5. Germany: Climate Change, Human Security and Southern Populations
5.2.3 The Sovereign Discourse: Developing Climate Foreign Policy
Although never becoming as dominant as in the US case, the sovereign discourse played a role in Germany. However, at the beginning of the period of analysis and throughout the 1990s, the
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discourse appeared only very seldom and it was not until the end of the 1990s that it gradually became more common. In addition, German actors understood national security in a much more multilateral way and did not link it to the defence sector as readily as in the US.
Non-Parliamentary Articulations: Distributive Conflicts in the Global South
The first distinct articulations of the sovereign discourse mainly appeared outside the parliament at the end of the 1990s, for instance in reports by the Hans Seidel Foundation, Adelphi, Institute for Development and Peace but also in several mainly academic publications.
These early sovereign articulations were closely entanglement with the academic debates about environmental and ecological security (Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001: 1; Carius and Lietzmann 1998: ix, x). They emphasised that they operated with a ‘modern’ or ‘non-traditional’ concept of security that went beyond state-centric and military understandings and questioned a simplistic correlation between environmental problems and conflict (Rotte 2001: 7, 62;
Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001: 3, 12, 16; Brauch 2002: 25). Yet, despite these theoretical reflections, many reports clearly articulated the sovereign discourse in being convinced that climate change would be a central threat to the security of Europe and Germany in the 21st century and thus would become a recurring theme in discussions about security and defence policy (Rotte 2001: 7). Many reports focussed on the well-known combination of environmental degradation (Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001: 19) and resource scarcity, which eventually would lead to conflicts particularly in already disadvantaged or unstable regions (Carius and Lietzmann 1998: vii, ix, 17, 20). The main line of argumentation was a combination of the disciplinary with the sovereign discourse. According to this reasoning, climate change would negatively affect human security, mostly in developing countries, which in turn could lead to instability and violent conflicts over scarce resources (Rotte 2001: 13-15, 20; Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001: 7; Brauch 2002: 22). In the end, this could lead to ‘domino effects’, escalation dynamics and migration, which eventually would directly threaten Europe’s and Germany’s interests and national security as well as international stability and security (Rotte 2001: 19, 20, 54-55; Carius and Lietzmann 1998: vii; Brauch 2002: 23).
To prevent these manifold threats from materialising, these reports on the one hand called for mitigation measures, e.g. coordinating with the EU and the promotion of renewables (Rotte 2001: 24-26, 28-29), but also emphasised the importance of early warning mechanisms, hence partly linking the sovereign to the governmental discourse (Brauch 2002: 25–26). On the other hand, they highlighted the importance of backup plans in the case of a failure of mitigation
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and prevention. To cope with violent conflicts (Rotte 2001: 50, 52) they highlighted that ‘[…]
peacekeeping and conflict management in the third world’ are ‘a vested interest of Germany […]’ (Rotte 2001: 53). Thus, the security implications of climate change had to become a central pillar of German foreign policy (Rotte 2001: 53–54) and should be included in the planning of the defence sector (Rotte 2001: 57-58, 61).
Despite these initial articulations of the sovereign discourse around the millennium, the influence on the broader political debate was measured and it was not until 2007 that triggered by the 4th IPCC report, the UNSC debates and by the ensuing discussion in the United States (GTZ 2008a: 7), sovereign articulations became more widespread and influential in Germany.
Here, the WBGU and Adelphi were the most active proponents but also several other organisations such as the GTZ and the Hans Seidel Foundation occasionally engaged in the discourse. Most organisations were certain that climate induced security threats go beyond human security (Tänzler 2011: 34) and eventually would have ‘major implications for peace and stability’ (adelphi 2012: 15). In this context, climate induced migration would play an important role because mass migration to neighbouring states could escalate human security threats to towards national security issues (Bayer 2011: 141). Moreover, a common theme of most reports was that they again first of all focused on the Global South where climate change could lead to ‘distributive conflicts’, could exacerbate the problem of ‘failing states’, which eventually would trigger violent tendencies in many societies (WBGU 2007c: 2).
Most of the time reports linked the sovereign argumentation to elements of the disciplinary and governmental discourses by, for example, stating that climate change ‘[…] has the potential to cause significant and highly uncertain impacts on societies, undermining human security and increasing the risks of conflict and instability’ (adelphi 2012: 4; see also WBGU 2008: 3). Yet, especially in relation to the small island states climate change was also constructed as traditional national security threat: ‘Climate change threatens lives, livelihoods, sovereign territory and, in some cases, the existence of states. The situation we face is as dire and serious as civil war, terrorism and nuclear weapons’ (adelphi 2013: 21, quote by Tony de Brum, Minister in Assistance to the President of the Marshall Islands).
Even though the focus of most articulations was on the developing world, several reports emphasised that these at first localised threats could soon spill over to industrialised countries.
