The effectiveness of the PSC has constantly been called into doubt and critical questions raised about its ability to perform beyond the parameters which the AU Commission essentially contributes towards defi ning.19 The most powerful body within the AU is the PSC, in terms of its ability to project the will of the Union. The PSC represents the ‘Board of Directors’ of the AU, with specifi c ref-erence to its collective security apparatus. Using this metaphor the chairperson of the AU Commission serves as the chief executive offi cer (CEO). The CEO is responsible for the execution of the decisions by the PSC and cannot overrule them. The PSC can, of course, involve the AU Commission in providing it with the relevant advice.20 This should essentially be the framework through which the PSC makes its decisions. It is also within this framework that the PSC can design trade-offs and utilise specifi c instruments to elicit compliance with its decisions.
The PSC also has a raft of non-violent coercive powers such as sanctions to elicit this compliance.
In the period of its fi rst fi ve years of operation, 2004 to 2009, one historical dimension of the PSC’s framework of operation was its relationship with the AU Commission and more specifi cally with the PSD.21 In this section, the analysis seeks to clarify the textual ambiguities and interpretations of offi cial texts that historically enabled the Commission to assert itself in the affairs of the Council and the Panel of the Wise, beyond what was originally envisaged by the framers of the PSC Protocol.22 Finally, it is necessary to explore the extent to which the PSC has developed an autonomous decision-making culture.
The decision-making process of the PSC was initiated when there was an issue relating to peace and security on the continent. More often than not, a particular security issue that came to the attention of the Council and its members came in
the form of a request from a PSC member state that had been sent to the PSD’s staff or desk offi cers and analysts who draft the initial reports. The draft report was then discussed with the senior management of the AU Commission, particu-larly the Director for Peace and Security and the Head of the CMD, who subse-quently briefed the Commissioner for Peace and Security. This provided the AU Commission and especially the PSD with the opportunity to infl uence the content of the documents that ultimately reached the PSC for discussion. According to a precise reading of the PSC Protocol, this was not the intention of the framers of the PSC Protocol. The Commission’s role should be to provide and administer the PSC Secretariat, but only in cases where it has been specifi cally tasked by the PSC to do this. The Secretariat in theory is also not required to report on a daily basis to the Commission on the workings of the PSC. According to the PSC Protocol, it is not the prerogative of the chairperson of the AU Commission to ‘approve’ the decisions of the PSC; on the contrary, the chairperson’s functions are to execute such decisions. However, there should be an effective system of communication between the PSC and the AU Commission to ensure that there is coordination in the interventions of these two bodies.
In terms of the process, according to interviews conducted with AU desk of-fi cers, prior to the report going to the Commissioner, there was an exchange of views with different stakeholders to ensure that the report was factually correct.
When necessary, and if needed, the AU’s in-country liaison offi cers were contact-ed to make inputs, and sometimes the draft report was forwardcontact-ed to these offi ces to ensure that there was a common understanding between the AU headquar-ters in Addis Ababa and its fi eld offi ces. Subsequently, the report was assessed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and again relevant amendments were made. Then the report was sent to the chairperson where it was discussed and amended prior to endorsement by the chairperson of the Commission. The reports were then translated into each of the working languages, Arabic, English, French, Portuguese and Swahili, when the facilities were available. This usually took place after the documents had been laid before the Commissioner for Peace and Security, and discussed with both the political offi cers of the PSD and the offi cers of the Secretariat to the PSC. There were, however, instances where these draft texts were rejected or amendments suggested either by the senior manage-ment of the PSD or by the Commissioner. This could happen for several reasons, among them when offi cers had not taken into consideration the political context within which a particular problem was to be debated, or had not been cognisant
of earlier decisions taken by the Council. Basically, these reports were intended to be factual and accurate representations of situations, with recommendations and options to enable Council members to make their choices. Such reports were meant to guide the PSC in terms of the civilian, police and military options avail-able to it if it decided to intervene in a crisis.
In terms of the process for drafting such reports, the Commission, and in this case the PSD, had a certain degree of leeway in framing the contents of the report before it went to the Council. The idea was that with the vantage position that the PSD had, such reports could contribute to more ‘unbiased’ and nuanced decisions by the Council. The point here is that the PSD and its divisions were more strate-gically placed to get such information, and collate, analyse, design and present it to Council to serve as inputs to the decision-making process.
