GFTLTNG TO GRIPS WlTH UNCEXTAINTY

The wide u n c e r t a i n t y surrounding Himalayan deforestation provides us with a wide choice of problems. We could, if we were s o minded, simply choose t h e problem best s u i t e d t o our approach a n d discard t h e r e s t ; but that. of course, would m e a n claiming t h a t t h a t was t h e r e a l problem and t h a t all t h e others were unreal. If we want to preserve what is r e a l about all t h e s e problems--the u n c e r t a i n t y a s t o which, i f any, of t h e m is t h e real problem- t h e n we have to t r e a t t h e problem we choose simply a s a point of entry: a way of opening up and exploring t h e complex physical, social a n d cultural system t h a t is currently generating all t h i s uncertainty. Since this whole idea of put- ting t h e problems inside t h e uncertainty r u n s so c o u n t e r t o t h e established

*An additional factor in the breakdown of the control system may be the partial erosion of the tuo great stabilizing ideals of Sherpa life; the proper utilization of acquired wealth and the cultivaticm of courtesy, gentleness and a spirit of compromise and peacefulness. Both Sherpa business in- volvement in Kathmandu and central government's involvement in the local affaim of Khumbu contribute t o this erosion.

**

Much mare data of this type i s now available. There is the experience of the National Park r a p dens (e.g. Jefferies 1082), and of the leaders of the two hydro-electric projects in Khumbu (e.g. Hin- richsen e t d. 1883 and Coburn ^1883). Recently there have been detailed studies of how fuelwood is used in Namche village (Adam Stem) m d of how that wood is obtained (Barbara bower). F'iire~

Haimendori has just completed another field trip t o Wumbu, aimed a t documenting the c h a q e s that have occurred since his previous visits, and Sherry Ortner has recently revisited the area to study the effects of mountaineering and tourism on the Sherpas' Buddhist belief m d practice.

Them there is t h e less formal, but every bit as usdul, on-the-ground experience of various pro- gramme staff and, be i t said, of the Sherpas themselves many of whom are multi-hgual, well- educated and extraordinarily well-travelled. In every local context in the Himalayas there is knowledge and experience of this type waiting to be tapped. All that is rnissing is the recognition by international agencies, organieed science b d national governments that this ia the level a t which data becomes information. That is, it b e p to tell you zmmethmg.

patterns of applied science, we should make explicit the various steps that are involved in this s o r t of exploratory exercise.

THE T R A N S SCIENCE APPROACH TO UNCERTMNTY

The system t h a t we wish to describe is, first a n d foremost, a system for generating uncertainty. This uncertainty, we would argue, is not inherent in the bio-physical properties of the system (though they, of course, a r e not irrelevant to it), nor is i t generated just by accident, nor is it generated just for its own sake. It is generated by institutions for institutions. The survival of an institution r e s t s ultimately upon the credibility i t can muster for its idea of how the world is; for i t s definition of t h e problem; for its claim that its version of t h e real is self-evident. And, for such credibility t o be maintained.

the institution m u s t come tolerably close t o delivering on t h e expectations t h a t rationally flow from from t h e system of knowledge t h a t it promotes.* In this way, uncertainties in knowledge about physical processes a r e brought face-to-face with t h e creation of expectations by social processes. Social insti- tutions a r e t h e m e a n s by which these two-knowledge a n d experience-are brought together, and only those institutions t h a t manage to achieve some measure of consis'tency in this conflation can remain credible a n d viable.

If we have a system of plural institutions- system t h a t depends for its very existence on t h e contention of the diverse institutions t h a t comprise it- then we should expect i t t o display a number of fundamental system proper- ties: plural perceptions, plural problem definitions, plural expectations, and plural rationalities. And for such a system t o go on existing it will, somehow or other, have t o generate sufficient uncertainty t o swamp all the contradic- tions that a r e i n h e r e n t in t h e pluralized positions i t contains.

