Formulation of A Priori Determination (a) To Determine an Object

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5.2.4 Formulation of A Priori Determination (a) To Determine an Object

In the following, I will clarify what it means by “determine an object” in general and what it means by “determine an object a priori” in particular. And then we will see how this move is necessary.

As for the first question, I propose that to determine an object is to add new determinations to it, and that to add new determinations to an object is to make it instantiate certain properties. The notion of “determine”

is a technical term in metaphysics, and its meaning should be understood in German metaphysical tradition. In §34 of his Metaphysics, Baumgarten writes:

Something is determinate if it is posited that it is A or that it is not A, but if it is posited only that it is either A or not A, it is indeterminate. Or, if nothing with respect to contradictory predicates is

125 posited in the subject except that one or the other is attributed to it, that subject is indeterminate in respect of those predicates. However, it is determinate, if one of them is posited in the subject.

Whatever can be determined is determinable. Therefore, concerning this it can be posited that something is A or that something is not A, [hence] that something is determinable.¹⁶⁰

In Baumgarten’s formulation, the notion of determination is relational. We can formulate determination in this way: for anything x, x is determined with respect to F if and only if x instantiate the predicate A or its contradictory predicate not-A, where F is a higher-order predicate of A. For example, when we say something a is scarlet, then we are saying that a is determined with respect to red, and we can also say that a is determined with respect to color.

In my view, this how Kant himself understands “determinate” and “indeterminate”. In Transcendental Dialectic, Kant writes:

Every concept, in regard to what is not contained in it, is indeterminate, and stands under the principle of determinability: that of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to it, which rests on the principle of contradiction C and hence is a merely logical principle, which abstracts from every content of cognition, and has in view nothing but the logical form of cognition.

(A571/B579)

To be sure, it appears that what Kant speaks of is about the determination of concept, rather than about the determination of thing. Remember Kant’s modal principle that the logical possibility does not imply the real possibility, while the real possibility implies the logical possibility, where the logical possibility is understood as the possibility of a concept, and the real possibility as the possibility of a thing. From the fact that the logical possibility entails the principle of determinability, it follows that the real possibility entails the principle of determinability, in spite of its logical nature.

In fact, Kant is clear about the inference because this is what Kant actually says in the immediately following paragraph: “Every thing, however, as to its possibility, further stands under the principle of thoroughgoing determination” (A571/B579). As a result, the possibility of s thing must stand under both the principle of determinability and the principle of thoroughgoing determination.

To make an object actual and to determine an object are entirely different. To make an object actual is to bring the object into existence. To make an object determinate is to confer property to

160Watkins 2009, 93-94. For determining ground and external determination see respectively §34 (Watkins 2009, 94) and §36(Watkins 2009, 94). Baumgarten writes: “[t]hose things that are posited in something in determining [it]

(marks and predicates) are determinations” (Watkins 2009, 94).

126 an existent object. The former is a claim about existence, while the latter is a claim about property.

The intuition of the difference between a claim on existence and a claim on property is made even sharper by Kant’s famous motto “existence is not a real predicate”. For the rationalist such as Baumgarten, existence is complete determination. For Kant, by contrast, existence cannot be analyzed in terms of determination. No matter how determinate an object is made, it can never be made actual in virtue of being made determinate. Put in contemporary locution, for Kant existence is a second-order property, which should not be lumped together with the normal first-order property.¹⁶¹

(b) Determine A Priori

In the following exploration of the meaning of the claim “pure concepts determine objects a priori”, I propose that to determine a priori is to instantiate necessary property. For illustrative purpose, the meaning of a priori determination could be elucidated by an analogy to Kant’s relevant account of pure intuitions, i.e. space and time. This move requires little justification. In fact, in the quotation from B-Preface Kant is speaking of the generic term “cognition”, rather than the specific term

‘concept’ or ‘intuition’. It suggests that an analogous reading of the a priori determination of intuition could shed light on the reading of the a priori determination of concept. Kant’s analogy between concept and intuition invites the suggestion that there should be an unequivocal meaning of a priori determination.

In Aesthetic Kant makes two a priori claims on space and time respectively:

If I can say a priori: (T1)all outer appearances are in space and determined a priori according to the relations of space, so from the principle of inner sense I can say entirely generally: (T2)all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time. (A34/B51)

While this passage contains an analogy of space to illustrate time, what is said of time can certainly clarify the nature of space. Therefore, we can sharpen our understanding of a priori determination with the help of the mutual reference between space and time. First of all, we can easily infer that a priori determined means necessarily determined. This is consistent with the meaning of

161 Another vocabulary employed by Kant is the notion of positing. For a discussion on the absolute and relative positing in Kant see Stang 2016.

