In mid-2011, the number of NATO troops deployed on operations peaked at a level of nearly 170,000.22 In the same timeframe, nearly 100,000 uniformed personnel served on UN peacekeeping deployments.23 Such
fig-20 Cf. L. Michel, “NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?,” Strategic Forum, No. 202, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, August 2003, pp. 1-8.
21 See: NATO Foreign Ministers’ statement on Patriot deployment to Turkey, Brussels, NATO, 4 December 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_92476.htm (accessed 9 July 2013).
22 See: J.G. Stavridis, European Command 2012 Posture Statement, Stuttgart, United States European Com-mand, 2012.
23 See: Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2012, pp. 5-6.
ures are historically unprecedented. They reflect the remarkable boom that has materialised in what is now commonly known as crisis management.
At the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping and related duties could be considered to be a relatively marginal phenomenon. Over the past twenty years, however, various indicators such as the number of missions, troops or organisations involved have broadly trended upwards. Yet one must keep in mind that historical trends never last indefinitely. Just as NATO itself is a multi-purpose organisation, its hardware and software must serve as versa-tile instruments for coping with the evolving security landscape.
The “crisis management paradigm” that has shaped the post-Cold War strategic environment is likely to be close to a tipping point. This is not just because the number of NATO troops in Afghanistan will decrease substan-tially in the years ahead. Rather, it relates to a combination of budgetary constraints in the Western world and emerging challenges in the Far East.
In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis, the developed world may not have the fiscal bandwidth required to sustain multiple large-scale campaigns over an extended period.24 This is not to say that the days of crisis manage-ment are numbered. New emergencies such as the one in Mali, as well as legacy dossiers such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, will continue to command a certain amount of attention and resources. But the fiscal situation many Western nations find themselves in will prompt them to be more selective in contemplating new missions and experiment with more cost-efficient operational templates. The reticence to repeat the Libya template in the context of the civil war in Syria is illustrative in this regard. Furthermore, this new trend is likely to manifest itself not only in a NATO framework but elsewhere as well. It is in this light that one can interpret the EU’s turn towards capacity-building missions, for example.
24 This problem is particularly acute for the European Allies whose total level of defence spending is broadly on a downward trend. Although some argue that this should be offset by increased regional cooperation, it is clear that combined European capabilities are currently in freefall. Cf. F.S. Larrabee et al., NATO and the Challenges of Austerity, Santa Monica, RAND, 2012; and J. Rogers and A. Gilli, Enabling the future: European military capabilities 2013-2025, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2013.
At the same time, crisis management operations are losing their rela-tive prominence on the international security agenda as new threats be-gin to materialise. Claims that a naval arms race may be emerbe-ging in East Asia, the American “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific and the sharply rising interest in cyber security issues suggest that contemporary strategists have started contemplating very different scenarios than those the international com-munity confronted in the past two decades.25 The fact that a new division responsible for emerging security challenges was set up inside NATO’s In-ternational Staff in 2010 testifies that this process also plays out within the Alliance. But again, this does not mean that crisis management has lost its relevance. The continuing instability in Europe’s wider southern neigh-bourhood will ensure that crisis management remains a salient theme for the Alliance. The recent Libyan request for assistance in reforming its se-curity sector illustrates that NATO may still have a role to play here.26 Yet, at the strategic level, it seems clear that a more crowded agenda (beyond crisis management) as well as a revisiting of burden sharing discussions is becoming unavoidable.
The gradual shift that is underway, from permanent campaigning to a
“contingent posture” characterised by selective engagement and force ra-tionalisation, suggests that NATO’s role as a vehicle for cooperative security may well increase in importance in the years ahead.27 Outreach to nearby as well as more distant partner countries offers a way to invest in conflict prevention and a multilateral mode of governing security affairs. This in fact constitutes a natural geographical extension of the internal function of the Alliance, namely to provide a stabilising framework for intra-European strategic dynamics. In essence, cooperative security speaks to the idea that
25 Cf. e.g. G. Till, Asia’s naval expansion: An arms race in the making?, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012; and M. Gunzinger, Shaping America’s Future Military: Toward a New Force Planning Construct, Washington DC, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013.
