h e high and low esti- m a t e s of annual p e r capita fuelwood consumption in Nepal differ by a factor (not a percentage!) of 67. Whether t h e subject of enquiry is tuelwood use, agri- c u l t u r a l production, or even whether t h e r e is a connection between deforesta- tion a n d flooding, t h e collection of valid and non-contradictory d a t a is extraor- dinarily difficult.
The available data, in o t h e r words. do n o t suggest a single credible and generally consistent picture of what is happening in t h e Himalayas. Such a p i c t u r e c a n be obtained only by arbitrarily declaring some of t h a t data t o be anomalous. Our approach, in essence, i s defined, first, by our unwillingness t o do t h i s and, second, by t h e mild and unremarkable observation t h a t t h e scien- tist in t h e Himalayan region is continually finding t h a t it is institutional forces t h a t muddle his a t t e m p t s t,o analyse and solve what, a t first glance, appear t o be technical problems. In many ways, it seems t o us, t h e institu- tions m e t h e facts.
We therefore have chosen t o t r y to understand t h e man-land interactions in t h e Himalayas through t h e institutions and t h e perceptions t h a t go along with those interactions. The tremendous variation encountered in all contexts--physical a n d institutional-is itself a key a t t r i b u t e of t h e system.
Recognition of this pervasive heterogeneity immediately makes approaches based on a homogeneous understanding of "the problem" inappropriate for t h e Himalayan region.
In t h e single-problem/single-solution approach t h e institutional reality a t t h e local level--the seething m a s s of contradictory problem definitions, con- tending perceptions, divergent personal strategies and polarised policy prescriptions-is inevitably p a r t OF t h e problem.
If
t h e problem and i t s solu- tion have already been defined t h e n successful implementation calls for t h e imposition of t h e c o r r e c t perception and t h e eradication of all t h e mispercep- tions. Inevitably i t calls for t h e hegemony of a single personal strategy ( t h e one t h a t will respond to policy in t h e expected way), and for t h e de- legitimation of those who, for t h e best of institutional reasons, advocate prescriptions t h a t r u n counter t o t h e official diagnosis.But, in t h e multiple-problem/multiple-solution approach, this plurality becomes part of t h e solution. The contradictions and t h e contentions--the heterogeneity a t every level--constitute a rich resource, perhaps the ultimate resource. Implementation n o longer requires us t o i n s i s t ' t h a t one s e t of pol- icy actors is right and t h a t all t h e others a r e wrong. Instead, our attention is directed towards t h e notion of appropriateness; which kinds of social transac- tions are best handled by which institutional mode? How can we a c t a t t h e macro level in s u c h a way a s t o encourage multiply defined solutions t o emerge a t the local level and t h e r e m e e t up constructively with plurally per- ceived problems?
These a r e t h e s o r t s of questions we pose, and a t t e m p t t o answer, in t h i s paper.
CHAPTER 2. APPROPRIATE INSIITLJTIONAL DEYELOPhENT:
AN ARROGANT ARGUMENT FOR A HUMBLE APPROACH
I.
INTRODUCTIONFor centuries t h e Khumbu Sherpas managed their common forest resources with t h e help of their social institution of forest guardian (naua)
-
a rotating office within e a c h village the annual holder of which, after due (but fairly casual) consultation, laid down the permissible extraction rates for fuel- wood and constructional timber and exacted traditional fines on those vil- lagers who did not comply [Fiirer-Haimendorf 1964 a n d 19751. But. following t h e overthrow of t h e Rana regime in Kathmandu in the 1950's. all t h e forests in Nepal were nationalised and control vested in regionally-based officials.Since the Sherpa who wanted to c u t a t r e e for a new roof-post now had to go on a four-day walk t o Paphlu ( t h e local administrative centre) t o obtain permis- sion, instead of just popping round the corner to a fellow villager's house, and, since the official in Paphlu could not see what was happening in Khumbu ( a n d in a hundred similar forests), the old institution was destroyed a n d the n e d one simply did n o t work.
This little example, by showing t h e way in which institutions a t different organisational levels can impinge on one another, helps t o clarify t h e idea of context. Before t h e nationalisation of forests, t h e administrative institutions in Kathmandu were not p a r t of t h e institutional context of forest management in Khumbu; after t h e nationalisation they were. Since t h e micro-institution- t h e system of village-based forest guardians-worked quite well, whilst t h e macro-institution-the nationalised forest system-simply destroyed t h e micro-institution and t h e n did not work itself, we can use t h e twin notions of institition and context t o distinguish between those institutional arrange- m e n t s t h a t are appropriate and those t h a t a r e not. That, in essence, is what we t r y t o do in this chapter.
INSTflUTIONS AND
THE
ENJTRONMENTBut this approach, by way of institutions a n d contexts, is only a begin- ning. Though i t provides u s with our conceptual framework, we still have t o bring t h a t framework down t o earth. And i t is t h e earth-the precarious rcsource base for all these institutions and contexts-that is our prime con- cern. What is happening t o it and what, if anything. can those who a r e caught up in all these institutions (and t h a t includes us) do about it? Since t h e parts of t h e Himalayan resource base t h a t a r e causing t h e most alarm a r e those parts t h a t are communally exploited, t h e whole inquiry has ended u p being concentrated on t h e tragedy of the c o m m o n s .
