Defence Policy

The overall impact of climate security discourses on Germany’s defence policy was limited.

This was not least due to the fact that many advocates of the sovereign discourse themselves did not see an important role for military actors or solutions in the defence and security sector (Brauch 2002: 25; Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001: 10). Instead, the construction of climate change as a threat to human and occasionally national security especially in the Global South facilitated the spread of holistic or ‘networked’ approaches to security that included defence, environmental and developmental aspects. Already in 2008 the then Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung (CDU) emphasised the increasing connections between different sectors and government agencies in order to ‘prevent crisis’ from materialising in the first place (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2008). Beyond that, the 2010 published 3^rd Report of the German Government concerning the Action Plan on Civil Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding further specified this holistic approach and recommended to integrate climate security aspects into the planning schemes of various actors such as the EU, NATO, the OECD, the G8 and development agencies (Bundesregierung Deutschland 2010: 33-35).

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During the peak of the climate security debate from 2007 on and in the wake of the increased appearance of the sovereign discourse in Germany, the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) began to acknowledge the security implications of climate change. However, they only very reluctantly deduced concrete pathways of action for themselves from this debate (Interview 2014w, 2015c). In stark contrast to the US, German military officials mostly refrained from talking publicly about climate change and if anything began to discuss the issue internally or in reports that were not primarily targeted at a broader audience. A first report published in 2012 mainly revolved around the security implications of climate change for the Middle East and North Africa. It acknowledged the potential of climate change to further destabilise this region but at the same time emphasised that ‘Increasing resilience is in the first place not a military task but rather a challenge for the state as a whole.’ (Bundeswehr 2012: 7).

In this vein, it also critically discussed the problems associated with ‘securitising’ climate change (Bundeswehr 2012: 21). In a second report issued in 2014, the Bundeswehr identified the Arctic as an important future topic concerning climate security (Bundeswehr 2014). It stressed the possibility of conflicts over resources or territorial disputes in the face of a melting arctic and especially in the context of an increasingly aggressive behaviour of Russia (Bundeswehr 2014: 1). However, it only predicted a marginal probability for military conflict and explicitly highlighted that the climatic changes in this region do not entail a ‘future challenge for security policy that is relevant for the Bundeswehr’ (Bundeswehr 2014: 1).

5.4 Tracing the Preconditions for Specific Discourses

How come that the disciplinary and governmental discourses were so prevalent in Germany and the impact on environmental and development policy so far reaching whereas the sovereign discourse had a much harder time than in the US and largely failed to influence the defence sector?

Germanys Troubled Past and the Primacy of Multilateralism

A first key contextual characteristic is the specific political culture in Germany when it comes to the use of force and questions of national security. Due to the country’s problematic experiences with nationalism and the unilateral use of military force in the past, the concept of

‘national security’ has been largely discredited and thus does not play an important role in political discussions (Hellmann et al. 2006: 187). This does not mean that security policy and governance are unimportant entirely but rather that the governmentalisation of security

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practices towards disciplinary and governmental power is more advanced than for instance in the US. In practice, this means that instead of focusing on Germany’s national security and the development of its own military capabilities or sovereign solutions, the emphasis is on ideas such as shared sovereignty and collective security that primarily strive to ensure international stability (Böckenförde 2014; Böckenförde and Gareis 2014). In this context, international law, the UN and particularly the European Union play a central role (Hellmann et al. 2006: 188).

Thus, Germany tries to act as a civilian or normative power that primarily relies on soft power and leadership by example to facilitate multilateral solutions to global problems such as climate change (Interview 2014z; Maull 1993; Hellmann et al. 2006: 192). This is further reinforced by a quest to make up for the wrongdoings in the past, to become a good and respected global citizen and to help disadvantaged populations and states and hence to increase human security around the world (Harnisch and Wolf 2010: 45–46).

This specific political culture has had several concrete consequences for the climate security debate. Together with the influential peace movement and widespread ‘anti-militarism’

in Germany (Gareis 2005: 46) it has led to a much less influential role of the armed forces, which has even furtherdeteriorated since the end of the Cold War. Besides a comparatively small size and budget – Germany spends 1.2 per cent of GDP on defence, compared to 3.3 per cent in the US (Statistika 2017) – , the Bundeswehr or military solutions as such do not have a particularly favourable reputation in the public or amongst political actors. Thus, the Bundeswehr usually does not participate in political debates. Especially concerning climate change, the involvement of the armed forces would not have helped the debate but would most likely have been received as dangerous ‘militarisation’ (Wagner 2008) of the issue.