127 a priori. What Kant makes here is a de re claim that outer appearances necessarily stand in the relation of space. In other words, the spatial relation is the necessary property of outer appearances.

Second, the a priori determination is valid of all objects in a certain domain. Since for Kant necessity and universality are coextensive, the claim that any object x in the domain D is a priori determined with respect to some property F means that F is universally valid of the domain of any object x in question.¹⁶²

Third, the a priori determination of a domain of objects is the highest-order property. It is worth noting that the determination in general implies excluding the opposite. However, this scheme is not immediately applied to the case of a priori determination. What is determined a priori is not any specific object in a domain, but all objects in that domain. Correspondingly, the a priori determination of a domain of objects is not any low-order property, but the highest-order property. The a priori determination of the positions between two bodies is not the property of, say, ‘being five miles from’, but the most indeterminate spatial property ‘being next to’. Excluding the indeterminate general relation does not determine any positive property or relation. Rather, it cancels all the possibilities of meaningfully attributing any spatial property to bodies. If it were the case, to attribute any specific spatial property to the objects in question is to commit the categorical mistake.

Finally, the a priori determinations are relational properties. As the passage indicates, appearances are determined with regard to relations. Outer appearances are determined with regard to the relations of space, whereas appearances in general are determined with regard to the relations of time. Only relations can be universally and necessarily valid of a domain of objects.¹⁶³

Therefore, the new determinations or content added to the objects is the general relational determination. The way the categories determine the epistemically significant objects is to determine a priori, that is, universally and necessarily. These new determinations do not belong uniquely to any object, or any kind of object. It indifferently subsumes all objects in the framework of space and time and in the reach of possible consciousness. The initial formulation of a priori determination could be articulated as follows: for any object x in a certain domain D and for relational concept C, x is determined a priori with regard to C=Def. x necessarily instantiates C.

162 The price it pays for meeting the universality requirement is that it is not valid of things in themselves.

163 Kant’s emphasis on the priority of relation to relata is striking. As for certain relation, Kant could be seen as a follower of Aristotelianism. On the one hand, relation does not depend on any particular relata for its existence; On the other hand, relation depends on some relata for its existence.

128 5.3 The Implications of the Transcendental Path

In the previous section, I have clarified what it means for representation to determine object a priori and why it is the only alternative for make-actual model if it is committed to the horn representation that makes object possible. However, it is possible that the notion of a priori determination is empty. In this section, I will address the question as to in how it is possible for the representation to determine the object a priori.

From the fact that concepts determine objects a priori, it trivially follows that the model must satisfy the three requirements: (i) the objects must be in a way such that they are susceptible to be determined by a priori concepts; (ii) the a priori concepts must be in a way such that they are susceptible to determine the objects; (iii) there must be a way such that it can make such determination realized. From the three requirements arise the following three how-questions:

(Q1) How the objects can be susceptible to be determined by a priori concepts.

(Q2) How the a priori concepts can be susceptible to determine the objects.

(Q3) How other conditions can be satisfied.

The answers Kant gives are as follows:

(A1) The objects must be idealized such that it can be legislated by the human mind.

(A2) The categories must be singularized such that it can be displayed in concreto.

(A3) The mind must be equipped with some faculty such that it can bring about the laws of nature.

The three answers commit Kant to his controversial idealism, obscure schematism, and notorious psychologism, which constitute the unmistakable trademarks of transcendental philosophy. Before I respectively expound these three implications of Kant’s Copernican move, I would like to have a brief survey of the negative consequences of this transcendental path in the hope of clarifying why it is difficult to propose a formulation of a priori determination, and why it is even more difficult to accept its consequences.

129 This question of how it is possible for representation to determine object a priori is elusive, if not entirely unintelligible. As Kant shows, one cannot make sense of the conditions of a priori determination in a straightforward way.¹⁶⁴ Rather, both the representation and the object in question must be radically reconceptualized. By the reconceptualization I do not mean Kant’s following moves: on the one hand, representations are identified not as intellectual concepts of the real use of understanding, but as a priori concepts of understanding, and, on the other hand, objects are identified not as things in themselves, but as things that appear to us. While the first change is merely terminological, the second change is more substantial for it is motivated by the Givenness Thesis of cognition that objects must be given to us if they are to be cognized at all. Rather, Kant reconceptualizes the two relata in a far more radical way: a priori concepts of understanding are replaced by the schemata, i.e. transcendental time-determination, and things appear to us are reduced to representations, i.e. mind-dependent entities.

