The Power Triangle: Sovereign, Disciplinary and Governmental Power

3. Theory: Governing Through Climate Security

3.2 The Governmentalisation of Security

3.2.2 The Power Triangle: Sovereign, Disciplinary and Governmental Power

Apart from the concept of the population, the ‘power triangle’ of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental power (Foucault 2006b: 76, 161) is central to the governmentality approach and also is a core aspect of my governmentality reading of securitisation.

The starting point of this threefold view on power lies in Foucault’s genealogy of the governance concept, in which he condenses these three forms of power that underscored the respective modes of governance during different historical periods. In the resulting typology, sovereign power is the oldest power form and is connected to the feudalistic territorial or

‘judicial state’ prior to the 16^th century, which was defined by its territory and governed mainly through issuing laws and direct interventions of the sovereign (Foucault 2006b: 164) – i.e.

similar to Machiavelli’s prince or Hobbes’ leviathan. Thereafter, disciplinary power became more important, which Foucault relates to what he calls the ‘administrative state’ that gradually arose from the 15^th and 16^th century on. In this era, the state territory lost in importance and political rule increasingly focused on individuals and disciplinary practices (Foucault 2006b:

19). Eventually, governmental power gained in importance, which Foucault ties to the emergence of the ‘governmental state’ in the 18^th century. This new form of governance was connected to and defined by its relationship to the population and to ‘security mechanisms’ or

‘apparatuses of security’ (Foucault 2006b: 36; Dean 2010: 29). Hence, providing security for the population and contributing to its welfare and prosperity and not the control of a territory became the central focus of governance practices. Of course, this temporal sequence does not imply that these power forms were not present in the centuries before, but rather that it was in these epochs that they became eminently visible and more dominant (Foucault 2006b: 23).

In the following, I elaborate on the emergence and characteristics of each of the three power forms and their relation to contemporary security discourses in detail and then explain how I use them to construct three distinct climate security discourses. To facilitate comparisons between the three power forms as well as to make assertions about their normative implications I develop a two-dimensional scheme. The first, performative, dimension covers the main modes of actions of each power form. The emphasis is on how it empowers specific actors and political

sectors and how it is connected to specific conceptions of security. The second, normative, dimension focuses on specific dangers and opportunities tied to each power form and to security discourses that draw on this form of power. While of course normative claims depend on the normative criterion used for establishing this claim, I think it is possible to define some general characteristics or blueprints for each power form, which in their application in the empirical part naturally will be specified in more detail. I use the normative dimension as heuristic starting point for my analysis, while staying aware of the fact that the definitive normative judgement depends on the concrete situation and empirical analysis and only makes sense in an ex-post manner. Many post-structuralist scholars would probably take issue with this normative dimension because it is shaped as well by power relations, can exercise power, and eventually can be abused for problematic purposes. However, I find not engaging in an open normative discussion more problematic since even a seemingly neutral post-structural analysis or

‘problematisation’ contains dozens of hidden normative assumptions. Thus, following the Welsh or Aberystwyth School in this respect, I argue that revealing the scholars own normative stance and integrating a normative dimension into the research design at least gives some hints of the, still mostly hidden, normative agenda, and provides the reader with a starting point for a normative discussion (Booth 1997; Wyn Jones 1999, 2005).

Sovereign Power: Defending the Realm by Invoking National Security

Performative Dimension

The first or ‘oldest’ power form, sovereign power, is the one in its effects most similar to mainstream conceptions of power, e. g. the power to enforce ones will over others (Weber 1976:

571) or what Stephen Lukes describes as one-dimensional view on power (Lukes 2005: 16, see the previous section). It is close to a Machiavellian or Hobbesian notion of power, meaning it mainly focuses at a certain territory and its core aim is to sustain the reign of the ‘prince’ or

‘leviathan’ (Foucault 2006b: 100; Opitz 2008b: 207–208). Thus, sovereign power is mostly exercised by the sovereign – often the state and its agencies such as the police or the military – in a highly visible and direct way over its territory, with its main target being the perpetuation of sovereignty itself or of a particular political order (Foucault 2003: 149). It has a binary and law like character defining what is permitted or forbidden, punishing those who deviate from the law (Dean 2010: 29; Foucault 2006b: 149). It constitutes a negative form of power that takes away things, as for instance taxes, labour, freedom or in extreme cases life itself (Foucault 2003:

