As argued above, the way that civil society is often used in this literature makes conceptual assumptions that do not always portray an accurate empirical picture. In order to avoid such assumptions, the major conceptual shortcomings of civil society as an idea are reviewed in the following. Civil society is not only badly defined more generally, but in the post-conflict context also frequently viewed from a western,
‘civil’ and ‘representative’ perspective, which makes certain normative assumptions. Having a clear understanding of what civil society as a concept and phenomena to be studied entails, helps to use the idea in an appropriate manner.
Mostly, civil society tends to be vaguely defined as the middle sphere (of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks) between the (free) market and the nation state (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001; Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 5; Lewis 2002, 570; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 15). Michael Edwards, who has done extensive research on civil society, speaks of ‘un-coerced human association … in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and market’ (2011, 4). This is not the sole definition of civil society.
Edwards differentiates between three types of definitions: Civil society as a part of society (the associational life model already described), civil society as a kind of society (namely characterised by normative norms and values in order to meet certain social goals) and civil society as the public sphere (2009, 10). The contested nature of the term, the ‘chameleon like qualities’ and difficulties in using it as a unit of analysis have been widely noted (e.g. Brühl 2010; Chabal 1994, 84; Christie 2012, 38; Edwards 2009, 3; Lund 2006, 686–687; Spurk 2010, 20–21).
A major difficulty that results from the associational life definition is the fact that three spheres are unlikely to be completely autonomous to each other and in fact overlap in different ways and are mutually constitutive of each other (Chandhoke 2001, 22; Christie 2012, 199; see also Utas 2012, 3).
More often than not civil society organisations are dependent on state structures, and in a global context this includes funding from external states and state-related donors (Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 7).
Because of the interdependence of these spheres, civil society is interpreted to be both reducing conflict with the state as local communities are empowered (especially in peacebuilding), as well as a check and balance on the state, hence being in tension with it (Christie 2012, 10). These overlaps and tension also makes intermediaries between the spheres difficult to classify, especially the media and political parties (Spurk 2010, 8). Does the media need to be independent from the state (and the market for that matter) in order to count as civil society? Are political parties always part of the state even when they are not part of any formal state institutions through elections or otherwise? In addition, the heterogeneous nature and organic nature of civil society actors and organisations, means they are likely to constantly evolve and change (Edwards 2011, 8; Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 9; Ron 2007, 5).
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Related to the discussion of emancipatory or communitarian peacebuilding outlined previously, the type of civil society has also been a major point of discussion. Much of the discussion on civil society actors stems from a western notion of associational life inspired by the project of Enlightenment (Pearce 2011, 407). Empirically, a lot of work has focused on anti-authoritarian activists civil society in Eastern Europe throughout and after the Cold War and the fight against military dictatorships in Latin American at the end of the 1960s (Kopecký and Mudde 2003; Spurk 2010). In the Middle East, civil society groups have been dependent on state patronage and in Asia such groups only became noticeable in the 1980s did such (Spurk 2010, 13–14). Both in Asia and in Africa, civil society has been linked to waves of democratisation and more generally is tightly linked to the concept of democracy (Ndegwa 1996).
Nonetheless, in both Asian and African countries, associational life through communal networks has existed since before colonial times. As Mahmood Mamdani shows at length in his book, a small urban class of civil society developed in the colonial settings. However, even the rural population or ‘subjects’
can be seen as participants in civil society if we accept a broad understanding of the idea (1996).
Such different understandings of civil society show for example, that these groups are not necessarily characterised by voluntary association, but rather are dominated by ascriptive groups controlled by a strong charismatic leaders (Lewis 2002; Obadare 2011, 185; Spurk 2010, 10–13). In conflict and post-conflict settings, a mushrooming of non-governmental organisations offering basic public services is also documented (Donais 2012, 11; Pouligny 2009, 184). In addition, in these settings civil society is likely to be weak, divided and diffuse - just as much a casualty of the preceding violence as other agents, infrastructures or institutions (Donais 2012, 60–66; Orjuela 2003; Prendergast and Plumb 2002; Spurk 2010, 19). Non-western types of civil society are likely to exist, even if weakened over time and by conflict, yet the question is whether these are the types of organisations that mediators actively engage with (Christie 2012, 193; Donais 2012, 69; Pouligny 2005; Watson 2012, 40).
