One area that has brought some degree of international respectability to the AU is in the area of helping to secure international peace and security. To achieve this, under the whole umbrella of the APSA the MSC is the one institution that is criti-cal in the decision-making process towards authorising a military intervention.
Basically, its function is to ‘advise and assist the PSC in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa’.34 Although this is clearly stated, not all African countries have fully fl edged defence attaches (DAs) accredited to their embassies in Ethiopia.
Although the MSC is expected to be composed of ‘senior military offi cers’, it rarely meets and its members are often not armed with the necessary analysis to fulfi l its mandate to ‘discuss questions relating to the military and security require-ments for maintenance and promotion of peace and security in Africa’.35
The MSC is tasked with supporting the work of the PSC by providing deploy-ment options, troop composition, logistics, civilian components, strategy, and costing options, which would then inform the deliberations of the Council. In the case of the Comoros intervention, there was no consultation with the MSC, which would have brought a different perspective on the most appropriate way to ap-proach the incursion. This raises the critical question of the functional utility of the MSC if the Council can undertake such an important, operationally technical and diffi cult mission without expert military advice.36
Herein lies one of the major institutional dilemmas for the PSC. In all the deci-sions that it has taken to intervene militarily in an African confl ict, it has done so without the professional-technical advice of its own military professionals. Thus, interventions in Somalia, Comoros and Darfur were decided upon on the basis of the political calculations of the PSC member states and then subjected to military realities later. While it is accepted operationally that there should always be a civilian/political lead during these interventions, operational decisions should always be undertaken in consultation with the military leadership about what is feasible.
The most signifi cant challenge confronting the MSC is the fact that the number of DAs in Addis Ababa does not always form a quorum to be able to take appropriate military decisions. Furthermore, some of the senior military offi cers serving as attachés to Addis are also not necessarily operations experts and their advice is not based on fi rsthand expertise. The limited role and capacity of the MSC is symptomatic of the absence of adequate support mechanisms for the per-manent representatives who constitute the PSC. Generally, larger countries have begun the practice of appropriately staffi ng their embassies, particularly when they have a term on the PSC. This trend needs to continue so that there is the necessary technical backup in Addis Ababa to help facilitate the work of the PSC.
The reality of the challenges faced by the PSC is how to create synergies between itself and its supporting institutional structures, such as the Secretariat to the Council, the PSD, the Panel of the Wise, and the MSC. This is because the quality of PSC decisions is dependent on the systematic fl ow of information and analysis.
CONCLUSION
The PSC has certainly acquired important insights, lessons learnt and experi-ences that should guide its work into the future. The Council’s inability to enforce and elicit compliance from its recalcitrant members is still an issue that needs to be addressed. The PSC essentially needs to explore independent sources of information in order to deepen the knowledge of its members prior to taking decisions. The danger is that by issuing communiqués with legally binding opera-tive sections that are non-enforceable, the PSC and its utterances can be rendered ineffectual, which can increasingly undermine the reputation of the Council itself. A possible option is to improve the early involvement of PSC members in the analysis of a confl ict situation, and improve its collaboration with the AU Commission on an equal footing. This should increase prospects for better in-formed and more implementable decisions. The challenges faced by the PSC have led to it being viewed as ‘a repository for insoluble problems’.37
This chapter has sought to provide a fair picture of the reality of the insti-tutional dynamics, particularly with regard to its relationship with the AU Commission over the period of 2004 to 2009. The PSC is arguably one of the AU’s effective bodies, and it appears to be open to insights that can improve its modalities of work. There is substantial scope for improvement of the Council’s
supporting mechanisms, working methods and reporting mechanisms, in partic-ular by formalising and increasing the frequency of the meetings of the military advisory body of the PSC, the MSC.
More recently, the PSC’s chairs of the month have started becoming more engaged as they are beginning to establish their own agendas and consult member states on them. PSC chairs are also beginning to inform the Secretariat in advance of how many meetings they are going to convene and are demand-ing the PSC Secretariat’s report from the Commission at least two weeks before the meeting so that they spend enough time consulting their capitals for advice.
Furthermore, sessions dedicated to an evaluation of the Council’s work are being held regularly, probably once a month.
Intensifying consultations between delegations of PSC member states, based on preparatory technical work carried out by the Commission and before the Council deals offi cially with a crisis situation, could certainly bring about better results. Informal meetings of the PSC at different levels should be established.
Member states should take the lead in the preparation process of the text of the Council’s decisions or communiqués. The text of communiqués should be ex-amined by the member states during the meetings. In a word, a more balanced collaboration is possible between the PSC members and its Secretariat located in the AU Commission. This collaboration will probably depend both on the will of the PSC members and on the willingness of the Commission to cede some of its functions to an autonomous Secretariat of the Council.
Theoretically, as in any international organisation, the AU Commission should be the conduit for carrying out the will of the member states of this organisation.
However, the Commission assumed an infl uential role in directing the work of the PSC during the period between 2004 and 2009. The Commission has a vital role to play as the repository of the AU documents, procedures and regulations;
however, it is necessary for it to grant the PSC the necessary autonomy to under-take its function as the central pillar of the APSA, so that the Council can play a more effective role in anticipating, managing and resolving the disputes that still affl ict the African continent.
