Transparent Communication

The Serena Hotel changed the name of one of the principal meeting rooms where the negotiations had taken place to ‘Amani Room’ (amani meaning peace in Kiswahili). A plaque at the entrance of the Amani Room now remembers the significance of the mediation (Baldauf 2008d; Jepson et al. 2014, 34). Whilst not everyone is likely to have the opportunity to pass by this room, it indicates an openness and transparency of the negotiations. Every Kenyan at least theoretically has the chance to know this is the place where the proceedings took place.

This symbolic gesture holds meaning regarding the third feature of the heuristic model - transparent communication. This feature was abductively shown to be relevant in the last chapter on the Liberian peace negotiations. Because of the infrastructure in place in the Kenyan setting, there was a completely different environment for transparent communication to unfold. This allows for a more precise tracing of the constitutive components related to this feature as well as the causal conditions that enabled them.

The comprehensive process-tracing encompasses is carried out in three steps. Firstly, an interpretive overview of transparent communication confirms that ensuring implementation constitutes a component of the legitimisation process. Instead of feeling included however, which was suggested to be a constitutive component in the previous case study, this is amended to feeling involved. This is shown by what I call ‘participative communication’. Secondly, the causal conditions that enabled these constitutive components are then traced, looking for the ways of communication. Thirdly, the context factors that play a role in the comprehensive process-tracing of transparent communication are discussed.

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5.4.1 Constitutive Process-Tracing: Ensuring Implementation and Feeling Involved

The extensive distribution of information in the Kenyan case confirms that ensuring implementation is a component that constitutes a part of the legitimisation process. The distribution of information also suggests that to an extent there is a feeling of involvement rather than feeling included. This is further expanded upon, shown to be component constitutive of a part of the legitimisation process in a second section of what I call ‘participative communication.’ Participative communication is either one-sided or dualistic and further allows the population to involve themselves in the negotiations process, without - necessarily - the input of the CSAs themselves. This shows another way of participation beyond representation by the CSAs.

5.4.1.1 The Distribution of Information

The distribution of information was much more extensive in Kenya, as can be shown with the density of information widely available. There were also communication efforts amongst the different CSAs, more than between each other.

Position statements, manifestos and ads in newspaper made the goals and demands from the CSAs at this time very clear. This was aimed not only at the conflict parties, the mediators and to a lesser degree other CSAs, see below, but also the population itself. As a result, the CSAs and the media are said to have brought information to the grassroots (K42). For the most part, the information distribution concerned the messages of peace from CCP or the details of the election fraud or violence from the KPTJ. Other messages of information were more general. For example a series of ads running on two full newspaper pages, signed by an anonymous group called Kenyans for Peace and Progress explained the worthlessness of violence and published an inventory of the privileges of MPs including their salaries and bonuses. In conclusion, they urged: ‘Say no to unlawful political activities that will not feed, clothe, or educate your family.’ The announcement meant that ‘Kenyans were referred to their disillusions, their own misery and the powerlessness of political mobilisations in the resolving of daily challenges’ (Connan 2008, 330–331). On top of these efforts from CSAs, detailed reporting of the progress of the KNDR was widely available in the newspapers and television programmes throughout the process.

As a result, knowledge on the peace process, conflict resolution tools and details of historical injustices is rather abundant (e.g. K11). This is especially evident in the level of detail given on the peace talks in the focus groups. Referring back to Table 5.2, this shows a detailed list of those thought to have been present at the negotiations, according to the focus group participants. This is especially notable in comparison to the focus groups in Liberia where the same questions resulted in ‘the UN’ or

‘international community’ instead of the detailed list of names and political affiliation (e.g. KET).

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Intricate information is available on the mediation process, to the outright bizarre such as the presence of a herd of elephants who crept close to the mediation room when Kofi Annan spoke, in addition to many other facts and impressions detailed in articles and books on the topic (Baldauf 2008c; see also Jepson et al. 2014; Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010). Compared to Liberia case especially, very few of the interlocutors complained about the lack of knowledge of the proceedings (exceptions include K42; K53 and tend to focus more on a lack of civic education generally, e.g. K19; K24; K29; K31; K49).

