Case study research remains highly relevant and important, despite a trend that seems to state the opposite. This trend is in fact based on a flawed understanding of the ontological and epistemological foundations of case study research. A question concerning a notion like legitimacy, constructed on the basis of beliefs and highly contextual and dynamic, arguably works best with a constructivist ontology and a pluralist epistemology. The reasons for this are outlined by considering both causal and constitutive perspectives. First of all however, the relevance of case study research is reviewed.
In social sciences, and political sciences especially, there has been a trend to view small-N case study methods as something akin to the younger unloved brother of quantitative research. Whenever possible, it is argued that a statistical analysis should be undertaken, at the very least to complement case study research (Lijphart 1975, 165). Case study research in fact has a long evolving history. What had started out as the study of single contextually embedded case studies was later changed to more comparative analysis with abstract theoretical concepts in mind. By the 1970s there was a trend towards ‘solving’ the small-N problem of single or a small number of case studies by focusing on a variable-centred logic of causality. Increasing the number of variables to be observed, it was argued, also increases the number of observations to draw inferences from (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 514; Blatter and Haverland 2012, 15). This was further cemented by a book, published in 1994, on qualitative research, which suggests that qualitative research should be built on the same logic of inference as quantitative science (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). The ideas in the book have received so much attention, that they and the work itself are widely referred to simply as ‘KKV’, after its three authors, Gary King, Robert O.
Keohane and Sidney Verba. As a result, qualitative work changed from being known as
‘meaning-46
focused or lived experience-focused research’ to ‘small ‘n’ studies that apply large ‘n’ tools’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, xvi). Whilst the KKV book is still used as a corner stone in the training of political scientists, it has also faced significant critique (most notably Brady and Collier 2004).22
Post-KKV work on qualitative case studies nevertheless only gives partial accounts of the full potential of case studies and conceivable epistemological and ontological foundations. This includes the effectively positivist account of John Gerring (2007) and the more critical realists work of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, which also includes a chapter on process-tracing (2005). As a result, confusion about case study methods is pervasive, particularly regarding the method of process tracing.
Moreover, there has been insufficient reflection on both the ontological and epistemological frames of the work discussed (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 9). As a result, case studies have a relatively low stature among positivists (see below), despite the fact they are one the most frequently employed research designs (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 132).
More recently, there has been a new wave of methodological textbooks that seek to reconsider case studies (Blatter and Haverland 2012) and the particular method of process tracing more concretely (Beach and Pedersen 2013). They argue for the revival of case study research because of changes both in social reality as well as in the social sciences disciplines. On the one hand, with the advances of globalisation, social reality has become even more complex. On the other hand, considering all the sub-strands of disciplines like International Relations means that political scientists need to account for more theories in their work (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 1–7; see also Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). As a result, single case studies are thought to yield more insight than what is possible through cross-comparison or larger statistical studies (della Porta and Keating 2008c, 4). Critics of KKV have long acknowledged the usefulness of case studies for exploratory work, theory building, testing and uncovering causal mechanisms instead of causal effects (e.g. Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2005, 213; Gerring 2004, 349–350; Brady and Collier 2004, 277). In addition, the newer books have argued that case studies are especially useful for their ability to include both idealistic and material understanding of the world and a consideration of both structures and agency, essentially ‘overcoming the incommensurable difference between constitutive and causal approaches in explaining social reality’
(Blatter and Haverland 2012, 8).
This dissertation looks to answer how peace negotiations are or can be made more legitimate related to the involvement of civil society. Because of the nature of current theories of legitimacy as reviewed in the last chapter (primarily focusing on the state as a unit of analysis) and the literature on participation in
22 Though Brady and Collier argue their work is founded on an ‘essentially similar epistemology’ (to KKV), and warn that an exploration of epistemology ‘may sometimes lead researchers .... to take sides and to engage in polemics’ (2004, 7). Bevir and Kedar counter however that the ‘absence of philosophical reflection has been filled by an over-emphasis or perhaps even fetishization of methodology’ (2008, 514).
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peace negotiations with little theoretical rigour, the question is essentially one of theory building. Case study research, and more specifically process-tracing, are ideal for dealing with ‘complex, abstract phenomena’ (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 19) under which legitimacy certainly falls. Accordingly, case study research is important and insightful, not merely as a second-best additional method of inference, but in its own right. It is particularly useful for researching something as abstract yet complex as legitimate peace negotiations.
