Reconstruction of the Philosophical Spectrum .1 Lists of Systems .1 Lists of Systems

Kant surprisingly has a quite complete list of philosophical systems at his disposal as early as in the Reflection 4275, which is dated to one year or two immediately before his 1772 letter to Herz. In R4275 Kant writes:

Intuitions of the senses (in accordance with sensible form and matter) yield synthetic propositions that are objective. Crusius explains the real principle of reason on the basis of the systemate praeformationis (from subjective principiis); Locke, on the basis of influxu physico like Aristotele; Plato and Malebranche, from intuitu intellectuali; we, on the basis of epigenesist from the use of the natural laws of reason.

59 From the truth-conditional semantical point of view, truth seems to be more fundamental.

34 The common sense of human beings, sensus veri et falsi, is a qualitas occulta.⁶⁰ (AA 17: 492)

Since the real principles of reason are taken as the target of explanation, it seems to be assumed without proof that everyone believes that there are such principles. I take “the real principle of reason” in question as the equivalent expression of “the real principle” formulated in 1772 letter to Herz. Whether the real principles pertain to reason or to understanding does not matter, for Kant’s the distinction between understanding and reason has not yet been well-established, and it is not surprising to find the frequent interchangeable use of understanding and reason within. Even in the Herz letter, Kant is careless about the difference between understanding and reason. Kant writes, for instance, “I sought to reduce transcendental philosophy (that is to say, all the concepts belonging to completely pure reason) to a certain number of categories” (AA 10:132).

However, Kant was previously talking about the intellectual concepts that pertain to human understanding.

According to Kant, for the explanation of the real principles there exist five alternatives: the preformation-system represented by Crusius, the system of physical influx by Aristotle and Locke, the system of intellectual intuition represented by Plato and Malebranche, and the system of epigenesis advocated by Kant himself, and finally the system of occult qualities for which no representative is mentioned. For explaining the real principles, the five rival systems appeal respectively to a variety of representations as the key to the solution: Aristotle and Locke resort a posteriori acquired concepts, Plato and Malebranche to a priori innate intuitions, Crusius to a priori innate concepts, and Kant to a priori acquired concepts. It is remarkable that this early list of the philosophical systems is quite complete; it includes all the three main positions to which that Kant will devote his most efforts in his subsequent years. As we shall see in the immediate following, the identification of and insistence on these five basic rival systems are retained well into the 1780s.⁶¹

This list of rival philosophical systems in the early 1770s is far from the only one in Kant’s writing. Kant’s most detailed discussion of the different paths taken by rival theories is contained in R5637 written in the 1780s:

60 The focus of this note is on the different ways of the acquisition of putative pure representations, which should be a task for metaphysical deduction or transcendental derivation, rather than for transcendental deduction. Different ways of the acquisition of putative representation yield different kinds of representation. As I have noted earlier, each kind of representation is matched with a distinctive mode of the ground of the reference of representation to object.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Kant attaches the labels of these systems to the grounding models of the reference of representation to object as well.

61 In fact, there is still one position left out in this list; however, it does not enjoy as the same status as the five positions do.

35 Reason, which will not let this restriction⁶² stand, supposes that our experience and also our a priori cognition pertain immediately to objects and not first to the subjective conditions of sensibility and apperception and by their means to unknown objects that can be represented only through the former.

Hence it]… strikes off on different paths. 1. The empirical path and universality through induction. 2.

The fanatical path of intuition through the understanding. 3. That of predetermination through innate concepts. 4. The qualitas occulta of the healthy understanding, which gives no account. [P. III.] If one concedes this, then all critique of pure reason is suspended and the door is opened wide to all sorts of fiction. Hence it belongs to the discipline of pure reason to investigate it and to bar these paths in accordance with its discoveries. (AA 18:272)

Kant’s study of paths reappears with all its essentials intact in the same Reflection:

Not only does reason overlook the ideality of the objects of the senses, it also bristles against this as it does against everything that restricts its sphere of influence. Hence it is necessary to investigate the paths that it takes. The first is empiricism. […]There thus remain epigenesis, mystical intuition, and involution. Finally there is also the qualitas occulta of common reason. (AA 18:273)

It is difficult to overestimate the systematic importance of R5673 for understanding the philosophical spectrum Kant keeps in mind. Here Kant explicitly claims that they are the paths of reason. In R5649, Kant also claims that they are the paths of metaphysics. (AA 18:296)⁶³ By paths Kant understands radically distinct systems that differ from each other not only in specific details but also in fundamental orientations. In the hope of resolving the secret of metaphysics, different paths of reason resort to different kinds of representation and commit to different models of the grounding relation of representation to object.

