T HE ENLARGED FISHERIES REGIME

The fisheries sector is one where political salience seems inversely related to the real economic weight of the sector, as it accounts for no more than 1% of GDP of any of the EU-15 states (Lequesne 2000: 345). Council decisions on the basis of the consultation procedure are often highly disputed, delivering an aggregate level of disagreement of 53.3 in DEU.

Unlike past enlargements, the candidate states have generally agreed to adopt the existing CFP without major irritations (Fischler 2001). Accession is linked to a series of measures affecting resource management, inspections and control aimed at the conservation of the maritime stock. At the heart of the supranational legislative game lies a fundamental conflict between the Commission and its allies who actively pursue policies of control and restrictions to assure the viability of maritime resources and those states who are reluctant to take on further limitations to the sector, let alone consequently implement them (see section 5.1).

In numerical terms, the impact of enlargement on the CFP appears to be moderate, as the number of fish caught by the first round of CEECs constitutes merely 10% of the EU-15 (EU Com 2002). However, the data gathered suggest that the preferences of the candidate states – both from the Baltic and Mediterranean region- are much more divergent than those of the EU-15. The vital question is how this repertoire of opposing standpoints may encroach on the stability of the current preference profile.

The values collected in various policy and country expert interviews reflect the CEECs’

attitudes of the on this surprisingly emotion-laden dimension³⁷.

37 see interview reports for formulation of questions and details on national standpoints.

Figure 7-11. Open waters vs. redistribution (mean standard deviation of results: 10.63) 0 – open waters: nation states retain the right to fish along their coastline and beyond

100 – Creation of a comprehensive EU regime with the distribution of quotas; limitation of national autonomy

EU 15 EU 25

Minimum – Maximum 10 59 0 87.5

Mean 36.3 41.9

Median 36.4 43.5

Median weighted by Council votes 36.4 36.4

Standard Deviation (from mean) 15.6 22.6

Skewness -.18 -.05

The landlocked countries (H, SK, CZ, H, SLO³⁸) expressed either absolute indifference or their willingness to support the Commission’s strategy. However, negotiations have been more complex with the Baltic Sea states, some of whom have frequently reneged on accession agreements. Enlargement will bring two staunch opponents of further restrictions and redistribution onto the playing field, EST and PL, who were labeled most extreme actors in the EU-25. Furthermore, the gathered data visibly indicate that Malta will join the existing constellation as the most fervent advocate of fishing restrictions, as these are the most effective means of securing this struggling, yet historically anchored sector’s competitiveness against Italy. As for the significance of the fisheries sector in the CEECs, the quantitative data coincide well with other structural indicators.

Table 7-5. Statistics on the Fishing and Acquaculture Sector in the CEECs

Country Acquaculture Production

Total Catches Total Fisheries Exports ( 1000€)

38 Slovenia only has 35 kilometers of coastline and a maritime industry of minimal importance

Slovenia 1206 2009 6197 178 Bulgaria 7780 10556 5446 7215 Romania 8998 7843 7250 25661 Turkey 63000 575100 94170 50831

(source Eurostat 1999; Employment 2000)

In terms of policy output, the Commission’s claim that the impact of enlargement on the legislative process will be minimal (EU Com: Fisheries) is debatable. Enlargement entails a substantial increase in the range of interests and patterns of dependency as the risk of exploitation is acute in the Baltic area, whose dwindling maritime stocks are shared by at least 8 states. It cannot be excluded that distributive politics involved will create highly asymmetrical patterns of resource allocation (Franchino and Rahming 2003: 25), as the maritime sector remains a historically anchored and expanding way of life for a variety of Baltic and Mediterranean states. The prime example is EST (pop. 1.8 mill.), whose fishing sector employs more people than that of PL (pop 39 mill.).

The growing danger of exploitation motivates us to briefly address questions of legislative and executive politics. The data indicate that the Commission will gain more allies than the

“renegades” for open waters. Yet it is doubtful that enlargement will set the framework for any conservationist breakthroughs, as the open water coalition is most probably set to align itself with like-minded Baltic newcomers who resist further supranational intervention.

Table 7-6. Likely Scenarios in the Fisheries Council

Status Quo

Commission Allies³⁹ (M, CZ, SK, SLO, H, A, D, L, LT,

39 The moderate, SQ-oriented Scandinavian states and GB were also classified as Commission allies, as they have become increasingly interested in restrictions on CEEC fishermen in the Baltic and North Sea in the past years (see Interview Report Roitmann)

The mere distributive character of fisheries policy and its legislative constellation may be prone to inefficient outcomes in the future. As Baron (1991) indicates, distributive policies often allow for the concentration of benefits and the collectivization of costs, even under majority rule. During the legislative game, actors expect that if they were to reach a similar game structure in a future game, it is in their interest to act at the present (1991: 60). This incentive frequently results in the adoption of inefficient distributive programs, as the benefits are only allocated to a minimal number of actors, while transferring the costs to the

“commons”. This dilemma is ever-so-present, as the Commission was unable to introduce restrictions on the size of fleets to preserve endangered maritime species in December 2002, and in turn could only insignificantly reduce the quota on catches.⁴⁰ In accordance with the Baron theory, the benefits of unrestricted fishing have been concentrated in the hands of a few (southern European Fishermen), while the costs (extinction of maritime stocks) have been collectivized to the entire population.

The scenarios presented here indicate that distorted patterns of resource allocation or “home-made” legislative gridlock (à la Niçoise) may be the norm for the years to come. Enlargement will also complicate the equally significant issue of implementation, which has proven to be inadequate within the realm of the EU-15 thanks to different control standards. Such effects of enlargement could, of course, be counterbalanced by a greater executive role of the Commission and more restrictions on member states (Franchino and Rahming 2003: 25;

Kelemen 2000). However, since the proficiency level of inspection and control in the CEECs remains unsatisfactory even after adaptation to the acquis, there are solid grounds to assume that the Commission and its conservationist allies will suffer a moderate setback after this enlargement, let alone further expansion to the Black Sea region