The recent work not only strengthens the argument for case studies as a method, but also clarifies the difference between methods on one hand and epistemology and ontology on the other. Methodologies implicate certain ontological and epistemological foundations but this is not strictly speaking the case for methods. In other words, methods, especially qualitative ones, can - in theory - be used with any philosophical stance (Bevir and Kedar 2008). This qualification differentiates between methodology (as a well equipped toolbox) and methods (as tools) (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 4). Thus, before the method of comprehensive process-tracing is described further below, the methodology of the research is further explained in the next section.
3.1.1 Causal and Constructivists Perspectives
This section will outline three broad perspectives in the philosophy of science, namely positivists, (critical) realists and constructivists who work with different ontological and epistemological premises.
Their ontological differences (as naturalists or anti-naturalists) and pursuant epistemological assumptions on causality is considered in order to show the relevance of a constructivist ontology and epistemological pluralism for this research in the next section.
Different researchers have different views on causality, informed by their ontological and epistemological approaches, which will inform the research methods that they choose to follow. Whilst numerous groups of scholars exist, all with different perspectives on the philosophy of science (and degrees of willingness to discuss this), three broad perspectives that are widely used are particularly useful to explain the methodology of this research. These are the positivist, (critical) realist and constructivist schools of thought. They can also be divided - ontologically - into naturalists and anti-naturalists camps (Bevir and Kedar 2008; Moses and Knutsen 2012).
The first school of thought, the positivists are furthest along the naturalist spectrum. The ontological premise for this group is that an objective reality exists in the world, which means that law-like generalisations and the (probabilistic) establishment of causal relations is possible (Sil 2004, 314).
Epistemologically, the aim is to discover and explain patterns that are assumed to exist in the real world.
This research supposes that definitions are and must be value free and that concepts can be operationalised in a non-prescriptive manner (Hawkesworth 2006, 48; Moses and Knutsen 2012, 8).
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The second group, the realists, still makes the ontological assumption that reality is objective (e.g.
George and Bennett 2005, 131). Nevertheless, epistemologically speaking there is a degree of uncertainty with regards to knowledge gaining. Some elements in the social world, whilst they do exist, are not observable. Karl Popper was a critical rationalist who argued in his falsification theory that things can never be proven to be true but merely disproven (Hawkesworth 2006, 32). Causal knowledge may be possible for realists much like for positivists, but causal laws do not govern everything. Here, as elsewhere, the epistemological preference depends entirely on where on the spectrum the researcher finds herself in. A more critical variation of realists will propose that knowledge is socially conditioned and subject to challenges and reinterpretations (della Porta and Keating 2008b, 24). This includes some constructivist scholars.
Usually though, constructivists prefer to be aligned to the constitutive philosophical approaches, which stand firmly in the anti-naturalists camp and is the third school of thought which is discussed. The ontological assumption for constructivist research implies that there is no independent objective reality that can be observed; rather such reality can only be accessed by seeking to understand its subjective construction. As a result, a constructivist looks at what constitutes the world. There is no causality per se;
at best regularities of meaning that enable and constrain interpretations and actions can be uncovered.
Epistemologically, the aim is to reconstruct meaning or understand (‘verstehen’) the meaning of human behaviour or actions within a certain cultural and social framework (della Porta and Keating 2008b, 26;
see also Halperin and Heath 2012, 49; Sil 2004, 317). Note that understanding is arguably an inadequate term, as at best the aim is to reconstruct or deconstruct interpretations of meaning. At the most extreme, post-fundamentalists would even argue that the ‘subjectivity inherent in each and every human act makes it impossible to establish the ‘truth’ of even the most basic observational statement about the social world’ (Sil 2004, 317; see also George and Bennett 2005, 130). Whilst there is a spectrum of different epistemologies amongst interpretivist researchers, a few epistemological characteristics are widely accepted: Knowledge is socially situated; closely associated to power and is inter-subjective, carried by individuals but anchored in the collective. Thus knowledge can be obtained, but only very carefully, and with great self-awareness and scepticism (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 194).
