Over t h e centuries t h e g r e a t empires have always r u n o u t of steam a t t h e Himalayas. The Moghul Empire, though i t ruled all t h e plains, could not forci- bly convert t o lslam t h e Rajput kingdoms t h a t took refuge in Kangra, Kulu.
Garhwal and Jumla; n e i t h e r t h e British nor t h e Russian Empire, for all t h e i r bitter rivalry, was able t o win t h e Great Game (as i t was called) and subjugate Afghanistan; f u r t h e r e a s t , t h e British simply gave u p trying t o incorporate Nepal into t h e i r empire; and, on t h e o t h e r side of Nepal, t h e Chinese Empire had little option b u t t o leave Tibet autonomous a n d independent in all but token claim. In geopolitical t e r m s t h e Himalayas a r e not a power vacuum-for t h a t would imply t h a t they could readily be filled--but, r a t h e r , a sort of pla- t e a u where t h e power of t h e plains finally becomes so a t t e n u a t e d t h a t i t c a n no longer sway events one way or t h e other. The Himalayas, in consequence, a r e a vast political m a r g i n - a largely uncontrolled t r a c t filled with a rich assortment of independent-minded opportunists and refugees.
For those who have become accustomed t o understanding human affairs in t e r m s of power relationships t h e Himalayas a r e a s baffling as i s weightless- ness t o those pragmatists long used t o operating with t h e i r f e e t planted firmly on t h e ground. Himalayan politics, i n countries like Nepal and Bhutan, a r e more concerned with t h e management of powerlessness t h a n with t h e d i r e c t exercise of power. The difference is akin t o t h a t between judo and prize- fighting. The c o n s u m m a t e skill of t h e r e c e n t kings of Nepal (and, before t h e m , of t h e hereditary P r i m e Ministers) h a s resulted in a delicate display in which t h e balance of t h e slight c e n t r a l figure is maintained by continually playing off t h e various superpowers (and, m o r e recently. t h e various international agencies) against one another.
Development experts have now l e a r n t t o t h e i r cost t h a t t h e impressive arrays of policy levers displayed in t h e ministries of many of t h e less- developed countries a r e , all too often, not c o n n e c t e d t o anything. This is usu- ally i n t e r p r e t e d a s a symptom of underdevelopment; t h e conclusion is t h a t they should be connected a n d t h a t satisfactory development will become pos- sible once t h e y a r e connected. But such a conclusion would be valid only if t h e political system was based upon t h e direct exercise of power. 1n a system The curious politics of the Nepalese budgetary process, for instance, makes sense only when inter-
~ r e t e d in t h s light (Wildavskg and Caiden 1974). For a detailed eccount of Nepalese politics see Rose and Scholz (1980) and for Bhutun see Rose (1871).
based upon t h e management of powerlessness the fact t h a t the policy levers are not connected t o anything may demonstrate neither underdevelopment, nor inefficiency, nor oversight; rather, i t may confirm that everything is func- tioning correctly. It would be as well to bear this perhaps alarming possibility in mind when devising policies aimed a t alleviating t h e environmental and developmental problems of the Himalayas.
From this geopolitical perspective Himalayan deforestation (and other concomitants of environmental decline) is just another specific instance of the problematical relationship between centre and periphery--between empire and margin. The power lies in the plains but t h e problem lies in the hills.
What should t h e c e n t r e do? Over the centuries t h e r e have always been two options: impose or interpose. The establishment of a forestry service and the designation of Reserve Forests (such as occurred along t h e Himalayan fringe of British India) is a n imposed solution. When effectively implemented, it makes both visible a n d actual the uneven distribution of power and, in so doing, incorporates t h e mountains into the empire. The judicious fostering of Buffer States (such as occurred with Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet) is an interposed solution. Deciding that (beyond a certain point) i t is less trouble simply t o leave well alone, the empire deliberately holds back and, in effect, guarantees t h e autonomy of t h e mountains in exchange for their absorption of the pressures t h a t t h e empire would be exposed to if it were to move up and take control of them. In this way, an arrangement t h a t appears quite natural often t u r n s out t o be largely contrived and, when this implicit compact between empire a n d margin breaks down, we often see t h e empire switching over to imposed solutions-Younghusband's punitive expedition t o Lhasa, for instance, a n d India's recent annexation of Sikkim.
