Since the 2003 Maputo summit, the AU has put considerable effort into operation-alising the CEWS. The most important developments include the following:
■ In December 2006, a framework for the operationalisation of the CEWS was adopted. The framework consists of three major components: data collection and analysis; engagement with decision makers; and coordination and col-laboration with the RECs and RMs, and was endorsed by the AU Executive Council of Ministers in a meeting convened in January 2007.
■ A Strategic Confl ict Assessment (SCA) methodology handbook has been de-veloped. The handbook serves as the main source of guidance to analysts engaged in monitoring and analysing, and to those recommending possible response options to potential confl ict situations.
■ Various software applications have been developed in order to enhance the process of data collection, information gathering and analysis capacity. These software applications include IT-based infrastructure such as the Africa Media Monitor (AMM), the CEWS Portal, the Indicators and Profi les Modules, the Africa Reporter and an Africa Prospectus.
■ In January 2008, an MoU on Peace and Security was signed between the AU and RECs/RMs, in Algiers, Algeria. The objective of the MoU is to enhance cooperation between the CEWS and the regional early warning mechanisms in a number of fi elds, including through coordination, regular reporting, and division of labour as well as undertaking joint activities.
■ Between May 2008 and end of 2010, seven quarterly technical meetings were convened between the AU and RECs, with the objective of enhancing coordination and collaboration and to facilitate the establishment and opera-tionalisation of the EW systems of the RECs through training, expert sharing and technical support. These meetings also serve as the main forum for pro-moting an institutional partnership, exchanging lessons learned as well as harmonising the functionality of methodology, and interoperability of data-collection systems.
■ The IT infrastructure within the Situation Room has been upgraded. This facilitates the sharing of information in an effi cient and timely manner. The connectivity between the AU Situation Room and the RECs/RMs will be en-hanced by the use of the AU e-governance VSAT Network.
■ The staff component of the CMD, specifi cally that of the early warning offi c-ers/analysts as well as Situation Room personnel, has been enhanced. As a result the various tools and methodologies have been put into practice since early 2009 and currently such staff continue to play ‘a lead role and develop the highest level of ownership’.13
Although the developments listed above are an encouraging indication that the CEWS is on the path to full operationalisation, there is still much to be achieved.
Currently, the issues of staff recruitment; the deployment of the necessary tools for data collection and analysis; and the establishment of long-term and institutionalised relations between the AU and RECs as well as other stakehold-ers still need to be addressed. For this reason the CEWS is not yet functioning as a fully operational pillar of the APSA. In particular, it still has to achieve a degree of consistency in terms of producing early warning reports in a regular and timely manner.
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE CEWS
Lack of provision of adequate resources, both human and material, is gener-ally a problem that faces many of the AU divisions and departments. The CEWS cannot be an exception in this and the absence of adequate human resources in terms of the requisite staff affects the system’s ability to undertake monitoring, analysis and reporting. While CMD personnel have acquired considerable experi-ence over the years, the skills required for CEWS staff call for trained individuals with a capacity to ensure effective data mining, analysis and reporting. These tasks require that CEWS staff possess a sound methodological understanding of early warning as well as an ability to communicate effectively to policy- and decision makers within the AU system about the need for and urgency of an early response when it is required. The inadequacies affl icting the CEWS require additional analytically trained staff and the CMD/PSD also need an increase in their personnel so that the dedicated CEWS staff are not regularly drawn in to undertake other departmental tasks. A total of 15 staff is recommended for the
operationalisation of the CEWS; this number has not yet been achieved. Given the overall instability within the continent and the other daily demands imposed by PSD activities, the few CMD staff members who are currently undertaking the role of CEWS staff often fi nd themselves over-stretched. This makes it diffi cult for CEWS staff to monitor even the most urgent cases that warrant continuous and comprehensive early warning.
Institutionally, the CEWS also faces a number of technical challenges. As with contemporary early warning systems, the CEWS depends heavily on the utilisation of IT, including an information database and a software-based format for data collection, reporting and analysis. This requires a dedicated and well-trained technical support team as well as reliable IT connectivity, and clear pro-cedures and protocol with regard to data collection and exchange. The technical support teams within the CMD that are dedicated to the CEWS therefore need to be strengthened.