240, 2006b: 75). A concrete example for this power form is the issuing and enforcement of laws

by the government and the punishment of those who do not comply with these laws – in its most extreme form by killing the convicted in the name of the sovereign. In general, the exercise of sovereign power is tied to hard-politics, direct interventions of the state such as issuing and enforcing laws, collecting taxes and it legitimises state actors to handle problems. In its extreme forms, this culminates in a focus on traditional security conceptions as well as defence and military topics that all directly aim at preserving the reign of the sovereign over the territory.

Sovereign Power and Conceptions of Security

Transferred to contemporary security debates and security discourses, this form of power can be linked to a state and military focused national security conception (Elbe 2009: 86). In other words, national security – or equivalent concepts such as territorial security, state security but also international security and order – are manifestation of sovereign power. Nonetheless, it is important to stress at that sovereign power in general is broader than the mostly defence focused national security conception. A sovereign power intervention does not necessarily have to entail a military element but can also be the issuing of a strict law, raising taxes or directly enforcing laws through the state executive. However, it is always a highly visible, top-down and direct form of evoking security and primarily aims at the state territory, which in political practice (especially in the realm of international relations) often intersects with national security.

Moreover, in combination with the political effects of designating something as existential threat, invoking sovereign power in securitisation process can go beyond the law and can legitimise a temporary (or even permanent) state of exception where the sovereign decision replaces the written law (see Agamben 1998: 11, 2005; Schmitt 1963). Thus, while originally being much broader, it can be, for analytical purposes, useful to link it to national security, at least as a starting point and then to come to a more nuanced understanding in the empirical analysis. The effects of sovereign power in securitisation processes therefore resemble what the CS describes as effects of successful securitisation: more attention for the problem at stake and a more serious handling, though also possibly a bypassing and acceleration of normal and democratic political procedures.

Normative Dimension

On the positive side, the exercise of sovereign power in securitisation processes draws attention to issues that otherwise would probably not had been handled in such a serious manner, thereby elevating those issues into the realm of high-politics. This can be useful to draw attention to so

far overlooked problems and can, at least until it reaches a certain degree, have a politicising effect because it brings issues on the political agenda. Furthermore, an acceleration of typically slow and bureaucratic procedures can sometimes be an advantage. Both the attention generating and accelerating qualities of securitisation have been referred to as legitimisation for securitising non-military issues such as climate change or HIV/AIDS (Floyd 2013: 281–282;

Ingram 2010; Elbe 2006).

However, sovereign power also entails several problematic features, such as granting extraordinary powers to the sovereign, possibly even culminating in a temporal state of exception and thereby suspending laws and democratic procedures. Moreover, it can narrow down the focus towards predominantly direct and short-term action such as police or military interventions. Thus, a political response in the wake of a sovereign based securitisation often neglects the root causes of the problem. It is a reactive form of governance that tries to cure the immediate symptoms thereby running the risk of making the underlying problematic much worse in the long run. Finally, a securitisation focusing on sovereign power tends to legitimise state, security and defence actors as primary agents and relocates the discussions into these circles, which often also brings with it an increase in secrecy. It thus concentrates the power to act within the sovereign and thereby narrows down the space for political discussions and excludes societal and non-governmental actors. Consequently, in its extreme forms it diminishes the opportunities for democratic control and public scrutiny. The following table 3.2a summarises the argument made in this paragraph:

Table 3.2a: Sovereign Power

Performative Dimension Normative Dimension

Modes of Action Actors and Sectors Security Conceptions/

(Partly based on Foucault 2006, Elbe 2009 and Dean 2010)

