Kant’s Notion of Cognition

There are two ways to understand the meaning of the metaphor “below”. Understood in the metaphysical sense, the argument from below is the argument from consequence. If so, then all arguments are “from below” in this sense, and “the argument from above” does not make sense anymore. Obviously, this is not the sense in which the argument from cognition is called the argument from below.

167 In the second sense, the argument from below is the argument from lower faculty. In the argument from below, Kant starts his argument by explicitly reminding us that “[n]ow we will set the necessary connection of the understanding with the appearances by means of the categories before our eyes by beginning from beneath, namely with what is empirical”.(A119) Kant continues: “[t]he first thing that is given to us is appearance” (A119-A120).

The argument from below forms a contrast to the argument from above that precedes it in A-Deduction. Kant starts his argument by saying: “Now if we wish to follow the inner ground of this connection of representations up to that point (bis auf denjenigen Punkt) in which they must all come together in order first to obtain unity of cognition for a possible experience, then we must begin with pure apperception.” (A116) As Kant later makes clear, the two “extremes” of “below” and

“above” are sensibility and understanding, which refer back respectively to “the manifold of intuition” and to “the necessary unity of intuition” (A124), which are nothing other than the points of the departure of the two lines of arguments. The hierarchy is also confirmed by Kant’s general theory of faculties. As Kant observes in his Jäsche Logic¹⁹⁰, sensibility is the lower faculty, whereas understanding is the higher faculty. Therefore, the distinction of the argument from above and the argument from below is drawn in terms of the hierarchy of faculties. The argument from above starts with the pure and intellectual, while the argument from below sets out with the empirical and the sensible. (AA 9:36)

In fact, the label of argument from below is inaccurate. To be sure, the argument from below appears to be an argument from perception. For one thing, its first sub-argument starts with the premise that “[t]he first thing that is given to us is appearance, which, if it is combined with consciousness, is called perception” (A119-120). For another, it is evidenced by the occasional formulation of the conclusion in B-Deduction that self-consciousness is indispensable for perception. (B161)

Strictly speaking, however, Kant merely starts with, rather than argues from, the appearance or the empirical consciousness of it. With the unfolding of the argument, it turns out that it is not the weaker conception of perception, but the stronger conception of cognition, on which the entire course of argument is premised.¹⁹¹ The correction of the initial impression stems from the following facts. First, the argument from below consists of a series of reductio ad absurdum. The explicit point of departure does not exhaust all premises that are employed in the argument. In the course of his introduction of reductio assumptions, Kant in effect adds new premises to his argument,

190 Abbreviated as Logic thereafter.

191 The virtual argument from perception is contained in the second half of B-Deduction. It will be discussed in Chapter 9, which bears striking resemblance with, or even possibly originates from, this argument from below.

168 and betrays his commitment to our possession of cognition. Second, the A-Deduction might differ from B-Deduction, so does the conclusion in the B-Deduction.

Since the entire argument is premised on the notion of cognition, we have to examine what cognition is for Kant. Kant has various definitions or specifications of cognition, which could roughly be divided into two groups. In §1 of the Logic, Kant writes “[a]ll cognitions, that is, all representations related with consciousness to an object, are either intuitions or concepts”.(AA 9:91) In effect, Kant offers one intensional definition that cognition is the conscious representation of an object and one extensional definition that cognition is either an intuition or a concept.

These two definitions of cognition could also be found in the Critique. In his Stufenleiter in Dialectic, Kant offers a systematic exposition of cognition in the taxonomy of representations:

The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (sensatio); an objective perception is a cognition (cognitio). The latter is either an intuition or a concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. (A320/B376-377)

Extensionally, cognition is a genus of intuition and concept; intensionally, cognition is an objective perception. As Kant indicates, “objective” means “related to object”, and “perception” refers to

“conscious representation”. Therefore, the objective perception is the conscious representation of object, which is consistent with that given in the Logic.¹⁹²

The other characterization of cognition is focused on the notion of connection and rule. In

§5 of the Anthropology, Kant introduces the notion of cognition in the context of the distinction between distinctness and confusion. (AA 7:138) ¹⁹³ Kant writes that “an aggregate of representations becomes knowledge, in which order is thought in this manifold, because every conscious combination presupposes unity of consciousness, and consequently a rule for the combination.” Then, Kant continues: “In every complex representation (perceptio complexa), and thus in every cognition (since intuition and concept are always required for it)”.

Kant obviously identifies cognition as complex representation or complex perception. From what follows we can see that complex representation is composed of (a) the aggregate of the

192 In the following I will use cognition and objective representation interchangeably.

193 In this context, Kant’s view is starling in that he proposes an ontic rather than an epistemic reading of clarity and distinctness of representation. I think that overwhelming textual evidence indicates that epistemic reading is Kant’s more usual view, and we should also understand along this route.

169 representations, (b) the combination of the part-representations, (c) the rule of combination, or

“the order according to which the partial representations are combined. The order is either a logical division or real one” (AA 7:138).

This portrayal could also find itself in the Critique. In the second section of A-Deduction, Kant offers a definition of cognition as “a whole of compared and connected representations”

(A97). Since this definition makes an appearance in the preliminary to the argument in A-Deduction, it seems to be the conceptual preparation that is supposed to play a role in the subsequent argument. The comparison and connection are correspondent respectively to the logical division and the real division in the account of cognition in the Anthropology.