There is a tendency, especially among those who c a r e most vociferously about the world's n a t u r a l resources, to i n t e r p r e t environmental degradation in general, and Himalayan deforestation in particular, in uncompromisingly tragic terms-something quite awful is befalling u s , a n d it is we who have unleashed t h e inexorable forces t h a t lie behind it. The trees disappear, they argue, because no one individual can afford to do what h e would do if only everyone else would do t h e same. Unable to take this first step from selfish- ness t o altruism, we end up destroying the one world t h a t should be our most sacred t r u s t in a frenzy of myopic g r e e d
We bring our approach down to e a r t h by questioning this interpretation.
I t is not the tragedy itself-the environmental degradation--that we query.
That, we concede, happens often enough. It is the inezorableness of t h e forces t h a t shape the tragedy, a n d our powerlessness in the face of t h e m , t h a t we take issue with. As t h e example of t h e Sherpa forest-guardians shows, even t h e flimsiest a n d most casual of institutional' arrangements can a v e r t t h e tragedy. Tragedies happen, not because they a r e inherent in t h e commons, but because t h e institutional supports for t h e commons a r e insufficient or inappropriate.
Of course, if every appropriate institutional support was already i n place, if every one of t h e m was already giving its maximum possible support, and if every instance of contention between these institutions had already adjusted itself to t h e Pareto optimum,* then t h e r e would be nothing t h a t we could do, except keep our fingers crossed and watch t o see whether t h e g r e a t tragedy hit us or passed us by. But this is not how things a r e in t h e Himalayas. The institutions. a s they now stand, a r e not giving of their best; t h e r e is room for improvement. The problem is t o h o w what can be changed (and what cannot be prevented from changing) and t o know whether such changes would be improvements.
Institutions a r e all t h a t we have to work with and, like it or not, we m u s t work with t h e institutions t h a t we have. These institutions, fortunately, a r e not immutable; they can be changed and they do change. But, a s the example of t h e Khumbu forests makes clear, n o t every institutional change is a s t e p in the direction of environmental sustainability. The challenge is threefold a n d formidable: t o identify t h e feasible (or inevitable) institutional changes, t o gain some feel for whether they a r e likely t o promote o r demote environmen- tal sustainability, and t o understand t h e e x t e n t to which it may be possible t o intervene so a s
to
encourage t h e desirable changes and t o discourage t h e undesirable changes.ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND POLiTICAL DEVELOPMENTThe lessons of t h e Khumbu forest have not gone u n h e e d e d All t h e signs a r e t h a t control of s u c h forests is now beginning to be devolved back t o t h e local level. Social forestry projects in Nepal and grassroots pressures, s u c h as the Chipko Movement i n India, a r e helping t o bring this about. So it might appear t h a t after thirty years we have come full circle, with t h e original insti- tutional supports back where they were but with many of t h e forests having disappeared i n t h e process. But this back-to-where-we-were interpretation ignores t h e very considerable political development t h a t h a s taken place dur- ing this time. In 1950 t h e administrative institutions in Kathmandu scarcely
*fie point beyond wnich any change makes one, other or both parties worse off than they were b e fare.
touched t h e daily lives of t h e Sherpas in Khumbu; now t h e y t o u c h t h e m in m a n y ways. The Royal Nepalese Airlines Corporation flies regularly into Lukla and Sangboche, t h e Edmund Hillary schools ( s t a r t e d in t h e 1960's) have been incorporated into t h e national education system, a police station a t Namche s t a m p s t h e trekking permits of t h e thousands of tourists who pass through t h e a r e a every year, and many Sherpas now divide their time between t h e i r f a r m s in Khumbu and their burgeoning business i n t e r e s t s in Kathmandu.
So it is not simply a m a t t e r of t h e government increasing t h e centraliza- tion of its power in 1950 and preparing t o decentralize it now. Over t h e last t h i r t y years t h e r e has been an enormous increase in t h e total amount of power in t h e system and, even when i t has devolved t h e control of t h e forests back t o t h e local level, t h e government's power will still be immeasurably m o r e centralized than i t was when i t saw fit t o nationalize t h e forests.
The relationship between economic development and political d e v e l o p m e n t is not (to say t h e least) entirely clear, nor is i t altogether free from con- troversy, b u t t h a t t h e r e i s a relationship and t h a t i t is an important relation- s h i p i s somewhat less disputable. The point we wish t o make is simply t h a t t h e undoubted economic development t h a t has occurred in t h e Khumbu region is consistent with t h e thesis t h a t political development is a necessary condition for sustainable economic development, and t h a t t h e decentralization of power is conducive t o political development only after t h e total a m o u n t of power within t h e system has been very considerably increased [Boggs 19821. One advantage of seeing both economic and political development in t e r m s of institutional development i s t h a t i t allows one t o take some useful account of these sorts of necessary conditions and to make some sort of useful institu- tional assessment of just where a n d when decentralization (or centralization) is likely t o be effective--politically, economically and environmentally.