Thus, reports picked up the earlier argumentations about the danger of escalation dynamics,
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according to which the effects of climate change could ‘act as a multiplier’ of existing problems (adelphi 2012: 8) and overstretch the ‘adaptive capacities’ of developing countries. At the end of the day this could lead to ‘domino’ effects concerning the destabilisation of fragile states (Tänzler 2011: 34) and contribute to ‘jeopardizing national and international security’ (WBGU 2008: 1; adelphi and UBA 2013: 13; GTZ 2008b: 56; adelphi 2012: 8). Thus, reports saw a real danger thatthe failure of ‘preventive and adaptive strategies’ could ‘overstretch the global governance system’, which eventually could lead to ‘far-reaching (global) structural policy or even geostrategic consequences’ (GTZ 2008a: 8).
However, even though many reports articulated the sovereign discourse around that time, there was not even one that predominately considered Germany’s national security as threatened or primarily focused on a role for the armed forces. Instead, the reports acknowledged the debates about new or non-traditional concepts of security (adelphi 2012: 15) and did not uncritically adopt a straightforward link between climate change and national security or conflict. The tenor of the sovereign discourse in Germany was that although climate change could have implications for the national security of certain developing countries and could (indirectly) affect international security, the solutions where to be found beyond traditional security and defence policy (WBGU 2008: 21, 23). One Adelphi report directly quoted the then Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle on this issue, who described climate change as a ‘non-traditional security threat’ that required ‘climate diplomacy’ as well as
‘resource efficiency, energy transformation and technology cooperation.’ (adelphi 2013: 21).
Recommendations: Mainstreaming Climate Change in Development and Foreign Policy
Concerning policy recommendations, most reports included mitigation measures to prevent threats to national security from materialising. Thus, they urged to adopt ‘an ambitious global climate policy’ in the ‘next 10-15 years’ (WBGU 2008: 1, 6) or advised to ‘to promote sustainable energy systems aimed at ending energy poverty and reducing resource competition need to move ahead.’ (GTZ 2008a: 10). However, even more so than in connection to the other two discourses, the focus on the traditional security implications of climate change also led to an increased focus on adaptation measures to tackle the immediate security concerns. Here reports, for instance, suggested ‘conflict sensitive adaptation’ strategies (adelphi and UBA 2013: 2; GTZ 2008a: 9) that could help to contain problematic situations in affected countries in the Global South. In this context, many reports underlined the importance of development policy, which could support local populations and increase their resilience to prevent the
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escalation of human security threats to conflicts. Some even saw the discussion about the security implications of climate change as ‘a great window of opportunity’ to increase the importance of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (GTZ 2008a: 8) and to ‘upgrade climate-related development cooperation in terms of staffing and funding.’ (GTZ 2008a: 10). Moreover, reports linked the sovereign discourse to governmental articulations by emphasising the importance of ‘prevention’, which would
‘reduce fragility, and lower the risk of future crisis and violent conflict’ (WBGU 2008: 44).
Finally, while reports largely avoided defence policy recommendations, they nevertheless considered climate change one of the ‘key foreign policy challenges of the 21st century’ (adelphi 2013: 5). In this vein, they frequently stressed that it was necessary to
‘strengthen the profile of climate change within the foreign policy agenda’ (adelphi 2012: 12;
see also GTZ 2008a: 8). Thus, reports recommended a close cooperation of all OECD countries with the emerging economies and developing countries to prevent global instability and conflicts (WBGU 2007c: 5). Especially the rise of new global powers such as India and China and related conflicts about climate policy necessitated a stronger integration of climate change into German and European foreign policy agendas (WBGU 2008: 193). Furthermore, particularly Adelphi was very keen to foster a dialogue between climate security scholars and political practitioners especially in the German Federal Foreign Office and in this context actively promoted the concept of ‘climate diplomacy’ (adelphi 2012, 2013).
Parliamentary Articulations: Supporting Endangered Developing Countries
In the 1990s, the sovereign discourse only occasionally appeared in the German Bundestag.
The reports of the Enquete Commission for instance mentioned the possibility of ‘distributive conflicts’ (Deutscher Bundestag 1990: 89) and ‘threats to world peace’ (Deutscher Bundestag 1992: 15) and some members of parliament referred to the possibility of the territorial extinction of small island states (Deutscher Bundestag 1995a: 809). Paralleling non-governmental articulations, the discourse gradually became more common in the early to mid-2000s. One important trigger was the publication of the 2003 Pentagon study, which was directly discussed in the German Bundestag to emphasise the traditional security dimension of climate change (Deutscher Bundestag 2004b: 8374, 8379). However, the discourse remained a minority position and it was not until the mid-2000s and especially in the peak of the climate security debate between 2007 and 2011 that sovereign argumentations became more important in the parliament. Similar to the above described reports, members of parliament most of the time did
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not discuss traditional security implications of climate change in isolation but always emphasised the close interconnectedness to human security (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a:
14269).
