Though m a r k e t s a r e always s m a r t ( t h e y are defined a s such) t h e y a r e n o t always eco-smart. Though sanctions exist for good social reasons they a r e n o t always t h e r e for good ecological reasons. We can ask (and reasonably expect an answer) whether c u r r e n t m a r k e t s and sanctions (as they a r e variously deployed in specific Himalayan settings) a r e eco-smart or not, and we c a n then go on t o ask whether t h e r e a r e any policy options/instruments t h a t might help t o strengthen those t h a t a r e eco-smart already, and t o s t e e r in a s m a r t e r eco-direction those t h a t a r e not.
What this means, in practice, is:
(1) Close, careful and continuous observation, evaluation a n d monitoring of specific on-the-ground processes. For example. of t h e Namche Market a n d its effects upon t h e strategies of t h e Rai who a r e increasingly drawn into its orbit, of t h e environmental effects of t h e s e changing Rai s t r a - tegies, of t h e environmental effects of all this a t the Namche end a s well, a n d so on. Another example would be t o design this s o r t of monitoring a n d learning component into t h e development plan for t h e Bhumtang a r e a of Bhutan from t h e very beginning.
(2) Continual facilitation (again, in specific on-the-ground contexts) aimed a t revealing p a t t e r n s of social sanctions t h a t a r e way below t h e P a r e t o optimum and, thereby, helping t h e m to readjust into a m o r e optimal con- figuration. Such revelation is not just for the edification of t h e facilitator a n d t h e "decision maker"; to be effective i t has t o be a m u t u a l process t h a t involves all t h e people who a r e actually applying t h e sanctions.
For example, a social forestry project t e a m arrived in a Nepalese village and immediately set about clearing lines (in preparation for planting t h e eucalyptus saplings they had brought with them) through t h e sad-and-sorry r e m n a n t of a forest t h a t they found there: To their surprise a n d dismay, t h e y were s e t upon by t h e villagers who. brandishing sticks a n d kukri.s (large curved knives) chased t h e m out of t h e forest and refused to let t h e m back in.
The members of t h e t e a m , anxious t o do what they had c o m e t o do a n d fully authorised by t h e government t o do it, found themselves unable t o do it. They
*We are indebted to Jeff Rornm for this vignete.
had two options: go away or t r y t o talk t o t h e villagers. They chose t h e l a t t e r . What had so incensed t h e villagers, they l e a r n t , were t h e s t r a i g h t lines and t h e eucalyptus saplings. Though straight lines a n d eucalyptus saplings spelt good forestry practice to t h e t e a m , t h e y spelt unwelcome government control t o t h e villagers. (Fences, too, it t u r n s out, c a n be similarly repugnant a t t h e village level a n d in some r e c e n t successfully facilitated social forestry projects t h e villagers have actually persuaded t h e government not t o go t o t h e expense of putting fences around t h e forests a n d have themselves provided, and paid for, forest c a r e t a k e r s instead). As t h e y talked t o each o t h e r , t h e divergent a e s t h e t i c s of t h e t e a m m e m b e r s and t h e villagers became more a n d more apparent t o t h e m both. As t h e leader of t h e project p u t it, "It gradually became clear t o u s t h a t o u r idea of what a healthy f o r e s t looked like was very different from t h e i r idea of what a healthy forest looked like". He described t h e facilitation process t h a t eventually got t h e t e a m back into t h e forest ( b u t this time with t h e approval of t h e villagers) a s a negotiation between t h e s e two aesthetics. Each side conceded t h a t t h e existing forest was way s h o r t of i t s aesthetic ideal. I t was, they both agreed, an ugly forest.