To describe s u c h a system you have t o observe it, a n d herein lies the next difficulty. The observer is inevitably a part of t h e system he wishes to observe; t h e r e is n o way t h a t h e can step right outside i t and play the "cosmic exile". Our t e r m s of reference and, indeed, t h e whole context within which t h e institutions we a r e embedded in were able t o come together to conceive, approve and fund this project predisposed us t o g r a n t credibility to one partic- ular problem definition-that in terms of the trans-boundary properties of t h e silt and water run-offs in t h e Himalayan region. So we begin by treating this particular problem as if i t is t h e real problem but, mindful of all the uncer- tainty we have already described. we t r y t o resist t h e narrow parochialism that inevitably closes in around any single-problem definition by all the time asking ourselves how this particular dehnition might relate t o some other pos- sible. definitions. By doing this we a r e able t o list some practical reasons- some useful advantages-for choosing as our point of entry this trans- boundary problem. Then, as we try t o generalize these advantages by placing this trans-boundary problem into its political and institutional setting, and by conceding t h a t all sorts of other flows (technology "transfers". for instance) also encounter boundary problems, we a r e able t o translate these practical advantages into tactical m-d even strategic advantages.

'"Tolerably close" means that the system of knowledge that ^ari individual is supplied with in return for granting credibility to a particular institution comes closer to delivering on the expectations it creates for him than would any of the systems of knowledge that would be available to him if he were to switch his elleqiance t o other institutions. For a fuller treatment of this see Thompson 1882 (especiaily p. 56).

In other words, we gradually detach ourselves from a particular s e t of trans-boundary problems-those involving water and silt flows between t h e countries of t h e r e g i o n a n d fasten finally upon trans-boundary problems of a much more general kind. Boundaries, we come t o realize, are being generated (or actively maintained) all over the place and we end up by focusing on t h e perceptual and transactional boundaries t h a t serve to separate and sustain all the various contending institutions. The physical boundaries between t h e nations of the region, of course, fall within this frame but, a s our exploration has proceeded, so we have found t h e m becoming less and less significant.

And, as this particular trans-boundary problem has receded, so others have come t o t h e fore. If we were to single out one particular type of trans- boundary droblem as being the most significant we would choose the problems of transfer between national and village-level institutions-between pro- gramme provision and programme delivery.

POINT OF ENTRY: SOME CREDIBLE PROBLEMS

1. Is t h e problem t h e environmental degradation of the Himalayas? i f so, we m u s t consider all t h e vegetated vertical z o n e s - f r o m the alpine pastures t o t h e Terai.'

2. Is t h e problem the deforestation of the Himalayas? If so, we m u s t con- sider the forest zones or, a t least, those t h a t a r e or may be subject t o deforestation.

3. Is t h e problem the downstream effects-the worsening impacts of flood- ing, t h e silting of dams, the clogging of turbines, etc.? If so, we have only t o consider the increased run-off (from removal of the forest buffering) t h e increased erosion (from deforestation, over-grazing, over-terracing- over-extension of land-use generally) a n d the increased transport of silt (from t h e combination of these two):

*These zones are not a t all clear-cut. They are "merely broad outlines that conform to a basic pro- gression of changing temperature and rainfall, and each contains a preponderance of particular species that gives it a characteristic identity" (Cronin 1078, pp. 24-25). Botanists dispute the specific boundaries and compositicms of these zones but agree that, whatever they are, they do vary a s one moves eest or west along t h e Himalayan chain. Around the middle of this chain, ac- cording to Cronin, "there appear to be six zones of plants and animals stacked one on top of the other in rapid succemion up the slopes". These zones are:

1. From 600 feet above ma level (the edge of t h e plains of India: the Terai) up to 3,000 feet. A f r o p i c d ZOM, originally largely sd forest.

2. From 9,000 feet to 6,000 feet. A sub-hopicd zone, originally a mixed forest of Ccrstunopsis and &hima trees and the palm Pundanus fircafus. This is now almost entirely replaced with terraced cultivation.

