Representations, involvement in international

The outcome condition in this thesis is related to the political process of the Buzan and Little model. Before we go to the measurements of these conditions, we look why the engagement might matter do de facto states and to what extent they might be engaged.

We will start with the importance of international engagement to de facto states themselves. As one would assume, acceptance by confirmed states is very important to these entities. The reasons for this importance can be found in political as well in economical spheres. In economic arena acceptance is more related to international finance than commodity markets. As our theoretical framework establishes, economic systems and interaction usually develop before political. Therefore the political acceptance can influence the economic aspects that are more related to government. Access to government loans or official development aid might be the major incentives. Private sector enter-prises including exports and foreign investment are easier to obtain than government related economic activity even in under the conditions of non-recognition.

On the political side possible benefits that come with recognition are even larger. Most often are they associated with security. And the reasons for this are rather obvious. De facto states exist on territories that, although under their control, are claimed by some confirmed state. International acceptance would make the position of the de facto in that particular argument much stronger.

Without formal recognition it would fall short of victory for the entities’

position but it would have significant practical implications. Widespread acceptance f the de facto state would add an international dimension to argument that is considered to be an internal affair. And that dimension would be different from mediation. Besides disputes over borders, acceptance could create allies. The more an entity is involved in international affairs the more it could attract supporters. Therefore it could reduce the military threat to de facto states that come from former parent state and could also decrease the reliance on the patron.

Still, de facto states are to some extent already engaged in the world politics, or ‘embedded in the network of international politics’ as Isachenko (2012,

p. 157) puts it. One facet of being embedded is that at the moment different de facto states enjoy different levels of acceptance from confirmed states (Cas-persen, 2008), (Pegg, 1998). Some, like Taiwan are rather well accepted and enjoy even some formal recognition. Some are very much ignored, like Somaliland. Some, like the de facto states of former Yugoslavia are opposed very strongly and positions of parent states are restored with international help.

Also, Yugoslavia gives us an example where international intervention helped to create a de facto state in Kosovo. Finally, in some cases like Tamil Eelam, the external actors let the parent state to deal with the entity without intervention. Altogether, there are differences in acceptance between de facto states. These differences have been studied (see for example Berg and Toomla (2009)) but this thesis takes a more complex approach. We try to find out what conditions cause this differentiation in engagement.

For this we have taken three outcome conditions that will be analysed – number of foreign representations in the de facto state, number of formal recognitions by confirmed states, and involvement in international organi-sations. These conditions are chosen because of how states can interact with each other. Logically, there are three types of actions in international relations – unilateral, bilateral and multilateral.

To recognise a state, another state can act unilaterally. A declaration of recognition, for example, can be made without any relations to the recognised state. Therefore, formal recognition is included as a unilateral action. There can be other actions of course like declarations or speeches but these do not have a lasting effect in a sense that they are easier to take back. A speech does not leave a similar footprint to a formal recognition.

Empirically, most of the de facto states enjoy some recognition, at least that of the patron state. However, there is no particular theoretical approach to exactly why states recognise each other. International law, a field that has studies recognition the longest, is not interested why it happens; the focus is more on the implications of the recognition. Similarly, research on de facto states has not given answers as to why the entities are recognised. Mostly the issue has arisen when defining the de facto state. This is visible from Chapter 1.2.4 of this thesis. A slightly different view is given by Pegg (1998, p. 38) who introduces a possible hierarchy of different recognitions on the road to full recognition but, like many others, it is more useful in defining the de facto state than finding causes for recognition.

The second outcome condition corresponds to the bilateral relations and is measured by the number of foreign representations in the de facto state.

Establishing a representation involves two actors: one state has to establish a representation and the other has to host it. Bilateral relations between two nations are arguably the most important type of relations in the academic study of International Relations. The major theories emphasise the nation-state as the main actor and relations between these actors constitute the discipline.

Theoretical legacy is, however, not the main reason why this type of relations forms the core of this thesis.

As opening and running a representation involves costs it can be argued that the decision to open one could be more calculated than a unilateral step, definitely more than a speech. Formal recognition should not be done hastily, however, because it is very difficult to reverse. This possibility exists with representations. It is easy for a state to abolish a mission in a de facto state if circumstances demand. These two aspects of representations – the relative gravity of a decision to establish one; and the possibility to back away if necessary – make it a good measure of engagement. Also, it is easier done than accepting a de facto state into an international organisation which needs consent of several actors.

One question that arises is what are foreign representations in a de facto state? We do not differentiate between ranks of diplomatic missions. As those in de facto states are rarely embassies, we treat them equally no matter how they are labelled – as mission, representative office, or representation. The data is mostly provided by de facto states themselves, via the website of their Foreign Office, for example, but occasionally sources from the media have been used.

The final outcome condition, representing multilateral relations, is involvement in international organisations. Membership in any international organisation in general and the United Nations in particular, is a concrete proof of statehood. As cited earlier in the dissertation, Geldenhuys considers UN membership to be the formal birth certificate of a state. Among de facto states, UN membership is the most relevant issue in the cases of Taiwan and Palestine.

Taiwan is a founding member of the organisation which was ousted from it.

Naturally, there have been discussions on the island about rejoining, or at least about the possibilities of rejoining, the organisation. This is also reflected in scholarly debate. Palestine’s bid for full UN membership in 2011 was well-covered by the world’s media. The bid has stalled, however, with opposition mainly from the United States. Ironically, the Palestinian state was initially created by the UN.

Membership in an international organisation can definitely be considered an acceptance into the international system. Main reason for this is the multi-lateralism; it needs several actors to accept the de facto state. While bilateral relations are important and most proliferate, one could argue that international organisation membership is better security guarantee for de facto states. This is exemplified in the case of Taiwan where international organisation membership is considered to cement its independence (Zaid, 1997–1998) and protect itself from claims from the parent state (Li, 2006). And it is indeed difficult to argue against a statement that, membership of an organisation like the WTO would increase an entity’s credentials as a state.

Overall, with all the outcome conditions – formal recognition, foreign representations and international organisations – de facto states’ motives are more prominent in the research. The main question that has been asked seems to

be why de facto states would like to have these kinds of relations. Here we pose a slightly different question, namely why these relations have occurred. What are the conditions that lead to this engagement?