International organisations

This section contains fewer tables and figures than the previous two outcomes.

There are two reasons for this. First, unlike previously, we will not start with truth tables. The reason for this is that most results show high enough consistency for complex and intermediate solution terms. Out of the four analyses performed, three show perfect consistency of the subset-superset relations between conditions and outcome. This yields our second reason for less tabular material: we do not have to look for irregularities and logically contradictory cases. So we start with the analysis of membership in inter-national organisations with the economic conjunction. The results are shown in Table 32 below.

Both paths in the most complex solution term are fully consistent with the statement of sufficiency, as are the other solutions. The cases for the most complex solutions are Taiwanese, one for each, and both contribute to the intermediate solution term. As we can see, the ‘usual suspects’ are at work again, with ‘~secession’ and ‘patron’ constituting the intermediate solution term. This shows no difference to the analysis of ‘representations’ and ‘re-cognitions,’ therefore this combination could be considered the sufficient condition for engagement in the international system. However, the problems remain because this model is not applicable to future de facto states and is only a reflection of the current empirical situation.

Table 32: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for involvement in international

Complex solution 0.421 1

~economy*~secession

*patron*~freedom 0.269 0.163 1 economy*~secession*patron

*freedom 0.259 0.152 1

Parsimonious solution 0.6 1

~secession 0.6 0.6 1

Intermediate solution 0.589 1

patron*~secession 0.589 0.589 1 Notes: consistency threshold 1; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition

This is further confirmed with the analysis of necessity, which shows similar results to the earlier analysis. We have one single necessary condition, and it is

‘patron’ with a consistency score of 0.99. But this deviation from perfect superset-subset relations is so small that it does not allow for any contradictory cases. In fact, the cases (Somaliland and Nagorno-Karabakh) that are presented as deviating from the main diagonal do it in such a minor manner that it can be written off as a calculation error, and we can speak of the ‘patron’ as a perfect necessary condition.

If we substitute the conjunction ‘economy’ with the disjunction ‘eco-nomyor,’ the results are a little different. Treating economic conditions separa-tely, we can see that they have an influence that ‘economy’ did not. The results are shown in Table 33 below.

As we can see, the main differences involve the loss of equifinality but a more parsimonious complex solution that also includes ‘economyor’.

Elsewhere, the most parsimonious solution term stays the same, as do the consistency scores. One thing worth noting is that the consistency and coverage scores of the intermediate solution terms are exactly the same. This means that, although included in the formula, ‘economyor’ does not add anything except the possibility to logically minimise the most complex solution term.

Therefore, in the analysis of sufficiency, we see no substantial differences no matter how we treat the economic conditions. However, these differences are apparent when we analyse the necessary conditions. The possible changes can only affect economic conditions, as everything else stays the same. And

‘economyor’ has a consistency score of one, which means that it can be con-sidered necessary for the outcome. As we may recall, with ‘economy’ the only necessary condition was ‘patron’; here, then, we have added ‘economyor’.

Table 33: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for involvement in international organisations with disjunction of economic conditions

Consistency and

Complex solution 0.589 1

economyor*~secession

*patron 0.589 0.589 1

Parsimonious solution 0.6 1

~secession 0.6 0.6 1

Intermediate solution 0.589 1

economyor*~secession

*patron 0.589 0.589 1

Notes: consistency threshold 1; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition

Compared to other outcome conditions, ‘representations’ and ‘recognitions’, the results obtained here are more similar to those of ‘representations’. In that case,

‘economyor’ also added to parsimony and was part of the same causal path that constitutes the intermediate solution in Table 33. The consistency scores were also higher than those obtained with ‘recognitions’. Finally, with ‘represen-tations’ and ‘organisations’, ‘economyor’ was consistent with the statement of necessity, while that is not the case with ‘recognitions’.