Disciplinary Power: Securing Individual Human Security

Performative Dimension

At its core, disciplinary power focuses on sophisticated surveillance technologies and control mechanisms aimed at the transformation of individual behaviour towards a certain predefined norm – a process also called ‘normation’ (Foucault 2006b: 89–90). The goal is to discipline, classify and control individual behaviour, therefore this power form is not exerted over territory buts aims at the individual body and tries to optimises it (Foucault 1975: 143). An example would be military drill schemes that entail very detailed codes of conduct and even prescribe certain body movements e.g. when handling a rifle – all tailored to transform individual behaviour for serving a certain purpose and towards a predefined ideal typical norm. In short, discipline is a deductive approach that divides reality into the abnormal and normal based on an ideal typical or optimal model of what this ‘normal’ is (Foucault 2006b: 89). Furthermore, discipline is not a negative but productive way of exercising power that instead of taking things away tries to create and transform them according to the predefined norm. It is also very accurate, operates at the micro-level and tries to control every single part of the process (Foucault 2006b: 74). Accordingly, requires many resources and continuous attention of the one who exerts it. It necessitates a constant monitoring of the process and every single deviation from the norm has to be attended to immediately. Eventually, its goal is to optimise processes by assessing and understanding the function of every single element in the process and then arrange these elements into the optimal order (Foucault 2006b: 89). Finally, while in its original conception, disciplinary power was particularly connected to institutions like the military, prisons, or hospitals, Foucault insists that it should not be identified exclusively with these concepts (Foucault 1975: 215). Instead, it can empower a variety of actors ranging from the state to non-state actors such as classical NGOs, church organisations and think tanks.

Disciplinary Power and Conceptions of Security

Disciplinary power particularly materialises in new security concepts such as human or individual security (Elbe 2009: 113) or similar terms such as human vulnerability or food security. These conceptions too, look at individuals and try to enhance and empower these disadvantaged people towards a predefined ideal typical norm – the secure, free and thus emancipated individual that is able to fulfil its human potential (Booth 1991: 319). The original conception of human security that emerged in the political realm (Boutros-Ghali 1992; UNDP 1994), as well as similar academic concepts such as individual security and emancipation linked

to the Welsh or Aberystwyth School of CSS (Booth 1991, 2005a; Wyn Jones 2005), tried to set up a new and positive concept of security. Aiming at individuals and their problems and wellbeing these concepts primarily tried to come up with an alternative to the then dominant state centric national security conceptions. Thus, the goal was to empower individuals not states and to facilitate policies that benefited their wellbeing.

However, in the course of political and academic debates the concept of human security has undergone a discursive shift and increasingly is also employed to not only empower disadvantaged individuals but also to control their behaviour (Duffield 2005, 2007; Duffield and Waddell 2006; Oels and von Lucke 2015; McCormack 2010). Moreover, especially in a securitisation context it can be transformed and (miss)used to facilitate the interests of powerful state, military and particularly Northern actors (McCormack 2010). It can function as a justification for different kinds of interventions and as rationalisation of military and neo-colonial action (McCormack 2010: 36; Devetak 2007: 152; Eriksson 1999: 318). Hence, the originally well-intentioned concept can itself become perverted and thus normatively problematic (Floyd 2007a, 2007b).

Thus, despite the emancipating origins of the concept, in contemporary political and security debates, human security often entails a distinction between people of the Global North and those living in the Global South. Thus, the ideal typical norm usually is the well-fed, healthy, productive, democratic and wealthy citizen in advanced and highly developed Western societies. Based on this ‘normal’, the human security framework produces an opposing

‘abnormal’ that has to be disciplined, often by organisations from the Global North: ‘[…] the human security framework produces ‘’humans’ requiring securing’ and empowers

‘international institutions and actors to individuate, group and act upon Southern populations.’

(Duffield 2005: 2). In this example, we can observe the productive elements of disciplinary power that have a bearing on the governed as well as on the governing. Disciplinary power prescribes certain identities and instructions and hence empowers some actors to act (e.g.

Western organisations) whereas it constitutes others as passive elements of normation and governance (e.g. endangered individuals in countries of the Global South).

As with sovereign power, in its original conception disciplinary power goes beyond this narrow focus on human security. Yet, when analysing securitisation processes it can be useful to narrow it down to this security conception to define an analytical starting point and to bear

in mind the specific power of security (i.e. threat constructions), which in their combination with disciplinary power can facilitate specific political actions. The application of such disciplinary power in securitisation processes does not necessarily lead to extreme and undemocratic measures by the state, but rather imposes certain identities and truth regimes onto the situation (Elbe 2009: 117; Dean 2010: 81). It fosters the implementation of various, rather long-term, measures to monitor and discipline individuals that do not resemble the predefined ideal norm. In comparison with national security, because of its rather ‘soft’ and favourable image, human security broadens the actor spectrum decisively and particularly legitimises human rights and development NGOs to act.