Due to the transparent media infrastructure, the civil society groups also had less need to communicate with each other. In any case, due to different and sometimes contradictory goals and ambitions of the major players, communication between the groups was limited to for example the KPTJ acknowledging the peace efforts of the church, or the Citizen’s Agenda from the CCP referencing ‘deep-rooted’ issues of truth and justice (Concerned Citizens for Peace 2008, 4; Connan 2008, 328). However, information on the meetings, goals and aims was easier to receive not only for the population but also the different civil society groups. Hence, there was less of a need to directly communicate with each other. For example the Kenyan Human Rights Institute put together a half-day forum on the 1^st February for

‘human rights and governance specialists to reflect on the response of civil society groups to the crisis’

(2008, 2). The summary of the meetings is publically available on the Internet. Their collections of critique are therefore plausibly useful for other CSAs.

The distribution of information meant that implementation becomes easier, which is a component that constitutes a part of the legitimisation process. Ensuring implementation is especially important in the Kenyan setting for the legitimising process, not just regarding the interim political power-sharing government, but the many Agenda 4 mechanisms that promised to address a variety of grievances or concerns. This included not the least the extensive reports released by the two inquiry commissions as well as further comprehensive reports from human rights organisations on the crisis and the mediation process which followed (e.g. Jepson et al. 2014, 58; Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 5). These reports gave an overview of what had happened and confirmed the existence of collective concerns to be addressed.

Moreover, the CSAs took on a watchdog role to ensure implementation for which it needed to know details on the status of the reforms (K42; KNY). This was possible because the AU Panel decided to commission a regular monitoring and evaluation of the implementation status of the four agendas but especially Agenda 4. South Consulting, headed by a Kenyan academic, took on this task on a quarterly basis for a total of fifteen reports up to and including February 2013. Detailing not only the progress of the inquiry commissions and the institutional and legal changes made to advance implementation, South Consulting also conducted regular surveys to gauge public opinion on these events. These reports were therefore not only useful for information purposes (and findings could be discussed and reprinted in the

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media) but also served as a tool for the CSAs to determine where they could focus their attention in the implementation process (Wanyeki 2010).

This distribution of information was further promoted in the implementation period by annual conference conducted by the Kofi Annan Foundation, three times after the mediation had taken place between 2009-2011, which invited media stakeholders as well as all the CSAs. A website was dedicated to the process (http://www.dialoguekenya.org/) and guests at the conference were invited to use Twitter and other social media sites to report from the event. Moreover, a coordination office, the CLO, was set up to organise and monitor the implementation process. This CLO organised the conferences, the website, oversaw the monitoring reports from South Consulting and held numerous meetings with CSAs in order to discuss their coordination efforts in order to fully support implementation (Jepson et al. 2014, 57).

This very transparent process ensured that the pressure on the conflict parties to implement the different Agendas and was kept up in the period after the agreement had been signed. The importance given to the implementation confirms this as a component constitutive of the legitimisation process. So much emphasis was put on the implementation phase it cannot be neatly separated from the negotiation process, at least not regarding the legitimisation process. This is shown also at least in part, to the detrimental nature the lack of implementation has on the legitimisation of the peace process as discussed under collective concerns previously.