Meanwhile, the CEWS envisages that its analysts should obtain timely, reliable and relevant information from a variety of sources, including from the RECs/RMs.
This requires the creation of an institutionalised linkage between the Situation Room within the CMD and the complementary structures within the RECs/RMs.
This is where coordination and harmonisation become crucial. Although the MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs is being partially implemented through the quarterly meetings, the process of deepening institutional linkages has been lacklustre and slow. In part, the challenges of unequal development of linkages are related to infrastructure problems, a poor telecommunications system and the absence of the necessary equipment, particularly with reference to establish-ing the links between the AU and RECs/RMs via the AU-VSAT. There is also a difference in the theoretical and methodological across the RECs/RMs and this requires an effort to promote a harmonisation of perspectives. There are also disparities in terms of the stages of development and implementation of the REC/
RM early warning systems.
The prospect of securing adequate and reliable funding is yet another insti-tutional challenge that could impede the CEWS long-term sustainability and ef-fectiveness. The delay in the operationalisation of the CEWS to a large extent is hampered by the lack of adequate fi nancial resources. The record of AU member states in respecting their fi nancial commitments refl ects this lack of sustained funding. The CEWS to a large extent relies on the continued funding from ex-ternal partners.14 Normally, these funds are unpredictable and at times lack of
honouring pledges could still pose a problem. But even when the funds are made available, the resources needed may not be made available in time owing to ad-ministrative bottlenecks, or they may come with conditions, which might diverge from the interests and objectives of the AU.
Another institutional challenge that confronts the CEWS implementation is the tension between the AU’s mandate and its responsibilities. This relates to what has been described as the principal-agent dilemma faced by the AU.15 As a continental organisation, the AU is often caught between political considera-tions and the norms it espouses. As an intergovernmental organisation, the AU is primarily responsible to its member states, or the principals, while at the same time it struggles to achieve its norms within the framework of its missions and objectives, as an agent of change. Arguably, when compared to its predecessor, the OAU, which perpetuated the primacy of sovereignty over the necessity to address civil wars and human rights violations within its member states, the AU has a more robust mandate to intervene in the affairs of its members, which is a signifi cant qualitative difference. The fact that confl ict early warning appears, at least theoretically and as perceived by state authorities, as an intrusive activity means it is likely to be met with suspicion by member states. In such situations, the AU might fi nd itself predisposed to put the interests of its member states, or principals, before its early warning and early response tasks. This could, in the long term, negatively impact on the CEWS, which ultimately cannot function effectively without the cooperation of member states, particularly with regard to information collection and data sharing.
Yet again in the list of institutional challenges confronting the CEWS’ ef-fectiveness is the issue of bureaucracy. The slow and complicated bureaucratic structure within a given organisation is a natural impediment to clear commu-nication and timely decision making. The current CEWS reporting and decision-making procedures are very hierarchical. The process begins with analysis that contains recommendations for action from analysts. These analyses and recom-mendations are submitted to the head of the CMD, who then forwards the report to the director of the PSD or requests more information. From the director, the report is then submitted to the Commissioner for Peace and Security, who will try to defi ne the level of action either to request the Chairperson of the Commission to act or to perform the action himself in consultation with the PSC.16 Such a hierarchical communication structure regrettably undermines rapid decision making. A more structural concern is that even after the early warning reports
have been navigated through the system, there is the occasional chance that of-fi cials who receive the warnings at the various levels of decision making may be less enthusiastic about the reports. That could happen for a variety of reasons.
First, considering the sophistication and data manipulation involved in develop-ing the alerts, the offi cials might consider them overly qualitative and academi-cally oriented and, hence, far removed from the need for concrete information to guide the decision-making processes. Second, the alerts could cause pressure in their demands for the allocation of limited resources. Third, organisational resistance to new working methodologies and adopting new ways of working culture can undermine the need for professionalism and effi ciency within the AU’s early warning system, the challenge to act on early warning situations as compared to full-blown confl icts.