6.5.1 Data
Even when an incumbent retains power, each election is followed by a reshuffle in the cabinet indicating that the regime is adapting its ruling coalition in response to the electoral results. To measure whether regimes engage in co-option, the politics of the belly or the politics of punishment post-election, this paper examines the composition of the post-election cabinet. Because the research is interested in regime/incumbent strategies, observations are restricted to elections where the regime retained power, resulting in 55 elections across the eighteen countries in the period of 1997-2017.
Information on the cabinet is provided by the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED), a dataset of cabinet members and positions by month across African states. Each minister is coded with the following information: name, position, gender, political affiliation, ethnicity and regional background.
Because ACPED’s unit of analysis is the cabinet minister by month, it captures a significant amount of volatility within the cabinet that is missed by annual cabinet lists.59 Prior studies on cabinet compositions agree that different posts hold different degrees of importance (Lindemann, 2011b;
Francois et al., 2015). Consequently posts in the cabinet are further separated into the inner/outer circles.60 Table 6.2 outlines the metrics for the analysis of post-election cabinets.
59 Out of the countries included in this study, approximately 16 percent of country-years had more than one major reshuffle and over a quarter had more than one minor change within the cabinet. Approximately 20 percent of ministers recorded in the ACPED data have a tenure lasting less than a year.
60 Inner circle posts typically include vice-president or prime minister, finance, foreign affairs, justice, defence, internal security/home affairs and oil/mineral resources (if the country is a major exporter)
Table 6.2 – Description of Variables
This variable captures the aggregate change in the total size of the cabinet, inner circle and outer circle for the 12 months following an election.
Change in Representation
Government ‘representation’ is assessed by calculating the share of total, national ethno-political populations who have an associated elite in the cabinet. The aggregated total for groups and regions in cabinet is divided by the composition of the population at large. The index assumes a value between 0 and 100, where 100 means total representation of all politically relevant ethnic groups in the population. This variable can represent the aggregate change in representation to whole cabinet, the inner circle and the outer circle in the 12 months following an election.
Change in Leader’s Co-Ethnic
Representation
Captures the aggregate change in percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers from the same ethnic group as the current president in the 12 months following an election. The index takes a value between 0 and 100.
Change in Primary Opposition Leader’s Co-Ethnic
Representation
Captures the aggregate change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers from the same ethnic group as the opposition candidate/opposition party leader who secured the most non-regime votes in the 12 months following an election. The index takes a value between 0 and 100. In the case of general elections, the main opposition candidate is determined by votes secured in the presidential election. In the cases of just parliamentary elections, we use the ethnicity of the leaders of the top opposition party in terms of seats.61
Change in Regime Party Representation
Captures the change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers belonging to the regime party (the party of the president or most senior executive) in the 12 months following an election. The index takes a value between 0 and 100.
Change in Opposition Party Representation
Captures the change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers belonging to opposition parties in the 12 months following an election. To be counted as an opposition party, the party must have fielded a candidate in a presidential election against the regime or competed in legislative elections without belonging to a multi-party coalition with the regime party.
The ACPED data will then be used to examine the post-electoral changes in the cabinet and classify the leader’s post-electoral strategy.
1. The following will be considered evidence of politics of the belly: lower ethnic representation, higher representation of leader co-ethnics and the ruling party of the leader.
2. The following will be considered evidence of politics of co-option: higher ethnic representation, higher representation of opposition co-ethnics or opposition parties.
3. Post-electoral settlements which decrease the representation of opposition co-ethnics and parties will be considered as evidence of the regime engaging in the politics of punishment.
61 Appendix table 1 lists the primary opposition candidate for each election and their ethnic identity (along with sources).
6.5.2 Classifying Elections
This study opts to use Schedler’s (2013) regime classification, in which a hegemonic regime must hold over two-thirds of the seats62 in parliament (lower house if bicameral legislature) and have held power for at least 10 years. The cohesion of the opposition is classified by applying Laakso–Taagepera’s (1979) fragmentation index63 to the share of opposition votes. This index has been used by multiple studies in determining the ‘effective number of parties’ in a legislature or candidates in an election (Schedler, 2013; Bogaards, 2004). Overall, systems which have a fragmentation score of under 2 are considered dominant party systems, while those with a score of over 2 are considered two-party or multiparty and thus indicative of a divided opposition (Bogaards, 2004). The resulting data covers 55 elections in 17 countries. Over two-thirds of the countries included in the data have elections that fit into more than one category, demonstrating that the political environment varies across with time as well as space. A list of the elections included in the data and their position within the classification scheme is out in table 6.3.
62 This is typically the amount of seats needed for a constitutional majority (Schedler, 2013).
63 1/ ∑ 𝑠𝑖2 where si is the vote/seat share of the ith candidate/party, depending on whether the election is
legislative or presidential. In the case of concurrent presidential and legislative elections, the mean of opposition presidential and legislative fragmentation is used.
Table 6.3 – Classification of Elections configurations lead to different patterns in post-election reshuffles. The significance of observed patterns will then be tested by using a K-Nearest Neighbour algorithm, which will assess the degree to which post-electoral cabinet changes can predict the regime-opposition configurations outlined in table 6.3.