More than this, the distribution of information also provides for a feeling of involvement rather than inclusion as suggested by the previous Liberian case study. In that case, it was shown that a lack of information leads to a sense of exclusion. As a result, it was supposed that the distribution of information, when widely carried out, results in a feeling of inclusion. The Kenyan case illustrates however that the distribution of information if anything results in strengthening public confidence, which adds to a feeling of involvement rather than inclusion. Through the distribution of information, the public was incorporated into the pressure for a political solution and ensured the generation of

‘domestic legitimacy’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 31). Wanyeki sums up the activities of the CSAs as

“strengthening popular public appetite” (K55). The distribution of information ensured the strengthening of popular support for the process and as a result in the process. The more the process was popularised and strengthened, the more the process becomes legitimised because people feel involved. It cannot be argued that there was a feeling of inclusion, as the confessions that the process was “limited in terms of participation” (K46), or “at the time … everybody had to be given a voice. There ought to have been a popular consultation where everybody had a chance to talk” (K48) show. This call for consultation, which mirrors similar confessions in Liberia, further suggests that a widespread feeling of inclusion was absent. This revised component of feeling involved is discussed in more detail in the next section on participative communication.

175 5.4.1.2 Participative Communication

Wanyeki stresses that CSAs ensure “legitimacy through participation” (K55). As was argued previously, subjective representation on its own, even in addition to the collective concerns, does not fully suffice to result in a sense of participation. This is why the feature of transparent communication was added.

Based on the Liberian case study it was proposed that because the lack of information led to a sense of exclusion, the distribution of information would in turn lead to a sense of feeling of inclusion. The discussion of distribution of information from the Kenyan case, in the preceding section, shows nevertheless that more than anything there may be an enhanced sense of public confidence in the process, rather than inclusion. As a result, this leads to a sense of involvement rather than inclusion, as a component constituting to the legitimisation process. This is confirmed by what I label participative communication, traced in this section. In other words, participative communication, which can be either dualistic or one-sided, supports an interaction between the process and the population through forms of communication, partially including CSAs, which leads to a feeling of involvement, constituting a part of the legitimisation process.

Dualistic participative communication is illustrated by the communicative engagement with the public at the behest of CSAs, which contributes to circular information flows. The best example comes from the Open Forum conducted by the CCP. From this Open Forum, the Citizens Agenda for Peace was developed which was then presented to the mediators. The idea behind the Open Forum was that anyone who wanted to could attend and exchange thoughts, also called an ‘idea harvesting session’

(Concerned Citizens for Peace 2008, 2). Similar forums were also set up including the Nairobi Peace Forum, District Peace Forums and Listening Forums (Ibrahim Abdi 2009; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11). The open invitation to all makes this a participatory process that further contributes to a circular information flow: Listening allows for information on collective concerns to be gathered.

This information was then fed into the mediation process through the regular meetings between the CSAs and the mediators (see also “the Panel used what it heard;” Jepson et al. 2014, 238). In turn, information on the mediation was then redistributed to the public through the media - both by the CSAs and the AU Panel members, thus creating dualistic participative communication, see Figure 5.3 below.

This dualistic participative communication opens up the discourse in the peace negotiations to anyone in the public who wants to participate, at least theoretically. The event was described as asking ‘anyone interested in saving Kenya to come’ (Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11), suggesting that through attending a role is played in helping to save Kenya, and thus contributes to a feeling of involvement. For Habermas too, what counts is the theoretical participation, rather than the actual participation. The dualistic participative communication constitutes a part of the legitimisation process by allowing for a feeling of involvement. ‘Public approval and advocacy gave these documents

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legitimacy’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 45). This statement makes the link between ‘public approval’, best ensured by the communication flow as described above, and the legitimacy of the agreement itself, presumably because of a feeling of involvement.

Figure 5.3 Circular Communication Flows for Dualistic Participative Communication General

Population

CSAs (& Media) AU Panel

The feeling of involvement is further illustrated by one-sided participative communication, which gives a sense of involvement simply by airing the grievances and explaining one owns suffering, whether symbolically, artistically or otherwise.

