The pressing question is what will happen if new elements are added to the constellations presented above. Will the new legislative actors fall into the core? Will they form coalitions with current preference outliers or perhaps have even more extreme preferences and expectations than the current outliers? What decisional tendencies will be prevalent in
Council negotiations five years from now? The central challenge is now to derive robust and reliable data on the policy positions of the future member states within the framework laid out by the factor analysis and additional research.
6.1. Gathering data: The methodological approach
As we are dealing with states within the midst of a rapid transition, searching for concrete answers on their future political alignment requires particular caution. To increase the accuracy of the data gathered on the CEECs, I have opted for expert interviews as a primary technique. Statistical data on their socioeconomic background will be offered as a secondary source of information to support the qualitative data. This method outweighs other methodological possibilities such as coding party programs (in Maltese, Estonian, etc.) or purely statistical data on the candidate countries for several reasons. Firstly, interviews are a prime means of securing data from policy experts directly involved in the accession negotiations. Thus, the central criteria for the experts chosen is that they be high-ranking negotiating officials on the EU or CEEC side, dealing with the dynamics of enlargement in their daily work. Secondly, interviews with core policy and enlargement experts were considered the most adequate solution as we are in fact dealing with estimates and prognoses on how new actors will behave within the given structure of constraints. Mere statistical data may indeed deliver a realistic image of these nations’ socioeconomic standing, but would prove to be ineffective in pinpointing their expectations in some policy areas less effected by financial questions. Experts dealing with the CEECs are aware of national peculiarities, the structural and cultural background, and have a concrete image of their behavior in the course of accession negotiations. Thus, they are able to pinpoint the most salient and problematic issues for the countries involved and deliver objective and plausible prognoses on their future behavior. Moreover, experts on the accession process and/or the candidate states themselves dispose of inside knowledge on the decision making process and can offer valuable expertise on present and future developments.
6.2. Securing Reliability
Using the results of the factor and content analysis as a point of orientation for gathering data, 16 expert interviews were carried out in Brussels in October, 2002 (see appendix for
interview reports). The selected experts can be divided into three groups in terms of the perspective from which they are dealing with EU-enlargement23:
1) high-ranking diplomats from the CEECs who have the regular task of negotiating accession with the European Commission,
2) EU officials involved in the enlargement negotiations in various policy areas (e.g.
IM, agriculture, fisheries) and high-ranking members the DG Enlargement dealing with particular candidates,
3) the highest-ranking Commission representatives on enlargement and the future of the EU
Interviews - despite the advantages they hold in obtaining specific expert knowledge - are a social situation in which the perceptions and personal orientations on both sides of the table can pose an obstacle to collecting reliable and useful data. For this reason, I have opted to conduct interviews with the widest possible array of policy-makers, each dealing with the enlargement process from a different angle. For instance, some representatives of the candidate states demonstrated a slight tendency towards socially desirable answers in particular on future financial questions (e.g. agricultural subsidies). Thus, the interviews were constructed so that at least two, mostly three opinions, were given on the CEECs’ standpoint on each conflict line. This strategy has the advantage of reducing any distortions or social desirability that may emerge in the interview situation, and thus securing highly reliable data.
The standard deviation of the results offered for each variable (policy position of CEEC) as well as the mean standard deviation for each policy area have been calculated and will be presented in the following. As a rule, the constructed instruments (see Appendix B for interview structure) have been successful in generating highly reliable results that widely correspond with each other. The aggregate standard deviation for the CEEC policy positions pinpointed by various interviewees generally does not exceed 8 for scales from 0 to 100 (for exact calculations, see individual policy areas and appendix B).
6.3. The interview structure
Extensive preparations were carried out to maximize the quality of the measuring instruments and enhance the validity and reliability of the data sought after. While the factor analysis served to ensure the validity of what is to be measured, the reliability of the data was secured by collecting widely corresponding data from a large variety of perspectives on enlargement.
23 for a detailed list of the interviewees and their background, see appendix B and interview reports
Furthermore, employing the same closed format in all interviews (excluding group 3 above) ensured that the format of the data collected from one interviewee coincided with those from others. The discussions with policy experts from groups 1 and 2 thus followed the same structure, of course with consideration of the particular role the interviewee plays in the negotiations (see appendix for interview questionnaire). Diagrams depicting the preferences constellations and conflict lines illustrated in the previous section were presented to all policy experts for visual clarity. This closed structure with visual aids was instrumental in hindering any deviations from the standard format.
The interviews with the EU policy and/or enlargement experts had several important components.24 All EU officials were presented one-dimensional graphs depicting the conflict lines and preference values in various policy areas and requested to discuss whether they agree with the conflict dimensions and classifications at hand. The enlargement and policy experts were asked to locate the current SQ along the illustrated conflict lines. The scales resulting from the factor analysis were slightly modified in that the current members were positioned between 20 and 80 (see Appendix B) to make room for more extreme actors.
The next step involved pinpointing the expected behavior of the CEECs within these conflict dimensions. Preferences estimates were assumed to be a function of the behavior of the CEECs in the accession negotiations, their expectations of the CEECs alignment in legislative procedures as well as the socioeconomic context of the country. After locating the CEEC preferences in numerical form or in terms of a coalition, the EU policy/enlargement experts were requested to elaborate on the motives for their given estimates. As some EU representatives dealing with enlargement in a particular policy domain (e.g. trade) tended to offer the same values for all CEECs, I attempted to extract a greater degree of variation by requesting the interviewees to distinguish more clearly between countries. Furthermore, the experts were asked whether they envision any candidate states having more extreme preferences than the EU-15 in any of the discussed policy areas. All EU officials then shared insights on the evolution of the existing conflict lines after enlargement.
The format of the interviews with the CEEC representatives25 was nearly identical. The selected diplomats were considered to be porte-paroles for their countries apt to explain the expectations and policy positions of their governments and populations. As central
24 for detailed descriptions, see interview reports for Mirel (DG Enlargement), Roitmann (DG Fisheries), Stamatopoulos (DG Internal Market), Mögele (DG Agriculture), Romeo and Saab (DG Enlargement).
negotiators, the CEEC diplomats have primarily focused their efforts on completing the accession process. For this reason, it was crucial to explain to all interviewees that the legislative game will continue after enlargement and that they will have an impact on the future direction of EU policies. Thus, current conflict structures, voting patters and the SQ were presented in graphic detail. The CEEC diplomats were then asked to align their country with a numerical preference estimate or by labeling the voting coalition they intended to join.
As for the third group, consisting of the highest ranking experts on enlargement26, the focus was put on the EU’s capacity to come to terms with the interest and preference heterogeneity.
A more flexible interview format was followed here, providing for in-depth discussions of an open nature. These interviews dealt less with preferences, but more with the consequences of enlargement in terms of institutional constellations. Viable options for governance after enlargement were discussed and prognoses were offered for individual policy areas and EU decision making in general after enlargement.
25 for details, see the following interview reports: Ostrowski (PL), Boháč (CZ), Becsey/Borbély (H), Javorčík (SK), Milukas (LT), Vigants (LV), Halliste (EST).
26 see interview reports Landáburu, Mitek-Pedersen. The results will be integrated into section 9