Throughout most debates, the emphasis was on threats in already instable developing countries. Thus, members of the parliament highlighted how climate change could lead to new conflicts (Deutscher Bundestag 2009c: 604) or at least could exacerbate existing ones, e.g. ‘[…]
fierce wars and conflicts over water, food and the access to raw materials […]’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2007c: 10953; see also: Deutscher Bundestag 2008b: 17247, 2011a: 17375). Once again, a particular focus was on Africa where according to some members of parliament – and concurring with the US debate – climate change already had fuelled violent conflicts, for instance in Darfur:
There are already wars and civil wars as a result of climate change. For example, the deserts in Sudan have spread by 100 kilometres in the past 40 years. Part of the war and civil war happening there is a conflict over the land mass […] (Deutscher Bundestag 2008d: 21069).
In contrast to the US debate, the discussion only seldom revolved around direct threats to Germany. Thus, members of parliament occasionally argued that conflicts in the Global South could eventually pertain Europe’s and Germany’s security as well (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a: 14278). More specifically, they feared that climate change could lead to ‘global tensions’, ‘conflicts’, ‘migration’, ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, which all could become direct threats to Germany if left unattended (Deutscher Bundestag 2009c: 604, 2011b: 17991). Here, members of the German Bundestag again adopted some of the arguments most vigorously stressed by US think tanks and occasionally directly referred to their reports, for instance to the 2007 CNA report (Deutscher Bundestag 2008e: II). Finally, the debates frequently mentioned the debate in the UNSC to highlight that ‘[…] climate change is a potential threat to global peace and security.’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2012: 25936).
However, direct threats to Germany’s national security or to international peace and security were mostly portrayed as an unlikely scenario and never became the centre of the debate. Moreover, the articulations always made clear that in response to these threats traditional military measures should not be the first choice. Instead, the focus ought to be on preventive strategies (Deutscher Bundestag 2012: 25936). Thus, mitigation measures and
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helping developing countries were central pillars even within the sovereign discourse.
Members of parliament called for more CDM projects (Deutscher Bundestag 2008b: 17247), for technology transfer (Deutscher Bundestag 2007d: 13377, 2011b: 17991) but also for reducing CO2 on a global scale for instance through emission trading systems (Deutscher Bundestag 2007c: 10953). Besides mitigation, even more so than in relation to the other two discourses, the focus on climate change as a driver of traditional security threats increasingly contributed to a discursive shift towards adaptation measures during the end of the 2000s.
Thus, members of parliament more and more emphasised that ‘[…] climate and adaptation policies should be understood as an element of preventive security policy’ and called for
‘effective instruments to finance the high costs of adaptation.’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2007d:
13377). Once again, some articulations clearly displayed a tacit acceptance of a considerable degree of global warming and merely focused on measures to cushion its worst blows, for instance through an ‘international fund for compensation’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a:
14269) but also with a focus on Germany through a ‘national adaptation strategy’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2008d: 21069).
5.3 Political Impact
Although all three discourses played a role in Germany, the disciplinary and to a lesser extent, the governmental discourse, dominated the debates. Thus, concerning the concrete political consequences, the picture in Germany differs considerably from the US. The prevailing combination of climate security discourses had an impact on the legitimatisation and the content of a range of policies and governance practices in several different political fields. It helped to raise the attention for climate change in general and it directly contributed to legitimise Germany’s progressive climate policies, including mitigation and adaptation strategies. Beyond that, the focus on security threats in the Global South led to a considerable impact on its development policy. The specific securitisation also played an important role in transforming climate change from a largely environmental towards a key foreign policy issue. Finally, while it was not without any effect, the impact on defence policy in Germany was small.
Unsurprisingly, climate security discourses were never the only driving force behind these developments. Instead, climate justice argumentations aiming at global distributional as well as intergenerational justice and an influential environmental movement also played an important part in the German climate debate. Beyond that, particularly since the mid-1990s, climate protection measures increasingly were also presented as an economic opportunity (Beck
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et al. 2009: 19), leading to the already mentioned concepts of ecological modernisation and environmental industrial policy that became even more influential in the 2000s (Jänicke 2011:
134). Nevertheless, these concepts did not stand in opposition to climate security discourses but were often directly combined with them to reinforce the overall strength of the argument.
In the following, I take a closer look at the political sectors in which climate security discourses were most influential.