3. From 6,000 feet to 8,500 feet. A lower tsmpemfe zone, comprised of oak and laurel forests. Since much cultivation stops at around 6,000 feet, this forest is still quite continu- ous. In many areas, though, people largely of Tibetan origin manage t o cultivate potatoes, buckwheat and barley up t o 14,000 feet.

4. From 8,500 feet to 12,000 feet. An upper tempercrte ^ZOM containing a veriety of forests:

maples. magnolias, rhododendrons and bamboo.

5. From 12,000 feet to the upper limit of plant life (varies between 16,000 and 20,000 feet).

An d p i m zone. Fir and birch forests giving way to low shrubs, al?ine rneedows and moraine- covered slopes. Some cultivation extends into this zone and livestock are often grazed up to t h e very limit of vegetatian.

6. From the upper limit of the alpine zone to 28,000 feet (the end of the earth). A hrg3 dti-

tuQ zone. No piant life but many invertebrete creatures feedng on wind-blown plant debris (mostly pollen).

The serious trans-boundary problem is the last one. I t is, of course, nested within t h e first two wider problems so far as the total physical/biological sys- tem is concerned but i t stands by itself as apolitical problem.

In one sense, of course, it really does not m a t t e r where we start. Whether we begin with the tail or t h e trunk, the systems approach, concerned all t h e time with the connectedness of the' parts, should lead us t o t h e s a m e totality--the elephant. But t h e r e are, nevertheless, certain practical advan- tages in starting with this particular trans-boundary problem.

1. Being political, it is directly concerned with "the a r t of t h e possibleo-with delineating what, if anything, can be done given t h e way people and nations a r e now and might be in t h e immediate future.

2. It sets for its solution a clearcut and, by comparison with t h e other two problems, a modest goal--mitigating t h e downstream effects until t h e y become roughly equivalent to what they were some years ago. With t h e other problems. by contrast, you r u n the risk of inadvertently commit- ting yourself to t h e immodest and politically unreasonable goal of restor- ing t h e eco-system t o what i t was before man arrived on t h e Himalayan scene.

3.

I t

places a t t h e c e n t r e of t h e whole system t h e agent responsible (in t h e physical sense of wielding the axe, t h a t is, not in a social or political sense) for t h e problem--the individual hill farmer. In so doing i t encourages us t o understand his perceptions, his ecological theories, his strategies for coping with environmental dangers, his relations with his fellow men and the way in which all these a c t so as to shape t h e options t h a t a r e open to him and to guide him in his choice between them.

With this particular focus, t h e a r t of t h e possible becomes concerned with two things-the possibility of influencing his situation s o t h a t t h e options available to him a r e changed (either by adding new ones o r removing old ones or both) and t h e possibility of influencing his choice between these options (by, somehow or other, changing their attractiveness relative

to

one another).

Such influences can be brought to bear in two ways--by enforcement a n d by incentives. So far as t h e a r t of t h e possible is concerned, t h e s e sticks a n d car- rots a r e t h e only instruments t h e r e a r e for reversing t h e downward spiral of degradation. lf n o combination of these instruments can achieve this t h e n t h e r e is no solution. If t h e r e is no solution then t h e r e is n o problem.

I t

is important not to Lose sight of this posssibility; if t h e r e is n o solution t h e n resources, both financial and intellectual, should be redirected towards adapt- ing t o the inevitable.

In contrast to this a r t of t h e possible, where policy options have always t o be measured against t h e solid (but locally variable) f e a t u r e s of t h e hill farmer, t h e r e is what might be called the "science of the possible" which simply ignores these obstacles. The challenge is, somehow o r other, t o explore both these-to experience the exhilaration and scope of what could be whilst, a t t h e same time, gaining some s o r t of feel for the institutional barriers t h a t may inhibit its attainment.

