Whilst a lot has been written on legitimacy, most of the work looks at the authority of leaders or regimes, or the system analysis of well-established systems or procedures. A western bias no doubt exists, though a number of authors have also considered legitimacy in non-western contexts (e.g.
Alagappa 1995; Förster 2010; Schatzberg 2001). The discussion on the public sphere goes some way to explaining why peace negotiations may become legitimate: There is free and fair participation (through representation) and involvement in the discursive negotiations process including in its output. From this, two features of legitimacy are deduced that make the basis for a heuristic model. On the one hand, civil society actors are involved in the discursive peace process and relating back to substantive representation (‘acting for’), they address specific collective concerns. On the other hand, free and fair participation is
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ensured through representation by CSAs, which in line with the symbolic and descriptive elements of representation are subjectively representative for the beneficiaries of legitimacy.
The heuristic model is built on an empirical understanding of legitimacy, though locally relevant beliefs of values are thought to affect the experience or construction of legitimacy, the ‘grounded legitimacy’.
The process of legitimisation is dynamic, on going and started on an ad-hoc basis. Due to the dynamic nature of this belief on legitimacy, there is not a dichotomous belief in either legitimacy or illegitimacy.
Rather, the belief in legitimacy is continuous on a scale of more or less legitimate and can change over time (see also Alagappa 1995, 25; 45; Gilley 2009, 10–11; Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung 1998, 413). As explained previously, peace processes more generally involve several stages. This includes the pre-negotiations phase, hugely important in getting warring parties to the table. The actual pre-negotiations are followed - in the best-case scenario - by an agreement. After this, the open-ended process of implementation starts. All these stages have formal and informal dimensions. The focus of this dissertation is the actual negotiation stage coupled with the final agreement, though the other stages are also addressed. The two features of legitimacy that make up the heuristic model will now be introduced.
2.3.1 Addressing Collective Concerns
Using the output-side of legitimacy as a basis would suggest concentrating on the output of a peace negotiation, namely a stable peace agreement. Whilst this no doubt plays a role, it underlines an essentially tautological argument. Moreover, in line with the discourse element of the public sphere, addressing collective concerns also plays a role during the actual peace negotiations, and is not just a measurement to be made at the end. This is the basis for the feature of addressing collective concerns, which is now sketched out.
In order for the negotiation process to be perceived as legitimate, from the previous discussion on substantive representation and the discursive element of the public sphere, it would follow that the population must feel like their grievances and concerns were included, and be satisfied with the outcome of the final agreement at the end of the negotiations. In Guatemala for example, a Civil Society Assembly ensured the development of the ‘broad national agenda covering a gamut of interests and issues, and in particular those ethnic, social and economic fractures that had plagued the formation of the Guatemalan society and state’ (Arnault 2014, 22). Negotiations (and ensuing agreements) will therefore be more legitimate when grievances are addressed that the public collectively care about. This is enhanced by ideas of substantive representation, or acting for, which also means acting in the interests of the population, in a manner responsive to them (e.g. Pitkin 1967; Randall 2007; see also Odendaal 2010, 20).
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The feature of collective concerns encapsulates what is being discussed in the negotiations (and included in the final agreement) as a reflection of collective grievances. Collective concerns are therefore made up of grievances from the populations. These issues in turn need to be addressed by civil society actors in the discursive process itself, and the actual agreement. In theory, addressing collective concerns is interesting because it does not necessarily follow that civil society needs to be directly included in the peace negotiations for collective grievances to play a role. In that sense, even track two or parallel negotiations could suffice if they provide an opportunity for a broad set of concerns to be heard and ultimately considered for the final agreement (Paffenholz 2014a, 81). Due to the inherent power imbalance in a negotiation setting, the civil society need to be influential in taking part in the discursive process (be it as Track I or Track II actors) for it to be effective as a legitimisation feature, in relation to a role for CSAs.
Focusing on the output-side of legitimacy based on a system analysis, it has been argued that the output as regards policies, and acceptance by the affected population of these, is the key element to determining legitimacy, even at the cost of fair input into the decisions made (e.g. Boedeltje and Cornips 2004; Gilley 2009; Kratochwil 2006). Anders Hanberger for example defines legitimacy as the ‘product of satisfying felt needs and solving perceived and observed local problems’ (2003, 270). This would mean that the key to legitimisation of peace negotiations is the output of a peace agreement, preferably one that lasts. The risk would be in creating a tautological argument: With a lasting peace agreement, legitimacy is ensured.
When the peace agreement fails, then the process becomes illegitimate.
