H YPOTHESIZING ENLARGEMENT

On the basis of the discussed literature I have derived a set of working hypotheses as a framework for an explorative examination of enlargement. As the research challenge lies foremost in gathering and interpreting data on the CEECs, the hypotheses remain particularly cautious and refrain from making any specific predictions on the preferences of the CEECs.

My first general claim is that the accession of new member states only has consequences for decision making and, in turn, the course of integration if their preference alignments differ from those of the existing members. This places the northern enlargement of 1995 in sharp contrast to immanent eastern enlargement. There is a general consensus that northern enlargement did not disrupt the relative calm of the post-Maastricht period because political

standpoints of the new members did not differ greatly from those of the previous members. In their advocacy of social rights, environmental conservation as well as QMV and political transparency, the new members reinforced the integrative direction and supranationalist momentum of EU policies. In fact one of the most substantial effects of the past enlargement was that it stirred anxieties that any further expansion will infringe upon the precarious institutional stability (Bomberg and Peterson 1998: 59).

The central argument in the following is that the present ensemble of political preferences will become more heterogeneous in the course of EU-enlargement. This will most probably have the immanent consequence of reinforcing or reshaping the present cleavages in supranational governance. To bolster this argument, it is worthwhile to first draw some of the classical work on democratic political systems in Europe. For decades, democracy theorists have offered interesting insights on the predominant cleavages in western societies. As illustrated below, there is a wide spectrum of potential political divisions:

Table 4-1. Social Cleavages

Economic cleavages Political cleavages Cultural cleavages

rich vs. poor large vs. small populations Latin vs. Germanic

urban/industrial vs.

rural/agricultural

long vs. short democratic traditions

Catholic vs. Protestant center vs. periphery social democratic vs. conservative

governing traditions North vs. South high vs. low

unemployment majoritarian vs. consensual high trust vs. low trust societies

large vs. small income

inequalities corporatist vs. pluralist homogenous vs. multi-ethnic societies Anglo-Saxon vs. Socialist/

Christian Dem. welfare states

See Rokkan (1973), Gourevitch (1989), Lijphart (1984), Hix (1999b)

An array of these divisions continue to manifest themselves in contemporary EU politics, with many of them being directly reflected in the formulation of Union policies. While certainly not complete, this classification is a valuable starting point for understanding the impact of enlargement on the cleavages and divisions that guide European politics. In the case of enlargement, a vast number of these conflicts are highly salient within post-communist societies and will thus continue to make their mark on European policy making, e.g.

agriculture vs. industry, large vs. small income inequalities. The reason for this postulated preference heterogenization also lies within the socioeconomic and historical context of the candidate states and the particular disparities existing both between old and new members as

well as among the new members. Going beyond the well-documented cleavages in economic growth and social development, I postulate that the CEECs will have different expectations from various policy domains. As the candidates widely view enlargement as a means of accelerating and enhancing the process of democratization, it is plausible to assume that they will pose different demands to EU policy areas. On these grounds I hypothesize:

H1 The acquisition of new states only has consequences for integration when their political preferences differ from those of the existing core members

These preferences are in turn not merely a function of the social, economic and perhaps cultural background of the concerned states, but also a manifestation of the expectations that the candidate states have towards certain EU policy areas.

H2 The upcoming enlargement will lead to more heterogeneity in the preference configurations of the member states by bringing divergent standpoints and expectations into the playing field.

On the basis of this hypothesis, the present analysis intends to deliver valid estimates on the extent to which the preferences of the future member states will coincide with those of the present members. One cannot rule out the possibility that the CEECs will defend even more extreme standpoints on certain issues than those of the present members. The accession of - for the most part- socially and economically distorted ex-communist states is assumed tip the political balance in the course of enlargement, making it increasingly difficult to generate pareto-optimal outcomes in the midst of political division.

H3 The increased preference heterogeneity will aggravate tensions between member states and complicate the intergovernmental bargaining process.

This indicates that enlargement will raise the danger of legislative stagnation and political gridlock, in particular if the current decision making rules proceed to exist and the member states differ considerable in their policy positions. Thus we can expect intergovernmental bargaining to become a more complex process, hampering the governance capacity of the EU.

Additionally, one process by which the integration process has been driven, but often remains outside the scope of spatial RC research, must be a subject of debate in the following analysis.

Mattila and Lane (2001) pinpoint significant discrepancies between the predictions of legislative decision-making models and empirical observations. On the basis of roll call data, they conclude that unanimity is the norm in Council voting, even when the legislation at hand

only requires a qualified majority. This finding does not necessarily falsify the RC assumption that actors struggle for favorable outcomes, rather emphasizes the importance of taking other decision making modes into account. It is misleading to presume that voting in the Council is a one-shot game in which all actors insist on voting sincerely in accordance to their true preferences (Mattila and Lane 2001). Instead, one can conceptualize this process as several simultaneous decisions that facilitate as ‘log-rolling’ or vote trading. In other words, states may vote against their personal preference on less salient issues in exchange for a favorable vote from other actors on other issues.⁸

Table 4-2. Unanimity in Council voting

Policy

Sector Number

of decisions Negative

Votes Abstentions Unanimous decisions (%)

Agriculture 304 28 4 67

Internal markets 132 21 9 70

Transport 44 18 9 73

Public Health 13 8 15 77

Fisheries 181 12 4 84

Social Policy 29 10 7 83

Environment 33 12 3 85

Research 10 10 0 90

Commercial pol. 181 1 0 99

Others 219 14 6 81

(Source: Mattila and Lane 2001: 42)

Despite differentiated policy positions, unanimity is the norm in an overwhelming majority of Council decisions. This finding (Mattila and Lane 2001) must be reassessed in the context of enlargement. The acquisition of new elements with highly divergent socioeconomic backgrounds will overstrain the governance capacity of the EU if unanimity (constitutional or de facto) were to remain the general decision making practice. Thus, I postulate that the tendency towards oversized coalition will no longer be the prevalent in the Council.

H4 Unanimity in the European Council will no longer be the norm in legislative decision making processes

The increased spectrum of policy positions, expectations and interests will overload the existing institutional constellations if the legislative actors were to continue their quest to generate unanimous and by and large pareto-optimal outcomes. Thus, enlargement is likely to instigate a trend towards smaller or perhaps such minimum winning coalitions as postulated

8 Mattila and Lane also demonstrate Certain states are also assumed to promote a “culture of compromise”, by insisting that differences be worked out in the preliminary stages, so that a proposal can be voted on

unanimously; see also van Schendelen (1996)

by Riker (1965), because oversized coalitions will become increasingly unlikely in the midst of political diversification.