Sturman and Hayatou contend that it is on UCGs that ‘there has been the most signifi cant progress in the institutionalization of a norm’ in the work of the AU in general, and that of the PSC in particular.18 But what has this work consisted of and what assessment can be made of the performance of the PSC so far?
Answering this question requires two sets of contextualisation of the subject matter. The fi rst set has been made above, which is the circumstances and factors that led to the adoption of the various instruments that constitute the AU policy on UCGs. The second contextual point to highlight is that there were 28 cases of UCGs recorded on the continent from January 1990 to December 2010. Of those,
Table 1 Military coups/UCGs in Africa, 1990–2010
Military coups/UCGs in Africa, from January 1990 to May 2000 (16)
Mali: 03/1991 Lesotho: 04/1991 Algeria: 01/1992 Nigeria: 11/1993 G. Bissau: 05/1999 Côte d’Ivoire: Military coups/UCGs in Africa, from July 2000 to May 2004 (4) Madagascar:
12/2001 CAR: 03/2003 São Tomé: 07/2003 G. Bissau: 09/2003
Military coups/UCGs in Africa, from May 2004 to December 2010 (8) Togo: 02/2005 Guinea: 12/2008 Madagascar: 03/2009
16 happened before the adoption of the Lomé Declaration, four between this date and the launch of the PSC in May 2004, and a further eight cases, including three instances of ‘unconstitutional preservation of power’, from 2004 to December 2010 (see Table 1).19
Quantitatively, Table 1 shows that the Lomé Declaration might have had a de-terrent effect on UCGs, particularly in the fi rst four years of its adoption. But does the increase, since the launch of the PSC, mean that the Council is not perform-ing well or that the ‘deterrent effect’ of Lomé is wanperform-ing with time? Perhaps the quantitative approach is not the best way to assess the performance of the PSC on UCGs. The qualitative approach is probably a better model. In this regard, it is worth noting that there have been some inconsistencies in the approach of the OAU/AU vis-à-vis regimes bequeathed by UCGs, but less so since the launch of the PSC. In fact, the PSC has managed to take bold stances unprecedented in African history, particularly with regard to the description of ruling regimes as unconsti-tutional, as happened in Togo (2005), Niger (2009) and Côte d’Ivoire (2010).
For example, the OAU/AU did condemn the four UCGs that happened on the continent between 2000 and May 2004, and the countries concerned (Madagascar, G. Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe and the Central African Republic (CAR)) were suspended from membership, apart from São Tomé, whose overthrown leader was restored within hours of the putsch. However, none of these countries was subjected to targeted sanctions or the continued pressure of an international contact group (ICG). But some of these things changed following the inauguration of the PSC.
The fi rst UCG after the launch of the PSC happened in Togo on 5 February 2005. It was also the fi rst test of the PSC’s commitment to eliminate the ‘scourge’
of UCGs from African polities. For following the sudden death of Gnassingbé Eyadéma, the country’s long-serving ruler (1967–2005), the president of the National Assembly (Speaker of parliament) was expected to take the presidency and organise fresh elections in 60 days, according to Article 65 of the Togolese Constitution. However, the military suspended the Constitution and prevented the Speaker, who was on an offi cial mission abroad at the time, from returning home. The military then nominated one of the sons of the late president as the new Head of State. Both ECOWAS and the AU condemned this action and insist-ed that the military and its appointinsist-ed Head of State abide by the Constitution.
As a result, Faure Gnassingbé stepped down and agreed to elections, but was declared winner of these when they were held in April 2005. Indeed, this was
the fi rst time that the OAU/AU had refused such a takeover in favour of the ruling party.20
Perhaps the boldest of such actions were those seen on Niger in December 2009 and Côte d’Ivoire in December 2010. Niger’s leader, Mamadou Tandja, was determined to manipulate the country’s constitutional arrangements in order to hang on to power. In the face of growing opposition to his designs, Tandja dissolved Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Electoral Commission. He then promulgated a new constitution through a highly
After many years of serious political crises in the country and several postponements of the presidential elections since October 2005, the fi rst round of these elections was fi nally held on 31 October 2010, with a run-off election on 28 November. It was hoped that this poll would mark the end of the crisis. On 2 December 2010, the head of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared former Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara as the winner of the run-off election with 54.10 per cent of the votes, against 45.90 per cent for the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo.