So t h e approach we a r e advocating is a n approach by way of institutions.
Since t h e institutions (in t h e Himalayan region a t any r a t e ) a r e s o richly heterogeneous, t h e i r development is not amenable to "grand design" solu- tions. Rather, t h e process of institutional development is inherently unplann- able. But i t does, a t c e r t a i n places a n d a t certain times, offer points of leverage-localized opportunities for facilitating and integrating t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of institutions in t h e desired direction. Since such a n approach h a s all t h e t i m e t o be sensitive t o contexts, so as t o be able t o recognize a point of ieverage when i t sees one, we could perhaps speak of this approach a s appopri.de institutional deve Lopment
.
TRANSACTIONS
AND
BO UNDARlESThe actions of international agencies in t h e Himalayan region affect t h e lives of m a n y people. These actions a r e primarily concerned with t h e t r a n s f e r of various resources from t h e outside t o t h e inside of t h e region, a n d t h e g r e a t challenge lies not in doing this--that is easy enough--but in doing i t in s u c h a way as t o assure and s t r e n g t h e n t h e environmental sustainability of t h e development processes t h a t those resources will m e e t up with once t h e y a r e inside t h e region. The crucial question in t h e approach we label appropriate institutional development is: "1s t h e r e anything we on t h e outside c a n do t h a t will m a k e t h e forests (or whatever) m o r e valuable to those on t h e inside whose activities, directly or indirectly, impinge upon those resources?".
Take, for instance, those Himalayan creatures currently assigned to t h e category "animals of no economic valueH-tigers, pheasants, rhinoceroses, langur monkeys, red pandas, snow leopards, and so on. I t is t r u e that, in a narrow economic sense, these animals have no value-they a r e not exploitable through domestication in t h e way t h a t goats and water buffalo and yaks and domestic fowl are--but, t o many people far-removed from t h e Himalayan region, they have immense biological value*. Their argument is t h a t we (by which they mean humankind) would be immeasurably impoverished if we were t o allow these species to be driven into extinction. One of t h e great practical challenges for t h e practitioner of appropriate institutional development is to facilitate a n d integrate t h e long chain of institutional links that will transmute t h e biological values ,of individuals many thousands of miles removed from the Himalayas into t h e economic values of those who actually live there.
I t
is not an impossible task and, indeed, many of the necessary institutional supports are already in place.Each of these "animals of no economic value" has, organized around it, an articulate a n d potentially highly effective group of humans dedicated to its conservation and welfare. Those individuals in the West who a r e concerned for t h e pheasants of t h e Himalayan region are not just i n t e r e s t e d in pheasants- they are fandical about t h e m a n d the same is t r u e for all the other human groups t h a t a r e focused on these "worthless" animals. They will, a n d do, travel thousands of miles in the hope of seeing their chosen creatures and they will, and do, spend thousands of dollars, pounds, marks, yen, francs, a n d lira in the process. As long as t h e animals and their habitats a r e there, they a n d their money will pour into the Himalayas and, if t h e animals and their habitats go, then t h a t money will stop. Once this connection is made, it is clearly non- sense t o speak of these fabulous (and inalienable) assets as "animals of no economic value".
The problem, in many ways, is quite trivial. Those who want t o keep t h e forests and their biological riches in place are willing and able t o pay t h e price, and those who a r e currently removing the forests would be only too happy t o be paid not to. Only connect--that is the task of appropriate institu- tional development.
*Norman Myers, one of the eb!est proponents of this position, describes the world's tropical forests er "over-exploited and under-utilized". He argues that protecting them from rampant deforesta- tion should be a high priority for Third World governments and international arganizations, b e cause of the biological treasures the foresta hold. "Their tremendous diversity has not been exam- ined. Tropical forests cover less than seven percent of the earth's surface, but contain. fifty per- cent d its specied'. ( A s reported by Rob& Smgeorge, Washngton, 3 May 1863, UPL)
The literature, we have found, tends to segregate itself into three quite distinct levels-the bio-physical, the micro-social, and the macro-social. The phenomena a t each of these levels can readily be represented in a systemic way and each of these levels tends to be appropriated by a particular s e t of disciplines. We should s t r e s s that these a r e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l levels--partial discontinuities in the arrangement of knowledge. We do not claim that the world itself is so a r r a n g e d But, since it is systems of knowledge t h a t allow us t o understand and ( t o some extent) to manage the world. we draw upon these t h r e e levels and their systemic connections for our conceptual framework.
?he Bio-Physical Level
The physical and biological scientists [Reiger 1981, for instance, and Pereira 19811 focus on t h e physical and natural processes t h a t sustain (and, under certain conditions, undermine) the forests until eventually they bump u p against the agents t h a t a r e busy removing t h e trees-the individual hill farmers. These agents, clearly, a r e a crucial part of the system but t h e natural scientist is, by now, getting away from his expertise and he tends t o represent t h e behaviour of the farmer by some r a t h e r simple s e t of assump- tions based'on t h e "tragedy of the commons" hypothesis.