5.3.1 Environmental and Climate Policy
Abating climate change with decisive mitigation measures has always been one of the key demands in the German climate security debate. It eventually led to the adoption of several key policies and facilitated Germany’s rise as global climate leader in the 1990s and 2000s (Jänicke 2011: 129, 137; Ulbert 1997: 9). A first tangible political consequence of the mostly globally focused securitising articulations in the late 1980s was the establishment of the influential Enquete Commission on the Preservation of the Earth’s Atmosphere. In its first reports it adopted the disciplinary discourse and the emphasis on the global dimension by constructing climate change as ‘a danger of almost unimaginable proportions for all mankind’ (Deutscher Bundestag 1990: 88), as a ‘global threat’ (Deutscher Bundestag 1992: 3) and by highlighting the increased frequency of climate induced catastrophes (Deutscher Bundestag 1992: 10).
Therefore, the commission favoured a global solution for the problem and decisive restrictions for harmful substances, similar to the by then fairly successful Montreal protocol.
Consequently, in 1991 Germany announced an ambitious CO2 reduction target of minus 25 per cent between 1987 – later 1990 – and 2005 and began to convince other industrialised countries to do the same (Böcher and Töller 2012: 54; Weidner 2008: 7). Subsequently, as one of the first signatories, Germany became a dedicated promoter of the UNFCCC (Böckem 2000:
7; Weidner 2008: 7) and kept up the political attention for the international climate regime.
Eventually, these efforts cumulated in the first COP in Berlin and the adoption of the famous Berlin Mandate (UNFCCC 1995), which paved the way for the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Motivated by the recurring climate security articulations, Germany was one of the few industrialised countries that advocated for binding emission cuts in these early negotiations about the climate regime (Jänicke 2011: 133) and beyond that pushed for the establishment of the precautionary principle in relation to climate change (Mederake and Duwe
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2014: 11; Schreurs 2002: 4). Consequently, the country was also the driving force behind the EU’s Kyoto pledge of minus eight per cent until 2012 and agreed to burden the largest share of reduction within the EU (Weidner and Mez 2008: 363; Mederake and Duwe 2014: 14; Geden and Tils 2013: 24).
Early Impacts on Domestic Climate Policy
The early articulations of the disciplinary discourse also contributed to Germany’s domestic climate policies. In 1990 the BMU established the Interministerial Working Group ‘CO2-Reduction’ (IMA) that was supposed to develop guidelines for climate protection for the Federal Cabinett (Bundeskabinett), especially concerning mitigation measures (BMU 2006: 4–
5). The third IMA report published in 1994, called climate change a ‘global threat’, emphasised the importance of multilateral solutions, and in accordance with the dominant disciplinary discourse highlighted the special responsibility of industrialised countries to reduce their emissions (Deutscher Bundestag 1994: 5, 57, 160). Beyond that, throughout the 1990s, several members of parliament had advocated for measures that were supposed to combine a prevention of the security implications of climate change with (green) economic opportunities (Deutscher Bundestag 1995b: 2345, 1997: 18328, 1999b: 5985, 5988, 5990). This eventually led to the adoption of the ecological tax reform in 1999 by the newly elected Red-Green (SPD/Green Party) coalition government (Böcher and Töller 2012: 58), which aimed at increasing the tax for energy, especially for fossil fuels and to promote energy efficiency as well as renewables (Deutscher Bundestag 1998b: 1). One year later, the Renewable Energy Law (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG) followed, which aimed at increasing the percentage of renewables to 25-30 percent of electricity production until 2020 and also introduced fixed feed in tariffs to reach this goal (Böcher and Töller 2012: 59; Jänicke 2011: 138). The draft bill explicitly articulated the disciplinary discourse by emphasising that the increasing frequency of climate induced natural disasters necessitates immediate legislative action to mitigate GHG emissions but also highlighted the economic opportunities of renewables (Deutscher Bundestag 2000a:
18, 1).
Later that year, the government coalition established the German National Climate Protection Programme, which underlined Germany’s mitigation target of minus 25 per cent between 1990 and 2005 (Deutscher Bundestag 2000b). The programme emphasised the dangers of climate change, especially due to more frequent occurrence of storms and floods but also food security and the responsibility of developed countries to mitigate (Deutscher Bundestag
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2000b: 5, 137). In 2005, the new conservative led coalition government (CDU/SPD) prolonged the programme, and set a new target of minus 21 per cent between 2008 and 2012 relative to 1990 (Deutscher Bundestag 2005c: 4). Again, the initial report about the programme published by the IMA articulated the disciplinary discourse by emphasising that: ‘Extreme events cause billions in damage and threaten the health and livelihoods of the population in many regions of the world.’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2005c: 4). To handle these problems, the report highlighted the importance of decisive mitigation measures to restrict global warming to a maximum of two degrees and underlined Germany’s ambition to remain a climate forerunner (Deutscher Bundestag 2005c: 4).
The Rise of Market Solutions and the Peak of the Climate Security Debate
Whereas Germany had been reluctant towards market solutions for the climate problem for a
Whereas Germany had been reluctant towards market solutions for the climate problem for a