Though the autonomy of the Himalayan margin is always tenuous, in t h a t i t has always been at t h e mercy of t h e great powers t h a t surround it, i t has always proved to be remarkably resilient. In many instances it h a s crystal- lised out into small nations; in others i t is continually being manifested in t h e de f m t o independence of Indian citizens far-removed from the centres of power (e.g. t h e Chipko Movement). As t h e fortunes of the mighty empires wax and wane, and as they switch back and forth between imposed and interposed solutions, so autonomy is swept away here and reasserted there. The Chinese occupied Tibet in t h e 1950s, thereby stimulating t h e deployment of Indian troops and t h e construction of strategic roads in Lahoul and Ladakh in t h e west and in Assam and the North East Frontier Agency in t h e east; in the early 1970s Nepal secured t h e removal from its soil of t h e Indian Military Mission; in the late 1970s India annexed neighbouring Sikkim; more recently t h e Tibetan guerilla forces,having been expelled from Nepal, moved across into the vast wastes of Ladakh, Spiti and Rupshu, thereby providing a very effective intelligence-gathering screen t h a t allowed India t o pull t h e bulk of its forces back into warmer a n d more congenial garisons.' And, behind all these surface events, the Great Game (with the United States replacing Britain in t h e sha- dowy struggle with Russia) still continues.
A t first glance it might seem that, with these kinds of strategic priorities dictating t h e ever-changing geopolitics of the whole region. there really is no chance of devising and implementing any policies for arresting t h e environ- mental decline of t h e Himalayas. But perhaps we could relate these policies,
*But not the forces facing Pakistan. They are still in place in Ladakh and imposed solutions have long since eroded the autonomy of the buffer--Kashmir e n d Jammu-that used to keep them apart.
See Faux (1962).
not to the erratic and inherently unpredictable political situations, but t o t h e ever-present and unchanging principles t h a t underlie that turbulent flux?
These principles all have to do with the implicit compact that, so long a s it is observed, guarantees the autonomy of the margin-the continued existence of the buffer states. all those international agencies t h a t are concerned about Himalayan defores- tation is: is t h e r e anything t h a t they can do t h a t might help t o change t h e margin's answer from no to yes.
Of course, this assumes t h a t there is a causal connection between t h e downstream flooding and t h e upstream deforestation. Since both t h e Nepalese and Indian governments (and perhaps others as well) are a t present disposed reality, the case for adopting t h e appropriate institutional development
approach becomes overwhelming. This does not, of course, mean t h a t we should wash our hands of t h e bio-physical level and abandon all efforts a t increasing the certainty of the physical data. Indeed, one of the key strategic implications of this institutional approach is t h a t i t helps to pinpoint the sorts of physical facts t h a t it would be most valuable t o know and. out of those facts, the ones t h a t we a r e most likely t o be able t o know.
THE CONCEPTUAL F W E WORK AND I T S PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Generalising a t a high level of abstraction we have, at the macro level, a system based on the implicit compact and manifested in t h e dynamics of imposition and interposition and, a t t h e micro level, we have a system based upon interdependence and manifested in the dynamics of recruitment to t h e cautious cultivator and adventurous t r a d e r strategies. These geopolitical and socio-cultural systems, as well a s being related t o each other (by t h e processes of power accumulation, centralization and decentralization- processes t h a t a r e realized through t h e reciprocal dynamics of consent and authority t h a t mediate t h e ever-changing relationship between these levels) a r e in t u r n , connected to the bio-physical systems of resource exploitation which currently, by most of t h e expert accounts, would seem to be pro- grammed (via the increasing population of t h e cautious cultivators) for deforestation, denudation, degradation and, eventually, desertification. Some- where along this downhill path t h e r e is t h e crucial threshold point a t which the Middle Ranges cease to be a n e t exporter of grains. In the absence of any institutionally appropriate development, t h e crossing of this threshold will trigger the collapse of t h e interdependence system (and, one presumes, of t h e implicit compact system as well).