?he Micro-Socid Level
The anthropologists, t h e social foresters, and t h e cultural geographers focus on the individual hill farmer and his social c o n t e x t - t h e framework of land t e n u r e within t h e village and the patterns of social relationships within the village. The r a t h e r inadequate figure sketched by t h e natural scientists is h e r e worked up into a very full and accurate portrait. We g e t right into the worlds of the Gurung [MacFariane 1976, Messerschmidt 19761, t h e Sherpa [FGrer-Haimendorf 1964, Ortner 19781, the Rai [Allen 19721, and so on and we begin t o see their physical a n d social environments in their terms. In particu- lar, t h e ethno-ecological studies of Kirsten Johnson and h e r colleagues [1982]
reveal t o u s t h e hill farmer's own land-use categories and, through them, t h e shrewd, sensitive and rational strategies by which he strives t o manage t h e natural and man-made hazards t h a t he faces.
Furer-Hairnendorf [1975] goes one stage further and broadens t h i s picture by moving back and forth between the Hindu and Buddhist populations- between the Middle Ranges a n d the Highlands-and thereby revealing the very different, yet mutually reinforcing, strategies of t h e "cautious cultivator" (for whom land is wealth) a n d t h e "adventurous trader" (for whom individualized exchange is wealth). This painstaking teasing out of the various socially induced strategies t h a t a r e available a t the micro-level opens up all sorts of policy capabilities t h a t a r e ignored (denied, even) by the tragedy-of-the- commans assumptions.* But what is absolutely crucial before we can hope to exercise these capabilities is an understanding of t h e sorts of perturbations to an individual's social context that will dislodge him from one strategy and bring him to r e s t a t another. There are, of course; perturbations a t this micro-level but they pale into insignificance against t h e sorts of perturbations t h a t a r e generated a t t h e macro-level:
*And also, re would argue, by the assumptions built into "economic man"
e.g., rapidly rising population, industrial development, geo-political upheavals,
policy changes a t central government level.
'Ihe Macro- Social Level
The political scientists, the policy analysts, and t h e students of interna- tional relations focus almost exclusively on this macro-social level, often t o impressive effect. For instance, a serious trans-boundary problem in North America a n d Europe i s acid rain. There, as in t h e Himalayas, something t h a t happens in one country is seen as having unfortunate downstream conse- quences in another country. The physical scientists do their research, t h e ministerial level meetings a r e held, resolutions a r e passed, and eventually, mutually satisfactory national policies a r e t h r a s h e d out. When it comes to t h e implementation of those policies t h e obstacles, though considerable, a r e not insuperable. The agents t h a t cause the acid rain a r e t h e power stations con- trolled by vast utilities or even vaster nationalized industries. Legislation.
regulation and inspection a r e quite easily applied t o s u c h agents. once t h e political will has been mustered. But, in t h e Himalayas, t h e agents are the myriad individual hill farmers. So i t is a p r o b l e m of m a n y rzgents, and satis- factory policy formulation and implementation simply will not be possible unless the micro and macro levels a r e first related t o one another.
A S m p l i s t i c Model
The understanding of the systems t h a t operate a t each of these t h r e e levels-the t h e bio-physical, the micro-social, a n d t h e m a c r o - s o c i a l i s really most impressive (in qualitative t e r m s , a t least). The understanding of the sys- temic connections between these t h r e e levels is abysmal--.on-existent almost*. But it is precisely these connections-between t h e natural environ- ment, t h e myriad strategizing agents, a n d t h e large-scale social perturbations-that will have to be explored and understood before we can really tell whether anything can be done about t h e environmental degradation of the Himalayas and, if so, what.
What we have tried t o do with this little s t u d y is t o construct some sort of framework for these connections, and t o c o n s t r u c t it in such a way t h a t t h e crucial insights t h a t already exist a t the different levels a r e preserved and.
indeed, a r e given salience. Insights such as t h a t t h e tragedy is not intrinsic to the commons but, r a t h e r , results from a lack of appropriate institutional s u p port. Insights such a s t h a t t h e "cautious cultivator" a n d "adventurous trader"
strategies a r e induced and stabilized by social context r a t h e r t h a n by cultural heritage. Insights such as t h a t the foreign policy of a buffer s t a t e is best served by it playing off one international agency against another r a t h e r than by encouraging t h e m t o negotiate a n integrated effort.
*The one disciplinary exception being the forest historian.