26 See: NATO to send expert team to Libya to assess aid request, Brussels, NATO, 4 June 2013, http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_101096.htm (accessed 9 July 2013).
27 On the shift from campaigning to contingency, see: P. Wall, Keynote speech to the RUSI Landwarfare Conference 2013, London, Royal United Services Institute, http://www.rusi.org/landwarfare (accessed 30 June 2013).
international security does not have to be a zero-sum game. Budgetary con-straints in the West, as well as increasing geostrategic rivalry in the Far East, only add to the appeal.
Paradoxically, the assets that NATO can rely on to fulfil this coopera-tive security role are the same as those that enable its operational role. The NATO Command Structure constitutes the organisational backbone of the Alliance for all tasks, not only those relating to crisis management. NATO headquarters monitor the security environment and engage in prudent planning with an open mind. In the absence of actual operations, the dis-tinction between the three core tasks of the Alliance is largely a theoretical one. Internal processes such as the NATO Defence Planning Process and initiatives such as Smart Defence and Connected Forces are instrumental to enabling Allies to confront an age of austerity and retain military know-how after ISAF gradually winds down. Military exercises not only help prepare the Alliance for collective defence as well as crisis management sce-narios, but can simultaneously serve to benefit partnerships. Joint doctrine development and standardisation efforts remain critical for international cooperation, inside as well as beyond the Alliance. The multifunctional nature of NATO’s key assets therefore mimics the multifaceted nature of the Alliance as a whole.
Serving as a repository of military expertise not only makes NATO op-erationally capable, but also ensures that the Alliance has something tangi-ble to offer as far as cooperative security is concerned. The primary reason for engaging in cooperative security efforts is of course to advance common interests and work towards shared objectives. Yet it is not only the destina-tion that counts: there is much to learn from security cooperadestina-tion with NATO. Its status as the pre-eminent international organisation specialised in military affairs, enabled through its hardware and software assets, assures partner countries that they will get something out of such cooperation they are unlikely to find elsewhere. Above all, this relates to the profession-alisation of their armed forces: it exposes military personnel to advanced
military doctrine and technology, employed in a joint and combined envi-ronment. Partnerships in this sense contribute to an extended multilateral security network in which all nations can learn from each another and develop mutual understanding on contemporary challenges. Multilateral cooperation is thus not only a method for reaching common objectives, but also something of intrinsic value.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to advance the thesis that NATO constitutes the principal multilateral repository of military expertise and therefore acts as the gold standard enabling international military cooperation. This role is founded upon operational experience which is institutionalised in the NATO Command Structure and Allied doctrine – the twin containers of Allied military know-how. The combination of these factors ensures that the Alliance is a unique defense and security actor. Even if the Alliance had not already been around since 1949, there still would be a need for an organization serving the functions it currently fulfils. Today the Alliance’s principal assets serve all core tasks simultaneously, from collective defence through crisis management to cooperative security. As the international environment changes, the Alliance also evolves.
What does all this mean for potential partners such as Brazil? The an-swer very much depends on how Brazil sees its own future role on the in-ternational stage. Dialogue and cooperation, and joint decisions, must take into account the perspectives of all countries involved. Having said that, however, it is clear that potential areas for cooperation abound. These range from constabulary tasks on the high seas and UN-mandated crisis man-agement tasks to the pursuit of military modernisation. Brazil would also benefit from access to advanced military training and education. Common standards would allow for greater interoperability and thus boost Brazil’s ability to contribute to multilateral security assistance missions, including
in the UN context. Global partners such as Japan indeed recognise that this is where NATO’s “greatest comparative advantage” lies.28 It is natural that such dialogue must be tentative and exploratory at first, only to mature over time. Yet, if the longer history of the Alliance proves anything, it is that multilateral security cooperation has much going for it.
28 See: M. Tsuruoka, “NATO and Japan as Multifaceted Partners,” Research Paper No. 91, NATO Defense College, April 2013, p. 6.