As Thania Paffenholz points out, civil society reflects characteristics present in society and as such it can be divided along lines of power, hierarchy, ethnicity and gender. In addition, civil society actors display moderate as well as radical images and behaviours (2010, 414; see also Donais 2012, 37 on the diversity of local actors; as well as Atuobi 2010; Hultin 2014; Schaefer 2010). In Burundi it has even been suggested that the inclusion of civil society would have made the peace process even more polarized (McClintock and Nahimana 2008; see also Odendaal 2010, 20). Civil society can in fact be partisan, non-neutral and ‘uncivil’, and even use violent means to achieve their goals (Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 3;
Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 32). Moreover, it has been suggested that uncivil society will tend to have more grassroots influence rather than larger international civil society organisations, which will have much less of an idea of what exactly the issues at stake are (Kopecký and Mudde 2003:4-5). Mary Moran and Anne Pitcher recognise that the role of civil society in a peace process is not only complex, but often contradictory (2004, 516; see also Hasenclever and De Juan 2009). What it comes down to, is that there is normative circumscription to the type of civil society which is discussed and in fact norms like
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trust and cooperation will have different values for people in different circumstances (Bob 2011; see also Bolzendahl and Coffé 2011; Edwards 2009, 52). As a result, what counts as uncivil for one will not necessarily be so for others.
The reality is that most of the civil society actors likely to be involved as Track II or Track I actors are urban elites who receive external donor funding (Paffenholz 2014b, 20–21). In this line of argumentation, civil society are part of and help to implement neoliberal peacebuilding (Christie 2012, 195; Taylor 2010; Richmond and Mitchell 2011, 13; see also Schrader and Denskus 2010, 46). Regarding civil society involved in the peace process, normative expectations are frequently posited whereby civil society should be peace-oriented or civil as opposed to ‘uncivil’ (McClintock and Nahimana 2008; Orjuela 2003). As a result, civil society actors are often criticised as elites who are more accountable do international donors than the grassroots they may or may not claim represent (Belloni 2008, 209; Brühl 2010, 187; Calhoun 2011, 318; Daley 2006, 317; Edwards 2009, 99; Pouligny 2005; Spurk 2010, 15;
Steffek and Hahn 2010, 11). Civil society is both civil and uncivil, in opposition to the state and helping the state, so broad that debates on what counts as civil society and what does not continue to be discussed, ranging from their emancipatory potential to being a further straightjacket tool of liberal peacebuilding. One thing is sure: Civil society is both a normative and an empirical concept (Pearce 2011, 404).
Despite all these problems of conceptualisation, voluntary associations have been shown to curb power of central institutions, and to nurture social norms like trust and cooperation (Edwards 2009, 7; see also Donais 2012, 77). For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition of civil society is seen as associational voluntary organisations as well individuals involved in them, which are broadly speaking not part of the state or the free market, and act in a public sphere. The civil society actors are assumed to contribute to the legitimacy of the talks because of their actions. In order to avoid any normative connotations, both the understanding of legitimacy and civil society is primarily an empirical one: Which organisations or actors were present, what did they do and what does this means regarding legitimacy?
This empirical understanding of civil society is similar to Christoph Spurk who proposes using civil society as a descriptive rather than an analytical tool (2010, 23). This is based on the argument that,
‘normative expectations about ... civil society should not derange our analysis of actually existing civil society’ (Chandhoke 2001, 5) nor should civil society be romanticised (Donais 2009, 14; Pouligny 2005).
Some further definitions of concepts that are used throughout this dissertation are defined in the next section, as well as outlining the focus of the research question.
