Transnistria

Transnistria has been part of Moldova since the incorporation of the latter into the Soviet Union following World War II. Before that, the area was part of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR within the Ukrainian SSR. After the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (mostly today’s Moldova) from Romania, Transnistrian areas were united with the newly formed Moldavian SSR.

Transnistrian efforts for independence began when the Soviet Union still existed. As a reaction to Moldavian Romanisation efforts (for example, establishing Moldovan as the main state language and returning to the Latin alphabet) and during times of ethnic tension in the Soviet republic, Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova as a Soviet republic as early as 1990.

However, the declaration created the Transnistrian SSR, not an independent republic. This was due to a Soviet-inclined elite which wanted to stay in the Union in case of Moldovan independence. This declaration was recognised neither by the Soviet and Moldavian authorities nor by other states, and legally Transnistria stayed within Moldova.

With Moldovan independence and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Transnistria considered itself to be a Soviet republic and therefore entitled to similar treatment to 15 titular republics. This claim was again not recognised. In 1991, the entity dropped ‘Soviet Socialist’ from its name and became the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR).

In 1992, a short war between the secessionist entity and Moldova broke out.

With the intervention of the Russian 14^th Army, a ceasefire was established in July 1992. Roper (2004) estimates the causalities of the conflict to have been around 1,000. After that, several negotiations have taken place but, as Cham-berline-Creanga and Allin put it (2010, p. 2), no permanent solution has been found despite mediation ‘by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE), Russia, and Ukraine… later joined by the United States and the European Union (EU) as ‘observers’ (known as the 5+2 format)’.

Today, Transnistria generally controls the left bank areas of the river Dniestr. Its territory is approximately 4,000 km². Territorial control is not strictly divided by the river, however. There are areas and villages on the eastern (left) bank that are under Moldovan control and areas on the western bank under Transnistrian rule. The Moldovan villages on the left bank create small corridors in the elongated Transnistrian map.

The population of the entity is just over half a million people and its ethnic composition is rather heterogeneous. Three ethnic groups – Moldovans/Roma-nians, Russians and Ukrainians – each make up around 30 per cent of the population. This ethnic diversity does not generate major tensions within the nation. Transnistria has been involved in concerted state- and nation-building, with the main focus on regional identity. Soviet symbols are frequently used and are also present in the coat-of-arms and the flag of the entity. This has led to the question of whether the Transnistrian conflict is ethnic or political in character, with no clear conclusion on either side. Arguments supporting a political conflict are given by Kolstø and Malgin(1998) and Roper (2001), while Kaufman (1996) and Kaufman and Bowers (1998) argue for an ethnic conflict.

The relative success of state-building also shows in the functioning govern-ment that the entity possesses. Despite this, Transnistria is not very active in foreign relations. This is effectively seen in the representations or, to be precise, the lack of them in Transnistria. Of UN member states, only Russia has opened a consulate in Tiraspol (Kalikh, 2009). The situation is no better concerning PMR’s representations abroad. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (МИД Приднестровья, 2012) of the entity, only embassies in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia have been established. No UN member state has recognised PMR and its main foreign activity seems to focus on relations with fellow post-Soviet secessionists Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

As with most de facto states, there are issues about political control over the entity. In Transnistria’s case, the question is how much independence there is in political decision-making and to what extent there is Russian influence. There are several features that a show strong Russian hand in Transnistria. Kamilova and Berg (2012) have gone so far as to consider Transnistria a puppet state.

Still, as we can see below, there is considerable Russian influence but also independent decision-making.

In the military sphere, there are similarities with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in that Russian support was instrumental in gaining de facto independence in the early 1990s. Today, there are two kinds of Russian presence. First, there is a peacekeeping operation that has been active since 1992, a joint operation with Moldova and Ukraine (Peacekeeping operation in Transnistria, 2012). The second Russian presence is considered to be illegal. This has been reaffirmed by NATO, which has called on Russia to end this particular operation (NATO, 2008). The estimated troop presence is around 1,300 soldiers (Rettman, 2011).

Additionally, the continued presence of the Russian 14th Army in Transnistria has contributed to more than just this particular conflict. It is one of the reasons that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-II) failed to be implemented. But in Transnistria, the Russian presence can be seen as a guarantee that the entity will not be liquidated by force.

In the economic sphere, Russian influence is less visible than in Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Angela and Igor Munteanu (2007) analyse the debt of Trans-nistria, which is the main channel through which Russia can exert its influence.

They claim (p. 52) that ‘gas debts started to be accumulated while Russian giants used the debts to take over important industries in Transnistria’. Popescu (2006, p. 12) states that in 2004 the Transnistrian debt was around €1 billion, roughly the same as Moldova’s. Two-thirds of this debt was from Russian loans. Although Transnistria receives gas from Russia under the market price, it has still accumulated a relatively large energy debt. But unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria is not dependent on Russia to meet its state budget.

Furthermore, Transnistria’s trade is more diverse, with both import and export markets in the CIS and the EU. Finally, the Transnistrian Central Bank issues its own currency, the PMR rouble.

In the political sphere, Russia has a direct way of influencing the conflict by being one of the participants in the 5+2 negotiation format. In broader relations with Europe and the US, ‘Moscow-friendly, independent (or even de facto inde-pendent) Transnistria provides Moscow with a forward operations base in South-eastern Europe’ (Sanchez, 2009, p. 175). Chamberline-Creanga and Allin (2010) conclude that Russian influence in the de facto entity and the whole conflict resolution process is growing, especially in the wake of the 2008 war in Georgia.

Therefore, Russia is thought to be interested in the internal politics of the entity. However, this has not always been a successful enterprise. In the 2011 presidential elections, Russian-backed candidate Anatoly Kaminsky finished as runner-up to Yevgeny Shevchuk. As the entity is considered to be ‘not free’ by Freedom House and election results could be manipulated, this development shows that Russian influence does not go that deep. Also, the then incumbent president Igor Smirnov was openly urged ‘not to seek a fifth term, arguing that the territory needed new leadership’ by the Russian presidential chief of staff (Freedom in the World, 2012). That suggestion was ignored.

On the level of the individual, the population has not been given Russian citizenship to the same extent as in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, but still ‘a significant minority of the region’s residents hold Russian passports’ (Freedom in the World, 2012).

Overall, Russia undoubtedly has influence over Transnistria, but it seems that this influence has more to do with other actors in the region than having political control over the entity itself. In its foreign relations, Transnistria is dependent on Russian support and the latter is willing to give it, but when it comes to internal matters, there is enough independent decision-making to consider Transnistria a de facto state.