INSIGHTS AND SYSTEMIC CONNECTIONS 1:
THE TRAGEDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALLY UNSUPPORTED COMMONS
The prevalent thesis t h a t t h e tragedy is inherent t o t h e commons and t h a t , human n a t u r e being what i t is, the tragedy is therefore unavoidable, leads directly t o some drastic conclusions. Either we must get rid of the com- mons or we m u s t change human nature. The first conclusion justifies privati- zation as t h e only viable policy; the second conclusion, pinning its hope on a new e r a of human cooperation being miraculously ushered in through t h e application of draconian regulation, justifies coercive utopianism as t h e only viable policy. Rieger [1981]. for example, and Wallace [1983] find themselves carried towards t h e privatization policy; Hardin, [1968] for example, and Cro- nin [1979] find themselves carried towards the coercive utopianism policy.
Those milder observers, who happen not t o be already predisposed towards one or other of these extreme solutions, will point out t h a t those who subscribe t o this bleak view of humankind have simply failed to apprehend t h e full wonder of h u m a n social and cultural institutions.
The whole historical process t h a t is subsumed within t h e rubric of "sus- tained institutional developmentw-whether i t be the successful operation of the Sherpa system of forest guardians in Nepal or the emergence in the West of professions with codes of practice and associated sanctions capable of discouraging those actions that, though profitable t o t h e individual practi- tioner, would bring t h e calling itself into d i s r e p u t e d a n be read as a cumula- tive sequence in which commons managing institutions a r e continuously being piled upon commons managing institutions. On this reading, human social life is, in large measure, a n enterprise in tragedy aversion; and human history is, in large measure, t h e story of that enterprise's successes and set- backs. But the privatizers a n d t h e coercive utopians do not read i t in this way;
i t does n o t square with their predelictions. Their perceptions a r e not false;
they a r e partial, partisan, provincial and polarised.
On top of this, t h e m y t h of modernization-the conviction t h a t we in t h e developed North a r e altogether different from them in t h e developing South- has curiously distorted t h e dispute between these two schools of tragic thought. Because of t h i s we have first to straighten out the distortion before we c a n draw the c o r r e c t conclusions from the dispute. The privatizers and t h e ' coercive utopians s h a r e t h e s a m e basic assumption--that t h e tragedy is intrinsic to t h e c o m m o n s d u t they s t a r t off from seriously polarized positions on development. The privatizers a r e f o r development, the coercive utopians a r e
against
it (it is t h i s polarization t h a t shapes the growth/no growth -debate in t h e North). Both subscribe t o t h e myth of modernization and see us as alto- g e t h e r diIferent from t h e m ; i t is just t h a t t h e privatizer sees development a s a desideratum a n d t h e coercive utopian sees it as a disaster. Both a r e suffused with missionary zeal (though, in t h i s secular age, such zeal tends t o take on an economic or ecological form). The privatizer sees the unmoderns a s benighted (underdeveloped) h e a t h e n s and is anxious t o lighten t h e i r darkness;t h e coercive utopian sees t h e m as noble (nature-respecting) savages and is anxious to bring us Gadarene swine to our senses before we all fall over t h e eco-cliff edge.
When t h e milder observers e n t e r onto this polarized scene. a n d point out t h a t in many traditional societies t h e r e exist all sorts of institutions for t h e collective management of resources, t h e myth of modernization immediately insinuates itself t o insist t h a t s u c h archaic institutions do not, of course, exist among us moderns. As the milder observers then move on to become advo- c a t e s for t h e adoption and adaptation of these traditional commons managing
institutions into t h e development process so they accuse t h e privatizers of seeking to impose t h e i r inappropriate Northern solutions upon t h e South. And so the myth of modernization, remounted, rides on; they are collectivized, we are privatized.
Appropriate institutional development, therefore, faces a twofold task.
First, it has to show t h a t t h e tragedy of the commons is not intrinsic to t h e commons themselves but is a consequence of their receiving insufficient or inappropriate institutional support; second, i t has t o show t h a t we in t h e developed North are as knee-deep in collective commons managing institu- tions as a r e they in t h e developing South (and that i t is only the different stages t h a t each h a s currently reached in t h e development process t h a t in any way distinguishes them). Of course, it is to the professions a n d to the self-regulation of institutions such as stock exchanges and Lloyds of London t h a t we should be looking in t h e developed North but. even so, we can still find examples of Northern agricultural commons managing institutions.
The Solway Marshes in t h e north of England, for instance, a r e a common that is managed by a combination of privately owned "stints" (grazing rights) and the collective control of grazing level through a venerable local body t h a t each year assesses t h e ecological status of the common and sets t h e number OF cattle, sheep, etc. p e r stint accordingly. Compare this with t h e forest a t Dahbaley in t h e Arun Valley in Nepal.
By mutual agreement everyone in t h e village shared the right t o use t h e forest as they needed, but no one was allowed to clear t h e land. To promote a sustained yield, the headmen of t h e village assign rights to gather firewood in certain areas of each woodlot, and households jealously guard t h e i r territories; many territories represent tradi- tional claims t h a t date back several generations. Trivial uses of wood a r e discouraged, and when a household needs a particularly large t r e e for a construction project, they must pay a sizable sum to t h e village headmen. The fundamental concept of a renewable resource is also recognized, and the headmen will sometimes declare a moratorium on cutting if a certain plot shows signs of really excessive use t h a t yill soon lead t o complete exhaustion. [Cronin 1979, pp.75-76]
So t h e Solway Marshes and t h e Dahbaley forest t u r n out t o be managed in amost identical ways (and similar examples can be added from other parts of t h e world-Botswana, for instance) and t h e common recipe for success seems t o include t h e following ingredients:
(i) A definite piece of land; a definite group of people.
