The Disciplinary Discourse: Mitigating at Home, Optimising the World’s Poor

The disciplinary climate security discourse with its focus on human security and well-being of people especially in developing countries was the most prevalent in Germany throughout the period of analysis. The intention of most articulations of the disciplinary discourse clearly was on supporting the most disadvantaged populations. Nevertheless, it also contributed to paternalistic normation processes by juxtaposing helpless and powerless victims in the Global South to seemingly more advanced climate resilient people in the North, which was reinforced by Germany’s self-proclaimed role as a climate vanguard and leader in green technology.

First Disciplinary Articulations in the 1990s: Protecting Humankind and the Planet

By the early 1990s, the disciplinary climate security discourse had firmly arrived in the political debate. A significant role in this respect had the highly influential Enquete Commission on the Protection of the Atmosphere, which was frequently cited in parliamentary debates (Deutscher Bundestag 1995a). Thus, already in 1989, the Bundestag Committee on the Environment recognised the Enquete Commissions’ recommendations and echoed the disciplinary discourse,

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yet with a decisively global focus, by stating that: ‘The threat to the Earth's atmosphere endangers the life on Earth if the present trend is not fully and comprehensively halted’

(Deutscher Bundestag 1989: 1).

Amid the reunification process of West and East Germany in the early 1990s, climate security articulations in general faded somewhat from the spotlight but the disciplinary discourse remained the dominant representation. On the one hand, parliamentary articulations kept the global focus and portrayed climate change as an important threat to humanity and all human societies, as the following quote exemplifies:‘The imminent climate catastrophe simply necessitates a decision between a reasonably secure and humane survival of human society as we know it, or the crash into chaos with unmanageable consequences.’ (Deutscher Bundestag 1993a: 2646). On the other hand, they introduced a distinction between the developed and developing world that would become a recurrent argumentation in the German climate security debate. While acknowledging the responsibility for climate change of industrialised countries, members of parliament frequently stressed that developing countries and their inhabitants especially in Africa (Deutscher Bundestag 1997: 18328), would be hit much harder even though not responsible for climate change (Deutscher Bundestag 1991: 3786, 1996: 8942). In the same context, a recurring emphasis was on the inhabitants of the small island states. They were pictured as the first victims of climate change whose only hope was to wait for ‘Noah’s Ark’

for rescue, if industrialised countries would not act soon to abate climate change (Deutscher Bundestag 1995b: 2345).

Concerning the concrete threats, almost all of the parliamentary debates at that time focused on the physical effects of climate change (Deutscher Bundestag 1993a: 12646) and hence cautioned against floods (Deutscher Bundestag 1995b: 2345), extreme weather events (Deutscher Bundestag 1995c: 2529), water scarcity, agricultural losses (Deutscher Bundestag 1998a: 19406) and widespread famines in developing countries and especially in Africa (Deutscher Bundestag 1997: 18328). To counter these problems, most of these early articulations of the disciplinary discourse suggested mitigation measures. Thus, they demanded to limit GHG emissions primarily in industrialised countries (Deutscher Bundestag 1993b:

14254, 1998a, 1998a, 1998a: 19413) by changing consumption patterns (Deutscher Bundestag 1991), reducing energy consumption, investing in renewables but also, especially towards the mid-1990s, by introducing an ecological tax reform (Deutscher Bundestag 1995b: 2345).

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The Early to Mid-2000s: Linking Human Security to Climate Policy

When the Red-Green government coalition under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder took office in 1998, the frequency and intensity of securitising articulations increased. The disciplinary discourse still dominated the debates and most articulations kept pointing to the physical dangers of climate change such as extreme weather events including tornados, hurricanes and cyclones (Deutscher Bundestag 1999b: 5985, 2004d: 10247), the spread of tropical diseases and water scarcity (Deutscher Bundestag 1999b: 6000, 2003b: 6439). Members of parliament feared that all these events would have considerable effects on human health (Document 3, Müller, 6000. 98-02), would very soon displace millions of people in the developing world and hence would increase the number of environmental refugees (Deutscher Bundestag 1999b:

6000). Moreover, they stressed that ‘[…] even today the effects of climate change kill over 150.000 people every year’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2004e: 13425) and hence should not be considered a red-green ‘luxury’ or ‘soft’ issue (Deutscher Bundestag 2004a: 7675), thereby defending the governing coalitions ambitious environmental policies of that time.