So, on this analysis, t h e absolutely key variable is development's mode of e n t r y into these linked systems. In other words, can t h e processes of develop- m e n t be s t e e r e d in such a way t h a t technical and institutional capacities ( t h e positive-sum game) can g e t ahead of population a n d natural resource con- s t r a i n t s ( t h e negative-sum game)? With this momentous question in mind, we can distinguish a number of crucial responses a t the micro-level.
1.
I t
s e e m s t h a t the cautious cultivator's strategy a t present results in increasing population (perhaps i t always h a s done) whilst the adventurous trader's strategy seems always t o have resulted in a stable population.More research would be needed t o substantiate this important distinction but t h e empirical evidence t h a t is at present available (institutions such a s fraternal polyandry, monasteries a n d nunneries with celibate inmates, a n d primogeniture rules of inheritance on the Buddhist side and, on t h e Hindu side, large families a s g u a r a n t e e s for support in old age giving way t o smaller families in situations where old age pensions are guaranteed) does all point in this direction.
2. Population pressure8* coupled with limited resources (agricultural land for grain production, grazing land for animal husbandry and forest land for fuelwood, fodder and forest products generally) is the main cause of environmental degradation a n d of t h e undesirable downstream effects generally.*** Ethno-ecological studies [Johnson e t al. 19821 go on t o
*Because of the ertreme heterogeneity of the region this threshold will not be reached everywhere at the same time. So the collapse will be spasmodic m d cumulative rather than instantaneous.
**But with the proviso that the effect of population is relative to institutional and technical capaci- ties. The statement holda if population increases and these capacities do not.
***Whether these downstream effects exist transfiationally is, at present, an open questiau, but the
suggest t h a t i t is population pressures t h a t cause t h e hill f a r m e r to switch from the detensification of land use to the intensification of land use in response to his (impressively a c c u r a t e ) perception of landslide (and other) hazards.
This m e a n s t h a t , for every individual who is absorbed into new industries, t h e direct pressure on land-based resources is correspondingly reduced. The popu- lation remains t h e same, of course, but t h e pressure to intensify land use is diminished. A t t h e s a m e time, those individuals who e n t e r developing indus- tries s u c h a s tourism a r e likely t o switch over t o t h e adventurous t r a d e r s t r a - tegy and this t r e n d should in t h e longer term, result in a diminution of t h e r a t e of population increase.
So tourism, (and o t h e r industries t h a t a r e not directly land-based), sensi- tively handled*, could r e s u l t in a quite rapid relaxation of t h e pressure t h a t t h e p r e s e n t population increase is placing on t h e land in general a n d on t h e forest in particular whilst, in t h e longer t e r m , i t could a c t s o a s t o stabilise t h e population itself. This is not to suggest t h a t tourism i s t h e only way of doing something t o remedy t h e environmental problems of t h e Himalayas but only t h a t i t might provide u s with a n e x e m p l a r 4 paradigm a s i t w e r e l o r t h e designing of policies and policy i n s t r u m e n t s in situations characterized, at t h e m a c r o level, by t h e m a n a g e m e n t of powerlessness and, a t t h e micro level, by a cause t h a t is t h e aggregation of t h e strategically determined a c t s of myriad individual agents.
m.
SOME STRATEGIC MPL~CATIONSThere is a growing awareness t h a t conventional approaches t o d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e Himalayan region have been a largely frustrating experience.
Increasingly, those'who work in t h e development field a r e having t o s t e p back from t h e i r problem t o a s k themselves what h a s gone wrong with t h e i r solution.
There has been a n inadequate use of learning in develop- m e n t programs. The short-term, result-oriented, project approach is doomed. We have to be very modest. There i s a n enormous n e e d for humility both in our capacity t o understand and intervene in t h e s e processes.**
In all humility. we propose t h e appropriate ins ti tutional development experts are all agreed that they do exist within the Himalayan states and regions and that they constitute a serious problem.