Whilst no doubt an end to violence is a prominent collective concern or grievance to be addressed, it is arguably not the only one. In other words, the absence of violence is not thought to be the sole criteria for legitimisation. In a policy brief on legitimate peace processes, Jean Arnault argues that ‘a peace process cannot rely on legitimisation brought about by the unbearable cost of war; it is required to address squarely the task of constructing the legitimacy required to prevail over the supporters of the continuation of conflict’ (2014, 22). Thus, a peace agreement that lasts amounts to much more than simply ending violence. It also includes the participation in the discursive peace process itself. As a result, when a peace agreement fails this is likely to have an effect on the belief in the legitimacy of the negotiations, but does not entirely delegitimise the process either. The construction of legitimacy does not exclusively relate to the output of ending violence. This supports the idea of legitimacy as a continuous concept not a dichotomous one and the reason why the input/output models of legitimacy are not wholly appropriate. In summary, as shown in Figure 2.1 below, collective concerns are addressed during the talks, which includes the final peace agreement.
43 2.3.2 Subjective Representation
In his book on why wars recur, Call considers legitimacy in peacebuilding arguing for ‘legitimacy-focused peacebuilding’ which depends on a state offering the main social groups acceptable levels of representation and participation (2012, 226). Whilst Call focuses on the post-war setting rather than the negotiations, the finding is still relevant. Building on what has been outlined on the public sphere, it reinforces the idea of free and fair participation through representation. It builds on the assumption, that at least in principle, ‘every citizen should have the ability to participate in ... public discourses’ (Scharpf 1997, 29).
Because elections are not possible in the setting of peace negotiations (or have limited influence regarding legitimisation as is discussed in the later chapter on Kenya) and there are no established procedures in place, the participation is ensured through the representation of civil society participants.
This idea is no doubt widely accepted, but has as of yet been conceptually and theoretically understood only to a limited degree. Who is involved and what kind of relationships exist between the beneficiaries of legitimacy and their guarantors? What interpretations of representation are relevant in the different contexts?
Considering the theories of legitimacy and representation, it has already been argued that Weber’s traditional and charismatic sources of legitimacy are likely relevant for individual civil society actors. This also includes any legitimation strategies of individual civil society activists involved in peace negotiations is also considered (see Barker 2001). Moreover, in line with Pitkin, it is not the formal representation that is plausibly replicated in the context of peace negotiations (much like Weber’s legal-rational source of legitimacy) but rather the symbolic and descriptive forms of representation. Substantive representation is already included in the feature of collective concerns alone.
The feature therefore considers who is taking part in the negotiations, not least because of contextual interpretations of representation, legitimation strategies of individual actors and other forms of obvious descriptive and symbolic representation. This may include non-conventional representative qualities, such as maternal or paternal metaphors. Because representation depends on the relationship between the guarantors of legitimacy and their beneficiaries (or in other words representatives and those they deem to represent), the feature is labelled subjective representation.
Whilst at first glance, the feature of subjective representation may seem to be a simple question of input legitimacy this is in fact difficult to apply so restrictively in the context of peace negotiations. Subjective representation certainly plays a role during the negotiations, after all this is where participation via representation takes place. But representation does not come out of the blue, thus the pre-negotiation stage is also relevant as well as after the talks. In other words the symbolic attachment or descriptive
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identity is prevalent during the talks, but also plays a role before and after as part of an on-going process of legitimisation. The complete heuristic model based on these two features, is summarised in Figure 2.1 below.
Figure 2.1: Heuristic for Legitimate Peace Negotiations
Before the Talks
Addressing Collective Concerns Subjective Representation
During the Talks After the Talks
Before the heuristic model is applied in two separate case studies, the research design of the rest of the dissertation is outlined in the following chapter.
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Methodology and Research Design
3 Methodology and Research Design
Having presented the heuristic model in the previous chapter, the starting point to answer how peace negotiations are made (more) legitimate, this chapter sketches out the methodology and research design of the dissertation. On the basis of a constructivist ontology and a mixed epistemology a ‘comprehensive process-tracing’ method of analysis is developed, that includes both constitutive and a causal analysis for the theory building in question. This method uses an abductive research design to trace the features of the heuristic model in two cases of peace negotiations, namely in Liberia and Kenya. The methodological foundations of the research and the method of comprehensive process-tracing is addressed in the following, before considering the empirical fieldwork methods of the research in more detail. The next section concentrates on the importance and relevance of case study research today, as well as the methodological assumptions made for the dissertation.