In
other words, i t was sub-optimal, and t h e issue was n o t whether i t should be changed o r not--both agreed t h a t i t should be--but how i t should be changed. The team's aesthetic a n d t h e villagers' a e s t h e t i c defined different directions of change, and t h e big question was whether t h e s e paths could be reconciled. The two aesthetics, fortunately, t u r n e d o u t not t o be fundamen- tally contradictory and, s t e p by s t e p , t h e villagers a n d t h e t e a m negotiated a synthetic aesthetic t h a t integrated m u c h of t h e good practice of t h e social foresters into m u c h of t h e traditional practice of t h e villagers, and discarded t h e straight lines a n d t h e eucalyptus saplings in t h e process..All this was several years ago, a n d t h e leader of t h e t e a m h a s recently revisited t h e area. The forest now, h e says, looks nothing like t h e idea h e h a d then of what a healthy forest should look like b u t he is a d a m a n t t h a t , nevertheless, i t is a healthy forest. "The whole thing", h e says, "has been a revelation t o me."
All t h e strategic implications of t h e appropriate institutional approach a r e captured by t h i s vignette. R r s t , we s e e t h e vigorous rejection a t t h e micro level of c e r t a i n technical fixes--straight lines a n d eucalyptus saplings- t h a t had already received institutional support a t t h e m a c r o level. And, in t h e facilitation process t h a t follows on from t h e project's acceptance of t h i s rejec- tion, we see t h e s o r t of backtracking t h a t i s needed t o modify t h e "top down"
approach so t h a t i t meshes constructively with t h e "bottom up" development t h a t it encounters as i t makes t h e transition from t h e "provider" level t o t h e
"delivery" Level.
Second, this backtracking exercise clearly d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e veracity a n d strategic importance of t h e assertion: t h e r e is n o "bottom up" approach. Only when t h e project h a s come down from t h e t o p t o t h e bottom c a n i t t h e n t u r n around and s t a r t t o move from t h e bottom t o t h e top. And, as t h e descending development project m e e t s u p with t h e ascending development process, we see clearly t h e s o r t of m u t u a l learning and adaptation t h a t , when feasible.
reveals both t h e existence of a point of leverage and t h e m e a n s by which con- structive leverage can be applied t o it.
*For those who would like to know what can be constructively done when the divergent aesthetics ww fundamentally contradictory, the answer is nothing.
Third, we see t h a t facilitation is possible only when the divergent aesthet- ics a r e not fundamentally contradictory and t h a t , in consequence, points of leverage do not exist everywhere within the development process. In o t h e r words, much of the development process lies beyond t.he reach of deliberate intervention. We can intervene constructively only a t those points where con- structive intervention is possible. Yet i t seems to us t h a t the Grand Design approach t o development planning refuses to accept this limitation* limita- tion t h a t , if accepted, would allow u s only a tinkering role in the development process. (This distinction between Grand Design and Tinkering, we should stress, has nothing to do with t h e scale of development projects. The size of a tinkering project should be appropriate to its point OF leverage.)
Students of urban development are a t last coming to realise t h a t the city is a social work of a r t which h a s a design but not a designer and t h a t , in conse- quence, those who would aspire to remake it by grand and conscious design are being ludicrously presumptuous [Rowe and Koetter 19811. The same les- son holds for those who would do something for the Himalayas. Just as t h e megalomaniac quest for the blueprint for the modern city is giving way t o a humbler effort t o understand t h e diffuse business of bricolage by which t h e city changes, so developers-in-the-large a r e a t last shifting their focus from immaculate technological prescriptions t o t h e institutional details t h a t keep getting in t h e way of those prescriptions. As this focus changes so the need for understanding increases. Understand t h e diffuse institutionally generated processes by which t h e system you would intervene in is maintained and transformed and you will then have some clues as t o where t h e r e might be some leverage--some chance of nudging it in a more desirable direction.