Consequently, the security implications of climate change were mostly linked to foreign and development policy, which resonated much better with the general role of Germany in international society and its strive for collective solutions, and preventive diplomacy (Harnisch and Wolf 2010: 49). Moreover, although this has begun to change since the 1999 Kosovo war , the German constitution has defined the role of the Bundeswehr rather narrowly as a ‘defensive army’ (Gareis 2005: 166, 175). This has for a long time prevented it from a more active role around the world and extensive peacekeeping missions and thus to directly operate in areas constructed as threatened by climate change. Accordingly, in contrast to the much more globally active US army, the German armed forces have not picked up climate change as a key security threat.

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Besides the less important role of the defence sector, the absence of a strong national security culture has also led to a much closer integration of Germany into international society, most importantly epitomised in its membership and role in the European Union (Jänicke 2011:

142). The key role of multilateralism in its foreign policy in general (Hellmann et al. 2006: 217;

Gareis 2005: 56) has also had a considerable effect on which climate security discourses and respective solutions where seen as appropriate. Thus, discursive interventions from the EU Commission (Solana and EU Commission 2008), the UN (UNGA 2008, 2009a; UNSC 2007a, 2011a) were highly influential and helped to forge a much more multilateral debate on climate security than for instance in the US. Together with the efforts to make up for past wrongdoings and global justice considerations this has facilitated the focus on the threats of climate change for poor populations around the world and the focus on development policy.

Environmental Policy as Mainstream Issue

In contrast to the US, climate security discourses had a far-reaching impact on federal climate mitigation policy in Germany. One important explanation for this striking difference is that although climate security articulations in both countries have pointed to the necessity of mitigation measures, in Germany these demands met a much more favourable discursive context. Partly due to the much higher density of the population and the hence seemingly more precious value of nature as such (Ulbert 1997: 22) as well as due to the fear of nuclear annihilation, beginning in the 1970s Germany saw the growth of an influential anti-nuclear and environmental movement (Schreurs 2002: 5–7). Subsequently, a green consciousness and post-materialistic worldview has quickly expanded and with the rise of the Green Party also became part of the political game and in 1998 even part of a governing coalition (Ulbert 1997: 26;

Schreurs 2002: 6; Kuckartz et al. 2006). Consequently, environmental and climate protection soon became mainstream positions in Germany, with over nine percent of the population being members of environmental organisations (Jänicke 2011: 131) and a huge majority feeling directly threatened by climate change (Kuckartz et al. 2006: 20) and favouring progressive policies in this sector (Jänicke 2011: 141, 144; Geden and Tils 2013: 24). In this context, all parties – with a possible exception of the far-right and extremist parties such as the AFD and NPD – have adopted decisive climate protection measures as important goal (Jänicke 2011:

131, 141; Geden and Tils 2013: 24). Moreover, political actors closely cooperate with several environmental NGOs, research institutions and business actors to come to progressive climate solutions (Schreurs 2002: 4).

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A Broad Constellation of Actors and Connections to the International Debate

From early on, the German research landscape concerning climate change became one of the most advanced and well financed worldwide (Krück et al. 1999; DWD 2013b). Its findings were broadly disseminated (Schmidt 2012: 69) and today several German climate scientists such as Joachim Schellnhuber or Mojib Latif play key roles in the German and international climate debate (Dehmer 2015). In this context, scientific organisations and knowledge became a driving factor in the climate debates in Germany and had a direct influence on political discussion. Examples are the Enquete Commissions on climate change, the PIK, the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy and the WBGU, which all worked at the intersections between science and politics and eventually helped to facilitate human security and risk focused climate threat constructions in Germany (Jänicke 2011: 141). In this context, scientific ‘expert knowledge’ is usually not questioned or politicised – at least not to the same extent as in the US – and often has been directly integrated into Germany’s climate policies.

Together with the strong role of environmental NGOs and the absence of influential climate sceptics, this has facilitated the far-reaching impact of climate security discourses on actual mitigation policies. Beyond that, the rather reversed or even outright judgemental attitude towards military solutions or military research at German universities and research institutions (Massenbach 2017), has generated further headwind for the sovereign discourse and military solutions to the climate threat.