Since the beginning of the atomic age, Brazil has been one of the main actors in promoting the need for international control over nuclear energy.
After supplying the Manhattan Project with atomic minerals,4 Brazil’s rep-resentatives between 1946 and 1948 participated in the first talks over the future of nuclear energy, beginning just months after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Brazil supported the US proposal to ban the production of nuclear weapons, and to control the use of atomic energy – the so-called Baruch Plan (named after Bernard Baruch, the US repre-sentative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission). Brazil thus supported the proposal to curb the spread of WMD, but did not agree to internationalization of atomic mineral reserves. This particular point was in fact perceived as a significant interference in Brazil’s own sovereignty.
Brazilian diplomats won the battle and excluded international supervision from the final text of the possible agreement over the peaceful use of nu-clear energy, non-proliferation of nunu-clear weapons, and elimination of the existing atomic arsenal. Despite the approval of the United Nations Gener-al Assembly (UNGA), the plan never entered into force. An important ele-ment was, however, introduced by Brazilian diplomacy: strenuous defence of sovereign control over its abundant resources of atomic minerals. This would remain a permanent position over the next sixty years, with regard both to national mineral reserves and to technology.5
After the diplomatic talks in New York, the Brazilian government un-successfully tried to develop its own nuclear plan. With scientific, industrial and military ambitions, Brazil tried between 1951 and 1955 to set up an atomic energy programme. This was the first time Brazil challenged the established nuclear order. Through the secret collaboration of European
4 Jonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores. The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943-1945, Princ-eton, Princeton University Press, pp. 49-57.
5 Carlo Patti, “Brazil in Global Nuclear Order,” Ph.D. dissertation, Università di Firenze, 2012, p. 32.
countries such as France and Germany, Brazil tried to import sensitive technologies and Brazilian scientists began studies on nuclear weapons.6 However, external pressures along with a new nuclear domestic policy then limited the programme to research activities.7
While Brazil’s nuclear ambitions were curbed, its nuclear diplomacy continued actively. Brazil was one of the first participants in the US-spon-sored “Atoms for Peace” programme, through which it received its first experimental nuclear reactor, and played an important role in the talks over the creation of the IAEA.8 Brazil made an unsuccessful bid to host the new agency headquarters and, along with India, proposed to guarantee the promotion of nuclear energy in developing countries.9 After the implemen-tation of the IAEA statute, Brazil became a member of the Agency’s board of governors, alternating with Argentina as South American representative.
At the end of the 1950s, Brazil played a central role in the discussions over disarmament. In 1958, President Juscelino Kubitscheck supported new proposals for reducing nuclear arsenals.10 Following that policy, and the proposals of Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki, Brazil at that time became a prominent supporter of the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones around the world, and also approved international norms on disarmament and nuclear proliferation.11 Indeed, Brazil strongly promoted the institution of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Africa, as a consequence
6 Carlo Patti, “The German Connection: the origins of the Brazilian nuclear program and the secret West German – Brazilian cooperation in the early 1950s,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, Arlington, 22 June 2013.
7 Guilherme Camargo, O Fogo Dos Deuses: Uma História Da Energia Nuclear: Pandora 600 a.C.-1970, Rio de Janeiro, Contraponto, 2006, p. 150.
8 On Brazil and “Atoms for Peace,” see: Drogan, Mara, “Atoms for Peace. US Foreign Policy and the Glo-balization of Nuclear Technology, 1953 – 1960,” PhD thesis, University of Albany, 2011.
9 Renato Archer: Energia Atômica, Soberania E Desenvolvimento: Depoimento, ed. Álvaro Rocha Filho and João Carlos Vítor Garcia, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil, Contraponto, 2006, pp. 77-79.
10 Glenn M. Cooper and H. Jon Rosembaum, “Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Interna-tional Affairs, 46, 1970, p. 74.
11 Patti, “Brazil in Global Nuclear Order,” 46. Poland’s Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, in 1957 proposed to denuclearize Central Europe. James R. Ozinga, The Rapacki Plan: the 1957 Proposal to Denuclearize Central Europe, and an Analysis of Its Rejection, Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 1989.
of the French nuclear tests in Algeria. This and other previous proposals over denuclearized zones were not approved within the UNGA, above of all because of opposition from the superpowers, which did not accept the proposed limitations on the use of nuclear weapons in different parts of the world.