(ii) Small in scale (village level institutions).
(iii) Some privatization (stints, family "territories'.') and face-to-face relation- ships for the communal control mechanism.'
*We are indebted to Malcolm Odell for this list of ingredients for success. Also relevant here are '.ra&tional communal working arrangements such as the Sherpa n g d o k (F'iirer-Haimendorl 1875) and the Gurung n o g w (Messersc hmidt 1881).
INSIGHTS AND SYSTEMIC CONNECTIONS 2:
THE
SOCIALLY IND VCED STRATEGIESVery little has changed, i t would appear, since Erik Eckholm wrote:
Land use p a t t e r n s are a n expression of deep political, economic, and cultural s t r u c t u r e ; they do n o t change when an ecologist or forester sounds t h e alarm t h a t a country is losing its resource base. [Eckholm 1976, p. 1671
Yet, incontestable though this assertion of changelessness may appear, it does not square a t all well with Heraclitus' similarly incontestable (but r a t h e r longer lived) assertion t h a t t h e only thing t h a t is p e r m a n e n t is change. To resolve this paradox we m u s t look a little m o r e closely a t what is m e a n t by a
"deep political, economic a n d c u l t u r a l structure".
Such s t r u c t u r e s . of course, a r e built up of institutions a n d they can, in general, be
wid
or fle&le. A rigid s t r u c t u r e resists t h e inevitable change t h a t it encounters and, in so doing, increases its own fragility. Though t h e change is not incorporated into t h e s t r u c t u r e , i t does n o t go away; i t builds up outside t h e s t r u c t u r e until i t reaches t h e point where its strength exceeds t h a t of t h e s t r u c t u r e itself. A t this point we g e t s t m c t u r a l collapse. A flexible s t r u c t u r e absorbs t h e inevitable change t h a t i t e n c o u n t e r s and, in so doing, stimulates its own adaptability. Since t h e change i s continuously incor- porated into t h e s t r u c t u r e , i t cannot build up outside i t a n d this m e a n s t h a t , instead of s t r u c t u r a l collapse, we g e t s t m t u r a l &ansition. A complex s t r u c - t u r e (such a s we a r e talking about in t h e Himalayas) will contain both rigidify- ing and flexing tendencies in some dynamic and, in general, unbalanced pat- tern-of contention.The classic development approach has been t o sound t h e alarm and then, confident t h a t t h e country's attention h a s been gained, t o tell it what will have to be done if it is t o avoid losing its resource base. I t has not worked. I t h a s not worked because i t has ignored (as if i t were some m e r e detail of imple- mentation) t h e deep political, economic a n d cultural s t r u c t u r e t h a t is, in fact, what determines t h e country's attention a n d lack of attention. What is needed is a more sensitive approach; an approach t h a t places t h e ' m e r e details'--the institutions t h a t constitute this deep s t r u c t u r e - a t t h e very c e n t r e of t h e stage and relegates t o t h e wings t h e alarm bellringers and their immaculate prescriptions.
There is, we hasten t o add, nothing particularly new about this approach.
It is, for instance, wholly consistent with t h e economic arguments s e t o u t by Hirschman [1977] a n d by Sen [1975], with t h e political science a r g u m e n t s s e t o u t by Dahl a n d Lindblom 119531 and by Wildavsky a n d Pressman [1973], and with t h e r u r a l development a r g u m e n t s s e t out by Clark and Johnston [1982].
The only novelty we would claim is in o u r giving this approach a thoroughgo- ing and, we hope, useful institutional expression.
We would agree with Eckholm when h e says t h a t t h e "prerequisites of eco- logical recovery a r e identical t o t h e t a c t i c s of a m o r e general war against poverty and hunger" and we would stay with him when h e goes on t o say t h a t
"those concerned with global ecological deterioration and its consequences have no choice b u t t o throw themselves i n t o t h e maelstrom t h a t is t h e politics of social change" [Eckholm 1976, p. 1671. But where we might. perhaps, differ is in t h e m a n n e r of our throwing oursqlves into t h a t maelstrom.