The mechanic in t h e backstreet garage cannot redesign t h e faulty engines of t h e cars t h a t are brought to him; but he can tinker with them. And, knowing this, h e develops the appropriate skills. There is the story of t h e motorist who, having tried everything h e can t o get hls car to s t a r t , finally pushes i t round the corner t o t h e garage. The mechanic lifts up the bonnet, looks a t t h e engine for a while and then, selecting a large hammer from his tool tray, gives it a hefty clout. "Try i t now" h e says t o the owner, a n d i t s t a r t s first time. "How much do I owe you?" asks t h e delighted owner. "Ten pounds"
says t h e mechanic. "Ten pounds" says the owner, his face dropping, "ten pounds for just hitting it with a hammer?". "Oh no" says the mechanic, "fifty pence for hitting i t with the hammer, nine pounds fifty for knowing where t o h i t it."
Knowing where t o hit it--that's what sustainable development is all about.
W.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONSTD
UNEPThe development community does two t h i n g s - i t acts and i t thinks. The relationship between t h e two is complex but suffice i t t o say t h a t each, to some extent, shapes the other. Development action, you could say, takes place within a conversation about d e v e l o p m e n t a conversation t h a t has been going on for many years and t h a t , despite the discord, the circularity and t h e eternal themes i t contains, does have a certain momentum. Currently t h a t momentum is, in certain quarters, imparting more and more credibility t o t h e theme t h a t large-scale aid (international and governmental) is not only use- less but positively harmful.
I t is t r u e t h a t all too often large-scale official aid
...
supports inefficient or corrupt governments and t h a t it is frequently spent on extravagant prestige projects which have little relevance t o t h e poor. [Brian W . Walker, Director General, Oxfam, Letter t o 7he rimes 18 April 19831.Without foreign aid t h e r e is no Third World. [ ~ a u e r and Yarney. 7he rimes 11 April 19831.
I a m not convinced t h a t a UN agency is capable of coordinating a "new approach". I believe t h a t t h e UN agencies and big government programs are a large part of t h e problem. [Personal communication from t h e head of a small voluntary agency.]
Overseas aid is just a way of getting the poor people in t h e rich countries t o help t h e rich people in t h e poor countries. [Anon]
Open season has been declared on t h e Big Agencies, and those of t h e m desirous of avoiding extinction should devise some s t r a t e g i e s for coping with this latest t h r e a t . Perhaps t h e simplest solution for a Big Agency i s for i t t o make itself appear small and this, in fact, is precisely what t h e strategic insights t h a t flow from our conceptual framework suggest.
The notion of a development process t h a t is open t o constructive inter- vention a t only c e r t a i n points of leverage, (and. even t h e n , only if the inter- vention is institutionally appropriate) suggests t h a t both institutionally i n a p propriate interventions a t these points of leverage a n d a t t e m p t s t o intevene a t other points where constructive intervention simply is n o t possible, a r e likely t o be positively harmful t o t h e process. The main s t r a t e g i c contribution of this appropriate institutional approach, therefore, is a useable basis for separating t h e useful interventions from t h e harmful ones.
I t
provides gui- dance not only on what t o do but also, and more importantly, on what not to do.What t h i s all boils down t o i s a strategy t h a t takes i t s shape from two com- mitments: t h e First t o t h e uncovering of p a t t e r n s of heterogeneity as a basis for a practical a n d local understanding; t h e second t o tinkering a s t h e only feasible way of intervening. Knowing where to h i t i t is a knack t h a t is not easily acquired, and some of t h e pitfalls along t h e way t o its acquisition c a n be mapped o u t by a little cautionary tale--the Sahel.
In 1977 t h e UN Conference on Desertification (UNCOD) agreed a programme t o reverse t h e overgrazing and over- cultivation in t h e Sahel and c r e a t e g r e e n belts n o r t h and south of t h e Sahara to halt t h e spread of t h e desert.
A
programme t o reverse these vast homogenized effects, and to throw a green belt around t h e Sahara, is a very grand design indeed. Between t h e agreeing of a programme and its delivery, between t h e vast coordinated project a n d its implementation, t h e r e is often a wide abyss:In a 90 page report, Earthscan [I9831 blames a sequence of
"personal a n d organisational antipathies" for t h e failure of plans t o save t h e Sahel, despite aid worth m o r e t h a n 4,000 million pounds committed t o t h e region between 1975 a n d
*The classic work, subtitled "How Great Ex?ecbtions in Washin~ton are Dashed in Oakland" is Wil- daoaky and Pressman (1073).
