Comparing Crisis Cabinets

The crisis cabinets are compared using a number of metrics derived from the ACPED data to measure the degree of change and volatility. These metrics measure the following:

1. Change in personnel in the cabinet

2. Change in personnel in the ‘inner circle’, the most important posts in the cabinet⁷³

73 The concept of the inner circle is borrowed from Lindemann (2011) and Francois et al. (2015). The inner circle typically consists of posts such as

3. Change in the regional representation of the cabinet and inner circle

4. Change in how proportionally cabinet and inner circle posts are allocated among a country’s regions

5. The average length of time served by ministers dropped from the cabinet.⁷⁴

Table 7.1 shows the comparison between crisis cabinets formed in response to protest and those formed in response to other crises. The average metrics for all cabinet reshuffles⁷⁵ are also included for reference.

Table 7.1 – Cabinet volatility in Crisis Cabinets

Crisis Cabinets in

Percent Change in Personnel 87.65 69.72 16.21

Percent Change in Inner Circle 79.76 70.12 19.12

Change in Representation -3.31 -0.50 0.09

Change in Inner Circle Representation 6.25 4.19 0.19

Change in Disproportion -1.22 3.19 0.00

Change in Inner Circle Disproportion 0.59 0.49 -0.06

Mean Tenure of Dropped Ministers 61.98 24.87 35.84

Regime Legislative Seats at Previous Election

75.23 65.31 56.82

VDEM Score of Democracy 0.18 0.40 0.51

Crisis cabinets, by our definition, have a much higher turnover of personnel than most reshuffles. But crisis cabinets motivated by protest have a higher turnover of personnel in both the cabinet at large and the inner circle than other types of crisis cabinet. The mean the tenure of dismissed ministers is much higher for protest-motivated crisis cabinets than other types of crisis cabinet and the average cabinet reshuffle.

Due to the rarity of protest-motivated crisis cabinets and the low number of observations, it is impossible to draw statistical conclusions. However, this finding does corroborate with the argument that protesters often seek a visible change in the ruling elite. This can include a widespread changing of the guard or the dismissal of key ministers deemed emblematic of the regime’s failures or excesses (Lust-Okar, 2004; Josua and Edel, 2014; Africa Confidential, 2019a). The interests of embedded regime elites frequently rely on the maintenance of the status quo and as a result are seen as obstacles to reform or change within the regime (Albertus, 2012; Rivera, 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle,

74 A more detailed explanation of the variables is outlined in Appendix Table 4.

75 Includes all reshuffles, including crisis cabinets and post-electoral reshuffles.

1992). Therefore, the jettisoning of longstanding elites is an effective strategy for the regime to signal that it is willing to engage in substantial reform and trade major concessions – in the form of key allies – for peace.

All types of crisis cabinet involve larger shifts in regional representation and disproportion than the average reshuffle, suggesting that crisis cabinets frequently involve a recalibration in the regime’s regional power sharing strategy. Feelings of regional disenfranchisement have driven protests, rebellions, coups and internal struggles (Amin and Takougang, 2018; Langer, 2005; Lindemann, 2011a; Boggero, 2009), all of which are potential triggers for crisis cabinets. Regional representation declines for crisis cabinets created in response to protest, while the inner circle becomes only marginally more inclusive compared to other types of crisis cabinet. These differences are less dramatic than those seen in ministerial turnover or the tenure of dropped ministers. This could show that issues of representation are less important in protest-motivated crisis cabinets compared to the widespread dismissal of enduring elites. However, further analysis in the next section shows that although overall regional representation does not drastically change, protest hotspots do appear to reap a boost in representation in the crisis cabinet.

The final major difference is in the electoral quality of the regime overseeing the crisis cabinet.

Electoral quality is measured by the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) electoral component index, an ordinal variable (0-1) which measures the “responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections” (Coppedge et al., 2017). Crisis cabinets in general on average occur in regimes with a lower VDEM score. This finding corroborates with the existing literature on anocracies and autocracies which describes elite rotation as part of the ruler’s

‘toolkit’ to ensure political survival (Albertus, 2012; Woldense, 2018; Roessler, 2011). However, crisis cabinets made in response to protest occur in drastically less democratic environments than other crisis cabinets. Appendix figures 1 and 2 show that the correlation between ministerial volatility and ACLED protest metrics is stronger in more autocratic or electorally dominant regimes.

Less democratic regimes are generally understood to be more vulnerable to protest. In more democratic or competitive regimes, the legitimacy of government and leader is continually critiqued and protests against government actions are perceived as ‘politics as usual’ (Schedler, 2013). In these settings, the political opposition has a greater chance of either gaining the leadership through elections or capturing a significant amount of power through the legislature and so have an incentive not to support protests calling for radical change (Trejo, 2014; Lust-Okar, 2004). In contrast, in more autocratic regimes, the public’s perception that the regime is invulnerable is a major political asset.

This perception is fed through supermajorities in elections, repression or popular mobilisation

(Schedler, 2013; Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2002).⁷⁶ Accordingly, protest-motivated crisis cabinets occur in settings where the regime dominates parliament, occupying on average over three quarters of the lower house.

Within these settings, public protest can inform would-be dissenters that dissatisfaction with the regime is widespread and could encourage cascading protests against a weakened and delegitimised government (Kricheli et al., 2011). Major protests in authoritarian regimes provide useful information for rival elites, showing that public loyalty to the government is low, reducing the cost of launching a coup (Magaloni and Wallace, 2008; Caspar and Tyson, 2014). In short, large-scale protests form a more severe political threat to the regime in autocratic governments, necessitating drastic changes in the elite coalition to mitigate the political threat and satisfy the public’s demand for change.

The dramatic changes seen in protest crisis cabinets can be interpreted as a pre-emptive revolution, in which widespread changes to the elite coalition are implemented, albeit under the stewardship of the regime. Out of the three protest crisis cabinets, only in Guinea did the incumbent retain power. In Ethiopia the ruling party remained in charge but under a new leader, while the leader and party was replaced by an interim government in Tunisia.

In the following section, the three protest-motivated crisis cabinets are qualitatively investigated to show how the protests caused a fissure within the ruling elite, leading to dramatic change in the ruling coalition; and secondly, how the resulting crisis cabinets were specifically tailored to address protester grievances.

7.4 The politics of crisis cabinets after mass protests