Existing literature describes the process of cabinet formation and ministerial appointment as transactional. Studies on cabinet composition in Western democracies highlight that leaders appoint ministers who can provide loyalty or ideological cohesion to strengthen cohesion of their governments, or expertise to improve performance (Indridason and Kam 2008). In other cases, ministers from outside parties can be brought into the government to allow the leader to form a viable government (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008).
In Africa, cabinet appointments are often explained as key positions in the regime’s web of patronage.
Ministerial appointments are used strategically to counter external threats by bringing political elites and ‘big men’ into the regime’s patronage network, while the newly incorporated elites deliver votes or political support from their network (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). The composition of the cabinet therefore provides insight into which groups and constituencies the regime considers integral to their coalition and political survival.
The composition of the cabinet also reflects the threat posed by potential allies within the ruling coalition. Included elites can use the state’s resources to cultivate a base to rival the leader or can try to depose the leader (Choi and Kim, 2018). Consequently, African leaders attempt to coup-proof their regimes by creating arrangements that raise the costs of elite coordination and hinder elite threats (Casper and Tyson, 2014). Examples include purges (violent and non-violent) and the rotation of elites among different positions to prevent the cultivation of separate powerbases (Jackson and Rosberg, 1992; Roessler, 2011; Albertus, 2012; Geddes, 2003; Powell, 2012; Woldense, 2018).
Elite volatility within the cabinet which happens outside ‘expected periods’, such as post-electoral cabinet changes or democratic alternations in power, is therefore indicative of the regime reconfiguring itself to mitigate against internal and external threats. Political crises or upheavals will necessitate changes to the ruling coalition when changes in the demands and political strength of different subgroups or elites cause changes to what constitutes a ‘stable bargain’. Former allies may begin to become a threat to the leader, necessitating their removal (Roessler, 2011). Rent-seeking elites, ideological movements at odds with the regime and dissatisfied ethno-regional communities may engage in protests or political violence to coerce the regime into granting them more state resources or more positions in government (Roessler, 2011; De Waal, 2009). A drop in public support may weaken the leader’s legitimacy, making them vulnerable to being ousted by either the opposition or rivals within government (Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005). In her study on the effects of economic crises and falling regime popularity on ministerial stability in Latin America,
Martinez-Gallardo describes the relationship between senior government composition and the political environment outlining how:
“[u]nexpected events over the course of a government’s life will change these conditions and make bargains that were previously “stable” no longer viable.
Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges.” (Martinez-Gallardo 2014: 5).
Economic crises, scandals, internal factionalism or mass protest all exert pressure on regimes to redistribute the balance of power among elites inside and outside of government (Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Leaders managing divided or unruly governments, or who are under siege from opposition forces and widespread popular disapproval, are more likely to dismiss ministers who pose an obstacle to their hegemony, making changes to the ruling coalition to secure their political survival (Martinez-Gallardo, 2014). Regimes which have become fractured or lost public confidence may need to implement a ‘changing of the guard’ to demonstrate a willingness to reform (Rivera, 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992;
Albertus, 2012)
The notion of ‘crisis cabinets’ developed here identifies those instances in which leaders or regimes which are confronted with an existential political crisis are forced to operate non-routine cabinet reshuffles involving mass ministerial turnover. Crisis cabinets occur outside periods in which a large-scale change in personnel would be instituted as a formal government procedure, such as the resignation of the cabinet during electoral periods or the democratic transition from one regime to the next.
7.2.1 The dangers of protests
Politics in Africa is frequently portrayed as a process of continual bargaining between the leader and rival elites within and outside the government (Bagayoko et al, 2016; Francois et al., 2015; De Waal, 2009). In contrast, the non-elite masses are ascribed secondary importance as resources to be mobilised by elites hoping to enhance their place within the political hierarchy (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011; Langer, 2005; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). However, demonstrations of discontent among a large section of the non-elite can damage a regime’s legitimacy and can embolden rival elites. Historically large-scale protests have provided elites within the government the opportunity to use the regime’s weakened legitimacy to launch a coup or extract concessions (Casper and Tyson, 2014; Volpe, 2013). During the early 1990s, opposition politicians or former insiders returning from exile sought to co-opt the pro-democracy movements that spread across the continent against the existing autocratic regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992).
It is well established in the literature that regimes rarely rely on repression or force alone to quash protests as these strategies may in fact cause escalation (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Josua and Edel, 2015; Sambanis and Zinn, 2006). As a result, regimes employ a range of accommodation strategies when dealing with threatening protests, including national dialogues, constitutional changes or important changes to the senior elite through crisis cabinets (Josua and Edel, 2015; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Thurston 2018).
The recent large-scale cabinet reshuffles in Sudan and Algeria are both examples of the regime instituting crisis cabinets to mollify popular discontent. In Algeria, President Bouteflika dissolved his cabinet in March in a last effort to contain the protests, and appointed a technocratic and inclusive caretaker government (Africa Confidential, 2019a). Similarly, President Al-Bashir of Sudan fired his government and all his regional governors after declaring a one-year state emergency in February, two months after demonstrations against the rising cost of bread had erupted across the country (Abdelaziz, 2019). After the two leaders fell, a faction within their respective regimes tried to reorganise the ruling coalition into a stable bargain which would ensure at least part of the regime’s political survival. In Algeria Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Salah, previously a Deputy Minister of Defence, became the main power and ousted Bouteflika’s le pouvoir faction while retaining key allies in the old guard (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Africa Confidential, 2019c). In Sudan, a segment of the military ousted most political elements loyal to Al-Bashir, including members of his National Congress Party, and eventually agreed to a transition timetable with the protesters (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Africa Confidential, 2019d). Other examples include Mubarak dismissing claims that his son would succeed him and firing the government led by long-standing Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif in an attempt to appease the Tahrir Square protester, or King Hassan of Morocco’s dismissal of his unpopular Prime Minister as a concession to opposition parties (Josua and Edel 2015; Lust-Okar 2004).
These examples show that regime’s will offer change in the senior government and turnover in the elite as a concession in return for peace. Existing large-N studies have attempted to approximate regime accommodation strategies through conciliatory rhetoric (Bhasin and Gandhi, 2013; Carey, 2006), while country-specific investigations have looked at how individual regimes have attempted to mollify protest through legal reform, policies and a change in the elite (Josua and Edel 2015; Lust-Okar 2004; Bogaert, 2015; Volpi, 2013). But there are no comparative studies examining the relationship between public unrest and volatility within the ruling elite.
We aim to address this gap in the research through isolating ‘crisis cabinets’ and determining which are preceded by popular protests. Through this process, we aim to determine whether protests are a common cause of crisis cabinets, and whether these crisis cabinets are distinctly tailored to address protester grievances.