%ere is, of course, the argument that tourism too i s land-based in that i t makes rapacious demands on food and fuelwood (and on labour that otherwise would have been committed t o tigri- cultural production). Tourism is often castigated as the goose that lays the golden eggs and fouls its o m nest in the procem, and this indeed is orten the case. But, as the Austrian example shown, tourism c a n be handled in such a way a t o maximise the golden eggs and minimise the nest-fouling and, as we explain in the next chapter, the Himalayea margin is rather well-equipped institutional- l y to handle tourism in this way.
**John Cool (Agricultural Development Council, Kathmandu). Stuternent made in introductory re- marks a t the International Workshop on the Problems of Mountain Renewable Resources Develop ment held a t Yohonk, New York, December 1982.
approach as a useful way of simultaneously learning about the development process and, through t h a t learning, of identifying the points of leverage t h a t furnish the only opportunities for us to intervene constructively in t h a t pro- cess.
Development, on this humble view, is something altogether g r e a t e r than the totality of development projects. Development encompasses t h e whole process; development projects can be usefully fed in only a t such points of lev- erage as exist within t h a t process. Mark Twain's advice--not to l e t your child's schooling interfere with his education-has, we suggest, a counterpart on t h e macro level-not to let your nation's development projects interfere with its development.
The strategic implications of this humble approach can be explored by way of three substantive manifestations of this important distinction between development and development projects. First, the matching a n d mismatching of technical fixes a n d institutional supports; second, the intervention implica- tions of "top-down" a n d "bottom-up" development; third, the relative m e r i t s of
"grand design" and "tinkering" solutions.
STRATEGIC EXPLORATIONS 1 :
TECHNICAL FlXES AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORTS
One convenient way of bringing the conceptual framework down t o e a r t h is t o quickly search through t h e literature to extract from i t a list of techni- cally feasible prescriptions-technical fixes-from galvanized gabions to intra- uterine devices, from solar stoves t o mini-hydro, from miracle rice to compul- sory re-settlement, from eucalyptus groves t o social forests
...
a n d so on, and then t o offer them up t o our conceptual framework [in t h e building trade sense of seeing whether the new p a r t will fit with the existing (w)hole] s o a s t o get some feel for whether they a r e likely or not t o enjoy institutional support.Since "technical fix" tends nowadays t o be used as a euphemism for technical fixation, we should s t r e s s t h a t we a r e not using it in this pejorative sense.
Whilst we would reject t h e bone-headed approach that, when a Ax bumps up against an institution, insists t h a t i t is t h e institution alone t h a t will have t o give way, we feel t h a t t h a t approach is today little in evidence and that, by and ' large; the quite clearly perceived cooperative challenge is t o bring some sen- sitivity t o this "offering up" exercise in which technical fixes m e e t up with, or are rejected by, t h e i r institutional supports.
Since for m a n y of these technical fixes the appropriate "delivery" level is the village whilst the "provider" level is t h a t of c e n t r a l govemment/international agency, t h e r e is always t h e likelihood of institu- tional mismatch; a " g o o d project will enjoy macro-institutional support ( t h a t is why it's "good") but quite possibly will not enjoy micro-level support. So t h e r e is, first of all, a problem of i n s t i t a d i o d t t m f e r a problem t h a t is often made even worse by being misinterpreted as a problem of technology transfer. Conversely, projects t h a t would probably enjoy institutional support a t t h e village level a r e often strangled a t birth because they do n o t have sup- port a t the macro-level, a n d therefore come off the project production line as
"bad" projects.
With this simple idea we c a n offer up technical fixes to t h e s e two levels- macro and village/individualand put pluses and m.inuses against t h e m according t o whether they will enjoy institutional support or not. At this stage we should also t r y t o flesh out this scorecard with d e v e l o p m e n t v i g n e t t e s - little case studies--that illustrate t h e various permutations. However, whilst
we do have quite a number of these vignettes, we feel that i t would be invidi- ous to parade them in this way. Instead, we prefer to leave the "development vignette" boxes blank and to invite the thoughtful reader to fill them in from his own experience, and to his own satisfaction.