The s t a r k simplicity of the poverty and desperation engendered by a rapidly growing landbased population is the basis for the deterioration in t h e Himalayan region, but the attempt to move forward-to do something about it-is fraught with all t h e complexity encountered in any anti-poverty cam- paign. As t h e pressures on the land increase so the hill farmer finds himself driven t o accepting the second, third, or even fourth best alternatives sug- gested to him by his traditional strategies [Johnson e t al. 19821. A t the limit, h e faces an almost total lack of alternatives. In o t h e r words, the deep struc- t u r e is becoming ever more rigid and ever more fragile. To find oneself a part of such a s t r u c t u r e is t o find oneself becoming poorer and poorer; that is what poverty i s a s h e e r lack of options.* But, though this sort of description does fit many of t h e people who live in t h e Himalayas, i t does not fit them all. I t does not fit those, like the Thakkalis and Sherpas, who are busy exploiting the opportunities presented by tourism and mountaineering; it does not fit Tamang villagers on t h e fringe of t h e Kathmandu Valley who are now breeding buffalo for t h e hamburger market, portering for expeditions, and pedalling tri-shaws in the gaps in between; i t does not fit, and it never has fitted, those largely Buddhist people whose institutions, s u c h as monasticism and economic individualism, s t e m the cause of all this rigidity--the rising popula- tion and the equation of land with w e a l t h a t source.
Of course, just because these people are following flexible and adaptive strategies, it does not automatically follow t h a t they are doing wonders for their physical environments-that is something t h a t can only be determined by careful on-the-ground observation and monitoring. No, what is so impor- t a n t about these opportunistic strategies is not what they are doing to t h e environment (though t h a t , of course, is important) but t h a t they a r e there. If rigidity and fragility spells poverty, t h e n anything t h a t promotes flexibility and adaptability carries with it t h e possibility of escape from poverty.
Let us explain more precisely what we mean by this, since it is the crux of our argument a n d t h e key to our strategic recommendations. If land and wealth are seen a s virtually synonomous, and if t h e population t h a t has to live on t h a t land is increasing rapidly, t h e n we have a negative-sum game from which t h e only possible relief is by way of population stabilization or increased productivity (or both). But, if t h e equation of land with wealth is severed, clo- sure is no longer inevitable and it is possible (but by no means certain) t h a t the game will become positive sum. A t present both games a r e being played in the Himalayas.
The distinctive feature of mountain environments is not t h a t they a r e relatively closed b u t , rather, t h a t they exert severe constraints upon t h e organisation of social life. Some settlements may indeed be constrained in such a way as t o be almost totally isolated; elsewhere lines of communication may be constrained in such a way t h a t settlements a r e little more than stag- ing posts for a massive two-way traffic in trade between areas separated by t h e mountains. Thus, a t one extreme, communities a r e so constrained t h a t they have to be self-supporting (though in the Himalayas such communities are few a n d far between a n d those t h a t do exist can have little effect on deforestation) whilst, a t t h e o t h e r extreme, t h e r e a r e communities t h a t exist solely
to
take advantage of t h e trade flow and which simply could not support themselves without this external contact. In many areas i t is possible to choose some optimal mix between these two extremes. Some--the c a u t i o u s cultivators-*Though the two often go together, poverty is to be distinguished from destitution. Destitution is s bio-physical concept, poverty a social one.
stay a t home to farm and are content to produce a small surplus of grain over and above their own requirements; others-the adventurous traders-make do with a minimum of agricultural production and direct most of their energies t o t h e business of trade. [Fiirer-Haimendorf 19751
So interdependence, not independence, is t h e mountain rule and the sig- nificant (and policy relevant) differences that emerge are those between t h e different ways in which t h a t interdependence is taken up. Those in t h e Middle Ranges tend to adopt t h e low risk/low reward option of cautious cultivation and a small production surplus* ;those in t h e higher valleys tend to adopt t h e high risk/high reward option of adventurous trading and some farming in t h e background. This bifurcation of risk-handling strategies is remarkably pro- nounced and, as well a s being reflected in the Middle Ranges/high valleys set- tlement patterns. usually corresponds with t h e profound cultural division between Hindus and Buddhists. Yet, despite this separation, each strategy depends for its viability upon the other. The myriad cautious cultivators sell or b a r t e r their small surpluses t o t h e adventurous traders who, in their t u r n , use this grain to supplement t h e i r own meagre production and t o form one half of their lucrative trade with t h e Tibetan plateau. To t h e adventurous trader, tourism is just another kind of trade and many have already switched across t o it. The development of this industry has, fortuitously, coincided with t h e decline of t h e traditional trade with Tibet (as a consequence, in t h e short t e r m , of the Chinese occupation of Tibet and, in t h e longer term, of t h e substi- tution of cheap Indian salt for Tibetan salt throughout the Middle Ranges). So the interdependence system remains essentially the same; it is just t h a t t h e surpluses of the cautious cultivators now find their way, via the adventurous traders, into tourism r a t h e r than into Tibet.
