Chapter 1 The Problems of the Transcendental Deduction
1.2 The Secret of Metaphysics
1.2.1 A Meta-semantic Reading of Kant’s Puzzle
In his famous letter to Herz on February 21, 1772, Kant writes that “I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, and failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto still hidden from itself. I asked myself this question: On what ground is the relation (Beziehung) of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object based?” (AA 10:130)
In the most general sense, a representation could be mental, linguistic, or pictorial, etc. Since Kant keeps mental representations in mind, in the following I will take representations as mental one without qualification. Kant’s mental conception of representation could be understood in two different senses. In most cases, representation could be understood in a broad sense in which it signifies the mental state whatsoever. In this sense, the generic term of representation is primitive, and it cannot be defined non-circularly.46 As Kant indicates, not all mental states are representational, i.e., have a relation to object. Occasionally, Kant seems to suggest that representation could be understood in a narrower sense, in which representation refers to representational mental states.47 The narrow sense of representation is synonymous with Kant’s technical notion of cognition, which is defined as the conscious representation of object.48 Representation in the narrow sense is a species of representation in the broad sense. In this narrow sense, representation implies intentionality, and therefore all representations are representational. Since in the Herz letter Kant seems to assume that representation must have relation to object, here I take representation to be used in the narrow sense.49
The term “relation” in locution “the relation of representation to object” is both ambiguous and obscure. Firstly, the term ‘relation’ does not specify the nature of the relation in which representation and object stand. Secondly, the term ‘relation’ does not specify the asymmetry of the relation in which representation and object stand. In my view, the relation of representation to
46 In his numerous transcripts of lectures on logic, this view appears repeatedly. See the Vienna Logic (AA 24:805).
47 For instance, Kant hints that all representations “represent something in me only insofar as they belong with all the others to one consciousness”. (A116)
48 See Chapter 6 for a more systematic survey of the definition of cognition.
49 As we will see in Chapter 5, Kant’s commitment to the representationality or intentionality of representation is much deeper than we might think.
22 object is a semantic relation of reference. Obviously, the relation of representation to object a binary relation, one between representation x and object y. Firstly, the relation of representation is asymmetrical; if one can say x represents y, it does not follow that y represents x. The semantic relation of reference is partly transitive; if x represents y, and y represents z,, then it does not preclude the possibility that x represents z.50 In the following, I will use ‘reference’ or ‘reference relation’ in place of the generic term of ‘relation’ to indicate the semantic and asymmetrical character of representing relation.
Although I propose a semantic reading, contra to a causal reading, of the relation of representation to object in the Herz letter, in any event it does not follow that Kant’s question is a semantic one intended to show that representations refer to objects. As Kant writes clearly, the question he has in mind is not about “the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object”, which is a semantic question. Rather, his question is about the ground of “the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object”, which is not merely a semantic question.
In order to illustrate the point, one analogy to the theory of reference in the philosophy of language could be made in service. The reference in language is a relation between linguistic expression and object. One central task of semantics is to assign semantic values to linguistic expression. Reference is widely regarded as the primary semantic value of the linguistic expression.
By assigning reference to linguistic expression one can have a minimal semantics, i.e. referential semantics, for a purely extensional language. But referential semantics merely provides us with the answer to the question what the referent of a linguistic expression is. Referential semantics by itself does not answer further questions such as what it is for a reference relation to obtain and what the ground of the reference of a linguistic expression to its object is. This further kind of questions is meta-question. Since the target-question is a semantic question, it is a semantic question. It is the task of meta-semantics to answer the question by developing a theory of reference.
Both linguistic expression and mental representation are intentional in character. The above analysis of referential expression could be extended and applied to mental representation. In the same vein, what Kant finds puzzling is not the referential relation of representation to object, but the ground of the reference of representation to object. In other words, what Kant finds problematic is not the first-order question of reference, but a meta-question of the ground of reference. Construed in this light, Kant’s question is not semantic, but meta-semantic.
50 Kant’s discussion of the second-order representation is not common. It seems that sometimes Kant holds that judgment is a second-order representation. In his discussion of the logical use of understanding, Kant writes that
“[j]udgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it” (A68/B93).
23 The question of the ground of reference relation is not only meta-semantic, but it is also metaphysical. The meta-semantic question could be metaphysical, but it also could be epistemological.