Thanks in part to this activism, in 1961 Brazil was elected one of the eight neutral countries in the United Nations Eighteen Nation Disarma-ment Committee (ENDC), which gathered in Geneva to discuss global disarmament.12 Together with development and decolonization, disarma-ment became one of the pillars of the more autonomous foreign policy that Brazil adopted in the early 1960s.13 The Brazilian Foreign Minister, San Tiago Dantas, was among the protagonists of the first sessions of discus-sions of the ENDC. Receiving the support of several countries, including neutral governments and the Soviet Union, Dantas proposed in Geneva measures to limit the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals and impose a complete nuclear test ban. The proposal was submitted in March 1962, but never discussed as the work of the ENDC became totally paralysed in subsequent months.14
The attention of the international community, and of the superpowers, was at the time focused on the Cuba missile crisis. Brazil, as several studies have highlighted, tried to play a central role in defusing the nuclear threat.15 First, Brasilia’s representatives tried to negotiate a possible solution between the Cuban and the Soviet government. Second, after that failed, they tried
12 Patti, “Brazil in Global Nuclear Order,” p. 49.
13 Paulo Wrobel, “Diplomacia nuclear brasileira: não proliferação e o tratado de Tlatelolco,” Contexto Inter-nacional, 15, 1993, p. 31.
14 From the Brazilian delegation in Geneva (Afonso Arinos) to Brazil’s Foreign Minister (Francisco Clem-entino de San Tiago Dantas). Relatório de Afonso Arinos sobre as atividades da primeira parte dos trabalhos da ENDC, 16 June 1962, Secret. Del.Bras./Desarmamento/No 5/1962/2. Antônio Azeredo da Silveira Personal Archive at Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação sobre a História Contemporânea do Brasil of the Fundação Getulio Vargas. (Hereafter AAS) del 1966.01.27.
15 James Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil and the Cuban missile crisis, 1962,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, 2004. Carlo Patti, “The Global nuclear crisis of 1962: a Brazilian perspective” (paper presented at the conference “The Global Nuclear Crisis of 1962,” University of Bristol, 6 September 2013).
to find a regional solution within the UNGA. Following the example of denuclearized areas elsewhere, Brazil proposed to declare Latin America as a nuclear-weapons-free zone, thus imposing a clear commitment for all the nuclear powers (some of them, such as France and the Great Britain, were present in the region as a result of colonial ties). Moreover, Brazil wanted a clear guarantee that its, and Latin America’s, security would not be the target of a nuclear attack. The idea was discarded by Cuba and the super-powers, but it did not mean the end of the initiative. In the following two years, Brazil continued to promote the project of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America, and to support the establishment of global non-pro-liferation norms. 1963 was a crucial year. In promoting a comprehensive nuclear test ban, Brazil was among the proponents and the first signatories of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), considered a first step toward a world free of nuclear tests. The agreement between the US and USSR al-lowed other initiatives to gain momentum. Disarmament and denucleari-zation were at the core of the debate over the future international system.
A few months before the signature of the LTBT, in August 1963, five Latin American presidents (from Mexico, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezue-la) declared a strong interest in establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America. In the following months, parallel to the talks in Geneva, the Latin American countries committed to discuss a possible denuclearization treaty. Within Brazil, which was experiencing a period of political turmoil, there was a clear difference in attitude between diplomats/politicians and the military/scientists. A survey among Brazilian military officers by a lo-cal newspaper demonstrated their massive support for a Brazilian atomic bomb, and clear opposition to imposition of denuclearization.16 The scien-tific community, and above all the members of the Brazilian Nuclear En-ergy Commission (CNEN), strongly criticized the diplomatic manoeuvres of the left-wing government. “Brazil can’t give up its right to nuclearize the country,” wrote CNEN Chairman Marcelo Damy de Sousa Santos to the
16 The Brazilian newspaper Última Hora wrote in 1963 that 80% of the military officials approved of Brazil’s weaponization. On the survey, see: Ovídio de Andrade Melo, Recordações de um removedor de mofo no Itamaraty:
(relatos de política externa de 1948 à atualidade), Brasilia, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2009, p. 40.
Brazilian Foreign Minister, João Augusto de Araújo Castro.17 Brazil was not pursuing a clear nuclear policy. Internal political weakness prevented this. Brazil’s nuclear project nevertheless existed, and its purpose was to give Brazil autonomous capability for generating energy or, in the future, building a bomb.
The crisis resulting from the impasse between the words of the diplo-mats and the positions of the military-scientific community was resolved in March 1964 with a coup that inaugurated a twenty-year military regime.