Even though the focus on the juxtaposition between industrialised and developing countries remained, from 2002 on, similar to the US case, the debates began to stress the adverse effects of climate change for people in industrialised countries as well. They referred to the flooding of the Elbe river in 2002 (Deutscher Bundestag 2004d: 10247), to the amplified likeliness of droughts and heatwaves in the US and southern Europe (Deutscher Bundestag 2004d: 10247, 2004e: 13417) or to the possibility of abrupt climate events that could lead to considerable sea level rise in Europe (Deutscher Bundestag 2004c: 8379). Besides improved scientific knowledge about the magnitude and specific regional effects of climate change (IPCC 2001), the 2003 Pentagon study on abrupt changes in the climate system (Schwartz and Randall 2003), which was partly based on research by the German Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) (Deutscher Bundestag 2004c: 8374), played a crucial role in introducing this argumentation into the debates. Moreover, several members of parliament mentioned the Hollywood movie ‘The Day After Tomorrow’, which revolved around one of the scenarios of the Pentagon study to exemplify the possible effects of climate change in industrialised countries (Deutscher Bundestag 2004d: 10244, 2005a: 14659).

The proposed countermeasures within the disciplinary discourse almost exclusively remained on mitigation. This included CO2 reductions in airplane traffic, increasing energy efficiency, the ecological tax reform and the quick ratification of the Kyoto protocol (Deutscher

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Bundestag 1999b: 6001, 1999b: 5985). Besides these measures, with a view on the ‘flexible mechanisms’ of Kyoto, and in accordance with the disciplinary concept of normation, members of parliament increasingly also urged to include developing countries in the efforts to mitigate climate change (Deutscher Bundestag 1999b: 5985, 2005d: 193). When new scientific evidence, for example the 3^rd IPCC report (IPCC 2001) and the ensuing academic debates, revealed the advanced stadium of climate change, but also as a result of the increased focus on the security implications of climate change, adaptation measures gradually became part of the debates as well. Instead of stopping climate change altogether by tackling its root causes, members of parliament increasingly suggested that one could merely alleviate its worst consequences: ‘Ten years ago, we still discussed whether we could prevent climate change.

Today, we merely talk about how we can mitigate the worst effects of climate change with our utmost effort’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2004c: 8370).

Non-Parliamentary Articulations at the Peak of the Climate Security Debate

In addition to the influence of the international climate security debate, several domestic actors played an important role in mainstreaming climate security argumentations in Germany. Thus, beginning at the end of the 1990s, a growing number of reports by German governmental advisory bodies, research-institutions, and NGOs began to articulate climate security discourses and hence also contributed considerably to the peak of the climate security debate in Germany between 2007 and 2011.

Although the debate certainly was most influential between 2007 and 2011, some organisations, such as the environmental consulting firms Adelphi and Ecologic or the Hans Seidel Foundation but also academics such as Hans Günther Brauch, had already begun to articulate climate security discourses around the turn of the millennium (Interview 2014y;

Carius and Lietzmann 1998; Rotte 2001; Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001). These early reports were mostly part of the broader academic discussions about environmental security and hence often discussed other environmental stress factors besides climate change as well. The central argument was that ‘scarce resources and environmental degradation’ (Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001: 3) together with the problematic socio-economic situation and population growth in developing countries could have serious security implications (Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001:

13; Carius and Lietzmann 1998). Similar to earlier parliamentary debates, these reports had a genuine concern for the security of people in developing countries and stressed that climate change could become ‘one of the most important challenges for human security’ (Brauch 2002:

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15). However, some of the reports included paternalistic argumentations that granted the industrialised countries a ‘special role’ that allowed them to intervene in the developing countries for the sake of climate policy (Rotte 2001: 63).