Due to the discursive shift of human security and the possibility of justifying political and military intervention of powerful actors, some authors claim that human security should rather be linked to bio and to sovereign power (Oels 2012a, 2013). Their point is that a human security perspective sets the ground for sovereign and bio political interventions by focusing on human life and defining the conditions for exceptionality (Larrinaga and Doucet 2008: 519).

While this perspective is interesting, I think that it rather demonstrates the simultaneous existence of all three power forms and does not refute the idea that disciplinary power underlies the human security concept.

Normative Dimension

The positive effect of a disciplinary and human security centred securitisation is that the focus shifts from the sole emphasis on the security of states, towards the needs and insecurities of individuals. Thus, the attention is redirected towards the most vulnerable actors, possibly legitimising policies in their interest, for instance development aid or disaster relief measures.

It is precisely because of these qualities that many scholars following CSS or the Welsh or Aberystwyth School have favoured individual or human security (Krause and Williams 1997;

Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 2005b). Furthermore, due to its more positive framing, the application of disciplinary power in the shape of human security broadens the spectrum of the actors that engage in the securitisation process and that are constituted as legitimate within the process.

This opens the political debate and avoids the tendency to secrecy that often comes along national security conceptions.

On the other hand, the main danger of a securitisation along disciplinary power lies in the described discursive shift and in taking away agency from the threatened people (often ‘poor

individuals’) to define the situation and the means necessary to overcome the problems. Due to the focus on an artificial ideal typical norm, it entails a paternalistic element and can oppress local solutions that might have been much more effective in a specific context. A further problematic aspect of disciplinary power is the fact that it necessitates a constant and thorough surveillance of the governed individuals, always comparing their characteristics and behaviour with the ideal typical norm. Hence, it can constrain the freedom of the monitored individuals and supress alternative solutions. Finally, the less direct way of applying disciplinary power and the related security practices, for instance by seemingly ‘good’ grassroots or non-governmental actors, makes this power form and its political effects less visible and thus hard to detect. The problem is that indirect governance through non-governmental organisations does not necessarily have to be desirable and raises questions about the sometimes missing or inadequate democratic legitimisation of these actors. The following table 3.2b summarises the above said.

Table 3.2b: Disciplinary Power

Performative Dimension Normative Dimension

Modes of Action Actors and Sectors Security Conceptions/ (Partly based on Foucault 2006, Elbe 2009 and Dean 2010)

Governmental Power: Governing Populations Through Risk-Management

Performative Dimension

The third and ‘youngest’ power form, governmental power, is closely tied to the governmentalisation of the state and specifically to the emergence of the population as referent object. Its main mode of operation is indirect governance through sophisticated risk management schemes to pre-empt problematic developments and hence to control the future.

Similar to disciplinary power, governmental power is a productive form of power. But instead of targeting individuals it aims at the whole population – i.e. its focus lies more on the

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level – and uses the inductive concept of ‘normalisation’ (Foucault 2006b: 98). Normalisation tries to statistically generate a normal distribution of certain values from within the population and then focuses at bringing outliers down to this average (Foucault 2006b: 97–98). According to Foucault, this is more efficient than ‘normation’ because it uses the natural dynamics of the population instead of acting against them (Foucault 2006b: 74). Consequently, one of the most important instruments of governmental power is social-scientific knowledge that enables to measure and discreetly influence the population dynamics. This knowledge is used to relate different normal distributions within the population to one another to in the end foster the desired and keep the problematic ones at bay. If handled in the right manner ‘the phenomena themselves’ will eventually bring about their own curtailment, which allows to control them and to get rid of undesired developments (Foucault 2006b: 69, 92, 98, 102).

A further characteristic of governmental power is the focus on risk groups whose variables lie outside the normal values of the population (Dean 2010: 119). This allows it to use the most cost-efficient measures (Foucault 2006b: 498–499; Elbe 2009: 67) and additionally – in the spirit of ‘laissez-faire’ or ‘laissez-passer (Foucault 2006b: 69) – not to intervene too much

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