But soon after this, the head of the Constitutional Council, a close ally of Gbagbo, invalidated these results and proclaimed Gbagbo as the winner with some 51.45 per cent of the votes. At the behest of Gbagbo and his en-tourage, he had scrapped more than 400 000 votes from seven constituen-cies in Ouattara’s strongholds in the north of the country. But the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the country as well as all the foreign electoral observers certifi ed Ouattara’s victory as announced by the IEC. Both ECOWAS and the AU – as well as the UN and European Union (EU) – condemned Gbagbo and asked him to leave power. The PSC recommended the suspension of Côte d’Ivoire from the AU, and the country was suspended from both the AU and ECOWAS, while both insti-tutions engaged in diplomatic efforts to persuade Gbagbo to step aside.
At the time this chapter was completed, both organisations were fi rm on their principled position of only recognising the real winner, an unprec-edented position – in African history – they were not ready to negotiate.23 Box 1 AU and the unconstitutional change of government of Gbagbo –
Côte d’Ivoire: one man against the whole world?
controversial referendum that was boycotted by the opposition and the major-ity of Nigeriens.21
Thus, on the basis of Article 2(1) of its Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, ECOWAS engaged with Tandja’s regime from mid-2009 with a view to dissuading him from amending the Constitution in a unilateral manner less than six months before the presidential elections in which he was not to take part. The AU followed the lead of the regional organisation in this instance. When Tandja ignored the efforts of both ECOWAS and the AU, ECOWAS suspended Niger’s membership from the regional organisation ‘until constitu-tional legality is restored in the country’. The AU endorsed this decision of the West African regional body.22
Although these respective actions did not force Tandja out of power (he had to be overthrown in a military coup in February 2010),24 or persuade Laurent Gbagbo to step aside (he was still on his feet in Abidjan at the end of December 2010), the principled stance taken by both organisations in this matter is commendable because, short of military intervention, they did all that they could in accordance with their prerogatives and constraints.25
Two other actions of the PSC illustrate a qualitative change in the work of the AU vis-à-vis UCGs. The fi rst one is the imposition of targeted sanctions against coup makers. The second one is the establishment of ICGs to give effect to AU policy and decisions.
The fi rst country against whose junta the AU imposed targeted sanctions – beyond suspending the country from membership – was Mauritania. Following the 6 August 2008 military coup that overthrew the democratically elected govern-ment of Sidi Ould Cheick Abdallahi, the AU immediately condemned the coup and suspended Mauritania from all the decision-making organs. This was for an initial six-month period during which the AU engaged with the military junta to restore constitutional order. When the continental body, spearheaded by the PSC, realised that despite several high-level meetings and consultations between the AU and its partners, on the one hand, and the military junta, on the other, there had not been any meaningful progress by the junta in the direction of restoring constitutional order by 5 February 2009 (the end of the six-month period), the decision was taken to impose targeted sanctions against all those whose activities were seen as de-signed to maintain the unconstitutional status quo in Mauritania.26
Mauritania was also the fi rst country on which the concept of ICG was ex-perimented. In addition to the AU, this group consisted of all the major partners
of Mauritania, including the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, the UN and the EU. A similar mechanism was devised in Guinea, fol-lowing the December 2008 military coup there, and in Madagascar folfol-lowing the March 2009 UCG there. In each of these cases, the group held several meetings in various locations in turn, including Addis Ababa and the capitals of the countries concerned. On Niger, as noted above, the PSC followed the lead of ECOWAS and the ‘crisis group’ that the latter had formed to facilitate dialogue between the Nigerien parties.
The effect of these groups is that they put pressure on military juntas and serve as a mechanism to remind them of their initial undertakings. Most signifi -cantly, they remind the juntas of their obligation, as per the relevant AU instru-ments, to restore constitutional order. The groups also serve, as was made clear in the case of Guinea, to offset tensions between the political actors during the transitional period.27
The foregoing clearly shows the evolution of the AU response to UCGs. It has to be noted, however, that the AU could not have taken any of the above-men-tioned actions alone. In fact, closer examination of the various cases reveals that the achievements made were the result of a combination of efforts by national, regional and international (non-African) actors, highlighting the importance of these various actors working in concert towards achieving the goal of eliminating UCGs on the continent.