Like in Liberia participants in the focus groups in Kenya noted in a final reflection session that they felt they had benefited from participating in the discussions themselves as a “learning process“ and a documentation of their “grassroots experiences“ (e.g. KEN). This suggests that any forms of expressions or reflections on the negotiation process give a sense of being involved or heard - even if this is rather symbolically. The story of Graça Machel crying and hugging a woman who had told her of her experiences of violence was given as an example of showing the proximity of Machel to the population as well as being deemed an important event in itself (that the woman was able to express her grievance). The ‘spitting session’ organised by Machel at a meeting of women from both political divides also gave an opportunity for people to air their grievances; giving them the sense they were involved in contributing to the collection of mutual concerns or grievances. Similarly, in another instance, a meeting held by women groups two years after the negotiations was framed as follows:

‘Every story needed to be heard. Everyone needed to share their experiences in order for healing to begin. Everyone listened, cried and empathised. In the end there was a feeling of release, possibility of forgiveness and the beginning of healing as people hugged and comforted each other’ (Ringera 2014, 190).

This shows that the externalisation of grievances, worries and experiences adds to a feeling of involvement, which personally legitimises the negotiation process. On a more practical and formalised level such expression of grievances took place within the framework of local peacebuilding dialogue (for examples of Local Peace Dialogues see e.g. Korir 2009; K11; K22; K54). Expressing grief and grievances

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as a form of participative communication re-introduces the shared experience or understanding, which was not a representative quality of the CSAs, as discussed previously as part of the feature of subjective representation.

The feeling of involvement as a component that constitutes a part of the legitimisation process is also shown by one-sided participative communication carried out through artistic expression. Examples of this include a photo exhibition ‘Kenya Burning’ which had been organised by an Arts Centre together with the CCP. A request was made to have these photos to be shown in the Parliament so that politicians would have to look at them as well (see Kahora 2008a, 79). This made the photo exhibition into a political event, trying to reiterate the responsibility of some of the MPs in the post-election violence. Furthermore, under the umbrella of the group, which called itself ‘Concerned Kenyan Writers’

a physical and virtual forum was provided for citizens to come to grasp with what had happened (Kahora 2008a, 2008b; Wanyeki 2010, 5). Initial responses included interactions by authors – largely amongst the Kenyan middle class - through social media forums. In addition, a collection of fiction and non-fiction stories on the post-election violence was also printed in an annual Kenyan literary collection called Kwani?.

These reflections on what had happened and why, were published in two edited volumes from 2008.

The editor of these two Kwani? editions, explains ‘we are in this business to tell the individual’s story as a citizen in the space called Kenya, his or her relationship to serikali or state or whatchamacallit … rather than to build one-characteristical narratives from sound-bites of Big Men’ (Kahora 2008a, 9). This confession underlines the commitment to telling another story beyond that of the politicians, one about and involving citizens. The two volumes collect stories, reports, interviews, poems, drawings and photos, seeking out to record and analyse stories from all sides of the conflict: ‘From people who threw stones, and people who had stones thrown at them; from farmers and nurses and hustlers, Luos and Kikuyus and Kalenjin … whatever name they went by, we wanted Kenyans to speak for themselves’ (emphasis added.

Arno Kopecky in Kahora 2008b, 48). As can be seen in Image 5.1 below, pages in the volume document for example text messages send at the time of the post-election violence superimposed onto photos. In a very different way, these efforts express a civilian counterbalance to the otherwise politicised process, by allowing for the experiences or sufferings experienced to be vocalised. This contributes to a sense of feeling involved.

With the aim of not forgetting what had happened in the short period of violence and reflecting on the bigger issues at stakes: ‘As writers…we have to look at what happened in the full-face. If there is any single reason this all happened, it is because we have refused to see, hear or listen’ (Binyavanga Wainaina in Kahora 2008b, 17). Such documentation and expression helped to come to terms with what had happened (the violence) but also with the negotiation process and therefore constitutes a part of the legitimisation through feeling involved. Other forms of communication used social media networks

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including blogs, text messages and other forms of social media. Kenyans approached ‘social media as a way to get involved’ (Mäkinen and Kuira 2008, 329). The resulting sense of involvement constitutes a part of the legitimisation process.

Figure 5.1: Artistic Expression of Grievances through copies of SMS and Photos in the Kwani?

Collection (Kahora 2008b, 294–295)

Collection (Kahora 2008b, 294–295)