Literature on elite dynamics (in Africa and elsewhere) does provide information on some of the political variables that can account for the variation in elite power-sharing strategies.
The existing non-Africanist literature suggests that regime strength is a key factor in determining optimal strategies of leadership survival. Quiroz Flores and Smith (2011) argue that leaders who face little threat from external challengers will be concerned almost exclusively with managing internal threats, unless facing an insurgency or mass movement. This argument is supported by the repeated factional conflicts which have threatened leaders in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa.
Schedler’s (2013) global study on regime survival strategies in ‘electoral-authoritarian’ regimes argues that weaker ‘competitive’ regimes are more likely to engage in defensive concessions to retain power during times of uncertainty, while stronger ‘hegemonic regimes’ can instead rely on
manipulation and repression to hamper the political opposition. Examples of this dynamic include the effective repression or exclusion of the opposition in the Tanzanian 2015 election and the Ethiopian 2015 election (Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Paget, 2017).
The political strength of opposition parties and movements is another factor dictating optimal strategies. A democratic opposition is meant to hold the regime accountable by providing a viable alternative coalition to the existing government (Ladd, 2013). The non-institutionalised, fragmented or transitory nature of most opposition parties is frequently pointed to as a source of regime longevity and unaccountability in Africa (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999;
Ochieng’Opalo, 2012). This description has merit for some countries at some time periods, for instance the Congo in the early 21st century hadover a hundred registered parties (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009). However, this generalisation does not work for Africa as a whole. The number of effective parties varies dramatically (between 1.0 and 8.8) across the continent and within countries at
11 Some, examples include Kroeger’s (2018) study of cabinet reshuffle patterns within
military/personalist/dominant party regimes, or Roessler’s (2011) study on ethnic purges and civil war or Roessler and Ohls’ (2018) work on ethnic power-sharing.
12 Examples include Martinez-Gallardo’s (2014) work on political/economic crisis and ministerial stability in Latin America, Camerlo and Perez-Linan’s (2015) study on how scandals and protests impact portfolio
allocations in Latin America, or Huber and Martinez-Gallardo’s (2008) study on ministerial stability on Western parliamentary democracies.
different periods (Bogaards, 2004). These different configurations of regime/non-regime/opposition party power will present different levels of threat to the leader13 and will need to be factored into their power-sharing strategy.
Another factor explored in the non-Africanist literature is the country’s economic health. Leaders and regimes need sufficient economic resources to nourish their patronage networks in order to retain a viable coalition. Schedler (2013) summarises the threat succinctly:
“When the reservoirs of patronage resources dry up, the reservoirs of ‘instrumental’ regime support are bound to do so as well.”
Poor economic performance can also weaken leader or regime popularity, which in turn makes the leader more susceptible to replacement from rivals inside and outside of the regime. Large-N studies have associated economic failure with coups, ruling party disintegration and opposition victories (Langer, 2005; Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Reuter and Gandhi, 2009). Beyond economic performance, the state’s control (or lack thereof) over the financial landscape can dictate the leader’s ability to limit opposition coordination, threaten those inside the regime into compliance and respond to public discontent (Arriola, 2013; De Mesquita et al., 2005).
The above factors are examples of some of the main variables which leaders may consider when creating or altering their coalition of elites. These factors explain some of the variation in ruling coalitions witnessed in Africa, along with the contradictory arguments over ideal coalition type in the Africanist literature.14 These variables are in a continual state of flux. A strong regime can become weakened by internal splits or succession crises, which occurred in Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and Senegal’s Socialist Party (PS) (Cheeseman, 2010; Arriola, 2013; Kelly, 2018). A booming economy can grind to a halt, as shown by the end of the Ivorian miracle due to declining cocoa prices (Langer, 2005). A previously fragmented opposition can coalesce around a single opposition elite and present a viable threat, as shown in the Tanzanian 2015 election where the regime faced a united opposition coalition for the first time since the start of multiparty competition (Paget, 2017). As the political environment changes so to do the primary threats to the leader’s political
13Various types of opposition party have proven capable of threatening or deposing the leader.Coalitions of convenience between opposition parties managed to win elections against entrenched incumbents in the 2002 Kenyan elections and the 2011 Ivorian elections. Well-established opposition powers managed to take power from the regime in 2000 Senegalese elections and 2015 Nigerian elections, while fledgling opposition parties managed to beat the incumbent regime in the 2011 Zambian elections and the 2012 Senegalese elections.
Countries such as Ghana or Sierra Leone have seen a regular alternation in power between two established parties.
14Systems of government – such as parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential – are deemed to affect the leader’s autonomy and vulnerability to rivals (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011; Roberts, 2015). However, in an African context the key features of a powerful presidency and the comparative weakness of the other branches of government endure regardless of institutional system of government (Van Cranenburgh, 2008
survival and their calculations concerning the optimal coalition. Martinez-Gallardo (2014) studied the relationship between political and economic ‘shocks’ and volatility within the cabinet:
“unexpected events over the course of a government’s life will change these conditions and make bargains that were previously “stable” no longer viable. Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges. Cabinet changes allow presidents to change policy by changing the individuals in charge of making policy, and can also help presidents adjust their support coalition by giving them a resource they can use in their negotiations with other actors.”
This research project will provide a large-N comparative study of how different political contexts and unexpected crises change what is considered a stable power-sharing bargain. This project will provide context and caveats to the competing claims of how African leaders choose to share power, and help bring the literature closer to the level of detail and comparability shown in the extant non-Africanist research.