While these early securitisations moves had only a limited influence, they laid the ground for the ensuing climate security discussions from the mid-2000s. Especially after 2007, these discussions were able to reach beyond academic and expert audiences and began to firmly influence the general discussion on climate change in Germany. Particularly in the wake of the publication of the 2007 WBGU report ‘World in Transition. Climate Change as a Security Risk’

(WBGU 2007c, 2008) climate security articulations in reports and parliamentary debates multiplied. Similar to the earlier parliamentary articulations, many reports stressed that because of problematic socioeconomic and political preconditions the poorest – particularly in Africa (WBGU 2007c: 3–4; adelphi 2013: 42) – will be hit hardest:

Rising global temperatures will jeopardize the bases of many people’s livelihoods, especially in the developing regions, increase vulnerability to poverty and social deprivation, and thus put human security at risk (WBGU 2008: 1; see also GTZ 2008b:

8).

The influential annually published Climate Risk Index of the NGO Germanwatch further reinforced the recurring dichotomization between people in developing and developed countries by stating that the ten countries that were most affected by climate change in terms of economic costs and human suffering between 1990 and 2010 were all developing countries (Germanwatch 2011).

Concerning specific threats, the focus continued to rest on the physical effects of climate change such as water stress (WBGU 2008: 2; Jakobeit and Methmann 2007: 1; Schünemann 2014: 4; Seiler 2011: 25), food insecurity (WBGU 2008: 2; Franke 2011: 14–15; GTZ 2008b:

27), health problems (Jakobeit and Methmann 2007: 7; Seiler 2011: 25; GTZ 2008b: 30) and sea level rise (Schünemann 2014: 6; GTZ 2008b: 29). As a study of Greenpeace summarised in 2013, taken together all the adverse effects of climate change are ‘already taking 5 million lives a year’, a number, that could rise to 100 million deaths in 2030 (Greenpeace 2013: 6).

Moreover, climate change would: ‘undermine development and undo progress made in reducing poverty, attaining Millennium Development Goals, and improving the socio-economic well-being of broad sectors of the population’ (adelphi 2013: 42). Finally, the

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deteriorating conditions in developing countries could induce in their quality and quantity

‘historically unsurpassed’ migration movements (Germanwatch Document 6, S. 3-4).

Based on this threat assessment – and in accordance with a global justice argumentation (Jakobeit and Methmann 2007: 2) – most reports continued to recommend measures that would benefit the mitigation of climate change in order to prevent the worst threats to human security (Seiler 2011: 18, 24-25). These included the promotion of renewable energy, energy efficiency and the quick abandonment of coal power plants (Greenpeace 2013: 7, 27), which in combination would lead to a ‘transformation of the energy systems in Europe’ (WBGU 2008:

199). But also increased international cooperation (Bayer 2011: 141) and political efforts of Germany and the EU to bring about effective global mitigation treaties to halt global warming below two degrees (WBGU 2008: 189, 193, 198). Beyond that, reports increasingly suggested various adaptation measures (adelphi and UBA 2013: 10). In line with the disciplinary concept of normation, the goal was to alleviate the problematic deviation from the norm, which was primarily vulnerable people in developing countries. Thus, a central argumentation was to point to the responsibility of industrialised countries to protect and support weak developing countries and their inhabitants from the worst effects of climate change (WBGU 2008: 5). More specifically, this entailed an increased monitoring of the most vulnerable people and regions (WBGU 2008: 179, 185-186) and efforts to make them more resilient towards the adverse climatic changes (WBGU 2007b: 116). Furthermore, reports urged to expand the technical and educational preparation of people in developing countries for disasters (GTZ 2008a: 55; WBGU 2008: 10, 115).

In connection to these recommendations, there was a widespread agreement in the German debate on the necessity for ‘establishing climate protection as a crosscutting theme in development cooperation’ (WBGU 2008: 199). The goal was to abolish underdevelopment, to improve the so far inappropriate coping capacities of people in developing countries (adelphi 2013: 15; GTZ 2008b: 9–10; WBGU 2008: 9) but also to foster the role of development institutions in international policy (GTZ 2008a: 49; WBGU 2008: 197). Closely connected to this international focus concerning development policies, the disciplinary securitisation of climate change together with the sovereign discourse also led calls to include climate security into Germany’s foreign policy (WBGU 2008: 193) and to establish concepts such as climate diplomacy (adelphi 2012, 2013). The aim was to develop a holistic approach that especially linked foreign, development and disaster prevention policies (adelphi 2013: 15).