NOTES
1 I am grateful to my colleague, Emma Birikorang from the KAIPTC, and Naval Captain Johan Potgieter and Professor Paul Williams for comments on earlier versions of this chapter. My
deepest gratitude goes to my former colleagues at the Peace and Security Directorate of the African Union, who kindly gave me time and explained to me the complexities of the ‘new’
Commission and the Commissioners who took offi ce in May 2008. Fieldwork for this chapter was undertaken in November 2008.
2 On 25 May 2004 (Africa Day) the PSC was offi cially inaugurated to replace the ‘Mechanism on Confl ict Prevention, Management and Resolution’, which had been established in June 1993 in Cairo (Egypt), under the umbrella of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
3 AU doc. PSC/AHG/ST(X), para. 1, 25 May 2005.
4 The AU’s ability to manage its missions remains a challenge. While the rhetoric has consist-ently been about ‘capacity and capabilities’, it is clear that the real albatross around the AU’s neck is its lack of political will and a politicised institutional culture that does not engage with recalcitrant regimes. See Kwesi Aning and Samuel Atuobi, Responsibility to protect in Africa: an analysis of the African Union’s peace and security architecture, Journal of the Global Responsibility to Protect 1(1) (2009), 2011.
5 Paul D Williams, From non-intervention to non-interference: the origins and development of the African Union’s security culture, African Affairs 106(423) (2007). ECOWAS, Memorandum on the ECOWAS Mechanism for Confl ict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, 26–27 October 1998. This docu-ment’s paragraph 19 states that, ‘Using African traditional practice as a guide, it was proposed that eminent personalities should be constituted into a Council of Elders who would use their good offi ces and competence on behalf of ECOWAS, to play the role of mediator, conciliator and arbiter.’
6 Some of these guidelines deal with unconstitutional changes in government, genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
7 See Ademola Abass, The African Peace and Security Architecture: the African Union and regional economic communities, Mimeo, 2009; also see the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, the RECs and Standby Brigades.
8 Williams, From non-intervention to non-interference, 269–277; Aning and Atuobi, Responsibility to protect.
9 Protocol Establishing the PSC (PSC Protocol), Article 6.
10 Ibid., Article 7.
11 Ibid., Article 2(1).
12 For a detailed analysis of these institutions, see Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, The UN and the African Union’s security architecture: defi ning an emerging relationship? Critical Currents 5 (October 2008), 9–25.
13 See PSC Protocol, Articles 3, 4 and 7.
14 See Article 5 (1a & b) of the PSC Protocol.
15 See, for example, African Union, Background paper on the review of the working methods of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Retreat of the Peace and Security Council, 5–6 July.
Dakar, Senegal, 2007.
16 AU, Report of the third brainstorming retreat of African ambassadors in Addis Ababa on the African Union peace and security agenda, 1–4 May 2004, Cape Town (South Africa), 5–7.
17 See the Constitutive Act, Article 4(h).
18 These grave circumstances (genocide, war atrocities and crimes against humanity) are cited in Article 4(j) of the PSC Protocol and Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.
19 Interview with several ambassadors at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2–4 November 2008.
20 The 2007 to 2008 Council is the third set of Council members since the establishment of the PSC. The membership is made up of Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.
21 As of 2009, there were 11 desk offi cers at the CMD dealing with different issues about which it reports to the PSC. These are the Ethio-Eritrea and Somalia confl icts, Darfur/Sudan, Northern Uganda and Zimbabwe, Comoros, and Central African Republic; Burundi, DRC, and IC-Great Lakes Region; Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania; Liberia; Western Sahara; Early Warning System and Panel of the Wise; AU Border Programme; and funding of AU-led support operations.
22 See Barnett and Finnemore’s discussion of autonomous power of international organisations, especially their book Rules for the world (Cornell UP, 2004).
23 Interview, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, 3 November 2008.
24 Interview, AU Commission, 2 November 2008.
25 Interview with several development partners in Addis Ababa, 1–5 November 2008. For a dif-ferent view, see Williams, From non-intervention to non-interference.
26 These divisions are: Confl ict Management; Peace Support Operations; Defence and Security;
Darfur Integrated Task Force; and the Secretariat to the PSC.
27 Article 10(4) of the PSC Protocol.
28 Article 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the PSC.
29 Aning, The UN and the African Union’s security architecture, 22–25, and several interviews with staff of the PSD.
30 See PSC Protocol, Article 11.
31 Diverse interviews at the African Union headquarters with members of staff.
32 See the UN Secretary-General’s report, The relationship between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the African Union, in maintaining peace and security. Furthermore, see the ten-year
capacity-building support programme, which is part of the 2005 World Summit outcome document, also the AU-UN Memorandum of Understanding, 14 November 2006.
33 Interview with senior offi cial of AU, 3 November 2008.
34 PSC Protocol, Article 13(8).
35 Participant observation.
36 Interview, Addis Ababa, 4 November 2007.
37 Abdul Mohammed, Don’t blame the AU, The Guardian, 5 June 2007.
INTRODUCTION
The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) of the AU identify the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) as a key component of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The CEWS is also referenced in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Confl ict Prevention, Management and Resolution. This chapter assesses the challenges confronting the operationalisation of the CEWS. In particular, it highlights the current status of the operationalisation of the CEWS and refl ects on its future prospects. The chapter concludes with the recognition that the CEWS illustrates the AU’s stated commitment to confl ict prevention. However, the slow pace of its operationalisa-tion exposes some of the internal and external challenges that confront the AU.
These challenges need to be addressed if the CEWS is to serve as a vehicle for preventing future confl icts.