Figure 1. The simple scorecard
But, of course, each of these levels is not institutionally homogeneous. At the village level, for instance, landlords may support and tenants may not, or vice versa. At t h e macro level a n international agency might support and a ministry might not, or vice versa. So we have t o be prepared t o break down t h e scorecard even a t these specific levels so as t o take account of institu- tional plurality a n d institutional contention. As we do this our increasingly complex matrix of pluses and minuses carries us, a t the village level, right into t h e realities of power as manifested in the land t e n u r e system and, a t t h e macro level, takes u s into t h e realities of power as manifested in the manage- m e n t of impotence a n d in t h e vertical integration/horizontal insulation of ministerial sectors.
Once these two institutionally mediated power struggles have been revealed in this way, we c a n begin t o offer some prescriptive guidelines for t h e i r evaluation a n d modification. A t t h e village level, anything t h a t increases t h e security and local control of t h e peasant farmer will also increase t h e total quantity of power within t h e wider system. But t h e r e are some constraints.
I t
would, for instance, be difficult t o do this in ways t h a t did not a t t h e same time benefit t h e landlord. So t h e r e has to be facilitation between these two institutions-landlord and tenant. Such facilitation would focus on t h e land t e n u r e system which, contrary t o prevalent belief. can a t certain times and in certain places become quite flexible. For instance, in r e c e n t years r a t h e r diffuse r e n t strikes in t h e Kathmandu Valley have, by and large, been accepted by the landlords who, having seen t h e writing on t h e wall, have been easing away from investments in agricultural land and towards new business opportunities in and around t h e capital (a move, incidentally, t h a t severs t h e equation of land with wealth). A few landlords, however, did take legal action to obtain t h e i r r e n t s but t h e courts found in favour of t h e tenants.So here we have an instance of quite rapid, and quite large, de f a c t o and &
jure change in the land t e n u r e system.
At the macro level t h e concern of the facilitator should be more complex.
The aim should be to promote the integration of institutions in such a way as, first, to increase the quantity of power i n t h e system and, second, to increase or decrease its concentration--depending on the achieved level of economic a n d political development. We would not claim t h a t such judgment is easy.
but we would point out t h a t the apparent paradox of simultaneously increasing village level autonomy and concentrating power at the c e n t r e can perhaps be resolved by fractionating t h e issue. Such simultaneous aims a r e sometimes the appropriate goals of inter-institutional facilitation, particularly in cases involving the improvement of local incentives for increased private invest- m e n t in agricultural land. Again, the issue is t h e land t e n u r e system and t h e solution is for some fractions (e.g. ultimate title) to go to the c e n t r e and for others (e.g. rights of usufruct) t o go to the periphery. When we look, we find t h a t the land t e n u r e systems in the Himalayas always have been fractionated (for all sorts of pragmatic reasons) and may. therefore, prove to be quite amenable to this s o r t of approach. [Regmi 19761
However, to fully resolve this paradox we do need to examine another pol- itical (constitutional, even) variable-consent. A particular configuration of institutions functions as a total system only when two opposed flows regulate t h e i r exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s a u t h o r i t y from top to bottom and consent from bottom to top. Individuals (or groups with representative individuals) can readily negotiate these exchange relationships to reach positions where each party is better off t h a n they were before, but diffuse institutions (which abound in the Himalayas-castes. for instance) often require some sort of third p a r t y facilitation.
STRATEGIC EXPLORATIONS 2:
SMART
MARKETS
AND STUPIDPROJECTS
So these rough "scorecards" (both the simple a n d the complex ones) should give us some useful indications of technical fixes that, i f pushed through a t t h e macro level, would probably "take" a t t h e micro level. A t t h e same time, they might give an early warning system for those "good" projects t h a t will probably be disasters once they a r e pushed down to t h e village level.
But these sorts of prescriptions4ensitive and helpful though t h e y a r e a r e not all t h a t we can g e t out of this approach. In a way. they begin t o provide a m a p of key contextual boundaries. Indeed, i t may be best to regard t h e m just as a s t a g e a heuristic device--for moving to a dekper and, t o some extent,
But these sorts of prescriptions4ensitive and helpful though t h e y a r e a r e not all t h a t we can g e t out of this approach. In a way. they begin t o provide a m a p of key contextual boundaries. Indeed, i t may be best to regard t h e m just as a s t a g e a heuristic device--for moving to a dekper and, t o some extent,