The consequences of the Copernican Revolution are profound and far-reaching. In the first place, the Copernican turn makes things unbelievable. Idealism is a position characteristic of reducing physical objects into representations. It is justified, but it is unbelievable. Even idealistic precedents do not alleviate the intellectual shock. It is difficult for us to lend credence to the theory without believing in a realistic metaphysics.

In spite of the idealistic inspirations, Kant does not immediately see how far he is led, and what repercussion will be caused in the future path. The transcendental idealism results in a further repercussion: the object is lost. The repercussion is paradoxical: in order for categories to be applied to objects, one must concede to the truth of idealism. The concession to idealism results in that the newly introduced representations lose their objects (and that the temporal sequence loses objective time-determination). If Kant could not make a response to the problem, the promise of Copernican move would be bleak.

In the second place, the Copernican turn makes things irrelevant. We expect that Kant offers an answer to the question of how a priori concepts are related to objects. It turns out that it is schemata, rather than categories per se, that are related to objects. Kant’s answer appears to simply miss the point. Although Crusius illegitimately introduces God as the common cause between thoughts and things outside thoughts, his pre-established harmony intellectual system has at least one merit: it is concepts rather than anything else that represent objects. Kant is still obliged to provide justification for this move. Even if Kant can finally prove that the objective reality of schemata implies that of

164 Suppose that Transcendental Deduction does not presuppose the results of Transcendental Aesthetic that space and time are forms of sensibility and that appearances are representations.

130 categories, one might object that the objective reality of categories can be proved without resorting to schemata.

In the third place, the Copernican turn makes things complicated. In transcendental philosophy Kant gives an extraordinarily sophisticated theory of synthesis to account for the relationship between mind and the modal facts in the world. Consider Descartes’ theory of perception of intellect. Even if it is deplorably false, it is unparalleled elegant. The natural light can elevate us to penetrate the eternal truth created and laid down by God without appeal to further mental machinery. In developing his doctrine of synthesis Kant is committed to a theory of mind burdened with heavy metaphysical presupposition. For instance, Kant seems to postulate the mathematical synthesis and dynamical synthesis to be two numerically distinct kinds of activity which are responsible for different kinds of modal truths.

The above considerations suggest that to take a transcendental path means to accept following challenges which seldom people dare take: (i) one must have the insight into what conditions the Copernican model must satisfy in order for it to be intelligible at all; (ii) one must have the courage to accept all the consequences that flows from Copernican model, no matter how counter-intuitive they are when taken in themselves; (iii) one must have the skill to cope with the repercussions caused by the consequences of Copernican model upon other parts of the system.

On the above analysis, Kant’s transcendental philosophy is, on the one hand, counter-intuitive, and it is on the other hand, of high theoretical cost. Then, the natural question is why we have to accept it. In my view, the answer is quite simple: transcendental philosophy brings us huge theoretical benefits.

It can help us to explain the synthetic a priori propositions, the laws of nature, personal identity, and the antinomy between freedom and determinism.

This does not suggest that Kant’s characteristic transcendental path is favored because it involves theory choice, and it is an inference to the best explanation. Theoretical benefits of the transcendental system such as explanatory power do count as a theoretical virtue, but theoretical virtue is not the reason why Kant embraces it. For Kant, the move to the transcendental path is not a matter of taste, but a matter of truth. Kant’s transcendental philosophy is true not because some phenomena can be explained by it, but because those phenomena must be explained and they can only be explained by it against the background of a set of assumptions.

Again, we are brought back to Kant’s commitment to scientific actualism. For Kant sciences are actual and therefore correct, and sciences are synthetic a priori. These two basic facts are

non-131 negotiated. As I have noted, the explanation of synthetic a priori proposition is the most important criterion to measure the success of a theory.

That is why Kant’s quickest argument often collapses into such a simple linear version: because scientific actualism is true, therefore metaphysical realism is false. This is the most fundamental conflict underlying the surface argument in the Critique. In fact, the official argument is a little bit complicated. In the Critique empiricism is taken into account as the standard epistemological match of realist metaphysics. The argument goes like this: If metaphysical realism is true, there would be no synthetic a priori propositions. Why? It is so precisely because metaphysical realism is only compatible with an empiricist epistemology characteristic of a reception model of knowledge. We know that not even this critique story is the whole story. Things are much more complicated. That is how we find in his Reflections and why we reconstruct the spectrum of philosophical systems, and examine why all of them doomed to fail.