How could we determine the precise character of the meta-semantic question? Note that Kant is inquiring into the ground of the reference relation, it is natural to suppose that he is concerned primarily with a metaphysical question. The question is metaphysical not only in a loose historical as well as a distinctive Kantian sense but also in the contemporary sense. First, the notion of ground is an important metaphysical notion in German philosophy in the eighteenth century. Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius and many others make a continuous contribution to the philosophical literature concerning the notion of ground.51 Its centrality in Kant is reflected by the fact that the question of the ground of reference is referred to “the key to the whole secret of metaphysics”.
Second, this question is metaphysical in a contemporary proper sense. One typical meta-question with regard to a specific domain is to ask whether there exist facts and property distinctive of that domain. In meta-ethics, we can ask whether the moral discourse commits us to the existence of moral facts and moral properties. In meta-semantics, we can ask whether the semantic discourse commits us to the existence of semantic facts and semantic properties. Both of them are widely recognized as characteristically metaphysical questions.52
Kant’s question is not metaphysical in the sense of coping with the ontology of semantic facts and semantic properties such as reference. Rather, it is metaphysical in the sense of giving the ground of semantic facts and semantic properties. In effect, Kant is asking how the reference of representation to object is possible. One might object that the meta-semantic reading of Kant’s puzzle comes down to nothing but a causal reading of the “relation of representation to object” which I have rejected earlier. To be sure, Kant is not always careful to distinguish the different senses of relation, and sometimes he directly hits upon the question of metaphysical ground without mentioning the semantic surprastructure.53 Nevertheless, I believe that it is profitable to disambiguate the distinct levels of the question. As we will see in Chapter 5, it is precisely this effort that enables us to resolve the apparent inconsistency or circularity in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.
In pursuing the question of the ground of the reference, Kant is tacitly assuming that the reference of representation to object must have a ground: for any representation x and object y, if x refers to y, there must be a ground g for the reference to hold. The assumption of the ground
51 For detailed discussions see Watkins 2005 and Stang 2016.
52 For Kant grounding is a metaphysical binary relation between two things, and derivatively between two facts. It is both asymmetrical and transitive. Precisely because ground is also relational, the confusion between two levels arise.
53 Take Kant’s paradigmatic formulation of the question in §14 for example. After introducing the necessary relation of representation to its object, Kant immediately touches upon the metaphysical relation of making-possible, i.e., that of grounding. (A92/B124-125)
24 must be understood against Kant’s larger picture of the general assumption of explanatory rationalism, and thus metaphysical rationalism. Explanatory rationalism is the view that everything can be explained. Although Kant never makes it explicit in his publication, there is no doubt that explanatory rationalism is precisely his working assumption. Applied to the specific realm of reference, explanatory rationalism implies that every reference relation has a ground. If representability of all empirical representation has their own ground, then a priori ones should have, too.
Kant also frequently employs the term “objective reality” or “objective validity” to signify
“the relation of representation to object”.54 The question is whether the notion of objective reality is semantic or metaphysical. Since the objective reality of a representation could be proved by both its being lawful and its being a fact, i.e., by both quid juris and quid facti, it seems that Kant imposes metaphysical constraints upon the semantic relation of reference. In addition, in some argument Kant presupposes a strong notion of objectivity which demands not only the relationship of correspondence but also that of the real ground. Therefore, I propose that by the objective reality what Kant has in mind is the meta-semantic notion of really grounded reference.
1.2.2 Kinds of Representation and their Grounding Models
Before we answer the question what the ground is for reference relation to hold, we should be clear of the domain-specific nature of ground. Different kinds of representation have different kinds of reference relation, and different kinds of reference relation have different kinds of ground.
Then, what kinds of representations are there for Kant?
Let’s reconstruct the kinds of representation according to the twofold distinction as follows.
In terms of the source of representation, all representations are divided into sensible and intellectual ones. In terms of the immediacy of representations, all representations are divided between intuitive and conceptual ones. According to the combination of the twofold distinction, there are four kinds of representations that can be taken under discussion: empirical intuition, intellectual intuition, empirical concepts, and intellectual concepts. In spite of the difference, the relation of each and every kind of representation must have a ground.
54 I think that in most cases objective reality and objective validity are equivalent. Kant also uses objective validity in other different senses. Occasionally, Kant equates objective validity as truth; (A125) in Prologomena, Kant defines the objective validity of a judgment as necessary universal validity (for everyone), which is usually understood as truth-capable. (AA 4:298) Therefore, I will only use the term ‘objective reality’ to signify the relation of representation to object and leaves term ‘objective validity’ for the notion of truth-aptness, which has been convincingly defended by Prauss (1971) and Thöle (1991).