Whilst it is argued that methods are in theory simply tools that can be used with any type of methodological approach, in reality ontological and epistemological preferences are usually inclined towards certain methods. As such, positivists are most known for using quantitative methods and on the other end of the spectrum constructivist researchers primarily for using qualitative methods, often based on textual analysis. This is also related to the assumptions on causal or constitutive logic, which work best in relation to certain research methods. In fact, the three schools of thoughts broadly relate to the three types of epistemological assumptions - Humean causality, mechanistic causality and a constitutive approach.
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The ‘classic’ interpretation of causality - which positivists relate to - is based on the work of the empiricist David Hume who considered causality as a conjunction between factors regarding their regular association or regularity (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 24).23 Law-like generalisations are made through correlations and as a result causal relations are seen to be probabilistic. The idea is to make general or nomothetic statements about the world, rather than particular ones (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 9). These positivist standards of causality have often been applied to qualitative work, largely because of the influence of KKV on research design (1994 see above). Only a decade later did scholars begin to criticise these assumptions, which hugely affected the perceived relevance of case studies.
The critics from the realist camp argued that causal relations refer to more than just variables, as KKV depicted them. Instead, there are causal mechanisms that include the linkages between the variables, which thus requires an unpacking of the black box of causality to understand the entire process taking place (see e.g. Beach and Pedersen 2013, 37; George and Bennett 2005, 138–9; Sil 2004, 313–4). This critique has resulted in a return to a mechanistic understanding of causality. Incorporating ideas from René Descartes, the emphasis of knowledge creation is on understanding dynamic interactive influences of causes on an outcome - an entire mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 25). Spatial and temporal contingencies are of importance in order to gain deeper explanatory knowledge (George and Bennett 2005, 140). These mechanisms are underlined by a deterministic causality, there are no error terms like with the probabilistic correlations in Humean causality, instead there are necessary and sufficient causes.
George and Bennett define causal mechanisms as ‘ultimately unobservable physical, social or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information or matter to other entities’ (2005, 137). The renewed focus on mechanistic causality has been linked to process tracing and has also led to the differentiation between data-set observations, applicable to the frequentist logic proposed by KKV, and causal-process observations. The latter observations can offer their very own distinct leverage regarding causal inference and provides information about the context, process or mechanism (see Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004, 12; Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004, 96; George and Bennett 2005, 147;
Mahoney 2010).
Both Humean and mechanistic causality assumes a naturalist ontology. For researchers that make anti-naturalist assumptions neither a probabilistic Humean causality nor a deterministic mechanistic causality is feasible. Instead, the interpretive approach aims for a ‘rehumanized, contextualised … scientific
23 Though this was because Hume argued that only patterns and regularities could ever be observed, not causality per se. Causality, he argues, is based on our imagination not perception, thus making him quite a sceptic naturalist (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 25–28; 170). Methods of finding such associations - whether through induction or through falsification have also been discussed at length in the philosophy of science, especially after Popper (Hawkesworth 2006, 31). This is another area where positivists and critical realists begin to differ, despite both holding court in the naturalist camp.
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practice’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, xii; see also Bevir and Kedar 2008, 503; C. Lynch 2006, 294).
The roots of the interpretive approach can be traced back to the philosopher Kant, who although he believed in an objective world, noted that the patterns we study are of our own making and that social phenomena must therefore be interpreted in light of the relationships that surround it (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 165; 183; Yanow 2006, 10). Interpretive research focuses on reconstructing the meaning of subjective reality and deconstructing the power structures that are embedded in individual actors and actions. The end aim is to understand how events shape, and are shaped by actors and what the contextual meaning may be. Understanding is meant in the sense of meaning making through the reconstructing of interpretations. In other words, meanings - which cannot be reduced to allegedly objective facts - are constitutive of human actions (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 505; see also Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). Actions are evidence of beliefs and desires, meaning that the observer and society have an important role in constructing the patterns we study (Bevir and Rhodes 2004, 159; C. Lynch 2008, 712; Moses and Knutsen 2012, 10).
