With several years passed since the launch of the concept, many think the time to follow up and flesh out the concept has passed. The Brazilian government decided not to turn RwP into the foreign policy signature is-sue of Dilma Rousseff’s first term. This became clear when the Brazilian President declined to explain the issue further during her opening speech at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2012. In a debate on the sidelines of the UNGA about RwP, Brazil was markedly absent.47
Looking back, it seems clear that upon launching the concept, there was a window of opportunity during which Brazil should have drafted a more specific proposal to create momentum. Brazil would have had to develop a diplomatic campaign to garner support for the idea. For example, South Africa and India could have been potential candidates to promote the con-cept. Rather than being “Brazil’s concept” it could have become “IBSA’s concept.” But Brazil declined to assume leadership in the matter, and RwP never achieved what R2P did – to become a household name in the public international relations debate. In theory, a country other than Brazil could have taken up this role – yet, given the lack of a more specific description of what RwP entails and how it applies to the Syria crisis, no other country took the chance. However, given that Antonio Patriota, the creator of RwP, is Brazil’s Permanent Representative to the UN, it is not inconceivable that the country may once again try to push RwP into the centre of the global debate.
Conclusion
As new powers like Brazil, India and China rise to the top of the interna-tional order, Michael Ignatieff wrote recently, “their resistance to
interven-47 Conversation with a Head of Mission to the UN, August 2012.
tion will become increasingly influential. “Responsibility to Protect” will continue to frame the terms of debate, but it has a long way to go before it becomes customary international law.”48 Yet emerging powers are far from certain about their traditional stance on non-interference and rejection of R2P. As their national interests begin to change, according to their eco-nomic and geopolitical rise, the debate about what role sovereignty should play is gaining momentum in Brasilia, New Delhi and Beijing.
This does not mean that emerging powers can be expected to adhere soon to the Western discourse about intervention; far from it. On the other hand, Western governments and analysts would also be wrong to dismiss the leaders of rising powers as hopeless Westphalian ideologues. Consen-sus-builders are now needed more than ever to keep us from returning to the days of Rwanda and Kosovo, in which we faced the stark choice be-tween inaction in the face of large-scale killings (Rwanda) and intervention outlawed by the UN Charter (Kosovo).
As The Economist points out, China was beginning “to knock against the limits of its hallowed non-interference.”49 Perhaps worried that its eco-nomic interests in Libya would be threatened if it were to be singled out as Gaddafi’s staunchest ally, China decided not to veto the Resolution al-lowing for the use of “all necessary measures to protect civilians” in Libya.
Chinese diplomats also met the Libyan rebels in Qatar and Benghazi. This arguably reflected, as observed by the European Council on Foreign Rela-tions among others, that a posture of non-interference was increasingly at odds with China’s global economic presence. Such talk, however, cannot conceal the fact that, because of China’s domestic political situation, the government is for the most part likely to condemn any revolution abroad for fear of encouraging an uprising at home.
48 Michael Ignatieff, “The Libya Case, A Teachable Moment,” Süddeutsche Zeitung Special Supplement - Mu-nich Security Conference, 3 February 2012.
49 The Economist, “The Libyan dilemma,” http://www.economist.com/node/21528664 (accessed 10 July 2013).
India has traditionally been one of the most stalwart defenders of the principle of sovereignty, but has recently shown some flexibility as well.
While RwP is likely to be seen by the West as a tactic to delay interven-tion, India’s support for it implies that it is ready to support intervention in some specific instances. Rather than siding with Moscow and Beijing, New Delhi also voted in favour of the defeated Resolution condemning the Syrian government.
Brazil is no different, as shown above. Yet, rather than fully adopting Washington’s view, Spektor expects Brazil to continue straddling both worlds, thus seeking to become an active voice in the global debate about the future of intervention.
This makes Brazil’s role among the emerging powers unique, potentially turning the country into a crucial mediator between “the West and the rest.” The introduction of the concept of RwP was an example of just that.
At the 4th BRICS Summit, however, this concept failed to do its magic:
Russia imposed its view regarding Syria on the other BRICS countries, making any mention of RwP impossible.
Building that bridge between different worlds is a daunting challenge that may take years to complete, and it will require difficult concessions from both sides. The intervention in Libya may have complicated the de-bate even further, but as long as the topic is high on the agenda of both Western and non-Western actors, there is hope that meaningful progress can be made. Unprecedented debates about R2P, such as those in Brazil and India, certainly show that not everybody’s views are set in stone. RwP could have played a crucial role in this endeavour.
Just as important as RwP’s content is its origin. The debate about sov-ereignty and intervention pits two worlds against each other, seemingly often unable to communicate properly. Most rich Western nations support R2P, while many non-Western poor nations reject it. Analysts from
devel-oping countries argue that, in practice, R2P does not redefine sovereignty in general, but creates two types of sovereignty: that of the strong and that of the weak, the latter enjoying a significantly watered-down version of it.
RwP was thus significant because it emerged in the Global South, from a country whose perspective on sovereignty is much more aligned with that of the developing world than with that of NATO and its member states. As a consequence, it could help bring the two opposing sides to the table and thus mark a step forward towards creation of the framework for a construc-tive debate.