The neutralist position was abandoned, making way for a foreign policy that oscillated between pro-Americanism and nationalism. Nuclear diplo-macy and policy experienced a deep reformulation. Brazil abandoned its role as the main promoter of a denuclearized Latin America. On the con-trary, during the negotiations in Mexico City to finalise the treaty introduc-ing a nuclear-weapons-free zone, Brazil began to defend its right to develop peaceful nuclear devices and to accept the new zone only subject to a full commitment from all the South American countries and nuclear powers.18 The Brazilian position prevailed. Though the United States tried to influ-ence the course of the debate among the Latin American countries, the text of the treaty made provision for development of civilian nuclear power plants. (The technology concerned is, of course, not easily distinguishable from that used for development of nuclear devices for military purposes).
In 1967 Brazil signed and ratified the treaty, but important countries such as Cuba and Argentina decided not to participate. Furthermore, the nucle-ar powers did not commit themselves to refrain from use of nuclenucle-ar weap-ons in the area. This prompted Brazil’s immediate refusal to be an active party to the treaty. Brasilia persisted with this policy until 1994, reflecting the new Brazilian posture on nuclear energy. Brazil’s military regime, along with the political elites, did not want to give up access to both military nuclear and civilian technology. For this reason, the Brazilian government
17 Marcello Damy de Souza Santos (Chairman of the CNEN) to João Goulart (President of Brasil), Expo-sição de Mótivos 7/62 – Secreto, 29 de novembro de 1962. Maço 692.30 (00) Energia Nuclear. Universo 1954/66 – Caixa 47 – Secreto. Archive of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter AHMRE).
18 Wrobel, p. 52.
decided to reformulate a new nuclear policy, the aim being to turn Brazil into a civilian nuclear power by achieving full command of all the tech-nologies involved, without depending on external suppliers. As Brazilian President Artur da Costa e Silva declared in a secret meeting, Brazil “could not limit its possibilities” and, through diplomacy, should defend its right to develop nuclear energy for civilian use. There was no clear decision that Brazil should arm itself with nuclear weapons, but for Costa e Silva and his successors during the years of military rule it was essential to keep such a possibility open for the future. The quest for greater prominence in the international arena is one of the reasons for Brazil’s ambition to become a nuclear power. On the other hand, Brazil needed security guarantees from the nuclear powers so as to insure against risk of a nuclear attack. This also explains Brazil’s opposition to the text of the NPT, after participating in the long negotiations leading up to it. When the treaty was approved, in 1968, it was widely viewed in Brazil and other Third World countries as a mere agreement among the nuclear powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union. Brazil shared Indian Prime Minister Indira Gan-dhi’s view that the treaty “disarmed the disarmed,” since it imposed full commitment to denuclearization only on countries which in any case had no nuclear weapons, while there was no obligation for those which did to eliminate them. The result was a discriminatory regime, referred to by Indian diplomat Vishnu Trivedi as a “nuclear apartheid,” dividing the in-ternational community between the “haves” and the “have-nots” in terms of nuclear technology for military use. In addition, the treaty did not allow non-nuclear states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thus, if peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) were required by non-nuclear states for engineering or geological purposes, this technology could be offered only by nuclear powers.19 Brazil found such a prospect unacceptable, and began a thirty-year opposition towards a treaty which, seen from a Brazilian
per-19 In 1968, the United States Atomic Energy Commission attempted to offer Brazil the service of peaceful nuclear explosions, but the Brazilian government refused the proposal. On the US proposal see: Patti, “Brazil in Global Nuclear Order,” p. 69; Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Yers, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1987. On the PNEs see: Scott Kaufman, Project Plowshare. The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosives in Cold War America, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2013.
spective, did not guarantee security from attack by a nuclear-weapon state in the event of a nuclear war.20
Building nuclear weapons was not, however, a priority for Brazil. In the years following the creation of a nuclear non-proliferation regime, Brazil kept up its opposition to the treaty but was nevertheless slow to develop its nuclear sector, limiting its activity to purchase of a nuclear power plant in the United States in 1971.21 1974 was a watershed year for Brazil’s nuclear diplomacy. In order to diversify its energy sources and to reduce its de-pendence on external oil supply, Brazil decided to invest heavily in nuclear power and purchased the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including sensitive dual-use technologies, such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel repro-cessing. Brazil’s decision raised international concern about its real ambi-tions. Did it aim to emulate India, which exploded a nuclear device in May 1974? The Indian explosion was a shock for the non-proliferation regime.