1980. These frictions had "sometimes resulted in agencies working almost openly against one another." [This and preceding quote Samstag 19831.
At first glance t h e idea of developing an integrated interagency approach, within which one agency (UNEP perhaps?) will take a central coordinating position, is powerfully attractive. But t h e r e a r e t h r e e serious objections to this strategic option.
First, t h e fact t h a t the Himalayan s t a t e s sustain their autonomy by play- ing the agencies off, one against the other, suggests t h a t it would be difficult (impossible perhaps) to achieve this desired integration and that, to t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t could be achieved, it would actually be imposing dysfunction upon those Himalayan states-something t h a t , surely, must be undesirable.
Second, integration and coordination inevitably reduce diversity, redundancy, duplication a n d overlap-the very system properties that, in a setting charac- terized by high levels of uncertainty, should be conserved if fragility is to be avoided and resilience husbanded.* Third, an integrated and coordinated effort, especially if one agency is to take up a c e n t r a l position within it, is not something t h a t can be evolved step by gradual step.
It
has t o be large and complete t o begin with and this means t h a t it has to be right first time. In other words, learning, flexibility and opportunistic adaptation-precisely t h e approach qualities needed when the chances of getting it right first time a r e vanishingly small-would actually be ruled out by t h e integrated and coordi- nated approach.All tnis suggests t h a t t h e integrated approach is probably impossible and that, even if i t is not impossible, it is probably undesirable. At the same time, i t suggests t h a t t h e "hundred UN flowers" approach is probably unavoidable anyway a n d t h a t this, far from presenting u s with a n intractable problem, is all to the good Accordingly, we urge the following strategic orientation.
1. UNEP should resist the temptation to go for integration and coordi- nation in i t s Action Plan and should, instead, look for a distinctive approach t h a t will add to. r a t h e r t h a n reduce, t h e multiplicity in approaches t h a t already exists.
2. The appropriate UNEP approach can be distinguished by just one word: instifutinns. Existing approaches, focusing on the bio-physical level. all seek t o formulate policy by working from the environment to the institutions. We believe t h a t o u r conceptual framework, by focusing on the macro- a n d micro-social levels and by emphasizing t h e uncertainties a t the bio-physical level, will encourage t h e development of that complementary and currently neglected approach t o policy formulation t h a t s t a r t s with the institutions and works, through them, towards t h e environment.
3. In adopting this distinctive and counter-integrative approach it does not follow t h a t t h e r e is no need t o develop a consensus among t h e various UN (and other agencies) involved. But t h a t consensus will be ' achieved, not by getting all the agencies to agree to a single integrated approach, but by UNEP obtaining agreement (through a series of bilateral conversations, a s it were) t h a t its own distinctive approach complements those of all the other agencies.
*See, for instance, Landau, (1969).
4. We urge t h a t t h e distinctiveness and initial modesty of t h e UNEP approach c a n best be preserved by deliberately avoiding a cornmit- m e n t t o new projects. Rather, t h e aim should be t o draw upon t h e conceptual framework so a s t o l e a r n from t h e successes and failures of existing projects and, since learning is a two-way process, to s h a r - pen and modify t h a t conceptual framework in t h e light of what is discovered.
5. By s t a r t i n g out small-scale a n d modest, and within a relatively easily obtained consensus. UNEP will remain flexible, adaptive a n d oppor- tunistic. As t h e approach evolves so, if i t lives up t o t h e promise we believe i t t o contain, resources and credibility will flow t o it. If t h e y do not, t h e n t h e enterprise c a n be quietly abandoned, t h e only losses being t h e small amounts of resources a n d credibility t h a t will, by t h e n , have been committed t o it.