The crucial distinction between the "science" and t h e "art" is t h a t t h e first sees the agent (in this case. t h e hill farmer) as a sort of zombie who just sits there having his life altered by t h e various ingenious policies t h a t a r e t a r - getted on him, whilst the second sees him as a responsive strategising being who may be expected, not t o just passively receive s u c h policies, b u t t o r e a c t to them as well. The science of t h e possible, therefore, has no place for per- ceptions,

it

sees cis-science as the only way t o go. a n d i t deals in technical

fixes. The a r t of t h e possible, by contrast, accords a central place to increased run-off a n d silt transport from the hills causing increased flooding in t h e plains. But since we already h o w , from o u r exploration of t h e uncer-

Such management--the management of powerlessness-is often achieved by strategising behaviour; for instance, t h a t of t h e Nepalese ambassador who, economic rationality- is really no different (since it admits of no strategic options) from the sim- ple zombie assumption. Like the zombie assumption, it too generates surprise-free scenarios. The notion of "policy responsiveness" assumes but a single rationality and but a single correct percep tion; "reactivity" assumes that rationalities and perceptions are plural.

But it would be unfair, and untrue, to tar all economists with this single rationality brush. If ecanornic rationality is Reen as being context dependent, then one could expect to see different strategies emerging in different contexts. h a sense, one could then say that there are a s m a y rationalitiea as there ore possible strategies. So, rather than making tm indiscriminate attack an economists, we should try to mesh our approach with that of the institutional economists who, like us, do not ins& that rationality i s extensional. [We have tried to give some indication of how this m y h t be done in Chapter I, i n the section headed S m t a g i c : &Lordions 2: 39na~t hfarkats and Supid,Ifojacfs.]

who otherwise would have no voice in the policy debate. That, to a consider- able extent, is what we a r e doing here.

Of course, t o speak in t e r m s of just two p e r s p e c t i v e s d n e from the plains and one from t h e h i l l s i s t o grossly over-simplify the patterns of socially induced perceptions in the region, and the fact t h a t strategising behaviour also has some of t h e policy actors hopping back and forth between the various perceptual vantage points like characters in a Feydou farce only complicates things still further. Though these underlying patterns and their overlays of strategising behaviour can be sorted out*, we will not a t t e m p t to do it here.

Instead. we will simply try t o keep the idea of plural problem definitions alive by moving back and forth between just two of these socially induced perceptions--the "irate administrator's" and the "sceptical observer's". What we a r e doing, in effect, is taking a crude geo-political slice through all these varied perceptions. We identify the axis between the plains and the hills. and its accompanying implicit compact, as one of the key variables in the whole system and we t h e n collapse all the perceptions down onto t h a t axis and explore the range of credible problems and credible solutions through t h e remarkably different perceptions that lie a t each end of t h a t axis. What fol- lows, therefore, is n o t a complete analysis of problems and solutions but an exploratory range-finding exercise.

SOME

CREDIBLE SOL UTIONS

Solution 1. Restore t h e run-off (by increasing t h e t r e e cover) and restore t h e erosion r a t e (by reducing the landslides, etc. t h a t a r e caused by human activity and by increasing the t r e e cover) so as to reduce t h e violence of t h e flooding to what i t was t e n , fifteen. thirty or whatever years ago. This is an upstream solution.

The sceptical observer in the hills sees things r a t h e r differently. In his experience, "the major effects a r e felt primarily a t source. We don't count t h e m because uplanders don't record the disappear- a n c e of t h e i r farms from landslip or burial or chronic deteriora- tion". [Rornm 19831. from this perspective, the distinction between upstream and downstream cannot be drawn just o n c e a t t h e line t h a t separates the hills from t h e plains. Rather, every point in t h e hills is upstream of somewhere and downstream of somewhere else. a n d the distinction is one t h a t has t o be drawn over and over and over again if we a r e to gain any valid understand- ing of what is happening there. This distinction between upstream a n d downstream is crucial because water flows downhill, and t h e critical issue becomes "how t o redistribute water consumption"

[Romm 19831. The problem (in the hills. for t h e hills, throughout the hills) is that t h e present pattern of water distribution, when combined with t h e ethno-ecological knowledge a n d associated stra- tegies of the hill farmers, tends to encourage "extensive land use i n land scarce conditions" [Rornm 19831.

