Abkhazia

The roots of Abkhazian independence date back to the 8^th century when the independent kingdom of Abkhazia was established. After periods of indepen-dence and depenindepen-dence, in 1864 the region was annexed by the Russian Empire in which it remained until the October Revolution of 1917. The communist rulers of Russia gave the region autonomous status in 1919 and the status offederal republic in 1921. The latter did not last long, however, as later in the same year Abkhazia was united with the Georgian SSR. In 1930s this arrangement was overlooked and Abkhazia became an autonomous part of the Georgian SSR. This lasted until the end of the Soviet Union.

The current de facto status of Abkhazia was achieved via war with Georgia.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 all federal republics gained inde-pendence (in addition to those which had already declared indeinde-pendence and

were recognised as such). Therefore Abkhazia with its lower status was denied an independent state and the entity remained part of Georgia. In 1992, secessionists in Abkhazia staged an armed revolt against the Georgian central government in a bid to obtain Abkhazian independence. The rebels defeated Georgian forces and established control over Abkhazia in 1993, and in May 1994 a cease-fire was arranged. Despite the cease-fire and the subsequent deployment of a largely Russian peacekeeping force in the region, hostilities continued, and in 1999 the region formally declared its independence.

(Abkhazia, 2012).

During the separation, Abkhazia has been active in state-building. Public institutions have been established and the entity has had several elections, both parliamentary and presidential. The competitiveness of the elections has increased over the years. In presidential elections, only one candidate, the in-cumbent president, ran for office in 1999. In 2011, there were several candidates and the elections were generally considered competitive. Freedom House has therefore considered Abkhazia to be partly free since 2005.

Abkhazians consider their bid for independent statehood to have grounds in their status within the USSR. The union between Abkhazia and Georgia from the 1920s was supposed to be on equal grounds and as Geldenhuys(2009, p. 70) puts it, it can be ‘regarded as the source of their contemporary statehood’. This has led to demands for Abkhazia to have equal status with Georgia and to the challenging of the results of the Soviet breakup. As far as Abkhazia is con-cerned, it should be an independent nation like the recognised former Soviet republics. Additionally, the democratic achievements of Abkhazia have created the feeling within the entity that international recognition is deserved.

Currently Abkhazia possesses all the features set out in section 1.2.4 to qualify as a de facto state. It has a fixed territory at around 8600 km², covering most of the territory of the old autonomous republic. In 2008 Abkhazia gained control over the Kodori gorge, the only area that had previously remained under Georgian rule. As one would expect, Georgia considers the whole territory to be under its jurisdiction, a notion that is supported by international opinion and contested by Abkhazia.

Estimates of the population of the entity vary from around 180,000 to 250,000, with the latest census recording 240,705 people (Апсныпресс, 2011).

The ethnic composition of the entity is diverse with the titular nation making up less than half of the population. Other notable ethnic groups are Georgians, Armenians and Russians.

As can be seen from the empirical data, it has the capacity to enter into relations with other states. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia (MFA website), there are three ambassadors of UN member states to the entity. Only one of them, the Russian, is a resident ambassador; the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan ambassadors reside in Moscow. The MFA website also states that Abkhazia has representatives with different titles in 12 states.

Abkhazia is recognised only by six UN member states, leaving it short of the

127 required for full UN membership. Therefore, we can state that the non-recognition criterion is also fulfilled.

The main problem with de facto states regarding our working definition is the criterion of government. There may be situations where another power, usually what we have identified as a patron, controls them to the extent that they cannot be considered independent anymore. In Abkhazia’s case, that power is Russia. There are several features that point towards the fact that Abkhazia is highly dependent on Russia: economic, military and political. It is the latter that is of the utmost importance because it defines whether an entity is independent in decision-making.

In economic terms, it can be said that Abkhazia is very dependent on Russia.

Russia is the dominant trade and investments partner for the entity. Also, Abkhazia is extremely dependent on Russian aid. In an article in The Wall Street Journal (2009), Samantha Shields says that in 2009 the Russian contribution to the Abkhaz budget was around $66.5 million, which constituted 57% of the total. A similar proportion, around 60%, is also stated elsewhere (Shvedov, 2009). Additionally, the Russian rouble is the official currency of Abkhazia.

In the military sector, Russia has had a defence agreement with Abkhazia for 49 years from September 2009 which allows it to station 1700 troops there (RFE/RL, 2009). This is in addition to border guards that Russia has sent to help Abkhazian units. Russia has also deployed anti-aircraft missiles on Abkhazian territory (BBC). During the war of independence, Russian support was pivotal in the success of the rebel forces against Georgia. Today, Abkhazia is dependent on Russia for the provision of the entity’s security with the main fear coming from possible forceful reunification with Georgia.

These two sectors are of a practical nature and this kind of influence is not unique to de facto states. Economic aid, dependency on an economic partner and military assistance are quite usual practices in the world. Moreover, Montenegro, a UN member, uses the Euro as its currency without being in the monetary union or the EU in general. To determine whether a de facto state can be considered independent one must analyse the involvement of the patron in its political affairs and decision-making.

First, on the individual level, Russian influence is visible in people’s passports, as it is made ‘easy for people in Abkhazia to gain Russian citizen-ship, and most now hold Russian passports’ (BBC). One reason for this is that Russian citizenship gives people possibilities to travel that they lack with Abkhazian documents. But it can also be seen as a political tool.

Secondly, on the government level, Russia has had aspirations to get its

‘own’ people into powerful positions. However, this has not always been successful. In 2004–2005 the presidential elections were won by an opposition candidate, Sergei Bagapsh. Even though the elections were marred by controversy, which led to an eventual coalition between the government and

Russian-supported incumbent Prime Minister Raul Khadjimba, the Bagapsh victory shows that Abkhazian politics is not dictated from Moscow.

Furthermore, Freedom House (Freedom in the World, 2012) in its country reports states that the Russian influence on political matters has in fact decreased in recent years. In 2010 Russia ‘continued to tighten its grip on Abkhazia’ to the extent that ‘opposition and independent media repeatedly accused the government of ceding too much control to Moscow’. This is possible because of the rather strong NGO sector. The presence of the opposition and independent media already indicates that the entity is not controlled from outside. Also, in 2011 ‘in contrast to previous elections, Russia did not endorse a candidate, though the Kremlin continued to exert economic and military pressure on the territory’. This does not seem to influence the legitimacy of the government, though, as Bakke, O’Loughlin and Ward (2011) find. They conclude that internal security threats like crime and corruption are more likely to have a negative effect on state and regime legitimacy, whereas political violence and external security threats have no or little effect.

This shows that, notwithstanding economic and military dependency, there is at least some independent political decision-making and the entity is not a de facto Russian province. Russia’s political pressures are countered to an extent that we can talk about an independent, albeit unrecognised, nation.