25 Unfortunately, in the Herz letter Kant does not discuss the four kinds of representation in the way I have suggested earlier. In fact, Kant draws distinctions within intuition and within intellect respectively. Insofar as intuitions are concerned, the relation of representation to the object in terms of passive-active distinction, namely, two opposite directions of causation. Insofar as intellectual representations are concerned, the relation of representation to the object in terms of intuitive-discursive distinction, namely, the two distinct kinds of intellect. Since intuition and intellect is not mutually exclusive, this twofold distinction is doomed to be extensionally intersected and unexhausted. Therefore, the twofold distinction produces only three kinds of representations. It is in the case of intellectual intuition where the twofold distinction has an overlap, whereas it is in the case of intellectual concept where the twofold distinction has a gap. Nonetheless, the overlap and the gap in Kant’s own twofold distinction does not bother us. My focus is on what the ground of every kind of representation is, rather than on whether the division of representations is logically acceptable. It suffices if the result of the division is jointly exhaustive. Fortunately, Kant adds the discussion of intellectual concept to the list, and thus there are four kinds of representation which are extensionally exhaustive.
Although every relation of representation to object has a ground, they have entirely different modes of ground. On Kant’s view, the reference of sensible intuition rests on the fact of human affection where object makes representation possible; the reference of intellectual intuition rests on the fact of divine creation that representation makes object possible; and the reference of empirical concept rests on the fact of logical reflection that object makes representation possible.
Underlying both cases of human affection and divine creation it is the model of cause and effect that is at work. On this model, the effect is brought into existence by its cause.55 However, empirical concepts are acquired from sensible intuition not in the way sensible intuitions arise from the object through causation. While the derivation of empirical concepts can be loosely subsumed under the generic model of ground to consequence, the species of the model of cause and effect loses its weight here.
As Kant makes clear, it is the matter rather than the existence of empirical concept that is derived from sensible intuition. Therefore, it does not fall under the category of the model of causation. In addition to its matter, the form of the empirical concept is originated from the logical use of understanding.56
On Kant’s view, the reference of sensible intuition rests on human affection where the object makes the representation possible; the reference of intellectual intuition rests on divine creation where
55 The underlying assumption is that this analysis is unobjectionable only insofar as existence is concerned.
56 For a detailed account for the logical origin of concept see Kant’s Logic (AA 9:94-95).
26 the representation makes the object possible; and the reference of empirical concept rests on logical reflection where the object makes the representation possible.
The ground of the reference of representation to object rests upon a grounding relation of ground to consequence. Kant is committed to the following assumption: if there is a real ground for the reference relation of x to y to hold, then the ground is either the fact that x is the ground of y, or the fact that y is the ground of x. The semantic relation of reference derives its referential power from the metaphysical grounding relation between representation and object. Therefore, Kant is committed to a broadly causal theory of reference: for any representation x and object y, x refers to y only if x is the ground of y, or y is the ground of x. In the case of the reference of representation to object, there is no external ground can be pursued; it cannot be that it is z that grounds both x and y. The candidate ground can only be internal. Since grounding relation is also binary, either x grounds y or y grounds x.
All of these three kinds of representation can be made intelligible, for all of them are taking either horn of the grounding dilemma, though the specific model might differ. However, things are different in the case of intellectual concepts. We simply cannot find out which horn intellectual concepts can be caught on, for “they are neither caused by the object nor do they bring the object itself into being” (AA 10:130). Intellectual concepts simply cannot accommodate with any alternative in the previously discussed framework. Intellectual concepts are neither intellectual intuition, for they are discursive and general representations, which cannot bring the object into existence; nor are they empirical concepts, for they have their origin in the nature of soul, rather than in the object.
To put it in another way, they are something between intellectual intuitions and empirical concepts.
It is precisely because they do not fall in either category to fit any mode of explanation that makes them a puzzle. In fact, any one of the other three models of grounding representation to object cannot even shed light on the case of intellectual concepts, either.
There could be two responses to this predicament of intellectual concepts. One response could be that intellectual concepts cannot take either horn of the dilemma because the dilemma is false. The other response could be that intellectual concepts can take either horn of the dilemma because the dilemma should be properly understood. In the Critique, Kant makes move along the line of the second response. Kant does think that there is a dilemma, and the case of a priori concepts of understanding must take one horn of the dilemma. I will develop it in Chapter 5.