This system of interdependence would break down if the presently increasing population of the Middle Ranges were t o reach t h e point where t h e r e was no longer a n e t surplus of grain.** Or a t least, it would break down if new industries did not appear in t h e meantime. As was t h e case with Switzer- land a n d Austria, the most likely new industry is tourism.***
It i s t h e adventurous traders, with their opportunism and t h e i r entrepreneurial flair, who respond most readily t o this new industry. Some (like t h e Sherpas) have established a virtual monopoly in certain areas, but, a t t h e same time, some of t h e cautious cultivators (Tamang villagers on t h e fringe of the Kathmandu valley, for instance) have switched across t o t h e adventurous trader's strategy in order to take fuller advantage of this newly available opportunity. So these strategies, though they exhibit a certain rigi- dity, a r e not immutable-they a r e , as i t were, a function of the social context t h a t , paradoxically seemingly, is largely their creation.****
*Sometimes they will augment this by periods of seasonal labour in the Indian plains or by more lengthy absences as mercenaries in the British or Indian armies or in the Singapore riot police. As one moves further west along the Himalayas so the interplay of arable and pastoral strategies b e comes more sigmficant. 'I'he tranehumanic and semi-nomadic Gaddis and Gujars move their flocks of aheep a d goats and their herds of buffalo through the settled populations along traditionally es- tablished, but still changing, mutes t h a t are sustained by innumerable exchange relationships (~rtubble-grazing for manuring, for instance) of quite staggering sequential and spatial complexity.
**For a fuller description of these relationships see Fbrer-Hdmendorf (1975 final chepter).
***The latest five Year Plan for Nepal [HMG l m l ] shows serious shortfalls in almost all i t s industri- al targets with only tourism surging f a r beyond what was expected of it. In Bhutan, tourism is ex- pected to become the principle industry in the Bhumtang area (Jest and Stein 1682).
****For some discussion of the complex processes by which plural socially induced strategies are stabilized and transformed, see. Marriott (1867) and Thompson (1082).
We will r e t u r n presently t o discuss t h e practical implications of t h e s e socially induced strategies but, for t h e m o m e n t , i t is sufficient to note t h a t t h e strategies exist, t h a t they are stabilized by an individual's social context.
t h a t t h e process of institutional development inevitably results in changes in t h e social contexts of some individuals, t h a t such changes c a n sometimes result in t h e displacement of an individual from one strategy t o another, a n d t h a t (where points of leverage exist within this development process) t h e r e eldsts t h e possibility of intervening in s u c h a way as t o encourage t h e dis- placement of c e r t a i n "borderline" individuals from a less desirable to a more desirable strategy. Lest i t appear t h a t all t h i s - s m a c k s too much of social engineering, we would point o u t t h a t any policy implementation displaces peo- ple from one socially induced strategy t o another, often unwittingly and often in an undesirable direction.
INSIGHTS AND SYSTEMIC CONNECTIONS 3:
THE MANAGEMENT OF POWERLESSNESS
Over t h e centuries t h e g r e a t empires have always r u n o u t of steam a t t h e Himalayas. The Moghul Empire, though i t ruled all t h e plains, could not forci- bly convert t o lslam t h e Rajput kingdoms t h a t took refuge in Kangra, Kulu.
Garhwal and Jumla; n e i t h e r t h e British nor t h e Russian Empire, for all t h e i r bitter rivalry, was able t o win t h e Great Game (as i t was called) and subjugate Afghanistan; f u r t h e r e a s t , t h e British simply gave u p trying t o incorporate Nepal into t h e i r empire; and, on t h e o t h e r side of Nepal, t h e Chinese Empire had little option b u t t o leave Tibet autonomous a n d independent in all but token claim. In geopolitical t e r m s t h e Himalayas a r e not a power vacuum-for t h a t would imply t h a t they could readily be filled--but, r a t h e r , a sort of pla- t e a u where t h e power of t h e plains finally becomes so a t t e n u a t e d t h a t i t c a n no longer sway events one way or t h e other. The Himalayas, in consequence, a r e a vast political m a r g i n - a largely uncontrolled t r a c t filled with a rich assortment of independent-minded opportunists and refugees.
For those who have become accustomed t o understanding human affairs in t e r m s of power relationships t h e Himalayas a r e a s baffling as i s weightless- ness t o those pragmatists long used t o operating with t h e i r f e e t planted firmly on t h e ground. Himalayan politics, i n countries like Nepal and Bhutan, a r e more concerned with t h e management of powerlessness t h a n with t h e d i r e c t exercise of power. The difference is akin t o t h a t between judo and prize- fighting. The c o n s u m m a t e skill of t h e r e c e n t kings of Nepal (and, before t h e m , of t h e hereditary P r i m e Ministers) h a s resulted in a delicate display in which t h e balance of t h e slight c e n t r a l figure is maintained by continually playing off t h e various superpowers (and, m o r e recently. t h e various international agencies) against one another.
Development experts have now l e a r n t t o t h e i r cost t h a t t h e impressive arrays of policy levers displayed in t h e ministries of many of t h e less- developed countries a r e , all too often, not c o n n e c t e d t o anything. This is usu- ally i n t e r p r e t e d a s a symptom of underdevelopment; t h e conclusion is t h a t they should be connected a n d t h a t satisfactory development will become pos- sible once t h e y a r e connected. But such a conclusion would be valid only if t h e political system was based upon t h e direct exercise of power. 1n a system The curious politics of the Nepalese budgetary process, for instance, makes sense only when inter-
~ r e t e d in t h s light (Wildavskg and Caiden 1974). For a detailed eccount of Nepalese politics see Rose and Scholz (1980) and for Bhutun see Rose (1871).