Building on Kant and others, Weber was one of the scholars who promoted such a line of thinking by arguing that causal explanation relied largely on interpretive understanding of the subjective motivation of individuals, or ‘verstehen’. This results in the need for ‘rational understanding of motivation, which consists in placing the act in an unintelligible and more inclusive context of meaning’ (Weber 1978b, 8).24 This also means that any observations are theory dependent (Hawkesworth 2006, 31; Moses and Knutsen 2012, 182). Clifford Geertz, a cultural anthropologist develops his ideas, and cites Weber when he proposes, ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.’ As a result, theory building concerns ‘think description’, in order to generalize within cases, not across them (Geertz 1973, 5). For interpretivists, causal explanations are feasible - yet they are always singular in the contextually specific causes of historical incidents. Generalisations may still be possible across diverse cases, but only in the acknowledgement that this will result in a loss of a deeper understanding of a particular social phenomena (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 506; Yanow 2006, 11). Unlike for Humean and mechanistic causality, the aim is not to make probabilistic or deterministic predictions. Rather, the epistemological focus is on reconstructing and understanding the - socially constructed - patterns and regularities of the world (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 12; 192). In other words, institutions, actors and norms are constitutive of each other, rather than mono-causal relationships bounded by scope conditions (C. Lynch 2008, 709).
24 In a nod to the general overemphasis of a more positivist logic, Kristin Luker notes that ‘verstehen ... has connotations of tea and sympathy - a methodology not quite masculine enough for a ‘real’ science. ‘Rigorous’
training in the social sciences is now defined as quantitative, and the more abstractly mathematical, the better’
(2010, 25).
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Having outlined these different schools of thought with regards to their ontological foundations and perspectives on epistemology, considering especially the possibilities of causality or constitutive logics, the assumptions made for this research are introduced in the following section.
3.1.2 Constructivist Ontology and Epistemological Pluralism
As the previous chapter on the heuristic model has shown, legitimisation is a dynamic continuous process, bounded by specific contexts. Though it is studied empirically, specific contextual values or norms are likely to play a role. Critical realists acknowledge layers of realities and thus epistemologically, they come close to interpretivist thought. Nonetheless, they still ontologically claim a natural world, which in light of the critique of a universal normativity applying to legitimisation makes this claim more difficult to uphold. Thus, ontologically, the research chooses to distance itself further away from a strict naturalist approach, acknowledging the constituted nature of at least parts of the ‘real’ world or the way it can be accessed (and hence a constructivist ontology). Epistemologically speaking, a mid-way between the two most extreme views is also best suited to the question at hand. Such an approach acknowledges that things we study can change in appearance when viewed from different contexts and perspectives and as a result, at least to a degree, social reality is constructed (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 147).
Nonetheless, taking care to account for this construction of reality, knowledge can however also be generalised across cases. This is outlined further in the following, in order to show the pluralistic epistemology that allows for both a constitutive analysis and delineating the possibilistic causality of parts of the legitimisation process of peace negotiations.
Inspiration is taken from the ‘pragmatist’ or ‘pluralist’ understanding of epistemology, as part of the
‘spirit of eclecticism’ (della Porta and Keating 2008b; e.g. Sil 2004, 309). The onus for these pragmatists is on finding a middle ground, allowing for communication across the different research communities, and a rejection of fundamentalist views of the two extremes of positivism and constructivism. A ‘flexible middle ground’ is between ‘objectivism and relativism, and between causal explanations and interpretive understanding’ (Sil 2004, 317). Advocates for this pragmatic approach argue that this actually helps scientific progress as barriers are taken down to answer the question at hand (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 163). Social factors may be too complex for parsimonious explanations and generalisations but only understanding the motivations of actors with no attempt of explanation or causation is also redundant (della Porta and Keating 2008c, 14).25 Hence advocates argue that reality is at least partly constructed, but we can still look at events, actors and mechanisms and interpret them according to our own
25 As is argued below, this division undertaken by Sil and others of either ‘objectivism’ or ‘relativism’ / either
‘causal explanations’ or ‘interpretive understanding’ can be rather simplistic in its attempt to make a neat dualistic explanation of the ‘pragmatic approach’ or the ‘middle ground’. Depending on the individual researcher, they will argue that they are not carrying out relativism or also explain despite being constructivists, or as positivists also seek to understand etc. As such these definitions are only used to establish the idea of a middle ground with the delineation of plural epistemology for the work in question being explained in more detail in the following sections.
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conceptual understanding of time and proximity (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 14). This makes a pluralistic epistemology particularly relevant for the research at hand.
Whilst an objective reality of legitimacy does not seem ontologically plausible, the construction of
Whilst an objective reality of legitimacy does not seem ontologically plausible, the construction of