This is not an uncontroversial agenda. It may engender conflicts of dif-ferent kinds: conflicts over rules, particularly those pertaining to the access to key technologies; conflicts over principles, mainly those that oppose the basic values of fairness and freedom; and conflicts of power, related to the possibilities of influencing the evolution of international events. But where you stand informs what you can do. Brazil considers that emerging powers should have their opinion taken into consideration in the key decisions in world affairs. Over the last few years, it has shown that it is ready to take responsibility on important issues. By example, it hopes to lead, and offer other developing countries its expertise in international negotiations, its tradition of respect for laws and institutions, and its tolerance and restraint in implementing its foreign policy. Inspired by these values, global govern-ance architecture may gain in legitimacy – and become more effective.
The way ahead is an uneasy path to take, but the alternative would be to discredit the existing order completely, reducing states’ capacity to manage the running of world affairs on behalf of other political entities. After all, not that long ago, leading scholars thought of war as a phenomenon not exclusively related to nation-states.18 This may again become the case, if we bear in mind the current relevance of individuals and business in interna-tional economics, and of private entities, mercenaries, and terrorist groups in the security domain.
Yet, this is more easily said than done. The international system is com-plex, and the imaginary boundaries we use to make sense of it do not help us understand its recent adaptations to the most important shocks. By showing caution, Brazil does not fundamentally threaten the system. But it is innovating by applying globally the political savvy and creativity acquired regionally, and consolidating its position as a global diplomatic hub.
In-18 Quincy Wright, for instance, conceptualized war as “a social recognized form of intergroup conflict in-volving violence” (See: Wright, Q, A Study of War, Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1942, p. 6).
deed, despite being relatively richer and more powerful, the country lives in peace with its neighbours and helps resolving almost all conflicts in South America without resorting to the use of force.
The stability observed in the region is seen as a consequence of this general approach to conflicts. Applied to world affairs – particularly in key sectors, such as food, water, and energy, and poverty alleviation – it may help avoid conflicts and promote cooperation. Inspired by these principles and focusing on the long term, Brazilian foreign policy is persevering in this strategy to help build a more secure world in the 21st century.
Interests, Identity and Brazilian Peacekeeping Policy
1Kai Michael Kenkel
This chapter provides an analytical background for discussion of Brazil-ian participation in peace operations, including potential cooperation in that area with NATO powers. It lays out the role of both material and nor-mative motivations in determining the country’s stance on intervention, before placing these in the context of the discussions held at the Closed High-Level Academic Roundtable, “Brazil and the Euro-Atlantic Area:
Managing International Security in a Changed Global Order,” hosted by the NATO Defense College, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Getúlio Vargas Foundation on 9 May 2013 in Rio de Janeiro.
Studies of states’ motivations to participate in peace operations have grown significantly in recent years, simultaneously with the rise of new troop contributors, often from the category of “emerging powers.”2 Brazil is one such emerging contributor, having moved in 2004 from sending what had until then been a constant trickle of military observers and liaison officers to providing both the lead contingent and the military force com-mander of one of the United Nations’ (UN) largest missions, the
Stabiliza-1 A previous version of this article appeared in English and Portuguese in Revista Tempo do Mundo/ Perspec-tive of the World Review. Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011; pp. 9-35. Permission has been obtained from the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) for it to appear here.
2 See, for example, the numerous analyses in the field’s leading journal, International Peacekeeping, as well as, indicatively of studies of state motivations, the work of Arturo Sotomayor Velázquez, “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Ef-fects on Latin America’s Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations,” Security Studies, v. 19, n. 1, pp. 160-195, 2010; “Different Paths and Divergent Policies in the UN Security System: Brazil and Mexico in Comparative Perspective,” International Peacekeeping, v. 16, n. 3, pp. 364-378, 2009; and “Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop-contributing countries in South America: the cases of Argentina and Uruguay,” in Chiyuki AOI, Cedric De Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Opera-tions, New York, United Nations University Press, 2007, pp. 171-192.
tion Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This chapter brings a theoretically grounded approach to the study of Brazil’s foreign policy goals and how these translate into motivations for participation in peace operations.
Though the country has both very clearly defined foreign policy guide-lines and highly professional armed forces and diplomatic personnel, the public and political decision-making criteria for its participation in peace operations remain subjective, under-institutionalized and (perhaps inten-tionally) ill-defined. This stands in sharp contrast to what is increasingly be-ing referred to as a separate Brazilian model of peacebuildbe-ing, which tends more and more to reveal clearly-defined objectives in both the short and long term, and is implicitly geared towards implementable versions of what have heretofore only appeared as vague declarations of intent in official doc-uments. In this sense, practice leads policy and politics, not only in terms of Brazil’s motivations to contribute to UN peace operations, but also in the manner of that contribution. There is need for considerable consolidation and clarification in Brazilian policy on peace operations (especially in view of the country’s growing profile in this area); the appropriate framework for doing so is the country’s first Defence White Paper, completed in 2011.
After providing a theoretical background, the analysis begins with a re-view of the most important Brazilian policy documents on foreign and security policy, presented with a view to illustrating their shortcomings as a basis for consistent action in, inter alia, peace operations. It proceeds by illustrating how the vague basis set out in these documents has been trans-lated into diplomatic statements that are equally inchoate as a platform for concrete policy. Here, other factors from outside foreign policy traditions, particularly the country’s rise as an emerging power, are brought to bear as well. The theoretical framework is then used to crystallize objectives and motivations which can serve as the basis for a clear and implementable pol-icy on peace operations, as developed for and in the Haitian environment.