The Japanese decision-making process regarding the Jews was, therefore, influenced by various, often contradictory, factors. Some officials main-tained vague stereotypical ideas regarding the political and financial clout of the Jews and the influence they wielded on the governments in those countries where many of them lived. There were also other, more sober
and pragmatic considerations. Clearly Japan’s relations with Nazi Germany carried weight, although it is hard to evaluate the dimensions and influence of this factor. There were in Japan some serious doubts about the racial policy of the Nazis, mainly because it relegated the Japanese and Chinese to an inferior position as a “Yellow” race. But a number of thinkers in Japan sought to ignore this slur and focus on other issues, among them the Jewish threat.
We have noted that in the 1930’s there had already been a flowering of antisemitic literature and populist ideas that portrayed the Jews in a highly negative light. Various societies and associations active at the time played a role in spreading antisemitic ideas. The International Political-Economic Society, established in 1934, aimed at carrying out research on the “Jewish Question” and published a newsletter called The International Secret Force.
In 1941 they began to issue a monthly publication named Jewish Studies that contributed its share to creating a hostile atmosphere against Jews.
However, Jews were never seen as an element that endangered Japan’s very existence, traditions, and values. The populist anti-foreign concepts focused mainly on the hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens believed to desire to harm Japan’s interests on the Asian continent and to be aiming to undermine Japan’s efforts to attain a leading role there. Even the attempt to link the Jews with America, a country that was gradually emerging as Japan’s leading enemy, did not take hold in the minds of most Japanese people, who had never seen a Jew in their lives.
Similar to what often happens in countries whose regimes see the need to channel social unrest toward the “enemy of the nation,” thus strengthen-ing their holds on the people, in Japan, too, populist ideas were a mixture of lies and half-truths aimed at convincing the masses through the use of incitement, hatred, and irrational motives. The regime sought to assure the people that it was looking after their welfare and keepimg them safe from terrorist and subversive elements. Antisemitic mottoes, influenced partly by Nazi ideology, had a certain role in the populist-propaganda tapestry, but not a major role. The effectiveness of antisemitism in Japan in this connection was basically marginal and minor.4
At that time, there were a number of governmental organs that dealt with the Jewish issue, among them the foreign ministry, whose consular officers issued the required entry or transit visas; the home (interior) min-istry, whose officials were in charge of admitting foreigners to Japan and issuing them with landing and residence permits; the finance ministry, some of whose heads still toyed with the idea that they would be able to
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Passpor ts, Entr y Visas, and Transit Visas
mobilize Jewish capital to be invested in Manchuria; the Imperial Army and Navy, whose officers were the de facto rulers of the Japanese-occupied areas in China and later in South East Asia; and the Japanese authori-ties in Manchuria, which was the first stop in Asia for many Jewish refu-gees. Finally, the Japanese government decided that the principles of the policy toward the Jews would be formulated and adopted by a small body consisting of five ministers that met in Tokyo on December 6, 1938. The significance of the issue was seen by the fact that the most important min-isters in the imperial government of Japan participated. These were Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro; Army Minister General Itagaki Seishiro; Navy Minister Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa (1880-1948); Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro; and Finance Minister Ikeda Shigeaki (1867-1950). They were charged with adopting a clear-cut and precise policy and formulating instructions to be sent to the relevant Japanese officials in Europe dealing with requests for visas.
In the discussion, it was clear that a number of approaches to the prob-lem existed, some of them contradictory. One concept was expressed by Foreign Minister Arita, who argued that Japan must do everything within its power not to harm the country’s close relations with Nazi Germany in any way, and called for limiting considerably the number of Jews who would be admitted to Japan and the areas under its control. The opposite view was expressed by Finance Minister Ikeda and Army Minister Itagaki.
They claimed that hurting the Jews could have a negative effect on Japan’s relations with the United States, because American Jews controlled the economy and media. The Jewish experts, who also took part in the meet-ing, stressed the vast Jewish influence on President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) and his administration, and the ensuing need not to harm the Jews, even if it annoyed the Germans. Once again the irrefutable idea that Jews controlled America was in evidence at the highest level of Japan’s decision-making process.
Finally, as often occurs in Japan, a compromise proposal containing some ideas of both schools of thought was adopted by consensus. In prin-ciple, it was decided that although Japan’s close ties with Germany and Italy did not allow her to demonstrate a sympathetic and positive attitude toward Jews, Japan would not treat the Jews the way those two countries did: it would not institute policies that discriminated against Jews. On the contrary, the treatment to be accorded to Jews already living in Japan, Manchukuo, and the occupied areas of China, would not differ from the treatment of other foreigners, and there would be no special effort to expel
them. As for Jews wishing to enter Japan, Manchukuo, and Japan’s occu-pied areas in China for the purposes of residence or transit to other coun-tries, Japan’s attitude toward them would be determined according to the prevailing Japanese immigration laws. Japan would make no special effort to attract Jews to the areas under its control apart from refugees termed
“attractive”—businessmen and professionals whose contribution to Japan’s economy could be useful. It is interesting to note that at no time was the possibility of settling Jews in Taiwan or Korea (Chosen) even mentioned, let alone discussed in detail. As a rule, foreigners were banned from these two Japanese colonies.
Upon the adoption of this proposal, the Japanese foreign ministry dispatched instructions to all its diplomatic and consular representatives regarding the spirit of the Five Minister Committee decisions. The for-eign ministry instructed its consular officers to issue Jewish refugees entry visas to Japan only in special cases, which were not specified. Transit visas would be issued only to those holding a valid entry visa to a third coun-try to which they were proceeding via Japan. Jews would not be granted residence visas to Japan, but the issuing of transit visas was permitted in the situation specified. This arrangement proved to be highly beneficial in saving the lives of thousands of Jews. After the outbreak of World War II in Europe in September 1939, and the signing of the Axis Alliance in September 1940, Japanese consular officials in Berlin, Prague, and Vienna continued to issue transit visas to Japan, thus saving numerous Jews from almost certain extermination by the Nazis. Over two thousand, two hun-dred such visas were issued in the summer of 1940 by the Japanese consul general in Kaunas, Lithuania, whose name was Sugihara Chiune. His story will be discussed in Chapter 10.
Chapter 8