The striking feature of this definition is that Kant defines cognition with reference to representational mereology. Cognition is a whole-representation, and naturally it is composed of part-representations, which stand in the relation of comparison and connection. In a nutshell, cognition is essentially composite and structured. As we will see in the course of analysis, the facts (such as composition, combination, and rule) that unfold themselves are precisely contained in the conception of cognition.

A crucial question is what cognition refers to when Kant talks about it. Since the notion of cognition is generic, it seems that there are many candidates. I propose that the cognition in the context of the argument from below should be identified with intuition, or the unity conception of intuition. Kant discusses this after his introduction of synthesis in §10. Two initial objections to this proposal soon appear. A first objection is that intuition is an ingredient of cognition, rather than cognition itself. A second objection is that, according to Stufenleiter, cognition is broader than intuition, so all intuitions are cognitions, but not all cognitions are intuitions. The first objection is disarmed by the second objection. Kant explicitly says that intuition is a species of cognition.

According to Kant’s Stufenleiter, cognition is objective perception, and the genus cognition has two species: intuition and concept. Here, intuition is identified with cognition. As for the second objection, one might reply by saying that the primary sense of cognition is intuition. Although in A-Deduction Kant does not explicitly say that cognition is the intuition with unity, I think that there is a compelling reason for this identification. Kant’s account of the generation of a cognition and that of the building of one intuition bear striking similarity. As Kant indicates in the last paragraph, “manifold”, “synthesis” and “unity” are the three conditions that are separately necessary and conjointly sufficient for the cognition of the object. It is even confirmed by Kant’s discussion of synthesis in general at the beginning of §10: “[b]y synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action to put different representations together with each other and to

170 comprehend(begreifen) their manifoldness in a cognition.” (A77/B103) The intuition is likewise characterized. In §10 Kant gives the specific sense in which intuition could be identified with cognition. The built intuition consists of “different representations”, “synthesis”, and “unity”. One intuition is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of representations.¹⁹⁴

This identification runs counter with the general impression that Kant equates cognition with judgment, which is confirmed by numerous texts written in both pre-critical and critical periods.

Based on the collaboration thesis, a long-standing mistake is to attribute to Kant the view that the combination of a concept and an intuition is always a judgment.¹⁹⁵ We do not know what Kant’s ultimate position is with regard to the issue of whether cognition must take the form of judgment.

I think that it is more profitable to adopt a liberate view on the form the cognition takes. The judgment is one species of the objective representation whose peculiarity lies in its claim to truth.

Therefore, I think that this argument from cognition is numerically distinct from the argument from judgment, and discuss them in two distinct chapters.

The notion of cognition appears much thicker than that of perception. It is quite natural to worry that Kant’s argument from cognition might beg the skeptics’ question.¹⁹⁶ This kind of objection that the argument from cognition tacitly assumes that the primary, if not exclusive, concern of Transcendental Deduction is to refute skepticism. However, why should we accept this assumption? If one abandons the idea that Kant’s argument in Transcendental Deduction should be evaluated in terms of the prospect of anti-skepticism, few would embrace the view that the argument from cognition is anti-skeptical. As long as we do not adopt the anti-skeptical reading, the objection of begging the question immediately disappears.

To be sure, this does spare one the effort to reply to the worry whether it is anti-skeptical. It does not imply, however, that this argument is not controversial. Rather, a new substitutive worry is that the argument from cognition has no polemical force. Soundness does not exhaust all the virtues one argument could have. Even if this argument is valid and even sound, this argument still could be pointless. Then, what is the point of Transcendental Deduction? As I have suggested, my alternative is that the Transcendental Deduction is explanatory in nature. What misleads people is that its metaphysical character is dwarfed by its pervasive and extravagant representational language.

194 For more details about the notion of unity see Chapter 8.

195 Hanna attributes to Kant the view that the product of the threefold synthesis is an explicit judgment. See Hanna 2001, 45-53. I think that this move runs counter to Kant’s remark concerning the first product of human cognition and distorts the entire picture of Critique.

196 This point is repeatedly made by Guyer, especially in his 1987.

171 The argument from cognition aims to give a metaphysical explanation of the objective representation, which should be seen not as a brute fact, but as our intellectual achievement.

Even if it is conceded that the Transcendental Deduction in general and the argument from cognition in particular is not anti-skeptical, it does not license the cognition to figure in the premise of the argument. It could be the case that the peculiar conception of cognition is invented by Kant for the sake of meeting the requirement of argument. Besides Kant and his argument, neither will the notion of cognition be acknowledged by other philosophers, nor will it be of any use.

As I understand it, Kant uses the thick conception of cognition in a manner that it never occurs to him that it could be controversial. This is evidenced by the fact that cognition does not only appear in the revolutionary Critique, it also appears in his much less controversial Anthropology and Logic. It suggests that the notion of cognition is presupposed by the transcendental philosophy and accepted by the philosophical community. Indeed, the idea of representational mereology is alien to us, but it is not unfamiliar to Kant and his contemporaries. It could be found in Leibniz that every perception consists in a unity of manifold. ¹⁹⁷ It is not surprising why it is taken for granted by Kant.