Moving on to the analysis of the absence of outcome, we initially revert to

‘economy’. The results are presented in Table 34:

Table 34: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for no involvement in international organisations

Complex solution 0.829 0.879

~economy*secession*~freedom 0.829 0.829 0.879

Parsimonious solution 0.829 0.879

secession*~freedom 0.829 0.829 0.879

Intermediate solution 0.829 0.879

~economy*secession*~freedom 0.829 0.829 0.879 Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition

The first notable aspect of Table 34 is that all the solution terms share the same consistency and coverage scores with no perfect set-relations. This does not

mean that there are no such combinations of conditions, just that logical minimisation has produced these particular results. In fact, there is a causal path that does show perfect subset-superset relations and it corresponds to our theoretical expectations: ‘~economy*secession*~patron*~freedom’. The possi-bility of logical minimisation yielded a more parsimonious solution that is consistent with the statement of sufficiency based on the 0.8 threshold.

Additionally, because of the identical consistency and coverage scores, the most parsimonious and intermediate solutions are the same, as is the most complex solution. Therefore, the condition ‘~economy’ does not add to the results; it is simply in line with theoretical expectations. But, as we see, taking limited diversity into account without easy counterfactuals leads to the same result.

The most notable aspect, however, is the importance of ‘~freedom’ rather than ‘~patron’. With previous outcomes, ‘~patron’ was prominent, constituting the most parsimonious solution term in both instances.

With necessary conditions, we find ourselves in a similar situation to the analysis with ‘economyor’ a few paragraphs previously. While ‘~economy’ has no effect on the consistency and coverage scores of the sufficiency, it can be considered a necessary condition. With ‘secession,’ it has a high consistency score, and therefore we have two necessary conditions. These results are similar to those obtained with ‘representations’ and ‘recognitions,’ and without contradictions, as in the case of the latter.

The final analysis combines the absence of outcome and the disjunction of economy. The results are presented in Table 35:

Table 35: Solution terms of sufficient combinations for no involvement in international organisations with disjunction of economic conditions

Consistency and

Complex solution 0.513 1

economyor*secession

*~patron*~freedom 0.23 0.21 1

~economyor*secession

*patron*~freedom 0.303 0.282 1

Parsimonious solution 0.667 0.98

~patron 0.385 0.27 0.98

~economyor 0.396 0.282 1

Intermediate solution 0.596 1

~freedom*secession

*~economyor 0.394 0.282 1

~freedom*~patron*secession 0.314 0.202 1 Notes: consistency threshold 0.8; ‘~’ indicates the absence of a condition

This analysis gives us more equifinal results, as the intermediate solution term has two different paths to the outcome. Furthermore, there is no secession in the most parsimonious solution term. This means that using ‘economyor’ has some effect in creating several potentially sufficient paths. However, if we compare the results to the analysis with other outcomes, they are almost identical. With

‘representations,’ we had exactly the same solutions; only consistency and coverage scores were different. With ‘recognitions,’ the effect of ‘economyor’

was not so visible and it did not feature in the most parsimonious and inter-mediate solutions.

The necessary conditions are also unsurprising, with ‘secession’ being the only condition to pass the 0.9 consistency threshold. This is slightly different to the other outcomes because with ‘~representations’ we also had ‘~freedom’ as a necessary condition, but with ‘~recognitions’ no single condition was consistent enough: we had disjunctions of conditions that could be considered necessary for the outcome.

Finally, we test the same combinations with the addition of borderline cases.

As with ‘recognitions,’ we expect ‘~secession’ to have a more important role in explaining the outcome, while the absence of outcome should yield similar results to those outlined above. This is because both added cases, Palestine and SADR, score highly in the outcome, being full members of international organisations and not being secessionist.

And our expectations prove to be correct. With the presence of outcome, the intermediate results consist only of one path which is made of a single condition: ‘~secession’. The different handling of economic conditions does not matter. Additionally, the consistency score of the results is one which indicates perfect subset-superset relations in both cases. The coverage score is also the same for both analyses, at a quite high 0.73. This shows that the empirical evidence is very much in line with the results.

As for the absence of outcome, the results in most complex and intermediate solution terms are the same as with nine cases. The only differences are minimal changes in consistency and coverage scores. The former changes only in the case of ‘economy,’ while, similarly to the nine cases, there are no perfect subset-superset relations.