Acquiring the necessary material and technology thanks to its safeguarded cooperation with Western nuclear powers, India (another opponent of the, or NPT) had nuclearized its military. The international community, and mainly the United States, decided to strengthen the NPT regime. First, the US would be far more restrictive in its decisions to supply sensitive nuclear equipment and materials to other countries, particularly those outside the NPT. Second, the so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), comprising the Western military and civilian nuclear powers together with the Soviet Union, would impose stricter rules on international trade in nuclear ma-terials and technology. Brazil, in particular, was affected. Brasilia refused to adhere to the international regime, and the United States decided not to provide it with dual-use technologies (for peaceful and military aims).
This did not mean the end of Brazil’s atomic plans. West Germany, not
20 MRE to DelBraGen. Instruções para a delegação do Brasil. Conferência dos Estados Militarmente Não Nu-cleares. 16 August 1968. Secreto. Paulo Nogueira Batista Personal Archive at CPDOC. (Hereafter PNB) pn.a 1967.02.24.
21 It is important to note that Brazil adhered to another nuclear-weapons-free zone, signing in 1971 the Sea-bed Arms Control Treaty (ratified only in 1988). Brazilian Foreign Ministry to Brazil’s delegation in Geneva.
Desarmamento. CCD. Desmilitarização dos mares. Direito do Mar. 15 September 1971. Secreto Urgente. 953.1 (00). Tratado de desnuclearização do fundo do mar. AHMRE.
yet committed to the new non-proliferation rules under discussion within the NSG, decided to supply Brazil with all the equipment, facilities, and material needed for its civilian nuclear project. On 27 June 1975 after more than a year of confidential negotiation, West Germany and Brazil signed a major nuclear deal. Bonn would supply up to eight nuclear power plants and create Brazilian-German joint ventures for building facilities capable of implementing the nuclear fuel cycle. The deal was widely recognized as the largest technological and industrial transfer between industrialized and developing countries. In practice, however, it affected Brazil’s posture on nuclear weapons only to a limited extent. First, West Germany, in response to international pressure, decided to export an unproven uranium enrich-ment technology, considered unviable for producing nuclear weapons.
Second, Brazil agreed to safeguards on its nuclear cooperation with Bonn, respecting the norms imposed by the NPT. On the other hand, Brazil did not change its attitude to PNEs, continuing to declare its right to develop atomic devices. According to the available documentation, however, the agreement with West Germany was not seen by Brazil as paving the way towards nuclearization of its military arsenal.22
This perspective was not shared by the United States and other coun-tries. Despite Brazil’s commitment to certain non-proliferation norms, at least in its cooperation with Bonn, Washington thought that a nuclear arms race was in progress between Brazil and Argentina, which boasted a more advanced nuclear sector. Tensions between the two countries existed, but not over the nuclear question. Both strongly criticized the non-prolifera-tion regime and opposed its reinforcement. The NSG, in fact, set up a new normative framework to address some of the loopholes in the NPT. The nuclear suppliers undertook not to export sensitive materials to countries not belonging to the NPT, or not to accept as a condition of supply that the IAEA should have access to all their nuclear facilities. Brazil was one of the targets of a regime, which was perceived as increasingly intrusive. Between 1976 and 1979, the government in Brasilia was the target of sustained
criti-22 Patti, “Brazil in Global Nuclear Order,” pp. 94-146.
cism from the United States, which was trying to impede the implementa-tion of the German-Brazilian nuclear deal.
The US diplomatic pressure was both bilateral and multilateral. In its diplomatic contacts with Brazil, Washington tried proposing alternatives to the agreement with West Germany. At the end of the Ford administra-tion, there were secret attempts to convince the Brazilians to recede from the nuclear deal in exchange for US supply of nuclear fuel and economic assistance. The initiative was almost successful. However, when US State Department officials leaked news of the agreement, the Brazilians refused to keep their word. The period after the inauguration of US President Jimmy Carter was thus marked by a US crusade against the Brazilian nu-clear programme. While the Carter administration put pressure on both
The US diplomatic pressure was both bilateral and multilateral. In its diplomatic contacts with Brazil, Washington tried proposing alternatives to the agreement with West Germany. At the end of the Ford administra-tion, there were secret attempts to convince the Brazilians to recede from the nuclear deal in exchange for US supply of nuclear fuel and economic assistance. The initiative was almost successful. However, when US State Department officials leaked news of the agreement, the Brazilians refused to keep their word. The period after the inauguration of US President Jimmy Carter was thus marked by a US crusade against the Brazilian nu-clear programme. While the Carter administration put pressure on both