There i s no magic solution. Rather, it will be necessary to somehow or other encourage a gradual and pervasive shift in pat- t e r n s of water distribution so as to steadily move away from widespread elctensive land-use towards a patchwork of intensive use

*For an iliustration of how this can be done in the context of the energy debate in the Wesr see Thompson (1082a) and Wildarsky and Tenenbaum (1 88 1).

(where landslip hazards a r e low and other conditions a r e appropri- a t e ) and detensive use (where landslip hazards a r e high a n d other conditions render intensive use inappropriate).

If

t h e r e is a causal connection between h u m a n activity in t h e hills and flooding in t h e plains t h e n , t h e sceptical observer would hold, this redistribution of water in t h e hills will do more to lessen t h a t impact than any- thing else.

The i r a t e administrator's perception leads him towards t h e i n t e g r a t e d w a t e r s h e d m a n a g e m e n t s o l u t i o n a solution which presupposes t h a t someone is in a position t o do t h e managing. The sceptical observer's perception leads him towards a f a c i l i t a t e d w d e r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s o l u t i o n a solution which presupposes t h a t no one is in a position t o do any managing. The sceptical observer is keenly interested in t h e ecological theories, land-use categories and associated risk-handling strategies of t h e hill f a r m e r s because they provide t h e basis from which facilitation can s t a r t . The irate administrator shows little interest in such things a n d is often driven t o distraction by t h e deviant and irrational behaviour of

"these people". The i r a t e administrator, you might say, s e e s t h e hill farmer as p a r t of t h e problem; t h e sceptical observer sees him as part of the solution.

Solution 2. Reduce t h e i m p a c t of t h e increased run-off and silt t r a n s p o r t to match what it was t e n , fifteen, thirty years ago (by flood control engineering, relocation of settlements, etc.). This is a d o w n s t r e a m s o l u t i o n .

The sceptical observer would point out t h a t , though h e is doubtful about t h e r e being a n increase in t h e run-off and silt transport, this is probably still a sensible thing t o do. I t is, in fact, t h e traditional solution in t h e plains, a n d all those large-scale public works and resettlement s c h e m e s a r e just what's needed to keep t h e irate administrator happy a n d t o divert his attention from t h e punitive expedition into t h e hills t h a t he has been contemplating.

A little historical vignette m a y help to show the way in which t h e articulation of t h e political power t h a t resides in t h e plains a n d t h e implementation of downstream solutions go hand-in-hand. Political power needs public works and public works need political power:

The Ganges Canal was t h e brain-child of Captain Proby Cantley of t h e Bengal Engineers. He was convinced t h a t it was possible t o get water out of t h e Ganges and into t h e Doab, t h e land between t h e Jumna and t h e Ganges, ah immense a r e a which suffered from fre- quent a n d terrible famines. He made his first survey in 1836.

Then came t h e institutional obstacles--toes being trodden on in t h e efforts to coordinate departments t h a t had not had to be coordinated before, and all t h e exquisite agonies of implementation:

Every kind of difficulty had t o be overcome: orders and coun- terorders came from t h e authorities, civil and military, in bewild- ering confusion. One moment it was to be an irrigation canal, next for navigation only. Then i t was not to be built a t all; notwithstand- ing t h e fact t h a t t h e East Jumna Canal which had originally been built by t h e Mughals in t h e eighteenth century had been extremely successful in combating famine in t h e country which i t passed through.

Then there came the gloomy prognostications of the doomsters of t h e day:

I t was .said t h a t earthquakes would destroy t h e viaducts, t h a t rnias- mas would hang over t h e irrigated lands, t h a t malaria would become

I t was .said t h a t earthquakes would destroy t h e viaducts, t h a t rnias- mas would hang over t h e irrigated lands, t h a t malaria would become

Im Dokument Knowing Where To Hit It: A Conceptual Framework for the Sustainable Development of the Himalayas (Seite 50-62)