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Parliamentary Articulations in the Peak: Saving Vulnerable Populations

Especially the 2007 WBGU report (Deutscher Bundestag 2010: 6855, 2007b: 10403, 2007d:

13389) and reports by the PIK (Bulling-Schröter 2009: 599) received plenty of attention in parliamentary debates. Consequently, the discussions in parliament at that time resembled the tenor of those reports and the focus remained on the physical effects of climate change (Deutscher Bundestag 2009a: 24255, 2008d: 21069, 2008d: 21073). Members of parliament also problematised what this could mean for Europe and Germany, for instance the spread of tropical diseases (Deutscher Bundestag 2008d: 21069), or the increased frequency and intensity of flooding (Deutscher Bundestag 2013b: 31287). However, there was widespread agreement that ‘the first victims of climate change are the people in the countries of the Global South’

(Deutscher Bundestag 2007d: 13389, 2012: 25760). Members of parliament again especially focused on poor populations in Africa (Deutscher Bundestag 2008b: 17247) and partly Asia (Deutscher Bundestag 2009a: 24255), which due to their poverty were constructed as

‘especially vulnerable’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2007c: 10951) and ‘immediately threatened’

(Deutscher Bundestag 2007c: 10950). Hence, climate change threatened ‘millions’ of people around the world (Deutscher Bundestag 2006: 6191, 2005d: 192) and for some, such as the inhabitants of small island states, it even constituted ‘a question of life and death’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2011b: 17991).

Taking up earlier argumentations, the discussions in parliament continued to build a stark distinction between the coping capacities of industrialised and developing countries (Deutscher Bundestag 2013b: 31304), as the following quote fittingly exemplifies:

If we see the consequences of such disasters in an industrialised country with existing infrastructure and a certain level of prosperity, then, of course, is it all the more apparent what that means for Africa, parts of Asia or Latin America[...]. There, climate protection is a matter of life and death (Deutscher Bundestag 2013b: 31291).

Mitigating at Home and Adapting Abroad

In response to the described threat construction in the parliament, mitigation measures continued to be an important cornerstone of the debate (Deutscher Bundestag 2009a: 24255).

On the one hand, the recommendations focused on measures in industrialised countries. Many members of parliament emphasised the pioneering role of Germany and the EU that had to be upheld by ambitious targets (Deutscher Bundestag 2006: 6192, 10922) not only to prevent

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threats to human security around the world, but also to accomplish intergenerational climate justice (Deutscher Bundestag 2007a: 8144). Consequently, members of parliament frequently called for the adoption of a national climate law (Deutscher Bundestag 2013a: 31291). On the other hand, they also increasingly emphasised the need to include emerging economies and developing countries in the efforts to combat climate change (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a:

14278, 2013b: 31299). Eventually, there was widespread approval of the fact that emerging economies and developing countries had accepted some responsibility of their own at the COP in Bali (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a).

Besides mitigation, the ever-increasing debates on the threats of climate change for the human security of people in developing countries together with the realisation that ‘climate change is a reality now’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2006: 6192) further accelerated the already mentioned discursive shift in the German debate towards adaptation. This was particularly pronounced in the second half of the 2000s (Böcher and Töller 2012: 64-65, 69). In this time period members of parliament increasingly presented adaptation measures as a crucial part of tackling climate change and its security implications (Deutscher Bundestag 2009a, 2008c:

21069, 2007c: 10956). Concrete examples are calls to double Germany’s pledges for the UN Adaptation Fund (Deutscher Bundestag 2006: 6192), to help developing countries to adapt to climate change (Deutscher Bundestag 2007d: 10950), but also to scale up climate and environmental education to raise ‘ecological awareness’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2007c: 10951).