In his mature philosophy, Kant offers a most complete description of the alternative paths of metaphysics. According to the first quotation, Kant enumerates four paths that could lead us astray:

(i) the empirical path of induction; (ii) the fanatical path of intuition through the understanding; (iii) the fanatical path of predetermination through innate concepts; and (iv) the path of occult qualities of the healthy understanding.

The empirical path is the system of physical influx, or empiricism, endorsed by Aristotle and Locke.

This first path aims at acquiring absolutely universal (and necessary) propositions through inductive inference. The fanatical path of intuition through the understanding is the system of hyperphysical influx,

62The restriction in question refers back to the fact that the appearances “are given only through the synthesis” (AA 18:272).

63 R5649 is dated to the latter half of 1780s.

36 or that of mystical intuition, represented by Plato and Malebranche. This second path characteristically postulates an understanding which can intuit by means of which ideas are immediately apprehended. The fanatical path of predetermination through innate concepts is the system of pre-established intellectual harmony, or that of preformation or involution, represented by Leibniz and Crusius. This third path attempts to make appeal to inborn concepts to formulate judgments.

The path of occult qualities of the healthy understanding is the system of common sense. While Kant does not mention the representatives, from the Prologomena we know that the system of common sense or healthy understanding is represented by Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and Priestley.

(AA 4:258) This forth path is characteristic of invoking common sense without giving further explanation.⁶⁴

1.4.2 The Spectrum Reconstructed

The above list of five philosophical systems includes ancient philosophers as well as modern philosophers. Initially, this list appears haphazard. On a closer reading, it is by no means an arbitrary enumeration of the historically preeminent predecessors that strikes Kant. Rather, I believe that the paths of reason or metaphysics in the list is selected in a logically merited manner: they are not only mutually exclusive but also jointly exhaustive concerning some specific philosophical questions. As we will see, the question that concerns all of these paths is nothing but what Kant dubs “the secret of metaphysics”, namely, the ground of the reference of representation to object.

In the following, I would like to show how these paths are logically rigorously ordered. Let’s first consider a general case in metaphysics. If x and y are systematically correlated, there are following basic models for explaining the co-variation in terms of the ground of reference: (i) no ground model, (ii) real ground model (iii) common ground model, (iv) infinite ground model. They are not mutually exclusive, though jointly exhaustive:

(1) If the relation in question exists, then the relation is either contingent or necessary.

(1.1) If the relation of x to y is contingent, there is no ground for this relation.

(1.2) If the relation of x to y is necessary, there is some ground for this relation, and the relation is either ideal or real.

64 According to the theory of healthy understanding, the truth and falsity can be simply judged on the basis of

“common sense of human being”, in other words, the truth or falsity is simply being asserted without being accounted. This belongs to the least discussed systems.

37 (1.2.1) If the relation of x to y is necessary and ideal, then there is common ground for the relation.

(1.2.2) If the relation of x to y is necessary and real, then there is real ground for the relation.

(1.2.2.1) If the relation of x to y is necessary and real, then it could be case that x grounds y.

(1.2.2.2) If the relation of x to y is necessary and real, then it could be case that y grounds x.

When the general models of ground are applied to the reference relation of representation and object, then we have the following picture:

Picture 1

According to this reconstruction, we have a spectrum of the philosophical positions that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. I believe that I could fill the positions in the spectrum with Kant’s list of philosophical systems: (i) the system of occult qualities assumes a no ground model;

(1) If the relation of

and real, then it is the object that grounds the representation. (the

38 (ii) the system of pre-established intellectual harmony assumes a common ground model; ⁶⁵ (iii) the system of physical influx assumes a real ground model in one direction; (iv) the system of hyperphysical influx assumes a real ground model in the other direction.

Therefore, Kant’s list of the systems is by no means arbitrary. Rather, it is a carefully registered list where all possible alternatives to the problem of the ground of the reference of representation to object are mutually exclusive and jointly exhausted. Since the four rival paths of metaphysics are correspondent to the models of representation and object, it follows that the four paths of metaphysics are also mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.

For one thing, all these four rival paths are not only incompatible with each other, but also irreducible to each other. When one adopts some system of explanation, it is impossible for him to adopt any other systems at the same time. The actual philosophical system is complex, however. It does not prevent one system from being adopted by another when some assumption is held temporarily, or when some complementary argument is made.⁶⁶ For another, it seems impossible to conceive any further system that could be taken into account. Of course, the tree of the grounding model can be further divided as long as some underlying assumption is not detected.

No matter how it is further divided, and no matter how fine-grained the modal status of each putative case is, it does not prevent the now fourfold division from being extensionally exhaustive.

The list means something more for Kant: it means that the more fine-grained putative modal case is not instantiated in history and represented by any philosopher. It is not an accident. It means that the more fine-grained modal alternatives are philosophically unmotivated.