19 1.4 Key Concepts and Research Focus
The aim of the research questions is to consider how peace negotiations become more legitimate, through (if at all) the participation of civil society actors. The two major areas of interest concern negotiations on the one hand and legitimacy on the other.
Regarding negotiations, the focus is on power-sharing negotiations specifically, a sub-type of peace negotiations. Therefore, when the term ‘peace negotiations’ is used throughout the text it in facts refers to the specific type of power-sharing agreements that seek to end violence. This definition also includes agreements made to end post-election violence in Kenya, which I will include on the basis of a broad understanding of peace negotiations because the end result or aim is still to end violence through a power-sharing agreement. This definition allows a coupling of legitimacy to (sustainable) peace, which is the starting point for this research question, albeit not the focus of this research. In other words, the legitimacy of peace negotiations is reviewed as part of a question of peacebuilding and sustainable peace, but the focus of the research at hand is only on the negotiation process itself and how this is made more legitimate, not on the link to more sustainable peace.
Two further points are relevant for the concept of peace negotiations. Such talks are usually facilitated by mediators and may include negotiators who either are the conflict parties themselves or act on behalf of the conflict actors. This distinguishes two types of actors involved in peace negotiations that are not civil society actors: Those who are trying to make gains by participating favouring their own group (negotiators) and those who are ensuring the smooth running of the talks (mediators). This does not mean however, that mediators do not have their own interests (e.g. Bercovitch 1996, 9).
In addition, the negotiations refer to the actual talks themselves and the agreement that is signed at the end of the negotiations. This research focuses exclusively on negotiations with final signed agreements.
More generally, peace processes involve several stages. This includes the pre-negotiations phase, hugely important in getting conflict parties to the table. The actual negotiations are followed - in the best-case scenario - by an agreement. After this, the open-ended process of implementation starts. All these stages have formal and informal dimensions. The focus of this dissertation is the actual negotiation stage coupled with the final agreement. Yet the other stages are reflected in the analysis whenever necessary.
Thus, the terms peace negotiations or peace talks are used interchangeably throughout but refer to the negotiation period including a final agreement, unless stated otherwise.
With regards to legitimacy, the concept is discussed at length in the next chapter but a few definitions are outlined here. The research questions looks at how peace negotiations become (more) legitimate.
Legitimate peace negotiations are equated to a process of legitimisation. This is because peace negotiations are conceptualised as an ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised process. Peace negotiations do not simply become legitimate or not one day, when the peace agreement is signed, but
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more or less legitimacy is achieved in a process of legitimisation. The legitimisation process considers all the different factors or components that together make this ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised process of peace negotiations more legitimate. Scholars working on procedures as advancing legitimacy, speak of the legitimation of procedures (e.g. Luhmann 1983). I differentiate between legitimisation and legitimation however, in order to contrast the legitimisation of a process with the legitimation of individual actors (such as civil society representatives). Individual actors will legitimate themselves, i.e. show or argue for their own legitimacy, but this does not on its own translate into the entire process of legitimisation.
In other words, one part of the legitimisation process may be individual actors that are legitimate or can legitimate themselves, but this is not the whole process. Calling it a process of legitimation like other scholars do, would risk conflating a partial component with the overall process.
The legitimation of the individual civil society actors gives way to two further accentuations - the beneficiaries and the guarantors of legitimacy. That is, the legitimisation process is not only in part made up of the legitimation of individual actors, or individually legitimate actors, but also the whole idea of considering how peace negotiations are made more legitimate is to consider the interaction with the general population. Accordingly, firstly, there are people who gains or benefit from the legitimate actors and the legitimisation process itself (the beneficiaries of legitimacy), mainly relating back to the general population, who as is shown throughout the research are both passive and more active in this role. This is a rather abstract definition, which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Secondly, there are those that act on behalf of the beneficiaries of legitimacy or the general population: The guarantors of legitimacy. This relates mainly to the civil society actors involved in the peace negotiations. These definitions are also summarised in the glossary of key concepts at the beginning of this dissertation. The structure and layout of the rest of the dissertation is outlined below.