Therefore, when the revised text was ‘accepted’ it was then forwarded to Council members prior to the meeting. However, this was where problems with the timing and delivery of the report could be encountered. According to several desk offi cers, because of the speed and changing dynamics of the issue-areas that they dealt with, there were instances where revisions were made to the texts until just about 24 hours before a meeting was to be held. Sometimes, these reports were sent to Council members on the day of the meetings. If the quality of deci-sions made by Council depended on the quality of background material available to Council members, then it was fair to deduce that PSC members would not have had the time to prepare properly if the documentation had only reached them at such a late stage. This time pressure factor should gradually decrease when the CEWS becomes fully operational with the necessary staff complement. An operational CEWS will enable Council members to be continuously briefed about developments, which should in turn enhance their decision-making processes.
On occasion there were disagreements between the PSD and the Secretariat of the Council. This was because the PSD’s ‘priorities were different from that of the Secretariat’.23 These priorities related to the depth and quality of analysis in the document and the political sensitivity of member states, which dictated how much detail these reports could contain. There was also the issue of the capacity of PSC members to prepare themselves adequately for a Council meeting on their own. PSC member countries often did not have the necessary staff complement to undertake independent analysis of situations under consideration. This issue is beyond the remit of the AU Commission and is one which these countries need to address on their own in the future.
With regard to the process, after a report had been accepted, and for-warded to Council members, the rotational Chair of the month led proceed-ings in terms of discussing the agenda that had been produced jointly by the Chair and the Commission. This process of ‘informing’ the Council created a situation in which the PSC was not independently undertaking its own analysis. This was because the information fl ow to the PSC members was channelled in a manner that removed the PSC from such preparations prior to Council discussions.
There were several outputs emanating from such meetings. These includ-ed: a press release concerning the issue that had been discussed; a note which had been written to parties in a confl ict; or a PSC communiqué. In all these communiqués, if the discussion was a follow-on one, there was a reiteration of earlier communiqués and the operative sections were repeated, with a com-mitment by the Council to ‘remain seized of the matter’.24 After these com-muniqués and press statements were completed, they were then forwarded to the communication section of the Commission, where they were translated into the appropriate languages and placed on the AU website. They basically became public documents that were accessible to all. Most of the decisions taken by the PSC had both legally and non-legally binding provisions. More often than not, these communiqués drafted by the PSD staff recalled earlier decisions, and only one or two paragraphs articulated something ‘new’ in terms of demands for particular parties to a problem to comply. While moral suasion was the preferred outcome with respect to delicate national politics, the PSC had very few instruments at its disposal to elicit compliance from recalcitrant member states.
The diffi culties faced in the Council’s decision-making processes were exemplifi ed in both the Togo coup d’état in February 2005 and the subsequent Mauritania coup in 2006. The decisions of Council concerning these two cases exemplify an emerging duality to the decision-making processes of the PSC.
According to Delphine Lecoutre, fundamental legal decisions (for instance, the condemnation of coups d’état in accordance with the declarations of Heads of State and Government at the Algiers (1999) and Lomé (2000) summits, or the principles of the Constitutive Act relating to unconstitutional changes of govern-ment) have a declaratory impact on the authorities of the countries concerned and demonstrate to the African public that the organisation is facing up to its responsibilities. Information gathering and observation missions show that
the decisions taken at PSC meetings are implemented in practice. Yet, there is growing concern from external observers about the ability of the PSC and its Secretariat to follow through with implementation.25 Such concerns are justifi ed because, after 155 meetings of the Council, there is still no practice of following up or identifying which implicated states are complying with the Council’s deci-sions. Furthermore, there are no regular evaluations and feedback mechanisms in place that allow Council members, the Secretariat or Commission to scrutinise the implementation of their decisions. If there are any processes at all, they are primarily ad hoc in nature; therefore, it is necessary for Council members to in-stitute processes of following up on their own decisions.
The institutional dynamics between the PSC and the Commission illustrate and suggest a way for organisations to attempt to assert their right to intervene in the affairs of their members, against a culture of international relations that still prioritises sovereignty and territorial integrity. A result is that to some exter-nal observers the PSC members give the impression of being ‘invited’ into what ought to be their own ‘domain’ by the AU Commission. This is because most of the functions of the Secretariat of the PSC are in effect undertaken, for the time being, by staff of the PSD. In particular, the Secretariat of the PSC should under-take the following tasks:
■ Setting the meeting timetables
■ Proposing the agenda
■ Preparing draft reports
■ Presenting draft communiqués for member states for their consideration and adoption
While there have been concerns about the PSC’s institutional and professional effectiveness, the functioning modalities of the PSC have led to the formation of different sub-committees of experts to facilitate its work. On the basis of the analysis above it is also clear that there is a need to enhance the human resource capacity of the PSC to undertake the tasks that are currently being performed by staff of the AU Commission. The institutional dynamics described above are not unique to the AU and replicate themselves in other intergovernmental organisa-tions. Specifi cally, this issue also manifests itself in the UN system and the ability of its Security Council to elicit regular compliance with its resolutions among the body’s member states.